Trung Luan

Mulamadhyamakakarika

of

Nagarjuna

THE PHILOSOPHYOF THE MIDDLE WAY

lntroduction, Sanskrit Text, English

Translation and Annotation

DAVID]. KA.LUPAHANA

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, PUBLISHERS

PRNATE LIMITED e DELHIFirst Indian Edition: Delhi, 1991

ReprinL·· Delh~ 1996, 1999

C 1986 State UnivcrsiLy of New York,

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Library of C!'ngress Cataloging-ln-Publication Data

Nagarjuna, 2nd cent.

Mufamadhyamakakarika : the philosophy of the middle way

Translation of : Madhyamakakarika

lncludes bibliographical refercnces and index

L Madhyamika (Buddhism)-Early works to 1800

1. Kalupahana, David J., 1933- II. tilłe

m. Lille: Philosophy of the middle way

BQ2792.E5K35 1986 294-.3'85 85-14757

PRINTED IN INDIA

BYJAINENDRA PRAKASH JĄIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS.

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AND PUBLISRED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLlSHERS PRIVATE UMTTED,

BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI I IO 007To Profcssor N . A. Jayawickrcma

(yo) 11c11n'yo 'hosi mam' atthak.amo U5.~0)PREFACE

Almost teo years ago, I undertook a new transłation of Candrak.Irti's encydopaedic work the Pt4S(lnnapadi, a commentary on Nagarjuna's

primary philosophkal treatise, the Mu/41114dhyamak4kirikii. Meer 1 bad

completed nearJy ten cbapters, 1'learoed through one of my scudents about

a similar ·attcmpt by Professor Marvin Sprung. I was about to give up my

· project, when my student, who -had prćviously srudied under Professor

Sprung, shared wltb me a copy of Ptofessor Sprung's ttanslatioo of the fitst

cbapter. Comparing his and my translations, I discovered that Professor

Sprung's translation was to some cxtent influenced by Stcherbatsky's wotk

(The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1927). I fełt then that my effon

would not be in vain, cspecially because l had expressed strong disagreement with Stcherbatsky's interptctation of the Buddhist philosophical tradicion (5ce my C4usality, The Cen/rai Philoióphy ofB11ddhism. 191)).

To my surprise1 Professor Sprung's ttanslation) consiting of only seventeen chaptcrs (induding an incomplcte rendering of Chapter I), appeated in

1979. As I plodded along through my own labocious work, I began to

reałize how CandrakTtti was gradually leading me away from Nag~juna's

phllosophical standpoint. My suspicioos wece sucngthcned in 1981 when I

visited Jndla oo a Smithsonian gtant. Meeting with some scholai:s who were

brought up in the Vedantic uadition, I found them to be extremcły comfon-

·able witll]'rągarjuna as intetpreted by Candrak.Trti and less impressed by the

tcachings -of early Buddhlsm as recorded in the Nikayas and the Agamas.

My suspkion tbat Nigarjuna and Candrakirti were ~pholding two differeot

philosophical standpoints compeUed me to take a fresh look at

Kumarajrva's Chung-lun, which is at least two ccncurics prior to Candrak.Ttti. Translating the entire Chung-lun into English an.d compating it

witb Nagarjuna's origioal Sanskrit text, I was pleasaotly surprized by their

similaries:. I found no justiflcation whatsoever in l~oking at Nagarjuna

through Candrakttti's eyes when there was a more faithful and doser disciple of Nagarjuna in Kumarajrva. This discovery diminished my enthusiasm

for deaning up my English ,:endeting of the Fraran1111p11dii for possible

publication.

Mter translating botb the Sanskric and the Chinese versions of Nigirjuna's tteatise, 1 proceeded to annotate both according to my understan.ding

,of carly Buddhism as well as later Buddhist ttiditions before Nagirjuna.

The annotation of the Sanskrit teiµ alone turned out to be moce extcnsiveviii THE PH!LOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W/\Y

than anticipated. FU.Cthermore, considcdng the di.fficulties that might arise

in publishing this work with Sanskrit and Chioese. texts side by side, and

also with the Chinese characters in the body of the annotation, 1 decided

once again to modify my project. The Sanskrit text is h~re presented with

annotation and inttoduction. The Chinese text with commentary wiH appear subsequently as a companion volume.

I am not unaware of the controversy this work may engender. Hoping

that it will be a healthy one, I intend to raise one mąjor questioo regarding

Nagarjtina-, especially in the light of the more recent research in the bistory

of Bµdclhism. Professor Hajime Nakamura's monumental work, Indian

Buddhis111. (1980). has provided more information regarding the bistory of

Buddhist literature thań any other work published so far. This carefully executed work not only deals with the cootents and authorship as well as the

chronology of most of the Buddhist texts, but also compares the different

versions available in Sanskrit, Paii, Chinese, Tibetan, and Japanese. After a

careful reading of this work, l canoor help recognizing an earlier stratum of

łiterature that has so far been lumped together with all the literature that

carne to be called Mahayanistic. This indudes two famous pieces, the

Kaśyapaparivarta and the Vajracchedikii-prajnapiiramit?i (see Nakamura.

p. 159). I wondec whether the original versions of these t~ts can be approriately called Mahayanistic, even though they were preserved by the

Mahiiyiina schoołs. This objection, indeed, is not very difficult from that

raised against considering the Nikayas and Agamas to be Hlnayiinistic because

they were preserved by the Theravadins, the Sarvastivadins, or any other later

uadition.

The major question that can be raised is: "Where would a philosopher like

Nagarjuna go in order to discover the Buddha's teachings?'' This historical

ąuescioo bas, to my koowledge, neither been raised nor aoswered. The

Sadriharmapu„t/anka-sutra that highlights the Hlnayana-Mahayana controversy was not yet written. That does not meao that the controversy was oot

known before Nagarjuna. Eveo if che controversy bad preceded Nagarjuna,

what were the canonical tcns, embodying the pure Mahayana phiłosophical

standpoint, that Nagarjuna could have utilized in order to explain the

Buddha's message?

A careful reading of Nakamura's work shows it to be futile co attempc to

discover a pure Mahayana text that Nagarjuna might have been able to depend

upon. Before che compilation of the Saddharmapu??-(ianka, ope can bardly

expect to find a carefuJly executed tceatise chat would explicate the Mahayana

philosophy as it is presented by modern scholars. Since such sohistićated

Mahayana sutras wece not available to Niigarjuna, he could not help moving

on to the early discourses in the Nikayas and the Agamas in search of the Bud-PREFACE ix

dha's teachings, especially at a time when he realized that che probJems were

crcated not only by metaphysicians like the Sarvastivadins and the

Sautrantikas>, but also by morc popular religious ceachcrs like Aśvaghosa, who

over--emphasised the function of "faith" in the emerging bdief in a traosccndeoc Buddha. A careful rcading of Nagarjuna's rceatise will reveaJ that he

was.critical of both these trends. If Buddhagbosa wcre to be coosidered the

model of a Thcravadin and Candrakfrti or Santideva were to be looked upon as

ideał MahayanistS, oeither the Buddha, nor Moggaupotta-tissa, nor Nigarjuna

would fit into thcir shoes. ·

The prcsent worlc may come as a surprise to many who arc familiar with my

prcvious publications, espccially bccause it repudiates many i:.hings chat I have

said about Nigarjuoa. Io those earlier works, my major eodeavot was to show

how the Buddhism of ·the Buddha diffcred from both Sthaviravada and

Mabayana, and the Jatter ioduded philosophers like Nagacjuna. My main contention with scholars Jike Stcherbatsky and Murti has been in regard to the_

manner in which the for.mer equated Sarvastivada with early Buddhism and ·che

latter portrayed the Buddha as a half-hearted rnctaphysician incroduciog a

theory ofdcments char carne to be rejccted by Nagarjuna. I was preparcd co accept Murti's ioterpretation of Niigarjuna, white struggling to find ways in

which that interprl:tation could be justified without sacrificing the cmpiricism

of the Buddha. Amore detailed study of both Magarjuna and Candrak!rti has

convioced me that the former stili rcmains faithful to the Buddha, while the

lattec has moved more cowards a Vedantic inrerprctation, chercby initiating a

proces~ that culminated in the disappearance of Buddhjsm as a distinct..

ideology from the Indian scene a few cenruries later.ABBREVIATIONS

(Consult Kenneth Inada's Niigiirjuna, for-a ·detailed bibłiography on Nagarjuna and the Midhyamika school.)

A

AA

Ahh11t

AD

Adv

AK

Akb

'

Ch'ang

Chung

D

PIJ

DhsA

DhsT

It

Karika

Kp

Anguttara-nikiiya, cd. R. Morris and E. Hardy, 5 volumes, London:

PTS; 1885-1900.

Manorathapura1j'i, [Anguttara-a(fhtikathaj, cd. M. Walleser, London:

PTS, 1973.

AbhidhammatthavibhaWii-(ika. cd. D. Pannasara and P. Vimaładhamma, Columbo: Mahabodhi Press, 1933.

Abhidharmadipa, see At;lv.

Abhidharmatlipa wilh Vibh'iifiiprabhii11rt1i, ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna:

K. PJayaswal Research lnstirute, 1959.

Abhidharmako1a, sec Akb.

Abhidharmakośa- bha!a, ed. Pralhad Pradhao, Patna:·K. P.Jayaswal

Research Institute, 1967.

Ch'ang A-han Ching (Dirghiigama), te. Buddhay~as. Tairho No. .1.

Chung A-han Ching (Madhyamiigama), tr. Gautama Sarµghadeva

and Sarµgharalc$a, Tai.rho No.26.

Digha-flik41a, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpcnter, 3

volumes, London: PTS, 1890-1911.

Dhammappda, ed. V. Fausboll, London: Lu:zac, 1900.

Atthaiiilim , Dhamma.rangan'i'-atthtikath'ii, cd. E. Muller, London:

PTS, !897.

Abhidhammamula(ikii [Ttka oo Dhamma.rańganl-affhakathaj , ed.

D. Pannasara and P. Wimaladhamma, Colombo: Mahabodhi Press,

1938.

ltivuttaka, ed. E. Windish, London: PTS, 1889.

See MKV{P), MKV(JQ.

Kiiśyapapari1111rta of the RPtnakuta:-sufra, ed. A . Stael-Holstein,

Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926.xu

M

Mi/n

MKV(P)

PEW

PTS

s

Sdv

Sdmp

Sn

Taisho

Thag

Thig

Tsa

Tseng

Ud

VbhA

THE PHILOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE WAY

Katha11at1h11, cd. A. C. Taylor, 2 volu.mes, London: PTS,

1894-1897.

Majjhima-nikiiya, cd. V. Trenckncr and R. Chalmers, 3 volumcs,

London: PTS, 1887-1901.

Milindapaflho, cd. V. Trcnckner, London: PTS, 1962.

Mlidhyamik.avrtti(Mmihyamakakiin'Jias), cd. L. de la Vallćc Poussin,

Bibliotheca Buddhica 4, Sr. Petersburg: The Imperial Acadcmy of

Scicnccs, 1903-1913.

Madhyamakaśiistra of Niigiirjuna with the commentary; Prasannapt1'1ii by CandraRirti, cd. P. L. Va.idya, Darbhaoga: The Mithila

lnstiruce, 1960.

Philosophy East and West, cd. Eliot Deutsch, Honolulu: The

Univcrsity Press of Hawaii.

The Pali Text Society, London

Saf!Zulta-mlliiya, cd. L. Peer, 5 volumes, London: PTS, 1884-1904.

Sphu(iirth'iibhidhaimakofa-11:/iikhy'ii, cd. U. Wogihara, Tokyo: The

Pubłication Association of Abhidłwmakosavyakhya, 1932-1936 .

Saddharmapu'!<fe'ika-siilra, cd. H. Kern and B. Nanjio, St. Petersburg; The Imperial Acadcmy of Scieoces, 1912.

S11tfii-nipiita, cd. D. Anderson and H . Smith, London; PTS, 1913.

Tai.rho Shinshu Daizokyo, cd. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe,

Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Company, 1924-1934.

Thera-thefi-gathli, cd. H . Oldcnbcrg and R. Piśchel, London: PTS,

1883.

See Thag.

Tsa A-han Ching (Saf!Zyukfiigama), tr. Gur,iabhadra, Taisho No.99.

Tseng-i A-han Ching (Ekottaragama), tr. Gautama Saątghadcva,

Tai.rho No. 125.

Udiina, cd. P. Steinthal, London: PTS, 1948.

Sammoha11inodanl, Vibhangatfhakatha, cd. A. P. Buddhadatta,

London: PTS, 1923.ABBREVIATIONS xiii

Vin Vinay4 Pi{ala, cd. H. Oldcnbcrg, 5 volumcs, London: PTS,

1879·1883.

Vism The Vi.s11ddh1~magga ofB11ddhaghosa, cd. C. .A. F. Rhys Davids,

London: PTS, 1975.CONTENTS

Preface vtt

Abbreviations xi

lNTRODUCTION

The Middle Path 1

Nagarjuna: The Myth 2

Nagarjuna: The Philosopher and Grand Commentator 5

Nagarjuna and.Kumarajiva 8

Nagarjuna·'s Buddha 9

Analysis of the Kaccayanagotta-Sutta 11

Buddha's Conception of Language and Truth 16

Period of the Śravakas 20

Moggaliputtatissa: The First Refotmer 23

Early Mahayana: The Second Reform Movement 24

Strućture of the Kii:rikii. 26

Analysis of the Karikii 31

Nagarujuna·'s Philosophical Enterprise 81

SANSKRIT TEXT, TRANSLATION AND ANNOTATION 99

Dedicatory Verses 101

CłiAPTER

1. Examination of Conditions (Pratyayaparik$ii) 105

2. Examination of the Moved

and the Not-moved (Gatiigata-paif/fJii) 118

3. Examination of the Faculty of Eye .

(Cakfur-indriya-pafi~ii) 132

4. Examination of Aggregates (Skandha-paiilfJa) 140

5. The Examination of Elements. (Dhiitu-parilfJa) 147

6. The Examination of Lust and the Lustful

(Riiga-rakttJr-pari~a)' 153

7. The Examination of the Conditioned

(Sarp.skrta-parilfJii) 159

8. Examination of Action and the Agent

(Karma-karaka-pari~a) 180xvi THE PmtosOPHY OF THE MrootE WAv

9. Examination of the Pńor Entity (PUrva-pari/eya) 188

10. Examination of Fire and Fuel (Agnzndhana-pari/eyii) 195

11. Examination of the Prior and Posteńor

Extremities (PUrvaparakoP,-paril~ii,) 206

12. Exatnination of Suffering (Duł_ikha-parileyii) 211

13. Ęxamination of Action and the Agent

(Sarriskara-parik.$a) 217

14. Examination of Association. (Sarrisarga-pariieyii) 224

15. Examination of Self-nature (Svabhiiva-pari~a) 2.28

16. Examination of Bondage and Release

(Bandhana-mo~a-parzl~a) 235

17. Examination of the Fruit of Action

(Karma-phala-pari~a) 243

18. Exarnination of Self (Atma-pari~ar 263

19. Examination of Time (Kala-pari~ii) 275

20. Examination of Harmony (Sii:magri-pań/eya) 280

21. Examination of Occurrence and Dissolution

(Sa1!llihava-vibhava-paril~ii) 292

22. Examination of the Tathiigata (Tathagata-pa~ii) 302

23. .Exrunination of Perversions (Viparyasa-pań~a) 312

24. Examination of th.e Noble Truths (Arya-satya-pari~ii) 326

25. Examination of. Freedom (Nirva?J.a-pan~ii) 355

26. Examination of the Twelve -Causal Factors

(D~iidasańga-pali~ii) 370

27. Examination of Views (D~ti-pa1i~ii) 377

INDEX TO THE .KARI.KA 393

Nominał Forms 393

Verbal Forms 402

General Index 406INTRODUCTION____THE MIDDLE PATił

Myths of huge proportions have developed around the spiriruał and

philosophicaJ stature of various personaJities in aJmost evecy scbool of Buddhism. Often these myths were inflated by sectarian rivałrics tha~ continued to

plague the bistory of Buddhism , especially che rivałry between the two major

schools, Theravada and 1.iahayaoa. These prejudices tended to polarize che

phiłosophicaJ teachings of these two traditions chough. in face, they are similar

if oot idencicaJ. They are simiłar in bcing faithful to the basie teachings of che

Buddha; they are ałso comparable in the way in which chey rejected certain

metaphysical ideas that concinued to creep into the teachings.

