Trung Luan(2)

and death, and birtb as well as old age and death are substantial, thar is, existiog in their owo nature (svabhava), then there will be birth without old age

and death, which implies immorrality (XI.3). Moreover, ifthey were to be se!fex.istent, there would be no causa! connection between them (Xl.4). Similar

logical difficulties arise if they wete considered as being simultaneous.

While the Buddha was unwilling to cliscuss the absolute origin and end of

the life-process (saf!J-sara) and yet continued to speak of things arising and passing away on the basis of causa! dependence, Nagarjuoa bad to deal with che

notion of the life-process interpreted in a more substantialist way by the Buddhist metaphysicians. Thercfore, after ma.king the remark that the prior end of

s<1f!1-satt1 is not evident, a position upheld by the Buddha himself, Nagarjuna .

proceeds to maintain that "the pciot end of all existents is also not evident"

(sarve1am qpi bh'iivfinaf!J-pur:v'ii ko# na vidyate, Xl .8), theteby rejecting all the

views of the substanriaJists. ·

12. Suffen'ng (du'1kha). After analysing the nature of e.xistence and a.doping a

middle position between the two extreme views presented by his fellow Buddhist phi1osophers, Nagarjuna focussed his anention on the problem ofhuman

suffe.ring (duf7kh11). Herc again, it is difficult to believe that Nigarjuna was

unaware of the statements of the Buddha as .recorded in the Nikayas and

Aga.mas. His analysis of suffering follows ex:actly the line that was followed by

the Buddha in the Acela-kau11pa-sutt11 of the Samyutttt-nikaya. 0 Herein, when

a disciple by na.me Kassapa quesd.oned che Buddha as to whether suffering is

self-caused (sayat?t kataf!l- dukkhaf!J-), the Buddha, without saying: "l t is not so"

(no h'etaf!l-), wbich is a formal negation, merely remarks that "he should not

speak so," or "shoułd not put it that way" (ma h'evllf!J). Kassapa elicits the same

response from rhe Buddba when he questions him as to whetber "suffering is

caused by another" (paraf!l- kataf!J- dukkhaf!l-) or whethet it is "caused by both

selfand other'' (sayaf!l- katan caparaf!J- katan ca) or whether it is "caused neither

by oneself nor by another" (asayaf!J-k'ifraf!J- aparaf!l-k"iiraf!J-) and, therefote, of

"spontaneous origin" (adhiccasamuppannar?Z)·

The reason why the Buddha discoutaged Kassapa from reflecting oo the

cause of suffering in this manrlet was that he felt thac the first two views led to

beliefs in permanence (sassata) and anojhiJation (11cch~da) respectively. In the

background in which the Buddha preached , to say that "one acts and the same

person experiences the consequences" (so karotisopafis1111P11ediyat1) implied the46 THE PHILOSOPHY Ol' THE MIDDLE WAY

existeoce ofan eternal soul or self, and to maintain that "one acts and another

expedences the coosequences" (ańfJo karoti anńo parisa111vediyatt) was taken to

mean annihilation, that is, absence of any connection between act and consequence. This was tantamount to a denial of morał responsibility. Avoiding

these two extremes, the Buddha explained the rdation between action and consequences as one of dependence.

lt wouJd be necessacy to keep in mind that in the above context the Buddha

was not denying the four theories of the causation of suffering. He was merely

stating that the theories as presented were not sacisfactory, because of the implications drawn by the metaphysicians. However, a.Ęter warn.ing that one

should avoid such implications and explaining the dependence óf such

phenomena, the Buddha used similar linguistic expressions in order to explain

his view of the causation ofsuffering. Recognizing one's responsibility for one's

owo actions, he was even wilłing to say: ''An action is performed by oneself'

(attan'li va kataf!t kammaf!t) 184 so long as one does not assuroe the existence of a

metaphysical agent or ignore any other factor chat contributes to the situation.

Following the same method, Nagarjuna (Xll. l), instead of denying these

possibilities, merely says that tbey are not proper (na yujyate). The reason for

this is that "if [suffetlngJ were to be considered self-caused, theo ie will not be

dependeotly arisen" (Xll.2). Here then is a distinction between self-causatioo

and dependence, a distinction based upon the assumption or the nonassumption of a metaphysical agent respectively. Therefore, Nagarjuna maintains: "These aggregates appear dependent upon these other aggregaces."

However, this latter view should not be takeo as meaning "enernal causation"

(parakrta).

Subsequently Nagarjuna proceeds co show the logical difficulties involved in

accepting either self-causatioo ot externaJ causation. And this criticism is then

applied to the self-causation or external causation ofany other existent (bhava).

13. Dispositions (sa~kara) . The Buddha never claimed that all phenomena

(dharma!?) lead to suffering (duf?kha). For him, all dispositions (sa7[>skaral;) or

everything conditioned by dispositions (sar.mkrta) are subject to suffering or are

unsatisfactory. 8 , Thus, after explaining the concepcion ofsuffering, Nagarjuna

deems it necessary to discuss the conception of dispositions (saf!tJkara). Chapter

XIII is devoted to this question.

The noo-absolutist standpoint of early Buddhism is clcarly manifest in the

Buddha's rejection of·the sharp dichotomy between truth (ratya) and falsehood

(asarya) recogn.ized in the Indian philsophical tradition. lnstead of the

true/false dich'?tomy, the Buddha spoke of trutb (s{leca = satya) and confusioa

(musi = mrf'li),86 indicating thereby that he was not advocating a notio1.1 ofab-lNTilODUCTlON 47

solute or ultimate truth, comparable to the Atman/Brahman of the preBuddhist traditions.

Nagarjuna was faithfully following the Buddha and the carly Buddhists

when he bcgan his analysis of•·dispositions" (saf(tskiira) with a reference to chis

idea of "confusion" (mrfa). The relationship between "dispositions" and "confusion" needs to be carefully examined before any attempt to understand the

Budcłha's as well as Nagiirjuna's disquisition on the nature of dispositions.

A careful reading of the early discourses will reveal that dispositions are an

ioalienable part of the human personality. In the case of. an ordinary

unenlightened person, they are not eliminated even at death. ,Bence the

possibility of his being reborn. However, they arc completely eJiminated in the

tathagata when he attains parinirtia11a, that is, when he dies. Yet, there is no

mention of the dispositiońs being completely eliminated in the eólightened

one (b1uldha, tathagata) while he is stili ałive . What is achieved with the at·

tainment of freedom (niroaf!a) is the "appeasement of dispositions"

(saf!Zskiiropafama). This very subtle distinction will become extremely impor·

tant when we try to underscand Nagarjuna's treatment of "dispositions"

(saf!Z.rkara) in the present chapter.

WilliamJames explains human knowledge and µnderstanding in the follov.•'-

ing maoner: "The iotellectual life ofman coosists almostwholly in his substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which "his experience

otiginally comes."87 Elaborating upon this statement, he says:

The subsrirucion of concepts and their connections, of a whole

concepcural order, in short, for the immediate perceptual flow ,

thus widens enormously our mental panoram.a. Had we no concepts

we should live simply "getting" each successive moment of expericnce, as the sessile sea-anemone on its rock receives whatever

nourishment the wash of the waves may bring. With concepts we

go in quest ofthe absent, meet the remote, actively tuto this way or

that, bend our experience, and make it tell us wicher it is bound.

We change its order, run it backwards. bring far bits together and

separate near bits, jump about over its surface instead of ploughing

through its continuity, string its stems oo as many diagrams as our

rnind can frame.

Unless we attribute "omnisc~ence" (sproajńata) to the Buddha, and chat is

knowledge of cverything that has occurred, is ocurring and will occur in this

world, a knowledge he refused to claim for himself,88 we may end up turning

him into a "sessilc sea-anemone," if we are to deny bim the need to conceptualize. In this process of conceptualizing, in "putting things together'' (which48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

is the litera! meaning of sa'T!"Riira), our interests play a dominant role. lncerests

arc easily converted to likes and dislikes, and tbese lattet arc causes of most

human suffering. We are, therefore, in a double-bind. We need the S!Jf!Jsliiiras

in order to live. On the contrary, they can contcibute to most of out sufferLng

(du/?kha).

Realizing this·face, the 'Buddha emphasized the need to pacify our dispositions rather than eliminate them compłeteły. Thu~ , on the basis ofexpericnce

we come to know that things arc "depcndentły arisen" (prafftyasamutpanna)

and then adopt the view that in the dim past this may have been the case and

thac in the future it may be che case.