The two aspeccs of the Buddha's teachings, the phiJosophica ł and the practicaJ, which arc muruaUy dependent, are clearly enunciated io ewo discourses·,

the Kaccaya11agolla-1utta1 and the Dhamm111:akkappa11attana-sutta,2 both of

which arc heJd in high esteem by almosc all the schoołs of Buddhlsm in spite of

theiI secrarian rivalries. The Kaccayanagotlll-Jutla, quoced by almost all the

major schools of Buddhism, deals with the philosophicaJ "middle path". płaced

against che backdrop of two absolutistic cheories in Indian phiłosophy, o:imely,

permanent exiscence (atthifii) propounded in the early Upant{ads and nihiłistic

non-existence (na11hitfi) suggcsted by the Materialists. The middle position is

'exp łained as "dependent arising" (paficcasamuppada) which , when utilizcd to

explain the nature of the human pcisonalicy and the world of experience, appears in a formula consisting of twclvc factors (d11adaianga). The practicaJ middle pach is enunciated in the equally famous Dhammacakkappavattana-sulta,

respected by most Buddhists as the first sermon delivered by che Bud~ha . Herc

the middle path is becween the ewo extreflłCS of self-indulgence

(ka·maiuk.hallikanuyoga) and self-mortificarion (attak.ilamathanyoga) and consists of tbe noble eightfold pach (an'yo a!{hangiko maggo) leading to freedom

and happiness.

Throughouc che hiscory of Buddhism, Buddhists have endeavored to remain

faithful to the doctrines enunciated in 'chese two discourses, in spite of unforcunate divisions into Theravada and Mahayana and in the face of enormous

pressures. either from inside or from outside, either social or political, chat forced

them occasionaJly to deviated from the original message. For example, in the

sphere of philosophical specułations, one of the sects belonging to the so-called

Sthaviravada, namely, Sarvastivada, prescoted a theory of "sdf-narure" or

"substance" (svabhava) and some of the Mahayaniscs.admitted a conception of

" inherent thought of enlightenment" (bodhi-cilta), both of which, as .may be

indicated in tbe following d iscussions, are theories contrary to the fundamencal ·

12 TuE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

philosophical tenet of the Buddha, namely, "dependent arising" (paficcasamuppida).

The practicał middle path as enunciated in the famous Dhamffl(lcakkappavattana-sutta, which is complementary to or based upon the

philosophical middle path referrcd to above, was mote susceptible to varia·

tions. The analysis of the wide variety of religous practices th;n emerged in the

two ttaditions, Theravada and Mahayana, which appear to be contrary to the

middle pach enunciated in the above discourse may require aseparate volume.

The present treatmenr will therefore be confined to the philosophical middle

path and its ~urvival, in spite of the heretical interpretations tbat occasionally

appeared in the Buddhist tradition. The survival of that middle position in

philosophy can be atttibuted to reformers lilce Moggaliputta-tissa (litde known

among the Western scholars of Buddhism, in spite of the important role he

played in the Buddhist council held during the re.ign of the Emperor Asoka of

Jndia) and Nagarjuna. Such personałitics bave emerged from time to time and

·they have been responsible fot the continuacion of the Buddha's message. The

activities of such reformets have eitber been igoored, as in the case of

Moggaliputta·tissa, or exaggerated, as in the case of Nigarjuna.

The present essay is not intended as an attempt to bighlight the conuibutions of the less ~nowo figures- like Moggalrputta-tissa. whose famous

treatise, "The Points of Conuoversy" (Kathii.vatthu),3 awaits a ca.refu! and sympathetic treatqient by Buddhologists. On the contrary, this will be an attempt

to put into perspective the pbilosopbical and spiritual stature of Nagarjuna,

wh1ch has been cxaggerated beyond limit.S, more by modern scholars chan by

the classical Buddhiscs.

NAGARJUNA: THE MYTH

Nigarguna has been considered the second Buddha and has occupied a second position in the line of patriarchs in almost all schools of Mahayana Buddhism, primarily because the adherents of these schools refused to recognize

the spiritual status of thousands of Buddha's immediate disciples who, according to the Buddha's owo recognition, had attained the same knowledge alld

understanding (fiii'!-t1-dassana) as well as the morał and spiritual perfection attaioed by the Buddha. While the intellectuał and spidtual attainments of the

immediate disciples are clearły portrayed in (excs like the Theragatha and the

Thengatha, no such info..tmation is available to us about Nagarjuna's spirirual

attainments exccpt the account of his conversion to . Buddhism and. hislNTRODUCTION

scholastic activhies refecred to in a biogcaphkal account uanslated into Chinese

by KumarajTva.4 Nagarjuna's stature as the second Buddha derives, therefore,

from his basie writings, which are generally looked upon as philosophicaJ 1nterpretations of the Mahayina suttas.

3

Kenneth lnada, who presented one of the most sympathetic analyses of

Nagarjuna's thought, has admitted that the veneration of Nagarjuna "at times

reached such ridiculous heights that his name was sanctified and stamped

everywhete with recldess abandon even for purposes of frauding scriprural

a.uthority."> He was probably referring to the attempt on the part of some of

the later Tantric writers to seek authority and sanctity for their ideas, which

were undoubtedly influenced by some later Indian religious practices. Even if

one were to ignore such excesses, it is possible to maintain that the exalted

position accorded to Nagarjuna yet reflects an uncritical and dogmatic attitude

of some of the later Buddhists toward the spi.rirual ideii.I of early Buddhism.

Such an attitude is reflected ·not only in some of the Mahiyana texts butalso in·

some of the Theravada commentaries. For example, in the later Theravada

commentarial liceratu.re, an exalted status is accorded to the Abhidhamma in

relation to the discourses, so much so that the Buddha had to ascend to the

world of deities (devaloka) and ps:each the Abh.idhamma to his "mothe.t''. who

was residing there. 6 Such an admission, though intended to provide authoriry

and santtity to a body of literature that emerged long after the passing away of

the Buddha, undoubtedly carried the implication that the Buddha's immediate

disciples were not capable of undersranding its contenrs. However, even

though such an irnplication was there, the Theravadins did not daborate this

story in such a way that it' would lead to the devaluation of the ear:ly ideał of-.ui

arahant. Yet, when a similar need was felt by the Mahayanists ro provide

authotiry aod sanctity to somc of the latcr Mahayina textS such as the Ptajfiiiparamifii sutras, which were obviously later than the Abhidharma treatises,

they were not satisfied with merdy saying }hat they were "great dis_:ourses"

(11Pt'p11/ya-iiitra) 1 grearer than those included in the Nikayas and the Agarnas.

They, in fact, proceeded to condemn the very ideał ofan arahant embodied in

those discourses and to criticize the spititual attainments of the early discipJes

of the Buddha.

In this particular movement, the Saddhartnapuf'!r/affka-s11tra leads the

fiełd.7 The motivation or even the finał goal of this roóvement may have been

very noble. It was, in fact, one of the earliest atrempts ro unify all the conflicting ideas and ideals that were creating enotmous tifts among the Buddhist

community. Yer, the manner in which such unification was carried out led co

increasing conflicts rather than to their reconciliation or appeasement.

Even a superficiaJ glance at the rustory of Buddhism wouJd reveal the existence of"mooks'' (bhikfu) who deviated from the ideał and who falsely claim-4 THE PHILOSOPHY 01' THE MIDDLE WA Y

c:d spirituaJ attainments white leading a form of life infetior to that of ordinary

lay people. Such monks were reported even from the time of the Buddha. The

Vinaya-pifaka8 as well as the Kif.Jyapararivarta9 generate no sympathy for such

miscreant monks, the latter branding them as a pack of dogs fighting cach

other for a morsel of food thrown at them.

Such sdfish and dishonorable behavior on th(' part of certain monks may

hąve been counter productive. Self-sacrifice and absolute altruism could

emerg~ as noble ideaJs in sucha context. However, such actions and reactions

need not be a reason for condemning even the immediate disciples of the Buddha, l!·rahanlr like Sariputta, Moggallana, and Kassapa, as people of "low

aspirations" (liin'iibhirafii), 10 and forcing them to discłaim thc:ir attainmc:ncs in

order to accept a new ideał, an idea] certainJy contrary to the "middk path"

enunciated by the Buddha in his very first discourse to the world. It is by

folłowing a "middle path" avoidiog the rwo extremes of self.induJgence and

self-destruction that the discipłes of the Buddha attained the state of freedom

called "the appeasement ofdispositions" (sańkhara-samatha) and continued to

work for the welfate and happiness of mankind. Very ·authentic records

avaitabłe in the Thera- and Then-g'iithas bear ample testimony to the ideał of

the ~arly discipłes, and it is also an idea! recognized' by Nagarjuna, the champion of the ''middle way" (XVII.1).

While ~he Theravad~ns elevated the Abhidhamma to an exalted position

without devaluing the ideas emhodied in the carty discourses, the S11ddhar~

mapu„(llnka appears to have gone much funher in dealing with this eotire

Buddhist phiJosophical and religious tradition beginning with the Buddha

himself. It is responsible not only for condemning the early disciples, but aJso

for down-playing the value of the carty discours.es. The discoutses included in

the Nikayas and the·Agamas were considered to be inferior in content. The

argument presented is that because the immediate disciples could not understand the deeper doctrioe the.Buddha had to preach an jnfecior and unsatisfattory doctrine to .suit their incełlectual capacity. Such a statemeot, however, has

a hidden implication, nan1ely, that the Buddha lacked the capacity to teach the

deepcr doctrines in a way that would be intelligible to the people who were in

his presence. -In the Mahayana traditioo, the stage was thus made ready for a

philosopher li.kc Nagarjuna, who is supposed to have best expouoded the doctrine, to be ełevated to the level of a second Buddha, nay, even to the starus of

a supreme Buddha more exalted chan Slikyamuoi. Thus1 it is not surprizing to

find some modern commentators prodaiming the view that the locus bud that

appeated in the world with che binh of the Buddha grew up and blossomed

forth with the appearance of Nagatjuna. In fact, a scholar like T. R. V. Murti

has maiotained that che Buddha even suggested a "theory of elements'' (dharma), which carne to be be rejected by Nagarjuna when the latter presented hislNTI\ODUCTION

cheory of "emptiness" (fiinyalii). 11 This uodoubtedly places Nagarjuna in a

more exalted position than that occupied by the Buddha. Mosc dassical and

some modern scholars have thus creaced an atmosphere where the incerpreta·

don of Nagarjuna's philosophy wiłJ ha_ve to assume a historical development

and unfolding of doccrines that wece merely suggested, not taught, by the

historical Buddha. Some writers on Buddhism, intoxicated by this conception

of the evolution of thought, havc shown rełuccance to recognize che sophistication with which philosophical ideas were preseoted by the Buddha 2500 years

ago. Having miserably failed to perceive the philosophical ingenuicy of the

Buddha as reflected in the Nilcayas and che Agamas, as well as the subsequent

degeneration of that system in the !acer commenrarial tradition, followed by a

revival of the earlicr system by philosophers like Moggaliputta-cissa and Nagarjuna, these writecs arc insisting upon a graduał sophistication in Buddhist

thought comparable to what one can find in the Western philosophical trad!·

tion. 12

N AGARJUNA: THE PHCLOSOPHER AND GRAND COMMENTATOR

In the followiog pages, an anempt will be made to present Nagarjuna merely

as a grand commentator on che Buddha-word and to show that he did not try to

improve upon the ceachings of the: Buddha. His work will be: c:xplaincd as an at·

tempc co destroy che weeds thac had grown around che Buddha's teachings as a

resulc of some of the ideas expressed by philosophers of both che Schaviravada

and che Mahayaoa tradicions. Ir will be showo that tne Mii/a-madhyamakakarika (hereafter abbreviated as Kiin'ka) is a superb commentary oo the Buddha's owo KacciiyanagoJta-sulla, a commentary in which Nagarjuna upholds

cvery statemenr made by the Buddha in that discourse, bringing together more

materiał from the ocher discourses as well, and chen clearing the watce muddied

by the speculations of some of che meraphysicians of the later Buddhist ttad ition. The continuation of certain seccarian prejudices among che faich.ful

adherencs of Theravada and Mahliylioa may be understandable. Critical

scholarship. on the contrary, has a responsibility co remain unsmeared by such

sectarian prejudices. Modern scholarship in Buddhism, which began with th('

recogoition of this sectariao· rivalry as represencing a major split in Buddhist

philosophical and religious ideology. has come a long way in asserting ics

u n cenabiłity. Howcver, scholars are now beginning to realize chat che

Theravada/ Mahayaoa discinccion is an cxaggeration and that the fuodamencal·

reaching of the Buddha has remaiaed int~t throughouc the cenruries. Now it is6 THE PH!LOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE WAY

time to exorcize the terms Theravada and Mahayana from our vocabulary. A

major obstacle co the elimination of this distinction is the manner in which

Nagarjuna's phiłosophy has come to be expoundcd by a majority of modern

scholars. The presenc cranslation of Nigarjuna's Kiinka and commentary upon

cach of che vcrscs therein are inteoded as a correctivc to this intcrprctation.

A carcful study of the docuines in che cxteosivc corpus of Buddhis~ literature

indicates ve.cy dcarly how certain fundamental idcas have survived, in spite of

the occasional appearance of concepts chat conflict with the basie teachings of

che Buddha and thus produce controversies among the Buddhist thinkers.

Without undertaking a careful study of such insta.nces, scholars have rather uncriticaUy lumped together the early discourses of the Buddha and the summaries of their conten ts chat came to be preserved in the so-caJled Abhidharma,

togcther with all d1e interpret.ive cexts compiled by some of the later commentators, either in the form of vibhiif'ii or a!(hakatha, and criticized trus whole

corpus as being representacive of Theravada or Hrnayana. The same is clone

with some of the Mahayana discourses (sutra) and the treatises (fastra). The

contents of d1e discourses as well as of the Abhidharma literature arc examincd

only in the light of such commentarial explanations and not independent of

them. Modern scholarship has thus failed to extricate itselffrom commenta.riaJ

traditions. There seems to be oo justification for coosidering the discourses and

even the eady Abhidharma literature as sectarian works of the so-called

Thecavada. Theravada or Sthaviravada in generał , and Sarvastivada and

Saucrantika in panicular, may be considered sectarian, but their sectarian views

arc found not in the discourses and the Abhidharma but in the commeotarics

tbat carne to be compiłed on these two bodies ofliteracure. The elevation of the

Abhidharma to the level of a supreme body of literature, moce exalted chan the

discourscs, is the work of these later commentators and not of the compiłets of

chose Abhidharma texts. The Mahayanists themselves, bothered by the

substantialist thought of the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika schools, endeavored

to prcserve the eady teachings by emphasizing the negative aspect of the Buddha's doccrioe, especially the doccrine of emptiness (fUnyalii). The

Kiifyapapari11arta as well as the early Pcajfiapararnita literarure represent tbis

reacrion co the substantialism of łatce Buddhism and t.h.is literacure shouJd be

dissociated from the sectarianism chat cmerged as a result of the arcempt at

unificacion in treatises like the Saddh11rmapu11tfonka.

An attcmpt will be made in the followiog pages to show that even somc of

the moce prominent philosophers of Mahayana wece really trying to overcome

such sectarian ioterpretations and go back to the non-sectarian form of Buddhism as embodied in the early discourses, without rcjecting either the

canonical Abhidharma texts that embody posicive teachings or the early

Mahayana su tras that emphasizcd the ocgative aspect of the Buddha's docrrine.[Nrn.OOUCTION

The present aoalysis will be confined co the v.:ork of Nigarjuna in India.

Once Nigarjuna's philosophy is critically and objectiveły analysed, h will be

possible to see whether there is any substance to the rivalry between the two

major philosophical traditions, Madhyamika and Yogacara. That projecc has

co be postponed to a later occasion.

A.K. Warder was one of the first to .taise the question whetber Niga.r:juna

was a Mahayanist.n His reason for raising chat question was that in the KJirika,

which undoubtedly was Nigarju.na's most significant work, no reference what·

soever is made to any one of the major discourses of the Mahayana tradition,

not even to the fatnous P.rajff?iparamita-sutra.r. Wa.rde.r believed that the

discourse in the Samyukta served as a source for Nigatjuna's treatise, even

though he did not specify them. The only discourse referred to by name is Kiityay11niiva11ada,14 a discourse found both in the Pali Nikayas1' and the Chioese

Agamas. 16 This single most important fact has often beeo ovetlooked by mos.t

of the leading scholars who have written about Nagatjuna.

Even where this fact has beeo ooted, scholars have assumed that Nagarjuna

was merely referriog to the Buddha's rejection of the two extremes of existence

(atthitii) and non-existence (natthita) in that discourse and that was all. So far,

no published work on Buddhism (available to the present author) has treated

the contcnts of the Buddba's cliscoucse to Kaccayana in detail before ptoceeding to analyse Nagarjuna's thought. Assuming that Nagarjuna was a

Mahayanist and, therefore, must have rejected any literature that carne to be

ptesctved by the Sthaviravadins, these scholars have proceeded to analyze the

Kiiriliii in the light of their own prejudiced understanding of Macłhyamika

philosophy. The ultimate .result is bafflement and coofusion. Not only are tbey

reluctant to accept certain positive statements ofNiigarjuna in the Kiirik.a, they

are also ready to abandon some of the most imponant chapters in that work

eithet as later interpolations- or as having no relevance to Nagarjuna's thesis.

7

To asswne that Nigarjuna was a philosophyet: who would merely pick out

from the Buddha's statements only those that would support ot fit in with his

own preconceived nocions is to do him g.reat injustice. lf he was rejecting a

theory ofelements suggested by the Buddha (as Murti seems to think). Nigarjuan, who was one of the most fearłess critics of metaphysical views, would have

certainly said so. Nor is the.te any evidence to support the hypothesis that the

"Admonition to Katyayana" (KJity1iyanava11tida) that Nagarjuna was·referring

to was a vetsion different from the. Kacciiyanagotta-sutta found in Pali and

Chinese. The Kiiśyapaparif!aflfl of the Ratnakuta contains two discoutses, both

ofwhkh were addressed to Kasyapa and which deal with the middle path. One

of them refcrs to the middle path and explains it in terms of the twelve factors

of the human personality (d11adasańga), 11 while the other explains the middle ·

path in negative terms as "non-ceasing, non-arising, etc."18 This latter version is8 THE PHllOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WAY

oot fouod in the Nikayas and the Agamas. Nagarjuoa was probably aware of

the existence of both these versions and he understood their implicatioos. His

Kiin"kti was an attempt to explaio the docuioe without rejectiog the contents of

any one of them. However, his refcreocc to Kacyayana, instead of Kaśyapa, is

extremely significant, in that be was conversaot with not onJy the contencs of

~e Ratnaku{a versions but also the version included in che Nikayas and che

Agamas. For this reason the analysis of Nagarjuna's philosophy as embodied in

the Kiirika will be undenaken with a view to locating the sources of those ideas

that arc accepted by him and those thar arc criticized and rejected by him.

lt is anticipaced that an analysis of the Kiin"k.a in relation to the "Discourse

to Katyayana" as well as ocher discourses iocluded in the Nikayas and the

Agamas will lead to a better understanding of the Buddha's philosophy

wichout exaggeracing the so-called Hlnayana-Mahayana discinctioo.

NAGA.ff.JUNA AND KUMARAJIVA

Recent scholarship in the bistory of Buddhisc thougbt has emphasized a

distioccion bctween Indian and Chinese forms of Buddhism. Indian Buddhism

is explained as an attempt to deal with causation throug!'i karma, white Sinitic

Mahayana is secn as advocatiog causation thcough dharma-dhatu.19 Early Bud·

dhism. according to che proponencs of this thesis, underwent a radical change

when it was introduced inro China. In order co deal with this question of transition, it would be necessary to provide a complete English translation of

Kumaraj"lva's rendition of Nagarjuna's Kiin"k'ii into Chinese. Richard Robinson

made the first systematk attempt to deal with this problem of transition. 20

However, that was done on the basis ofan inadequate examioation of the first

chapcer of Nagarjuoa and Kumaraj"lva. A carefu1 scruriny of Kumarajiva's

work has convinced me that the form of Buddhism introduced into China by

him was not at all differenr from chat of Nagarjuna. Thus, if my contention

tbat Nagarjuna's philosophy is a mere rescatement of the empiricist and

pragmacic philosophy of the Buddha, the form of Buddhism incroduced into

China would also be the same as the originał teachings of the Buddha wich oo

paradigm changes. Aod this may account for che survival of Buddhism aloog

side of the equally pragmatic philosophy of Confucianism, wbereas it failed to

survive in lndia in the face of a very strong idealistic tradition. The prevalent

view - chat Buddhism, because of its idealistic character, goc absorbed inco the

ideałistic tradition in lndia and failed co remain as a separate enti cy - needs1NTRODUCTION 9

careful scrutioy, especialły when a leading philosopher like Nagarjuna is not

seen to advocate such an idealistic view. This caHs for a detailed treatment of

the Yogacara tradition in Buddhism that has not yet been attempted.

NAGARJUNA'S BUDDHA

Nagarjuna's Buddha was no doubt Gautama (see KJirikii XXVIl.30), the

prince from che Sakyan coupcry (p(esently pan~ of Nepal) who attai.oed

enlightenment and rorned out to be the most formidable opponent of almost

every major philosophical idea that came to be presented by the lndians. In

fact, as will be explained below, the phiJosophical atmosphere was so confused

during the Buddha's day thac sometimes be was fo.cced ro coin new terms to ex-·

press his thoughts.

Two of the major philosopbical theories that dorńinated the Indian scene

during this time were (1) existence (sat, astitva), proposed and developed for

centuries by Indian chinkers since the time of the eady Vedas, and (2) nonexistence (a.sat, 11iiistit11a), presented by the Materialists reacting against the

craditional metaphysics. Existence or astitva was no ordinary empirical existeoce

but the existence ofa permanent and eternal substratum in man as well as in all

aspeccs of nature. In man. it was the immutable self(atman) that remained in

boodage to the impermanent psychophysical personałity and which returns to

its ultimate abode, the universal self(Atman), once it is freed from thar bondage and reaches its ultimate moral status (Brahman) . Attempting to eicplain

the origin of this reality in man as wełl as in oature, some of the craditional

philosophers setcled for a conception of a creator god. As it is, this may not

have generated much protest from tłte Buddha. However, the Indian

philosophers wece not satisfied with the simple aorion of a creator god. At a

very earły stage, they asserted chat this self(at1nan) was created by a god or gods

who dete.rmined that it beloogs to one or the other of the four·social classes: the

priestly (brtihmatJa), the warrior (k1atriya), che merchant (vaiśya), and the ser-

\rant (śiidra). 21 Thus, cach individual's :aarus was predetermined and unchangeable. It was this particular idea of creation that elicited rhe most vehement criticism both from the Materialists as well as from the Buddha.

Denying such a metaphysi<ial self, the Materialists moved to the other extreme of advocatiog the annihilatioo of the human personaliry aftec death, and

then ałso denied any mąral responsiblicy for human actions. Instead, they propounded a theocy of the indestructibilicy of matter.22JO THE PHILOSOPHY OFnlB MIDDLE WAY

Kaccayanagotta-Sutta

The Buddha's discourse to Kaccaya.na, a discourse wbose authority was

recognized by aJmost aH the major philosophica1 schools of BuddhJsm,

becomes mea.oingful only in the context of the philosophica.l views mentioned

abovc. Following is the complete text of the discour:se as reponed by Ananda:

Thus have I heard: The Blessed one was once living at Savatth.i,

in the monastery of Ana(hapiJ:l<;łika, in Jeta's Grove. At that time

the venerable Kaccayaoa of that dan carne to visit bim, and

saluting him, sat down at one side. So seatcd, he questioned che

ExaJted one: "Sir [people] spcak of 'right view, right view.' To what

cxtcnt is therc a right view?"

"This world, Kaccayaoa, is generally indined towards two

[views]: cxistencc and oon-cxisrencc.

To him who perceives with right wisdom the uprising of the world

as it has come to be, the ootioo of non-existence in the world does

not occw. Kaccaya.na, to him who perceives with right wisdom che

ceasing of the world as it has come to be, the ootioo of existeoce in

the world does not occur.

The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bouod by approach,

gra.sping and inclinacion. And he who docs not follow chat approach and grasping, that determinacion of mind, chat inclination

and disposition, who does not eling to or adhere to a view: 'This is

my self,' who chinks: 'suffedog chat is subject to arising ariscs; suffcring chat is subjcct to ceasing, ceases,' such a person does not

doubc, is not perplexed. Herein, his knowledge js not othcrdepeodenc. Thus far, ·Kaccayana, thcrc is 'right view.'

'Bverythiog exists,'- this, Kaccayana, is one excreme.

'Everything does not exisc,'- rhis, Kaccayana, is the second extreme.

Kaccayaoa, without approaching either extreme, the Tathagaca

teaches you a docrrine by the middle.

Dependent upon ignorancc arise dispositions; dependent upon

dispositions arise consciousness; dependent upon consciousncss

arises the psycbophysical personaJicy; dependent upon the

psychophysica.l persona.lity arise che six senscs; dependent upon the

six senses arises contact; dependent upon contact arises feeling;

dependent upon feeling arises craving; dependent upon· craving

arises grasping; dependent upon ,grasping arises becoming; det>endent upon becoming arises birth; dependent upon birch arise oJd

age and death, grief, Jameotation, suffering, dejection and dispair.

Thus arises this encire mass of suffering. However, from the utterlNTRODUCflON

fading away and ceasing of ignorancc, there is ceasing of disposi·

cioos; from the ceasing of disposition.s, there is ceasing of consciousness; from the ceasing ofconsciousness, there is ceasingof the psychophysical persooality; ftom the ccasiog of the psychophysical personality. therc is ceasing ofthe six seoses; from the ceasing ofthe si.x

senses, there is ceasingofcootact; from the ceasing ofcontact, there

is ceasing offeeling; from the ceasing offeeling, there is ceasing of

craving; from the ceasing of craving, there is ceasing of graSpiog;

from the ceasing of grasping, there is ceasiog of becomiog; from

the ceasing of becoming, there is ceasing of birth; ftom the ceasing

of birth, there is ceasing ofold age and death, gcief. łamencarion,

suffering, dejeccion and dispair. And thus tbere is the ceasing of

this entire mass of suffering."23

ANALYSIS OF 1HE KACCAYANAGOTIA-SUTIA

11

The discourse is delivered in response to a fundamentał question in

epistemology: "What is a right view (sammadirtht)?" the Brahma1tila-suttanliJ

rcfers to sixty-two varieties of views prevalent during the Buddha's day.i4 After

his enłightenment, the Buddha reałized that oone of these were sacisfactory.

He was not willing to subscribe to any one of them. For this reason, many

scholars of Buddhism have assumed that the Buddha did not have a view to

present. Forthem, he had oo sixty-third view co propouod. If that was the case,

the Buddha could have admonished Kaccayana not to be bothered by any view,

whether it was right or wrong, true or fałse. However. that was not the case.

The Budąha próceeds to enumerate tWO basieviews that are prevaleot in the

world. The sixcy„two views referred to in the Brahmajala-suttanta represent, in

one way or fillother. a proliferation of these two basie views of permanent existeo.ce (atthitii, Sk. astitva) and non-existence (n'atthilli, Sk niistitva). He chen

provides reasoos for rejecting both these 'Views. The reasons arc epistemołogical

and therefore deserve detaiłed examinatioo. "For him, who perceives with right

knowledge, the uprising of the world as it has come to be, whatever view that is

i.o the world about non-existence will not ·be acceptable."

The two terms of great epistemological significance that occur in the above

statement are (1) "perceives" (passatz) and (2) "right knowledge" (sammappa;Jfiii). There could be no mystery associared with the implications of the first

of these two terms. Pa.ssali or "perceives" refers to simple, ordinary sense

perception, for what is perceived is not something chat is mysrerious bu~ simply ·

the arisiog arid ceasing of various phenomena in the world. lt does not, at least12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

in th.is instance, refer to a special or unique form of insight not shared by the

ordinary people. What makes the difference is "r.ight knowledge" (sammappanfia, or simply panifii), and that difference is then explained in the next

paragraph.

The perceptions or sense experieoce of the ordinary person in the world are

geoerally "bouod by approach, grasping and inclination" (upaya-upadiinaabhinive.rt.i-vinibandha). They arc colored by one's prejudices, by one's likes

and dislikes. lf a person is able to avoid such approach, grasping-and inclinatioo, if he does not follow his dispositions, chen that person would not cake a

detecmined stand and say: "This is my [per.rnanent] self." He would perceive

phenomena in the world as arising and ceasing.

The perception ofarisiog and ceasing of phenomena conditioned by various

factors is availablc even to ordinary people who have not been able to completely

free themselves from prejudices. Thus, there is a common denon1inator ber;ween the perceptioos ofan ordinaryperson and those of the enlightened one.

However, the ordinary person continues to worry about a permanent and eteroal substance behind phenomena or about a supreme being who is the author

of all that happens in the world. He is assailed by doubtS about wbat he

perceives. One way of overcoming such doubts is to confine oheself to what is

given, chat is the causa! dependence ofphenomena, without rrying to look for

something mysterious. The Buddha realized that "Wheo phenomena (rlhamm'ii) appear befor<: the brahman who is ardenc and contemplative, his doubts

disappear, as he sees their causal natute."2>

According to the Kaccayanagotta-sutta, if a person does no_t make up his

mind that there is a permanentand eternal selfand continue to look for it, but,

instead, merely uńderstands things as they have come to be (yathabhUta'f(J), as

for example, understands suffering (dukkha) as something that arises depending upon conditions, then he does not fa11 into doubc. In other words, instead

of look.ing for mysterious causes one should start with whatever .caµses one can

discover that are cootributory to each siruation. Of course, in most cases. past

experiences arc a good index. Thus, in order to attain such knowledge one does

not have to go around looking for a teacher who would transmit that

knowledge in a secret session or in some mysterious way..His knowledge would,

in chat case, 'not be other-dependent (apara-paccaya fla1Jam ev 'as.ra etIha hott).

On the basis of such knowledge and experience, one is said to have "right

view" (samm'ii-diftht). "Right view'' in early Buddhism is cońt.rasted with

"wrong view" (mz~cha- rlitthz) . These ewo ace oot contrasted in the way truth

and falsehood are contrasted in the pre-Buddhist cradicion. In the latter case,

what is true is considered to be what exists (.rat). Whatever ex.ists, is real, and by

definition whatever is real caonot be othcrwise. According to this a pn'ori

definition, "truth" has to be something that exiscs dlway.r. Yet, what is given toJNTRODUCTION 13

the sense expedences is nor available always. Hence it was assumed that what is

true is something other than what is given to the sense experiences, and that re·

mains always (saisata) and in everything. lt is the ontological truth (atman) as

welJ as the mora.I truth (brahman) in evcrything.

As mentioned earlier, ::. theory of existence or a theory that says "everything

exists' (sahba1{1 pttht) is wrong, not becausc it can be proved to be false, but only

in the sense that it does not take into consideration the empii:ically gi'ven fact of

cessation (nirodha). Hence, it is characterized as "confusion" (musa, Sk. mrfii),

not as "non-existent" or "un-rruth" or "falsehood" (P-satya).

· Avoidance of the theory that ''everything exists" docs not, according to the

Buddha, make the opposite view, narody "everything does not exist" (sab6P1{1

n 'fJttht), any tnore true. The reason for this is that this latter theory implies

much more than a simple denial of a pcrmanent and eteroal substance in man

(atman) or in the universe (btahman). 1t implies complete discontinuii:y in.

phenomcna or their annihilation (uccheda), and this too is a wrong view, not

bec.ause, like the former, it can be proved to be false, but because it is partia! in

rhat som~ aspecrs of experience like arising (samudaya) cannot be accounted for

by such a view.

The Buddha did not worry about discovering strictly Jogical arguments to teject aoy one of these views. He merely avoided these two theories in his explanation of existence. Hence his statement: "Without approaching either excreme, the Tathagata teaches you the doctrine by the middle" (ete te ubho ante

anupagamma majjhena lathagalo dhammaf?I desett).

The Buddha dearly distinguished hjs philosophy from that of his contem·

porary, Saojaya Bella~~hiputta, who refused to make any pronouncemeots

through fear that he would be found fault with.26 It makes no sense to assume

that the Buddba, after criticizing the rwo exueme views, avoided propoundfr1g

any view.or observed complete silence. Such an assumption would undetmioe

the autheocidty ofalmostaU the docttines attr.ibuted to the Buddha and wouJd

stand in the way of appreciacing the greatness of this philosopher and spirirual

leader whose message clid not fade into oblivion, as .in the case of the skeptic

Sat1)aya Bella~~hiputta , but instead became a formidable world-view

throughout the last twenty-five ceoruries. For tbis reason, the finał concłusion

of the Kaccifyangotta-sutta can in no way be ignoted as a later interpolation by

the so-called Theravadtns.

In this fioal statement, the Buddha was attempting to expfain the human

personality as well as its cicpe·rien~es in the world in terms of the priociple of

dependence, without resorting to the two extreme views that be criticized

earlier. ln the first part of that explanation, he was describing the personality in

bondage, as it evolves conclicioned by "approacb, grasping and inclination." ·

This is the twclvefold formula (d11adasang11) presented in posicive terms,14 THE PHILOSOPHY OFTHE MIODLE W AY

describing the functions of ignotance, disposicions, and behavior prompted by

such disposicions in the maner of propeUing human beings into states of

uohappiness and suffecing as well as continued process of binhs and deatłlS.

The negative statement e.xplains how, as a resułt of the eliminacion of rhat igoorance and the dcvdopmeot of insighc, one comes co pacify one's dispositions

a·nd ~hereby eliminate su.ffer'ing as well as the continued cycle of births and

deaths. Such is the conclnsion of che Kacciiyanagotla-sutta.

The Ka&cayanagotta-sutla, though brief, lays down in no unclear terms the

basie teachings of the Buddha. Funher elaboration of this philo~ophy is

available in the huge collection of discourses of the Nilcayas and the Agamas.

Although denying ex:istence and non-existence conceived of in such a

mctapbysical manner, the Buddha recognized existence and non-ex:istence in a

more empirical sense, such existence and non-existeoce being understood in

terms of the experience of coosequences or effects (attha, Sk. artha). Thus,

white bcing aware of the metaphysical implications of the nominalized forms:

"exist-ence" (atthi-ta) and "non-exist-ence" (n' atthi-fii), the Buddha continued to u~e che verba! fo.rms "exists" (attht) and ''does not exist'' (n 'atthz) to

explain his view of existence.11

The existence of things as wdJ as their arising and P3:SSing away arc clearly expressed in the famous formula:

When that exiscs, this comes to be; oo the arising of chat, this

arises. Wheo chat does not ex:ist, this docs not come to be; on the

cessation of chat, this ceases (/masmi'f!J sati idaf!t hoti, imassa uppadii idaf!t uppa1j'ati. Jmasmif!t fi.fali idaf!t na hoti, imas.ra nirodha

idaf!l niru1j'hatt).2e

Yet the linguiscic conventions of his day did not provide che Buddha with

technicał terms to express this idea. The notion of self-causation (.raya1(l kala1{Z,

Sk. .r11aya1'(l krtaf!l) was prevalent i.n the rradition of his day, but unfortunately

it carried witb ie the implication of a mctaphysical self(atman), permancnt and

eteroal (sassata), which he wanted to avoid.29 The idea of external causation

(paraf'(l kataf'(l, Sk. para-krtatrJ) was not different from the Materialist view of

anoihilation, especially in its denial of morał responsibilicy,Jo A combinacion of

these rwo views was also not satisfactory, for the Buddha was probably aware of

the implications of the Jaina theory of causation chat atteropted to combine

both.H Under such circumstances, i.t was almost impossible for him to express

his understanding of existence. This may also have contributed to his initial

reluctance to exlain his ideas after this enlightenmenc. However, he was equal

co the task.lNTRODUCTION I)

An attempt to explain rhe manncr in which a phenomenon gives rise to or

produces aootber phenomenon, how a cause gives ri.se to an effect, would have

involved bim not only in the taSk of unravelling the essence or substance in a

cause rhat produces the effecr but ałso in the job of.predicting the effect ari.sing

from a cause with absolute cenainty, a job for which he did not have the

necessary empiricaJ mea.os. The Buddha decided to explain this process in terms

of "dependence." He was thus led to speak of an event that has occurred

(samuppanna) by uacing it back to a condition or set ofconditions upon which

it depended (pa{icca). Having analysed the proccss of becomiog (bha1Ja) in this

manner, he laid down a principlc that would cxplainfuture occurreoces. Thus,

from observiog "dependently arisen" (paficca-samuppanna) phenomena, he

asserted the principle of "dependent arising" (paficca-.ramuppada). That termioology is indeed conspicuous by its absence in the pre-Buddhist Indian

literature.

The old lndian term dhamia was retained by the Buddha to refer to

phenomena or things. However, he was always careful to define this dharma as

"dependeotly arisen phenomena" (pa#cca-samuppanna-dhamma) . Most of the

controversies of the łater Buddhisrs centered on this conception ofdharma, and

thercforc the various uses of the term in the Budaha's discourses may be appropriatcly examined herc.

The term dhamma (Sk. dharma) has four rc!lated uses in the early discourses.

{l ) Dhamm'ii (in the plural) meaning phenomena or things.'2

These arc the dependently arisen phenomena refer~ed to

earlier. They may also be described as elements ofexperience.

(2) Dhammo (in the singulac) meaning the uriifotmity o(

phenomena ot things as represented by rhe principle of

dcpeadence (paficca-sarnuppada).H

(3) Dhamma (in the plural) referring to things or phenomeoa

cvaluated as good or bad in an ethical sense.H While good is

ofren designated dhamma, the notion of bad is expressed by

its oegation, (l-dhamma.

(4) Dha??JmO (in the singular) expressing che uniformity of moral

phenomena, which ałso represeated the ideał or the standard

of morality derived from the mora! pcrfection attained by the

saint. Hence, nibbana oc freedom is also called dhammo. ~>

In order to djstinguish this notion of dharnma from the Indian concepcion

where the term dharma meant reality (atman), in an oncological sense, the.

Buddha utilized the cooception of resulc or coosequc:nce or fruit (attha, Sk. ar-16 THE Pl-IJLOSOPHY OF THE MIODLI! WAY

tha) to bring out the pragmatic meaning of dhamma. For the Buddha.

whatever is true or real (bh'Uta, taccha) is alśo what produces result (atthasa'f?lhita).36 This pragmatic definition of truth or reality was moce often used in

expJaining mora! phenomena. Hence the reference to the three types of results

or consequences or fruits:

1) bad, evil-an-atthf!, correspooding to a-dhamma.

2) good, beneficiaJ-attha, corresponding to dhamma, and

3) ulcimate good, ultimate fruit-param' attha, correspooding

co nibbana.31

BUDDHA'S CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE AND TRum

While the term dharma, in the four contexts referred to above, may be takeo

as implying empiricaJ truths, a more compreheosive use of the term is also

available. In rhis case, the dharma (or sad-dharma) expresses the ootioo of

"true doctrine," and without any hesitacion this may be explained as a "true

st~temeot ,'' a use that may be most appealing to the modern linguistic

philosopher who is generaUy averse to met.aphysics and insists that "truth" pertains to statements. The use of the term dharma in this sense at ooce renders

futile any attempt to speak ofa lioguistically transcendent truth or reality in the

Buddhist cootext. ·

Dependent arising is the middle path presented by the Buddha between the

extremes of etetnalism and annihilationism, ofstrict determinism and chaotic

indeterminjsm, of absolute.reality and niliilistic unreality, of permanent ideotity and absołute difference. Considedag the mann.er in which he explained the

middle position between these extremes, no one could maintaio that this middle position is beyond linguistic descciption or uaoscends any forn1 of verba! expression. In fact, the two terms that are generally utilized in the absolutistic

sy~tems ofIndian tbought to presentruch a standpoint, namely ''indescribable"

(avacya) and "indefinable" (anirv~antya), do not occur in the.early discourses

of the Buddha. The ter:m "undeclared" or "unexplained" (avyakata) occurs, but

it ~ used to refer to problems such as the duration and extent of the universe,

the identity of or the difference betweeo che soul and the body, as wełl as the

status of the tathagata after death- these beiog pcobJems that could not be explaioed on the basis of any empirical evidence.~8 For the Buddha, whatever is

empirically giveo is also describable or defiaabte without having to Msume

!Uetaphysical standpoints.INTRODUCTION 17

Thus in the Buddha's view language is not, in itself, an inadequate means of

expressing whac is cmpiricałly given. Yet modern incepreters of Buddhism

seem to assume chat the Buddha considered Janguage inadequatc to express the

truth about ex.istence that he d iscovered. The evidence for such an intcrprctation is racher dubious. No attempt is made to examine che Buddha's own

statements abouc his cnlighteoment, as recorded in such 9iscourses as "The Noble Quest" (Ariyapariyesana).l8 Most books on Buddhism pubłished in the

modern world wiU atuibute to che Buddha, as well as to his early disciples and

even to the łater ones łike Nigarjuna, a distinction between sammuti and

paramattha. Sammuti (Sk. samvrh) is explained by Candrakirti as language •0

and paramattha (Sic. paramartha) as ultirnace reality or absołute ttuth. 41 The

terms sammuti as well as voh'lira occut in the early discourses.41 Sammuti,

(derived from sam + V man ''to think") literaJly means "agreement" and

therefore, "conventioo". Vohara (Sk. vyavaliiira) means "usage." A rather lop-·

sided interpretation of rhese two terms as implying "language" only has caused

havoc in the expłanatioo of the ceachings of the Buddha as well as of Nigarjuna. Tbere seems to be no justification for confining the meaoings of these

two terms to łanguage only.

Conventions (sammult) are of various cypcs- linguistic, social, political,

mora! or ethicał, or even rełigious. Eveo a superficial glance at pre-Buddhist

literary uaditions would reveal the manner in which the Indians elevated

linguistic, social, political, morał , and religious conventions to the level of absolute reałitics, permanent and ecernal. The language of the Vedas became th e

absolute language, posscssing miraculous powers. In spite of the existence of

such languages as Dravidian and Chinese, which have nothing to do with the

Vedic language, some educated Indian schąlars stiłl believe the Vedic is the

mothcr of aUlanguages. Therefore oot a single syllable of it is to be tampered

with. Another convention, the social order consisting offour castes, carne to be

considered absolute. Punishment awaited those who violated it or ignored ie.

Arjuna was to be rewarded for maiotaining chat social order. Political conveations derived their absoluteness from the absoluteness of the social order. A

rules (k1atnya) who ignores the advice of the spirirual leader and guide

(brahma1Ja)' was doomed to failure, since he was thereby ignoring the law

(dharma). The absoluteness of the moral and ethical conventions was equally

recogoized. No ocher form of moralicy except that which concributcs to the

preservation of the social system was permissible, Rcligious duties were specific

and unałtcrablc.

When, in che Sutta·nipata, the Buddha spoke of sammuti, he was referring

to all these different kinds ofconventions .4~ According to him, these coovc;ntions have come co be depending upon specific condicions (puth111/ii). They

wece not absołute and ultlmace; rhcy were·noc universally binding. The Buddha realized that when these convcncions were considered to be absolutc and18 TuE PHILOSOPHY OP nm MIODLE WAY

ultimate (parama"!') they contributed to the worst form of dogmatism (dittht),

which evenrually led to all the cooflicts (ka/aha, viggaha) in the world.« These

constituted the worsr forms of obsession, obstruction, constraint, or bondage.

Therefare, ilie Buddha claimed that a wise man (vidva) does not approach (na

upei.1) such conventions.4) This does not mean that he ignores all conventions.

fnstcad, he understands their conditionality and as welJ as their fruitfulness

without clevating them to the level of ultimate realities, thereby ma.king them

absolutei, or simply ignoring them as absolutely unreal and therefore useless.

F,re"tdom (nibbana) could chen be interpreted more appropriately as freedom

·ffom obsessions, obsessions for as well as against such convencions. The

elimination of such obsessions or constraints (pap4fica) turned out to be more

difficult chan abandoning pleasures ofsense, for if by freedom was meant only

the łatter, the Buddha could have attained enlightenment during the time he

was practicing self-mortificacion.

Herc again, the difficulty lies in adopting a middle path without accepting

conventioos as being ultimate or rejecting them as being usełess. The uniqueness of the Buddha's philosophy lies in the manner in which a middle path

can be adopted with regard to any conveotioo, whethet it be linguistic, social,

political, morał, or religious. Since the preseot aoalysis of the Buddha's

philosophy is undenakeo ooly as a prelude to the examination of Nagarjuna's

thought, and since the latter was more conceroed with the ,basic doctrines of the

Buddha, our attention at chis point will be focussed only on the way in which

the Buddha adopted the middle pach in dealing with linguistic conventioos.

As _poioted out above~~ term sammuti was used in the early discourses to

refer to all kinds of conventions: Hó.wever, chere were two terms that were.vCI'f

specifically employed to refer to linguistic conventions. They are nirt#ti-patha

(the way of etymology) and adhivacana.patha (the way of definitioo), The

Sarttyutt~nik'iiya contaios an important discourse dealing with linguistic con·

ventions, which are neither to be clung to as absolute truths, nor to be ignored

as mere conventioos. The discourse called Nirutti-patha runs ćhus :

There are these three lioguistic conventions or usages ofwords or

terms, which are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are distinct

in the present and will be distinct w .the future and which are not

ignorcd by the wise brahmans and recluses. Whatever materiał

form (rnpa) that has been, which has ceased ro be, which is past

and has changed, is c.alled, reckoned and termed 'has been' (ahost)

and it is not reckoned as 'lt CJtistS" (attht} or as 'it will be'

(bhavissatt). .. . [This is repeated for the other four aggtegates:

feeling, perception, dispositions and consdousness.] Wbatever

. materiał form has not arisen nor come co be, is called, teckoned orlNTROOl)CTION

termed 'it will be' (bhavissatz) and it is not reckoned ;is 'ie eidsts (atthi) or as 'it has been' (ahost). , .. Whaeevet materiał form has

arisen, and has manifested itself, is called, reckoned, or tecmed 'ie

exists' (atthi), and it is not reckooed as 'it has been' (aho!z) nor as 'it

wiH be' (bhavissatt).'6

19

The Buddha advised his disciples "not to eling to dialectical usage nor go

beyond the ł.imlts of linguistk convention" (janapada-nirultif!t nabhinivese.yya

i?imafJfzaf?l natidhaveyya).47 Such being the middle position adopted by the

Buddha regardiog linguistic conventioo, it would be an extreme position to

maintain that language is either ułtimately real (as it was the case with the Indians who made vae a supreme god) or that it is useless when it comes to expressing ultimate reality. ·

For the Buddha, language derives its "meaoing" (attha) when it is able to

p.roduce results (attha). and thus what is true (bhuta, taccha) is that which bea.rs

results (attha-sarp,hita). 48 The Buddha did not recognize anything rhat is fałse

to be productive of results. Truth in this sense can be equated with "me.aningful" language. Thus, linguistic expressions that imply permanence and annihilation would be "meaningless" (an-attha) in that they do not commu"nicate

anything thac is given in e.xperience (dhamma), where experience is understood

in terms of the felt results (attha) rather than in terms of an indefinable

ultimate reality.

Having thus rejected the two views, namely, the traditional Indian view that

che human personality consists of a permanent and eternal spirirual ent'ity

(atman) and the Matetialist view the denied such a spiritual entity and

recognized maccer (body) to be the only real~ty, the Buddha continued to speak

of the psychophysical personality (nama-~pa), referring to ie with such tetms

as "I" (aha'!IJ) and "you" (tvarp,) and even the term "self' (atta) when speaking of

that personality.

With the emergence of Buddhism as a formidable phiLosophicaJ and

spiritual movement that undermined the very foundations of che tradirional

Indian phjlosophy and religion. Indian thinkers reformulated their substaotialist world-view, presenting it in a morc subtłe and appeaJing form in the

Bhagavadgzta. The notion ofdharma embodied in this text may be analysed in

terms of the three Buddhist categories presented above, namely, an-flrtha, ctrtha and pararrUirtha, Iastead of the pragmatic definitions of the Buddhists, the

Indian thinkers were presenting a moce substantialisr incerpretation where,

1) an-artha = che psychophysical personality (nama-rnpa)

which is uoteal and whic.h is corHtasted with rhe real self

(atman).20

2)

3)

THE Pl-l!LOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE WAY

attha = the permanent and eternal self(atman) in man, the

so-called dehin (the dweller in the body), which is in bondage

because of attachmenc co che psychophysical personality, and

paramiirtha - = para11U1tman, which is the ultimate reality,

the universal self identified with God.

Thus was inaugurated an enormous controversy becween Buddhists and Indian philosophers that continued to rage for severa! cenruries until Buddhism

completely disappeared from the Indian soil as a philosophlcal and spiritual

force around the seventh and eighty centurie.s, only to survive and flourish in

the countries souch and southeast of India as well as in the Far East.

~ -

THE PERIOD OF THE SRAVAKAS

The survival of a pragroatic philosophy in the face of an extremely absolutistic tradition such as the one cmbodied in. the Bh4ga11adgT/a was not

easy. One of the ways in which the Buddhists responded to thac philosophy

was by compiling the now famous Buddhist classic, tbe Dha1tJmapad11. As

the citle indicates, it was an attempc to counter the Indian absolutist and

substantialist definition of dhamma. The Buddhist philosophers, confronted

by the onslaught of Indian thinkers asserting the reality of the self (atman),

spent most of their time analysing what they called dhamma in o.rder to

show that there was no permanent and eternal self. As Kenneth lnada has

rightly remarked , this represented 1'the most active, highly vibrant and compecidve age in Buddhist bistory known as the Abbidhaana period. ... lfthere

arc high watermarks to be considered in Buddhist bistory, the Abhid.harrna

period certainły ta.ces a very high leveJ, a level of great fermentation and

flourishment pf Buddhist thought. IdeologicaJly speaking, no ocher period jn

Buddhist bistory, whether of the Tberavada or Mahayana, or even national

Buddhist developments such as in T'ang Dynasty China, could ever match, or

come up to the level of activiry as recorded during this period." 49

Two complete sets of Abhidharma texts compiled during this period are

available to us. One is preserved by tbe Theravadins consisting of the foHowing

texts;

l. - Dhammasangani,

2„ Vighanga,lNTRODUCTION 21

3. Dh111ukath'1i,

4. Puggalapanńatli,

S. Kathavatthu,

6. Y1111111/ła, and

7. Pauhana.

The other version was preserved by the Sarvastivada schooł and comprises

one major work and six ancillary texts. They are as folłows;

1. ]fiangpraithana (atuibuted to Katyayaijfputra),

2. Sańgttiparyaya (attr. Maha Kau~~hila/Sariputra) ,

3. Prakaraf!apada (attr. Vasumitra),

4. Vijnanak'iiya (attr. Devaśarman) .

s. Dhatukaya (attr. Pori:J~ or Vaśumitra),

6. Dharmaskandha (attr. Sariputra/Maudgalyayana), and

7. Prajńaptifastra (attr. Maudgalyayaoa).

That the Theravada and Sarvastivada schools preserved these two bodies of

literarure does not make them sectarian, any more chan t_he discourses, preserved by any school, could be branded as such. Ałthough the treatment ofsubjectmatter io these two sets ofworks differs widely, the subjecr-matter is pract.ically

the same. Both deal with the categories into which the human personal.ity as

well as human experience carne to be aoalysed in the early discourses where

tbey receive amore discursive treatment. The analysis of human experience into

aggregates, eleme.nts, and faculties, all of which were considered to be dharmas

~r elements of existence, seems to be the first and foremost concern of the

Abhidharmikas. Undoubtedly, the purpose of this analysis is co dcmonstrate

the absence of a self or substance in these phenomena. Exhaustive analyses of

the various types of relations tbat obtain among them wece also undertaken,

providing a sort of scholastic ad:v.ancernent in the study of such phenomena,

but sti11 not deviating fro.m the fundarnental teac.hings ofeady Buddhisip. Examination reveals that these two processes in some way representan atte.mpt to

deal wich the same issues that the Buddha was concerned wich, namely.

"dependently arisen phenomena'' (pa{iccaiamuppanna-dhamma) and "dependent arising" (paficcasa1nuppada). The knowledge of these two processes was

looked upon as right understanding, which ułtimately leads to the attainment

of freedom (niniiif!a).

Unfortunacely, ew.o of the schools thar were involved in this Abhidharmic

enterprise were driven roo far in tbeir academic study of the 4hfJN1UIS, probabJ.y

by the unrelenting criricisms łevelled against Buddhism by the traditional22 THE PHlLOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE W AY

schoołs of Indian philosophy. These schoołs carne to be knowa as Sarvastivada

and Sautrantika.

The Sarvastivada concluded their analysis ofdharmas with the recognition of

ultimate discrete atomie elements which they wece unable to put together even

with a theory offour basie relations. The result was that they were compelled to

admir a singularly mec.aphysical conception of "self-narure" (.rvabhava) to account for the experienced concinuity of sucb discrcte phenomcna.>0 This selfnanae could not be Jooked upon as something impcrmaneot and cbanging, for

thacwould be to defeat the very purpose for which it was formulated in the first

pJace. Therefore they insisted that this self-nature (svabhava, dravya) of dharmaJ remain during all cbree periods of time, the past, the present and the

future. No ocher conception could be moce beretical in the eyes of the Buddhisrs who were avowed non-substancialiscs (aniiJmaviidf ).

The view chat dhamJa.I have self-nacure had irs impru:t on the cooceptioa of

"dependent ar.iśing" (prafiya-.ramutpada), the central coocepcion in early Buddhism as wełł as in tpe early Abhidbarma. Hcnceforward, "dependence" carne

co be expłained on the basis of self-natute. lt curned out to be no mare different from the iden ticy theory of causation (.ratkarya-11ada) formulated with

such precision, usiog logical arguments, by the Sankhya school of thought.51

The celationship becween these two schools of thought is so close that one can

hardly discount mucual iofluences and borrowings.

One of the schools chat reacted against chis concepcion of"self-narure". other

than the tradition represcntcd by Moggauputcatissa·referred to earłier, was the

Sautrantaka school of Buddhism. As ics name implies, this school was openły

ancagonistic to the "treatises" (Jii.rtra) and iosisted upon rerurning to the

"discourses" (sU.tranta) as sources for the study of the Buddha-word.n lt considcred the notion of"self-nature" as a theory of"self' (atma-11ada) in disguise.

Howevcr, for some inexplicable reasons chey failcd to realize that neither a

theory of atoms (paramaf!u) nor a conceptioo of moments (k!a11a) was part of

the early Buddhist teachings, either in che discourses or in the Abhidharma

treatises. On che one.hand, chey p robably assumed that these two conceptions

were not the root cause ofall the confusion among che Sarvastivadins. On che

other hand, they felt that these two concepcions were, afcer all. not incompatible with the docteioe of impermanence (anicca, Sk. anilya) in che early

discourses. Wichouc abandoning atomism and momentarioess, the

Sautrantikas proceeded to expJain "dependence" and eoded up recognizing a

sorc of non-identity theory ofcausarion (asatkiirya-vada) comparable to the one

proposed by che Vaise$ika school of Indian phiJosophy.B

Evcn though the Saucrancikas were openly critical of the substantialist

conception of dharma advocated by the Sarvastivadins, their reluctance to

abandon the theory of momcnrs (k.fa1Ja) Jeft them with the difficułt task of ex-INTROOUCTION 23

plaining the experienced conrinuicy in the individuaJ person. The ernergence of

schools filce "personalists" (pudgala-1iiida) and "transm,igrationists" (samkrantt~

v'iida),>• closely related to and sometimes identicaJ with the Sautraotikas, is indicative of the solutions that this school had to offer in order to overcome the

dtfficulties arising from the accep tance of a thcocy of moments.

The Satvastivlida and Sautraotika schools thus presented a rather complicated set of theories, all concribucing ro philosophicał confusion. The farmer

percdved a "self-nature" (svabh'iiva) in the cause and emphasized the idenrity

(ekalfla) of cause and effect, while the latter, seeiog no such "self-oature" but

merely perceiving "other-oature" (para-bhava). insisced upon the difference

(niinatva) between cause and effect. The Sarvastivada cooception ofself-nature

(svabhava) was extended to aJI phenomena, indudiog the human persooality,

while the Saucrliocikas, denying self-nature in pheoomena, surreptitiously iotroduced a conceprion ofself or peISOn (at1nan, pudgala) in a human personality.

MOGGAllPUTIATI~A: THE FIRST REFORMER

The Russian-Buddhist scholar Tb. Stcberbarsky was one of the first among

Western scholars to ignore the vecy significant differeoces between early Buddhism and Abhidharma on the one hand, and Sarvastivada and Sautrantika interpretations of the "discourses" and Abhidharma on the ocher. For him, Sarvastivada was not only an interpretation of Abhidharma but was Abhidhama,

and the early Buddhism of the discourses as well." However, there was at least

one disciple of the Buddha who was not willing to accept either the Sarvastivada or the Sautrlintika as the correct intetptetation of Buddhism. This

was Moggalrputtatissa. Critical scholarship unforrunately has blindly dismissed his views without much serious consideratioo, even though they arc

presented with darity and logical acumen.

Almost 250 years after the Buddha and 300 yeacs before Nagarjuna, Mogga.lrputtatissa was responsible fot the "great purge" in the Buddhist tradition.

The Indian emperor Asoka, as he dcclared in his Minoc Rock EdictS, was actuaJly

instrumeotal in unifying the Buddhist Order (Saf!Jgha) by expelling the

miscreant and schismatist monks and getting them to don white (lay)

garmentS. Yet, the backgro4nd fot this great purge was prepared by MoggalTputtatissa wheo in his famous "Points of Conttoversy" (Kath'iivatthu) be

refuted the ideas presented by almost seventeen beterodox schools of Buddhism. "MoggalTpunatissa is said to have followed the mcthod of discourse .

adopted by the Buddha-satthar'ii dinna-naya-11asena-at the time he24 THJ! PHllOSOPl-IY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

established the matika, 'topics' of the ,K{111haJ11[11tthu]."'6 Th.is monumental

work is an attempt to go back to the early teachings, and in doing so ~he

author, for the first time in Buddhist ·history , utilizes even abscract logic.

Whether the use of such abstract logic. is appropriate is not a matter that coocerns us herc. What is importaot is that Moggałfputtatissa was critical ofcertain

ideas which were incompatible with the Buddha's phllosophy,

The· metaphysical theory of a person (pudgala), propounded by the

Sautrancikas and rheir allies, was the first of the mecaphysical views co be ta.ken

up for criticism in the Katha11atthu.>7 With great ingeouiry and logical precision, Moggalfputtatissa descroyed the co·ncept of a person propounded by the

Sautrantikas and established what may be called the non-substantiałiry of the

human pecsonaliry (pudgala-nairatmya).

With equally cogent argumeoc.s, he anaihilated the Sarvastivada, doctrine of

dhamza that implied substar:itial and eternal existence (sabba'f{J sabbadii

attht),8 and established ·the non-substantiality of all dharma.J (dharmanairiitmya]. These two unconuovertcd achievements, recorded in one of the

most authencic texts, have been compJetdy ignored by those who atcributed a

substanrialist theory of elements to the eady Buddhist tradition.

EARLY MAHAYANA: THE SECOND REFORM MOVEMENT

The same text highlights anorher controversy that was beginning co ntlł1e the

minds of Buddhist thinkers ducing the rhird cenrury BC and which became the

topie of a heated debate during the fust and second ccnmries AD. This pertained

to the questioo whether the Buddba is transcendent (lokutlara). Moggauput·

tatissa rejected the view. gradually gaining ground in the Buddhist tradition,

which favored craoscendence.'9 The biographies of the Buddha, like the

Mahavastu

1 were probably not yet wricten. Mahayana, with its conception ofa

coropleteły transcendent Buddha, had not come into existence by that cime.

The Saddharmapu'łt/anka, which is responsible for condemning the miscreant

monks (bhik!u) as wdl as the ideaJ of a saint (arhant) in eiuly Buddhism, in"

dicates a graduał growth wich the finał version assigncd ro the third century

AD. In the earliest versions of some of the early Mahayana sutras, such as

Vajracchedika-prajnaparamita and the Kiiśyapa-pan·varta, there is no mention

of a bodhisattva.60 .

What sort of Mahayana can chere be without the conception of a ctanscendeot Buddha and the notion ofa borihiJattva? lt certainly ought to be differeot

from the kind of Mahaya na that one comes across in che avaiłab le versións oflNTRODUCTJON 25

the Saddharmapu„r!r;nka and other r:cxcs that indude a condemnation of the

early arhant-ideał.

Iodeed the K.aśyapa-parivarta, even in the Sanskrit version which is not the

earliest, will enable us to understand what that originaJ Mahayana was. lt was

not the Mab.a:yana that carne to be deeply prejudiced against early Buddhism as

weJl ~ Theravada, for, as pointed out eacJier, even though we find a suong

criticism of the moak (bhik111). a criticism that may be accepted even by the

Buddha and his disciples łike Moggalrputcatissa, this criticism is not extended

to the early ideał of the "wonhy one" (arhant).

09e of the most important series of discourses ot instruction (dharma~

paryaya) referred to in the Klifyap~pan·varta 'as "the great pinade of gems"

(maha-ratna-kufa), percains to che "middle path" (madhyam7i-prati'pat).6J

Hece we find a long list of middle paths, most of whicb are described in

negative terms. However, side by side with the negative descriptions, one also

discovers a positive description of the middle pach in ceans of the twdve faccorś

of the human personał.ity (dvadasaizga). It is indeed an abbreviation of the

Kacaayanagotta-sutta,"With Kasyapa as the interlocutor or the person to whom

the discourse is addressed.

The need for negative descriptions, especially at a time when Buddhahood

was nor yet looked upon as a transcendent state or as an AbsoJute, caJls for an

explanation. Available historica1 records indicate that soine of the canoaical

rexts chat emphasized the doctrine of non-subscanciality (naimtmya) , and

which included the work of Moggatrputtatissa, found a haven in Sri Lanka and

other South East Asian counrries after the third cenrury BC. However, some of

the early discourses as well as some of the Abhidharma teitts were still citculating in lndia and carne to be preserved in a Prakrit, slighdy different from

Pali. Yet, what carne to be popular after the tbird cenrury were the intCJpretations of the Buddhist metaphysicians, like the Sarvastivadins- and the

Sautrahtikas. The early Mahayana that did nor indude either the concept of

"ttanscendence" as applied to the Buddha or a notion of bodhisattva, but

which emphasized a aegacive doctrine while at the same time preserviag the

positive assertions of early Buddhism, was therefore a response to the Sar-

. vastivada and Sautrantika metaphysics, rather than a reaction to the early

Buddhism of the "discourses" or the Abhidharma.

N!igafjuna1s Mifsion

Nagarjuna, wbo lived at a time when the Theravada-Mahayana conflicc had .

not degenerated to the level that is presented in the SadclharmapurJt/aiika,26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TI-IE MtDOLE WAY

therefore had an already different mission. It was indeed not the least different

from the mission chat lay before Moggailputtatissa, to expose the untenability

ofcerta.in heretical views chat were gradually becoming popular in the Buddhist

uaditioo. A careful reading of the Kiirikii will ccveal the fact that Nagarjuna

had all the help he needed to achieve this cask. As mentioned before, even after

the transference of the Pali canon to Sri Lanka, che discourscs and the

Abhidharma texts survived in lndia. Thus the discourses of the Buddha as well

as the traditioo of the disciplcs (fravaka) were available to Nagarjuua. The

humilicy with which Nigacjuna bows down to the BuJdha and the respect with

which he treats the Buddha's disciples (Jravaka)61 are in complcce contrast to

the unsympathetic attitude of the later Mahayanists toward the eatlier Buddhist cradition.

In the foUowing analysis of che Kiirika, it will be shown char Nagarjuna actempced to discredit heterodox views, especialły those of the Sarvastivadins and

che Sautrantikas, and establish the non-substantialicy of all dharmas (Chapcers

III - XV) as welł as the non-substantiality ofpudgala (Chapters XVI - XXl) and

therc:after to explicate che positive doctrioes of che Buddha as embodied io the

early discourses like the Kaccayanagoita-sutta.

The present analysis is, tberefore, conuacy to the more popular incerprecacion ofNagatjuna espoused by commentators like Candrakirti who emphasized

the reductio adabstJrdum (prasangika) metho~. lt will be moce sympathetic co

the interpretations offered by Nagacjuna's disciples like Bhavaviveka and the

moce positive thiokers of the Midhyamika school. While highlighting the iogenuity and philosophical marurity cf Nagarjuna, the preseot analysis wilł at

the same time be unsympathetic toward the mych that Nagarjuna was a second

Buddha.

STRUCTURE OF THE KARlKA

Selec'tions from the works of a major philosopher belonging to a tradition

may be hełpful in introducing that tradition but not in providing acomplece

view of that phiJosopher's thought. The reason is thac when a philosopher

presents his ideas io some form , he feels chat everything he has said in chat

wock is relevant co his thought. If anything chat he has said is ircelevant to what

he proposes to convey co his readecs, he would be not only wascing his time, buc

also the readcr's.

Actempts have often been made by modern scholars co pick out selections or

chapcers from the works ofernincocphilosophers of the East, hopiog thereby coIN1'Rooucr10N 27

provide a complete and accurate picture of their ideas. Sometimes they are c.onsidered to be essentialsecitons or cbapters, the implication being th.at the rest is

inessential.6' This undoubtedly has conuibuted to a great deal of

misunderstanding and sometimes deliberate distortion of the author's ideas.

Coo.sidering the unsatisfaccoriness of such a method, the present analysis of

Nagarjuna's thought will be presented on the basis of an examination of his

Kiin'k'ii taken as a whołe, with ever,y word, every verse, and every chapter in it

created as in integraf part of that work. This is done in the absence of any concrete evidence that some portions of this work are not by Nagarjuna.

A supetficial reading of this work, with 448 vetses divided into 27 chapters,

could leave the reader with the impression chat the text is repetitious. This

wrong impressioo will disappear like a mirage if one keeps in mind the circumstances that led to the complication of this work, the motivation for writing·

it, the background in which it was written, and the goal that was to be achieved,

Such considerations will enable one to see a carefully execuced plan or structure

in the Kiirika. In order to highlight di.is Stf\.lcture, the Kari/iii will be aoalysed

hece into four major .sections, withouc changing the sequence either of the individua! verses or of the cbapters.

Section I

This first seccion includes Chapters I and II. which deal with the most fundame.ntal doctrines of Buddhism, causatioo and change. The problem of causarion or "dependent arising" is taken up io the first of these. If this were a cext

writteo during the Buddha's day , this cbapter would undoubtedly have dealt

with theories of e.xistence presented by the traditional schools of Indian

philosopby advocating the reality of a permaneot self (atman) and the

Materialist school that denied such a self(an-atman) thereby denying the concinuity of the human person as wdl as his mora! responsibility. 'HoweveI,

Nagarjuna was living in the second century AD and his problems, as mentioned

earlier, were created more by the Sarvastivadins and the Sautraotikas than by

the non-Buddhist schools. Th.is is dearly evidencfrom the way in which Nagarjuna begins his first chapter.

The first verse in this chapter refers to four different theories of causatioo or

arising: (i) self-causatlon, (ii} external causation, (iii) both self- and external

causation, and (iv) arising out of a non-cause. After enumerating four such

theories, any further explanatioń would naturally commeoce with an analysis of

the first of these four theories, sełf-causatioo (svata.utpattt). Thus, the four .

types of relations (pratyaya) referred co in the next verse shoułd be takeo as ex-28 THE PHILOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE W/IY

arnples of the theory of self-causation (s,vata-uJpattt), even though the most

respected modern interpreter of Nagarjuoa, narody T,R.V. Murti, following

the footsteps of Candrak:Trti, took these four types ofcausa! relations to represent the theory of externał causation, and not self-causation.64 He assumed that

self-causation was ptesented by the Hindu schools and external causation was a

theory advocated by the early Buddbists only. As explained above, the early

13uddhisc theory ofcausation cannoc be placed under ~he cacegoryofeicher selfcausation or external causation. Nagarjuna was clearly aware of this and

therefo.re, even though in the tJJSt verse he denied the p0$Sibility of any one of

the four causal theories, in the second verse he recognizes four conditions

f.pmtyaya) without denying them~though to make his analysis more comprehensive he denies a fifth condition. The denial comes onły in the third

verse, but what is importaot to note is thar it is not a denial of che four conditions (prtltyaya) but of the rnanner in which the coodition is considered to be

relaced to the effect. When Nagarjuna said, ''The self nature of an existent is

not evident in the causa! condition, etc." (Na hi sfiabhavo bhavan"iit?i

pratyayadi;u11idyate, 1.3), he was not rejecting or denying condicions, but only

self-nature (svabhava) that some philosophers were positing in the condition

f.pratyaya) in order to account for the arising of the effect. This is a quite elear

iodication that Nigarjuna was not rejecting the Adhidharma theory ofconclitions but only its interpretation by some of the metaphysicians, in this patticular case chat of the Sarvastivadins. As pointed out ·above, there is every

evideoce that it was the Sarvastivadins who interpreted the theory ofconditions

(pratyqya) on the basis of a concepcioo of substancc (Ivabhfiva). In the same

verse, Nagarjuna proceeds to deny externał causation (partlkl-utpattz) or, more

specifically, the conception of "other nature'~ f.par11--bliiiva) advocated by the

Sautrantikas. If this background is kept in rnind, the understandiog of Nagarjuna's ideas in the Kiirika is not as formidable as has been assumed.

Chapter II deals with the problems created.- not by an empirical theory of

change and impermanence (anityata), for that was a fundamentaJ conception

of early Buddhism- by a more metaphysical theory of change and impermanence based on a logical or even a psychological theory of moments (k;af!a-

1iiida).

Sectzon II

The second section includes thitteen chaptets, begioning with an examination ofsense faculcies(lndriya, Chapter ITI) and ending with an examination oflNTRODUCTION 29

substance (svabha11a, Chapter XV) . The entire section is an attempt to establish

the doctrine of the non-substanriality of phenomena (dharma-nairatmya)

without having to get rid of aoy one of the categories such as the aggregaces

(skandha). spheres of sense (ayaJana), and ełements (dhatu). all of which were

part of the early Buddhist teachings erobodied in the discourses as well as in the

Abhidharma. Almost all the imporcant subjeccs dealt with in early Buddhism

arc takćn up. once again not with the intentioo of rejecting them, but with a

determination co rid them of a.ny metaphysical explanation, espe~ially of existence (t11tit11a) and of non-existence (nastitva), implying permanencc (fiiś11ala)

and annihilation (uccheda) which the Buddha was openJy rejecting in the

Kaccayanagotttz.sutta.

Section III

The third secrion indudes eleven chapters from XVI to ~I. lt is a section

chat has caused confusion in the minds of many who wrote on Nagarjuna's

thought. First, many of the topics dealt with in the previous section arc again

analysed here. Thjs gave the impression that the text is repetitive and therefore

it is possible to ignore some of its parts when presenting Nagarjuna's

philosophy. For example, the examination of action and agent (karma-karaka)

was attempted in Chapter VIII , and a longer chapter (XVII) on the examioation of the fruit of action (karma-phala) is induded in this seccion. Secondly,

rhis particular chaptcr (XVII) deals with the docttine of karma in a moce

positive way, asserting the existence of a moce appropriate view than the one

criticized at the beginning of the chapcer. Such ao assertion seems to go against

not only the doctrine of emptiness (śuyata), as it is geoerally understood by

modern schola.rs, but also the view chat neither the Buddha nor Nagarjuna had

a view to propound.

However, reading the eleven chapters one cannot help comiog to the condusion that they were incended to establish the non-substanciality of the individual (pudgala-nairalmya) but not to eliminate the cooception of an individual or person altogether. The conception of the individual involves the

problems of bondage and freedom (bandhana-mo/qa) .ind, after defining

these, five chapters arc devoted to the problem of bondage. These five chapters

are undoubtedly commentary po a verse chat seems to have been excremely

popular among the Buddhists and which both Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu

wece cooversant with, for we find the latter composing a whole treatise caUed

Karm4Iiddhiprakara11a.6>This verse is quoted by CandrakUci 'in his commentary, and runs chus:30 nmPHILOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE wAy

Actions a.re not .destroyed even by [the passage of} huodred

myriads of aeons. Having reached the harmooy of condicions and

the prope.r time, they bear fruits for the human beings.

Na pr_a„alyanti karmil.t!i kalpako{ilatair api1

siimagrir(t prapya kala'!' ca phalr#nti khatu dehinar(t.66

The deoiał ofa permanent self(atman) by the Buddha prompted his critics

to insist that the Buddha coułd not satisfactoriJy explain the problem of morał

responsibility. The present verse is only a summary of the Buddha's causa.I explanation of the doctrine of morał responsibility, not an admission of a permaoeot and eternał karma. In fact, the determinism that may appear with the

reading of the fust line, is immediately corrected with the conditionality

specified in the second line. Three main topics are dealt with here: the imperishability of karma (aviprat{iiśa) , the harmooy of tonditions (samagfi) and

the appropriate time (kala). It is therefore not surprising to see Nagarjuna inserting two chapters oo "harmony" (samagfi. XJX) and time (kala XX). after

stating the "imperishability" of karma (XVII) and denying the existeoce of a

permanent and eternal "self' (atman , XVIII). To eliminate any one of these

chapters as inesseotial co the underscanding of Nagarjuna's thought is,

cberefore, hlghly unwatranted.

Mter a clarification of the meaning of bondage (bandhana) in the context of

a human beiog who is without a permanent and eteroal self and who still concinues to wander along experiencing births and deatbs, happiness and suffering, Chapter XXII takes up a person who has attained freedom (mokfa), who

has "thus gone" (tathagata) without'having to waoder along as a person in bond~ge . No other issue in Buddhist thought has been as misunderstood and

misinterpret~d. not only by the non-Buddhists, but also by the Buddhists

themselves, as the conception oftathagata. Probably for this reason, Nagarjuoa

felt the need to begin his discussion of freedom witb an examination of the

conceptioo oftathiiggta. It will be shown that Nagarjuna's arui.lysis follows exactly the method ofanalysis given by the Buddha. The chapter that follows explaios the reasons for such misconcepdons (viparyiisa, XXJII).

Modern scholarship on Nagarjuna has empahsizcd the cooception of two

uuths to the c.oroplete oeglect of his explanation of the fout truths as enunciated by the Buddha. It will be shown that the two truths in Nagarjuna are not

an improvement on the four noble truths, nor a spccial insight on the part of

Nagarjuna, buc an understanding of a doctrine that is already clearly expressed

in the early discourses. This lengthy chapter (XXIV) concludes with a recogni-INTROOUCilON 31

tion of the four noble truths and the docuine of dependent arising chat is the

foundation of the four noble truths.

The chapter on 111niii11a (XXV) is a refutation of the absolutisc interpretation

of the notion of freedom and a determined attempt to go baclc to the nonabsolucist form of Budcłhism enunciated in the early discourses.

Conuary to the view ot most modern scholars of Nigarjuna's thought,

Chapter XXVI (Dvadailingapankf1i) is hece presented as an ełaboration of the

Buddha's owo conclusion in the KJUcayanagotta-sutta. lt deals with the Buddha's positive explaoation of how a human beiog in bondage cin free himself

from the mass of suffering.

Section IV

Nigarjuna could have concluded his ueatise with the previous secdon.

However, he was aware that his most favoritc discourse-che Kaccayanagottasutta- began with che queston regarding "right view (sammad1/th1). Nigarjuna has already explained almost every aspect of the Buddha's doctrine and

sbown what conscirutes a "right view'' as against the "wrong or confused views"

(micchadiflht) chat appeared in the Buddhist tradition. Yet there wece some

views that che Buddha lefc aside without either asserting or denying them.

These penained to the cen, and sometimes fourteen, unexpJaioed or

undeclared questions (avyakata, Sk. avyakrta). A treatment of these questions

was nceded bcfore Nigarj_una could make a finał comme.nt about the attitude

of the Buddha, the "freed one" (nibbuta), with regard to aJI varic:ties of vicws,

whether they be right or wrong. One could hardly cxpect a better condusion co

a tcxt intended to bring about freedom from all obsessioos (prapancopaiama)

than this last chapcer. lt represcnts an expJanation of the higbcst form of

frecdom, chat is. freedom from ideoJogical cooscraints, thac che Buddha as well

as his disciples (Jravaka) had actained and wbich made Buddhism one of the

mosc tolerant religions ever to appear on earth.

ANAlYSIS OF 1li.E KARIKA

Part-I (Causa/ity and Change)

l. Conditions (pratyaya). The Buddha'~ main phiJosopbicaJ insight, as has

heco shown, was expressed by the term "dependent arising" (pa(i"asamup-32 'THE. P!-111.0SOPHY OP 'TłlE MIDDLE W AY

pada). It was presented against the four theories of self-causation, external

causacioo, both self- and external causation and non-causacion. Nagatjuna, be~

ing a true disciple of the Buddha, is thetefore seen as initiating his prima.ty

philosophical treatise by categorically denying these four causa! theorjes (1.1).

According to the Buddha, the four theories imply the existence or nonexistence or both or neither, ofa permanent existence, an eternal and substan.-

tial self (atman). That same impJication 'is assumed by Nagarjuna when he used

the term bl:iiiva (instead of bhava) to refer to the entities that are explained in

these four ways. Thus. in the very first stanza Nagarjuna's denial pertains to a

metaphysical existence (bhiiva) and not to the empirical notion of becomiog

(bhtt1N;) characterized by acising (utpada) and ceasing (vyaya).

In verse 2, Nagarjuna refers to four types of conditions (pratyaya), etnphaticaUy declaring that there is no fifth. However, therc is no categorical

denial of the four conditions, compared to the denial of the four causa! theories

in the previous ver.se. The reason for th.is is very evident. Nagarjuna, a 'łery

sophisticated philosopher, realized that the Buddha rejected the four causa!

theories mentioned in verse 1. He also knew that the later Buddh.ist disciples

(J.riivaka) attempted to ełaborate upon the B.uddha's conception of "dependent

adsing'' (praiityPJarnutpada) by formulating a theory of four conditions

(pratyaya); these wece the earły Abhidharmikas. H e saw no reason for an

outright rejection of the theory of foUI condicions.

However, io verse 3, he immediately takes up a particular interpretation ofa

conditioo (pratyaya) and oegates it: "The self-nature ofexistent:S is not found in

the condition, etc." lt is not difficult to see what is being denied here. To

Nligarjuna, it seems that some philosophers werc ioterpreting the Buddhist

(Abhidharmika) theory of four condicióas (pratyaya) in terms Qf one or the

other of the theories mencioned in verse 1, whkh the Buddha himself had rejected. Nagarjuaa could not have been unaware of the face chat the

philosophers who spoke of conditions (pratyaya) at this early period in Indian

thought were the Buddhists and not the noo-Buddhists. Therefore, his attencion is now directed to these Buddhist interpreters and not to the nonBuddhists.

As meotioned earlier, among the Buddhists the only school that gave a

susbstantialist interpreracion of phenomena (dharma) during this early period was

the Satvastivada school. Their theoty of self-nature (S11abhava) carne

dangerously close to the Indian conception of self (atman). Nagarjuna was,

therefore, mercly criticizing the view of the Sarvastivada school of Buddhists,

who were suggesting a substantialist 1nterpretation of the four conditions.

'fhus, the categocical denial in stanze 3 pertains to the view of the Sar-.

vastivadins, who assumed a self-naturc or substance (svabhava) of the existent

(bhava) in the conditioos (pratyaya).lNTROOUCTION 33

What son of argument does Nagarjuoa present in order to deny the existence of self-nature? Murti and others who saw in Nagatjuna's method a

dialectic eomparable to that of Immanual Kant have considered self-nature

(111abhava) and other-nature (parabha11a) as antinomies. This may be true.

However, such a dialectic is not used by Nagarjuna in his first refiitation of the

nocion ofself-nature. Nagatjuna rejects self-nature, not because ie is relative to

other-nature, but: because it is not evident (na 11idyate). The argument from

relativity is utilized'. to reject other-narure onły and not self-'natuce. ("In the

absence ofself-nature, other-nature is ałso not evident.") What is found hece is

a simpJe and sttaighdorwatd denial ofself-nature on epistemologicaJ grounds,

even though h e does not elaborate upon tbat epistemology at this point.

Throughout the text, one finds Nagarjuna using the negated verb, na vidyata,

and somecimes the ptesent participle, avidyamiintJ. The former is often

rendeced as "not found," and in our ttanslation preference is given to the more

epistemologically oriented rendering; "is not evident." This emphasis is dearly·

evident from the manner in which he rejects "self-nature," as explained above.

In other words, Nagarjuna appears more as an empicicist than as a diałecti·

ciao who merely utilizes reason. Thus, the text begin.s with a simple deniał of

self-narure as something that is not evident. What Nagarjuna means by

evidence will be expłained later oo in this essay. If this point ls kept in mind, it

becomes rather easy to understand the rest of Nagarjuna's analysis of condi-

.

uons.

Thus, in the verse that follows (1.4), Nagarjuna speaks of action (kriya) and

conditioo (pratyaya). In this case, neither the action nor the condition is

denied. What is denied is the sort of 1elatiooshlp that is assumed between

them, that is, ioherence which emphasizes identity. The denial of identity is

prompted by the fact that it is equated with "sdf-nanue'' (wabhava) which , in

its turo, was looked upon as a permaneot entity. Difference was likewise denied

because it was perceived as other-nature, which implied annihilation or lack of

any continwty.

Verse 5 takes up the definition of a coodition. A condition is such because

depending upon it others arise. However, the teason why Nagarjunarejects this

definition is not that it is not empiricalły valid, but that there j5 a rider attached

to the definition, That rider impUes that this dependence is eteroał and permanetlt. ln other words, that which is dependent and that upon which it depends

a.re substaotially coOI)ected through a telation of inherence. Hence,

Nagarjuna's queston• "So long as it [the effect] does not arise, wby is it Ithe

cause] not coosidered to be a non-condition?"

Verse 6 completes Nagarjuna's generał criticism of eonditions. Most modern

translators have failed to bring out the significance of this verse, primarily

because the term artha ( = effect, fruit, result, rendered into Chinese as kuo)34 THE PHILOSOPHY OFTHE MlDDLE WAY

failed to attra.ct their attencion. What is denied is, therefore, not the arising of

an effect as ordinarily understood, but the arising.ofan effect that is already ex·

istent (sato arthmy11) or one that is non-existent (asato arthtJJya). These again

represent the identity (1atkarya) or the oon-identity (a..ratkarya) theories of

causation presented by the Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas.

Verses 7-10 represent the criticism of the four types of conditions referred to

at 1.2 as interpreted by the Sacvastivadins and the Sauttantikas. Ifthe 1at(existent) and a1at (non-existent) qualifying dharma (phenomena) are undetstood

as implying "the substantia1ly (1vabha11ato) existent and oon-existent," a

quatification that Nagarjuna often make~. then it will be easy to understand

the nature of Nagarjuna's criticism. This is especiaJJy so in verse 10 where, on the

surface, it appears that Nagarjuna was criticizing the Buddha's owo statement:

"When that exists, this comes to be," (t1Jmi'f?'l .rafidam bhavatt). However,

Nigarjuna was very careful in dealing with this stacement, for in the first line

he was explicit with regard to the sort of existence he was criticizing, that existence being none other that "substancial existence" (sat-ta).

Verses 11-14 deal with severa! other aspects of the theo.ry ofcausacion such as

the arising of an effect from a combination of conditions. lt is indeed the coocluding line of the last verse (1.14) that possibly can give rise to all the

inisunderstanding regarding Nagarjuna's analysis of causa! conditions. "In the

absence of the effect, whence can thece be a condition or a non-condition." lt is

easy to interpret this statement to-meao that Nagarjuna did not accept either a

cause or an effect that is dependent upon a cause. To take it as a sirople deniaJ

ofcause and effect would be to ignore evetytbing that Naga.rjuna has beeo t.ty·

ing to say earliet in the chapter, regarding self-nature (s11abhava) or substantial

or permanent ex.isteoce (sal). Thete seems to be no tationałe fot interpteting

this statemeot independent of the basie premises with which he set out on his

examinacion of conditions. To conclude; Whar is denied bere is not the simple

effect that depends upon the condltion or conditions for its acisiog, but an effecr rhat is either pre-existent, and therefore permanent, or oon-existent

because ie is not pre-existeot. It is also teasonable to assume that a siroilac

denial pertains not to a simple cause or condition but to a cause or condition

that produces an already existent or non-existent effect.

"Dependent arising" or casuaJity (pratftytZJamutpada) was, to reiterate, the

principle in terms of which the Buddha was able to explain the funccioning of

phenomeoa (dharma) without resorting to a conception of permaoent and eternaJ entity (nitya atman). In other words, dependent arislog explaios the impermanence (anityata) ofphenomena·that are dependently arisen (pratftytJJam1ttpanna) without which no identification of "dependent arising" is possibJe.

Bccause such phenomena acc dependently arise, they acc rmpecmanent

(anitya). Impermaneoce involves change and movement.lNTRODUCTION

2. Change or movement (gat'iigata). Chapter Il of the Klin'kiis is an attempt to

reconsider this conceptioo of impermanence, i.e., change or movement. Such a

reconsideration, Jike the examination of causality, w.as necessitated not by a

de.sire to transcend it but by a desire to return to the original teachings of the

Buddha. Herc too the watets were muddied by the speculations of the Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas. In the first instance, Nagarjuna was compelled

to re-examine the conception of causality because these two schools wece confronting eacb other as a result of the former's recognition of a self-nature or

substance (svabhava). Why did the conception ofself-na,ture emerge at all? As

we have seeo, the two schools had wrongly conceived of change and impermanence.

The Buddha descrihed time and temporality in a more empirical way when

he said tbat the arising of pheoomena, the change of what has come to be and

their cessation arc evident.67 The three temporaI petiods of past (affta), present

(paccuppanna), and furure (anagata) in rełatioo to phenomena were thus

tecognized. To refer back to the discoutse on "Linguistic Conventions" (Niruttip4tha) mentioned earlier, the Buddha even examined the three linguistic conventions (adhivacana) such as "existed" (ahost), "exists (attht) and "will exist"

(bhavissatt), pointing our that these should not be ignored.

However, in their enthusiasm to demarcate the boundaries of the three

periods of time, the Sarvastivadios and the Sautrantikas were led to an atomie

notion of time and temporałity,68 unaware of the dangers chat lay ahead of

them. [n order to overcome the clifficulties they faced as a result of their acceptance of an atomie conception of time, the Sarvastivadins were bold enough to

admit an underlying substance that remaios unchanged, eveo though they did

not (ealize that sucha docttioe was incompatible with the Buddha's notion of

non-substantlality (anatman). The Sautrantikas, on the contrary, denying such

a substance and claiming themselves to be the fafrhful interpreters of the

discoutses, stili maintained the momeotary destructioo (h.a11abhanga) of

phenomeoa. They did not realize that their conceptioo of the momentary

desttuction of phenomena was forcing them to recognize a subtle

transmigracing entity. Hence, they carne to be characterized by their opponents

as "transmigrationists" (saf!tkrantivadin).

Nagarjuna's attempt, therefore, was to show that a speculative notion of

time and tempor~ity such as the one emphasized by the Sautrantikas was not

an empirically justifiable one. A modern critic ofa simiJar conception of time,

Williamjames, has provided the following analysis: ·

In short, the practicaJly cognized preseot is no .knife-edge, but a

saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perchcd,36 TuE PHlLOSOPHY OF TiłE MIDDLE WĄY

and from which we look into two directions into time. The unit of

composition ofour perception of time is a duration. with a how and

a stera, as it were-a rearward- and a forward-Jooking end.69

The very first verse in Chapter II suggests the kind of movement or motion

that is under ctiticism: "What has. moved is not being moved."

For someone ro daim t~at what: has already moved ( =present), the underlying assumption is that eveo though there is a distinction in terms of temporality,

there is indeed the sense in which what is being moved in the present is not different from what, on an earlier occasion, was also in a state Óf moving. This can

easiły give rise to the view that phenomeoa are in a constant flux, a continuous

uninterrupted flow (santatz). While such an explanation may account for the

continuity of phenomena tha.t are analyscd into discrete events, it aL50 explains

the ideotity of cach inruvidual stream (santiina). This latter idea, carded to its

extrernes, led to the roetaphysical notion ofa subtle but substantial pcrsonality

(pudgala), neither 1dential nor differentfrom the a,ggregates (skandha). This is

the school of "pcrsonalists" (pudgalavada).

Thus, following the same method chat he adopted in criticizing the substantialist ootion of causality, Nagarjuna focuses his attention on the metaphysical

interpretacions of ideas of change and movement, without atternpting to deny

the cooccpts such as "the moved" (gata), "the not moved" (agata), or "the present moving" (gamyamana) perse. After a detailed analysis of the unhealthy

consequences of such metaphysical interpretations, Nagarjuna, in che end,

specifies the sort of view he is criticizing when he maintained:

An existing mover does not carry out the movement in any ofthe

three ways. Nei~er aoes a non-existiog mover carry out the movement in any of the three ways. Nor does a person carty out a movement, both existing and non-existing, in any of the ®ee ways.

Therefore, neither the morion, nor the mover, nor the space moved

is evident. (Il.24-2~ . )

The 'existing mover' (stlflbhuto gania) is indeed similar to the 'exitcot'

(bha11a) possessing self-nature (s11abha11a) which was criticized in the previous

chaper. The denial of morion, the mover 1 and the space moved is thus not a

categodcal denial but the denial of a substancialist interpretation of these

phenomena.

Even though the refutation of che subscantiaiist view of existence (bhava,

s11abha11a) remains- the primaty coocern in Chapters I and II, the ideas examined

in Chaptet I seen1s to be predominantly those of che Sarvastivada school, while

Chapter II seems to _conccntrate more on the teocts of the Sautrantikas, whoINTRODUCTLON 37

were mote aligned with the "transmigrationists" (.raft'k.rantivadin) and the

"personalists" (pudgalavadin).

The m ethod developed in these two chapters provides a large framework oo

the basis of which the innumerable concepts are analysed in the chapters that

follow.

Part II (Dharma-nairatmya)

As mentioned earliec, Cbapters lll and XV deal with almost all the major

Abhidharma categories that are treated under general rubric "dharma." Of

these various categories, the most irnportant are aggregates (.rk.andht1) .

faculties/spheres (indriyalayatana), and elements (dhiitu). T~is is the order iJł

which these are normally eoumerated. However, Nagatjuna was interested in

epistemoJogy, and therefore ie is natura! for hlm to take up the faculties (indriya) for examination at the very outset.

3. Faculties (indriya). Chapter !Il, verse 1, refers to the six faculties and their

spheres. Yet, there is oo denial ofany one of them. This roay be compared with

Nagarjuna's statement in Chapter 1, verse 1, chat refers to the four causaJ

tbeories, all of which ·were iostantly deoied. However, in verse 2, Nagarjuna

criticizes a parcicular defu1ition of ''seeing'' (darfatJa) and that definition involves "the perception·of itself" (.rvat1!J(Z11af!J darśanaft') . This undoubtedly is

the Indian version of the Cartcsian ':c;ogito" which led to the belicf in a perma·

nent and eternal self during the period of the Upani!ad.r;0 and continued to

flourish in the speculations of the later Indian philosophical schools.H lt rs the

defioition that p.coduced the most roetapbysical of ideas, such as the conception of the "inner controller" (antaryiimin) chat tums out to be the permanent

and eternal self or souJ (atman). Any form of perceptioo, fot them, involved

self-awareness as a necessary pre-condition, after which every ocher form of activity follow~. In fact, łater oo Nagarjuna devotes an entire chapter (IX) to an

examination of this notion ofan antecedent self. Whether this view influenced

the Yogacara conception of "self-perceiving consciousness" (s11a.raf{1vedaka-

11ijfifina) remaios to be scen. For Nagarju.na, however, sucha defioition was not

sat:isfactory, sioce it implies the conception of a substantiał entiry.

Here again. after ma.king a categorical denial of "śeeing" as "seeiog itsełf,"

Nagarjuoa procecds to draw the implication, as he did in his criticism of othcrnature (para-bh'iiva, 1.3) , that "if seeing cannot see itself, how caQ it see .

another?" Such a cridcism on the part of Nagarjuna would srill Jeave inract che

Buddha's owo expianatioo of perceptual experience in terms of the pciociple of

dependence (prafitya.ramutpada). Cn fact, it is for this reasoo that łater on38 THE PHILOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE Wt.Y

Niigiirjuoa was able to speak of visual perceprion (cak;ur-11ijflt1nt1) as a product

of causal dependence (sec XXVI.4).

The criricism of "seeing" (thrlt1na) in 111 .~ is similar to the criticism of causa!

condition in I. 5. Nigarguna assumes that the implicacion of the substantialist

notioo of "seeiog" is that "sceiog must always sec." Thus, if the Sarvastiviidins

wece to recognize a "self-natute" (wt1bhava) in "seeing" , then it could possibly

not be "not seeing" even on some occasions, for the very nature of sceing is to

~e . Therefore, when Nagiirjuna asserts that "tbere cannot be a non-seeing seeing'' (1111 tTj;afytlffliinaf!I- dańanaf!J), he was merely stating the substantialist definition of the Sarvastiviidins. Hence the second statemcnt "seeing sees' (thrlt1n11f!1.

p4iyat1) becomes a merc tautology and, as such, is not appropriate. The rest of

the chapter deals with a criticism of all forms of perception conceived in the

above manner , indicating tt"lt "grasping" (upatliina), etc. wilJ remain inexplicabłe in such a contcxt.

4. Aggregates (skandha). Of the five aggregates into which the human personality carne to be anałysed in the Budd.łUst tcadition, Nagarjuna takes up only

the first, namely, materiał form (ripa). .After expłaining Niigarjuna's treatm~nt of materiał form , Inada rightly remarks: "But all this does not mean that

neither rupa nor che elemencs cease to exist."'2 This confirms what we have said

about Nigarjuna's treatment of other concepts such as cause, effcct, morion, or

secing. However, lnada's expłanarion of the reason for this needs to be

qualified. He maintains: "Nigarjuna is only trying to exhibit the face that any

cooception or thing cannot be describcd by rcfcrencc to a simplc cause-effect

rclationship in order to escablish its existentiaJ status.'' On the contrary, it

seems that Nagarjuna may not have aoy difficułty in maintaining that there is a

simpłe cause-effect· relationship betweeo d1e four primary clements (manbliuta) and material form (riJpa), so Jong as char cause-effect relatiooship is

understood as one of dependence, which was the Buddha's owo view.n Yet,

what is being introduced herc is not such a simple theory of dependence of the

effcct upon the cause.

The conception of k'iir1111ti chat Nigarjuna refers to hcre is one of the six

causcs (hetu) referred to in the Sanskrit .Abhidbarma texts and interpreted by

the Sarviistivadins as a "unique cause," that is, "anything other than itsełf"

(s11ato 'nye Riira„ahe111f?). H In other words, it is any cause whose self-nacure is

different from that of the effect. The four grcat element.s (mahabhuta) depending upon ~hich the material form (nipa) comes to be would be the kiir111!11 of

materiaJ form. Yet as a k'iira'fa of materiał form it would be distinct from

_materiał form. lt is this panicular definition of ~'iira„a that is criticized by

Niigiirjuna. His reason for denyiog it is stated in IV.2: "lf materia! form is

scparatcd from the unique-cause of materiał form [i.e. the four great elemeots],fNTRODUCrJON 39

it would imply thar macerial form is without a cause (ahet11ka)." However,

Nagarjuna's empiricist and analytical approach does not allow him to recognize

an effect (artha) which is without a cause (ahetuka).

Existence (bh'ii11a), wbich Nagarjuna was ofreo criticizing iroplied selfexistence (s11ahha11a). The fact that the Sarvastivadins defined not only materiał

form, but also the other four aggregates-feeliog, perceptioo, disposition, and

consciousness-as self-exiStent entities (bh'iiva) is evident from Nagarjuna's

statement at IV.7. Thus, Nagarjuna's basie criticism of the Sarvastivadins in

this chapter is that they could not consistently speak of a unique cause

(karar,a), while at the same time recognizing a cause and an effect that arc

related by way of self-nature (svabhava). In other words, the notion of selfcausation (svatotpath) contradicts a "unique cause" (kara?Ja), for it is anythlog

other than itself.

5. Elements (dhatu). In the early Buddhlst tradition, the psychophysical personality was ~ysed into five agg,regates (skandha) in order to show that there

was no permanent spiritual entity or self (atman) as recognized by the traditional Indian phllósophers. Therefore, rhe psychic part of the personality was

analysed in detail. In order to refute the view of the Materialists that the eternal

entity is matter, not a spiritual or psychic entity, the Buddha once again analysed

the human personality into six elements (dhatu) witha detailed examinatioo of

the physical part of the persooality. 'rhus we have the category of ełements consisting ofearth {Prth111) , water (apm) , fue (tejm), air (vayu), space (akafa) and

consciousness (vijńiina). ·

While the cooceptlon ofa "unique cause" (karafła) was iotroduced in the ex.

amination of the aggrcgates (skandha), the notion of"characteristics" (lakfal'Jtl)

is brought into the analysis of elements (dhatu}. Though the term

"characteristic" (Pali lakRhaf!a) occurs in the eady discourses, there it is not used

in the rnetaphysical sense in which it carne to be empłoyed by the Sarvastivada

school. For ·the Sarvastivada, a characteristic (lak,a„a) represented the changing

.aspect of an entity (dhtlf'l1t4), while self-nature (svabhiiva) stood for the un·

· changing and eternal aspect. This particular notion of "charactetistic" needs to

be kept in rniod when analysing the cootents of Chapter V.

A "characteristic" is cvaluated here in relation to an existent (bhiva) which

posscsses self-nature (svabhava). For the Sarvastivaclins, this existent was a

dharma. Hence, very often we find Kumarajfva utilizing the tecmfa (= dharma), in its restricted sense, to render bhava(yu), which is an indication that he

too was aware of the nature of the concept analysed by Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna's

major endeavor hece is to demonstrate the difficulties that ar.ise when speaking .

ofcharact.eristics (lak,a11a) in relatioo to eternaJ or absolute existence (bh411a} as

well as nihilistic non-existencc (abhava).40 THB PHU.OSOPHY OF TiłE MIDDLE WAy

This analysjs becomes all the more 'important because of the way bhava and

abhava are treated hece. Nagarjuna's condusion is sigi:iificant: "Those people

of łitde inrelligence who perceive the existence (t11tilva) as we11 as the nonexistencc (nastii-va) of existents (bhava) do not perceive the peaceful appeasement of the object (dratfavya)"(V.8).

In .the Buddhist text:S, including the Karika, we read more often about the

· appeasement of obscssion (prapaflcopasama). However, for the first time,

Nigarjuna introduces the nocion of the appeasement of the "object"

(dra1tavyopaiama). Why?

It was mencioned eadier that the Buddha's ruscourse oo the aggregates (skandha) was incended to refuce the nocion of a spiritual self (atman) and the

discourse on ełemencs (dhatu) was meant to reject the notion of.a materiał self

or eteroal matter. If this supposition is correct, we have no difficulty in

understanding the reasons fot Nigatjuna's introduction of the idea of appeasing the object. The objects of perception associated with the first five sense

faculties a.re materia!. If the Materialists wece looking for a self(atman) in matter and the Sarvascivadins wece looking fór .a seJf-narure (svabhava) in the

same, the best advice a oon-substantialist like Nigarjuoa could give such pe~

ple is to "vaporize or liquify" the object, and avoid grasping afcer ie. For Nigarjuna, there was no difference becween self(atman) and self-nature (svabhava).

While they carry the same philosophical impUcatioos, their praccical consequences are also similar, in that both lead to grasping and, therefore, suffering.

Abandoning grasping (upadana) for the object, one elin1inates the

metaphysical beliefs pettaining to eternal existence ("stitva) and oihilistic nonexistence (nastat1111). Hence the emphasis on che appeasement of the object. lndeed, "the appeasement of the object" (drartavyopafama) is the means by

. which one can realize the ''oon-substantiatity of phenomena" (dharmanairii.tmya) and it does not mean the ełiminatioo of the object.

Unleśs one were to keep in mind this particular cootext in which Nagarjuna

was emphasizing the "appeasement of the object," ie would be easy to assume

that here Nigarjuna was justifyiog idealism (11ijfiana11ada). Candr~rci's comments, unfortunately, lead to such unwarranted condusioos.n

6. Lust (raga). The Buddha coosidered lust (raga) to be the cause of most of the

llls of life, the worst of these being bondage. Freedom (niroaf!a) was th'us defined

as absence of Just (vairagya). Not ooly did he speak of!ust and absence of Iust,

he also often spoke of people who are lustful (rakta) and free from lust

(virakta). Yet, all such statements were made with no assumpcion of a co.ocealed

substaoce (svabhava) or of a mysterious spiricual or materia! personality. The

analyscs offaculties (indriya), aggregates (skandh4) , and elements (dhatu) were

. .intended to demonstrate rhe futility of such assumptions. However. the Sar-INTRODUCTION 41

vascivadins conceived of a su.bstaoce in every element, while the Sautrantikas

posited a mysterious personality. Therefore, it became necessacy for Nagarjuna

to examine the concepts of lust (raga) as wełl as the lustful (rakta). A varicty of

unsatisfactory implicatioos tbat arise out of the SarVastivada and Sautriiotika

interpretations is clearly presented in Chapter VI, with the cooclusion: "Tuus,

with or without the lustful, !ust is not established. Like lusr, aJI things. with or

without [accompanirnents], arc not established."

Once again, we sboułd not focget the fact chat the dharmas referred to herc

are those that were recognized by the Buddhist metaphysicians, not the empirical phenomcna as defined by the Buddha and the earJy Buddhists.

7. Conditioned(saft"krta). The carly discourses referred to three characteristics

of the conditioncd (sa1{Jskrta). 76 Tbese wece arising (ul/iiida), change of what

has come to endurc (Jthitasya anyath'iil11a), and ceasing (vyaya). In a similiar

discourse, a definition of the "uncooditioned" (aiaf!Jskrta) is providcd and, in

this case, it is said chat the three characteristics mentiooed above arc not evident. It was, tberefore, easy for some of the later ·auddhists to Jeap to the

conclusion rhac the "uncooditloned" is aJso uncaused or independent

(apralityasatnutpanna). This, evidentły, was the intention of the Sarvastivada

commcntator, Ya.Somiua, when he stated thar the terms ''conditioned"

(sar.Mkrta) and "dependent" (prafityasamutpanna) are synonyms.n Yet, fcom

other statements in the discourses, it is elear that this was not the case. For example, white the threc teims 11ni&ca (impermanent), Ifl?!Ukrta (conditioned),

and pralilyasam111panna (dependent) occur togethcr (though not as

synonyms), co explain the naturc of the wotld ,11 , of their negativc forms onJy

abhuta and asa'!Joskrta (together with t1Jala, and akrta1?) arc used to

characte1·1ze nirvana. The negative form ofpra!ityaiamutpanna does not occur.

For this reasoo, it can be maintaincd that the term saftUkrta has the specific

meaning of"dispositiooally conditioned," and is not idencicaJ in meaning with

the term prafflya1a11'11tpan11a ("dependent").

Not only did the Buddhist mctapbysicians ignore this subde distinction and

considered the concepts of "conditioned" and ''dependent'' as being identicaJ,

they also explained the "conditioned" in terms of their metaphysicaJ notions of

substam.:e and theit speculative notion of temporality referred to carlier. Nagarjuna's Ieogtby chapter oo the subject of "The Conditioned'' (Sal'!Mkrta, VII)

draws out all the implicatioos·of such metaphysics.

Mter rejecting the metapbysicaJly conceived notions of arising (utp1ida) and

along with ie all other related concepts such as "the present arising'' (ut·

padyamiina) and "non-arising'' (an11tpada) , comparing all of them to the nocions of "the moved" (gata), "the not moved" (aga/a), and "the presenc moving" (gamyamiina)(Vll.14) which he had previously criticized. Nagarjuna42 TuE PHILOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE W AY

mak.es a vety significant statement at Vll.16: "Whatever that comes to be

dependently, that is inherently peaceful. Thecefore, chat which is presently

arising as wełł as arising itself arc peaceful."

In the fiest place, hece thece is no denia1 of arising (utp'iida) or that which

is presently arising (utpadyamtina). By implication, there is no denial of cessatioo (vyaya) either. Sccondly, there is no denia1 of "dependent arising''

(prafiyasam'utpada) or that which is dependently arisen (prafftya yad yad

bhavalt). On the contcary, there is a very significant assertion: "Whatever is

dependently ariseo is inherently peaceful." Explaining the "elements" (dhatu)

in a previous chaptet (V), Nagarjuna has shown how the belief in ett:cnal existence (astitva, bh'iiva) and nihilistic non-cxistence (n'iistitva, abhava) lead to

the unfortunate consequences such as grasping (upadiina) and, thecefore, suffering (dul/kha). The avoidance of such pcrspectives and the adoption of the

view that things arise and pass away dependently (prafftya) were considered by

the Buddha and the early Buddhists as well as Nagarjuna as being "łnherently

peaceful" (s·vabha11atal/ śiinla'f!").

The significaoce ofthe use ofthe term sflabliiifla in the above context should

not go unnoticed. The term wabha11a as weU as its adverbia! use, s11abhato asti,

especially when qualifying existence, was condemned by Nagarjuna

throughout the work. However, in the present verse he was willing to use this

very same term in an adjectival sense, qualifying śanta (peaceful).

The concepts of "the conditioned" and "the unconditioned'', perceived in

terms of substancial cxistcnce, arc rejected herc, and the notions of arising,

ducacion, and ceasing, similacly conceived, arc also abaodoned as beiog illusory.

8. Action and agent (karma-k11mka). While "depenaently arisen (pratTtytJJamutpanna) phenomcna imply a process of natura1 occurence "uncondfrioned by dispositiooaJ teodencies1' (tJJaf!Jskrta) on the part of human

beings, "dispositiooally conditioned" (s(J1(Zskrta) pbenomena are the .results of

human deliberations (saf!Zskiira) or accions (karma). For this reason, after clari:-

fying the notions 9fthe "conditioned" and the "unconditioned," it was natu.tal

for Nagarjuna to take a look at the notions of action (karma) and agent

(k"iirt1ka). If these two wete found to be real in a substantialist sense, theo the

lengthy analysis of "conditioned" phenomeoa in the previous t.hapter would

appear faulty. .

Therefore, Nagarjuna begins with a substa.ncial agent (sadbhuta kiiraka) who

performs a substantia11y existing action (sadbhuta karma) and his analysis

demonstrates chat such an agent as well as such an action, in face, logicailylead

to a denial of action (kriy'ii), agent (kartr) as well as a cause (kiiraf/a).lNTRODUCflON 43

Verse Vlll.5 represents an u nequivocal assertion on the part of Na.garjuoa

rhat such a substantialist view not only leads to the denial of action, etc., but

also co an.abandoning of discrimlnations and distinctions such as good (dht1rma) and bad (adha-rma) that are so relevant to the Buddha's conception offruits

(phala) of life, both worldly ( = heavenly, svarga) and ultimate ( = freedom

from suffering, mok[a). Not only the goał or fruit of life, butaJso the pach that

leads thereto or all the accions that produce such fruits, would thereby be

rendered useless or meaningless (nairarJhakyaf!J). -. · ·

The statement at Vlll.12 that both action and agent arc dependentły

(pralitya) acisen and that there is oo other perceivable mannec in which these

could be' estabłished (nanyat paśjiimaf? siddhikaraf!af!J) stands as an eloquent

testimony to Nagatjuna's vindication of the empirical standp.oint of the Buddha and of earły Buddhism.

'

9. Antecedent stale (of the self) (purva). If there were to be no subscantial ac:

cioo and agent, exc:ept the empirically gjven action and agent which are the

results of dependence, ho\V is it that metaphysiciańs carne to assume the existence of such an eteroal self or persooality?

Io Chapter IX, Nagarjuoa uodertakes to show how the beliefin a pecmanent

and eternal entity arises as a result of the recognition of the exiscence of a person.ality prior (purva) to his experieoces such as seeing, heariog, and feelings

(IX.1). In other words, the Buddhist metaphysicians, foUowiog a method

similar to tbat adopted by Descartes in Western phiJosophy, were positjng a

substantiaJ eatity and theu p.rocecding to attriburc the funccions ofseeing and

hearing to tbat entity. It is hard to believe that a philosopher like Nagarjuna

was unaware that the Buddha's notion of non-substaotiality (anat1114n) was the

direct result of his rejeccion of such a perspective, vety clearly expressed by the

Buddha in a passage in the Sutta-nipata: "Let bim' destroy the eocire root of

obsession, [oamely, the belief) 'I think, [therefore] I am," (mantii asm"itz). 80

This indeed is an unequivocaJ rejectioo of the ucogito ergo sum" (1114ntfi

asmz) wbich contrihuted to the substantialist thought of the Upani/ads as well

as later Indian thought. Nagarjuna's arguments shows how self-destructive

such an assertioo is. The implication ofthis assertion, as Nagarjuna perceives, is

that such a personality has to be separated from the experieoces that emerge

subsequently. Nagarjuoa wants to know how sucha personałity could be made

known (parjfJapyate) independent of such experiences (IX.3) thus implying

that the sum (aham a.rmz) is tlependenc. If rhese experiences can be separated

from the personałity, it follows that they could occur eveo witbout sucha persooałity (IX,4).

Having explained cettain ocher implications of this metaphysical position, aJJ

of which he considers to be uosatisfactory, Nagarjuna maiotains tbac with44 THE PHILOSÓPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

regard to such a personality the concepts of existence and non-existence are not

validly applicable.

10. Fire andfuel (agritndhana). The futility of employing the example of the

fire (agnt) and fueł (indhana) in order to ilłustrate the relationship between a

substantial action and a substantial agent is shown in Chapter X. It is indeed

the. most important metaphor used by the substantialists to establish the conception of a metaphysical person. The manner in which che Pudgalavadias

utilized this metaphor is explained .in detail by Vasubandhu in the final

chap ter ofhis Abhidharmakośa-bh'?i!Ja (see annotation on Chapter X). Finally

he refuses to recognize those who admit the reality of a self(atman, pudgala) as

weU as those who uphold discrete substaorial entities (bhava), as people who

are conversant with the true meaning of the Buddha's teachings (X.16). It is

elear that the reference herc is not to the non-Buddhist metaphysicians, but

rather to the Buddhist metaphysidans who claimed themselves to be the tt:ue

interpreters of the Buddha-word, oamely the Sautrantikas ( =pudgąlavadins)

and the Sarvastivadins ( =svabhavavadins).

11. Prior andposterior ends (p'iirv'iiparako{t). The refutation of the prior existence of a substantial being or entity would stili leave open the question

regard.ing the beginning and end of things. Speculations regarding the beginning (purva-koti) wd the finał end (apara-koµ) have occupied the atteation of

phiJosophers from the dawn of bistory. These speculatioas have given risc to a

wide variety of beliefs, one of which is the substantial cxistence ofa being (such

as God) or an ultimate entity (such as pricnordial maner, pr~rti, sometimes

referred to as svabhava).81 Realizing the epistemological problems involved in

these speculations, the Buddha refraioed from mak.ing an.y state01ents regard~

ing such issues.

Chapter XI ,is iątended to explain the Buddha's attitude towards such ques·

tions.. Nagarjuna was aware that the Buddha refused to make any statements

about the prior end of the life-process. Hence his statement: "The Great Sage

has dedared that the prior end of the life-process is not known" (XI. I).

However, the Sanskritization of the Prakrit cerm anamalagga (= "inconceivable

is rhe beginnmg") as t1na11aiiigra ( = "wirhout beginning and end") had already

appeared in the Buddhist texts that Nagarjuna was familiar with.82 Taking this

lattet version of the Buddha's statemeot, Nagarjuna maintains that there is

neither a beginning nor an end, whereas the Buddha's own statement perta.ined to the epistemologica1 difficulties.

Yet, Nagarjuoa's ingeouity was such that he was able co indicate the Jogical

difficu1ties involved in any denial of either the beginning or the end. For he

finds that "no middle can be conceived of chat which is without beginning orINnoouCTioN 45

end" (XI. 2). Because of such logical difficulties, he maintains that prior and

posterior as well as sjmultaneous srates (ofSPf!l-s'iira) arc not appropriate, These

logkal difficulties arise primarily becauc entities are conceived of in. a rather

substantialist way. Thus, ifbirth were to be considered as being prior to old age