In the cyes of the Buddha this represencs a moce comprcheosive and,

thereforc, amore appropriate view (samyag-dr1ti) rathcr than the morc limited

views: (1) which says: "Suffering is self-caused" (svayaf{Jkfla'f?i), which is the

resułt of our believing in a self (atman) to the exdusion of every other factor,

and (2) which says: "Suffering is caused by another" (dul/khaf!J parakrtaf!J),

which is, in somc sense, the rcsult of out reluctance to admit our own rcsponsibility. ln both cases, out likes and dislikes havc domioated our dispositions,

and heocc our pcrspeccivc~ push us in two cliffctent d.irections. Such dispositioos1 domioated by our lik.es and dislik.es, evenrually misłead us regarding

many of our experjences and thereby contribute to out suffedng and frustta·

tions. In the Buddha's Yiew, therefore, the cessarion of sufferiog issynonymous

with ''non-grasping" after views89 which comes about as a result of the appeasement of dispositions.90 Cessation of suffering is notsynooymous with not having views or not having dispositions. Ratber, it is synonymous with the appeasement of dispositioos.

lt is very appropriate, therefote, that Nigarjuna decided to wcite fł chapter

on the dispositions (sa1!1-Skara) after his analysis of suffering (duh.kha).

However

1 what is m oce important is that this chapter is eotirely devoted to an

examination of "views" (dr'!tc) as wełł as of the condition that give rise to

"wrong-" ot "coofused views" (mithya dr1ft), narody, confusion (mrfii). In

fact, the term saf!Jskara ~curs in the first verse only.

The encire chapter is devoted to an examination of the notions of the "existent" (bhava), the ''non-existent" (abhiiva), "self-nature" (111abha11a), etc. and

the mannet in which these could be avoided by adopting the conception of

"emptiness" (Junyafii), wfrhout allowing that notioo of emptiness to be an

obsession. Heoce his condusion; "The Victorious Ones have announced that

emptiness is the rełinquishiog of all views. Those who are possessed of the view

of emptiness are said to be incorrigible."

We have rendcred the tetro ni4sara1}a occurting in the above verse as "relinquishing" in order to bring out the specific meaning that Nagarjuoa probably

had in miod. Many ioterprcters of Nigarjuna havc explained "erriptiness"INTRODUCTIO!ll 49

(fUnyafij) as a "provisional view," theteby impłying thac the uJtimate truth is

beyond conceptualization.91 The foregoing analysis of che Buddha's as well as

Nag2rjuna's thoughts would mean that they inde~ did noc recognize a "noocoocepruaJ truth or reality." For them, thcre is oo way in which a ''truth" could

be understood oon-conceptually, because, as meotioned earlier, truth in its

most comprehensieve sense pertains to statements and thus involves conceptuałization. However, conceprualizations can be compreheosive and therefore

right (sa1nyak), or limited and confused and therefore wrong (mithyi), and

these depend upon the amouot ofprcjudice thac has gooe into the formulation

of the conceptS. Thus, "emptioess" is a "view," a view not without identification, but which is identified wirh "the empty" (idaf!Z.'fitnya1p). lt is a view that

hcłps the indjvidual to attain freedom from views and upholding it as the absolute or ultimate truth without any reference to "the empty" would be the last

thiog either the Buddha or Nigarjuoa would advocace.

14. Association (Ia1'(Jsarga). The dispositioos arc inscrumental in our forming of

views on the basis of experience. It was also poinced out tbat if we wece not to

formulate such views we wouJd be no different from the sessile sea-anemone.

Dependent arising (prafftyasamutpiida), impermaoence (anityata), nonsubstaotialicy (an'iilmatii), emptiness (śinyata), etc. arc all coocepts which

would be .rendered meaningless unłess they wece to be identified with the

"dcpendeotly" ariscn," "the impermanent," "the non-substantial," and "the

cmpcy" given to us in experience. They arc vicws or theories formułated by

stretching out our experiences into the dim past as welł as the future.

However, some of the Buddhist mecaphysicians, as explained earlier, had

complicated the siruation for Nigarjuoa by chcir analysis of experience into

discrete momentacy events. Such as analysis, which led to the formulation of

the metaphysicaJ oocion of self·narure (S11abh'iiva), also created other problems

chat these metaphysicians were never able to solve satisfactorily. O ne of rhem is

che distioction they made becweeo mind (citta) and matter (mpa). In chcic

ultimate coruticution, chese were explained as having completely discinct

narures (s11abha11a). Mind was considered co be im-macerial (a·rnPa) and maccer

was looked upon as bcing non-mental (a-citta).

Avoiding such a reductive analysis, early Buddhism was able to maintaio tbat

depending upon the eye. the visible form, and consciousoess perception (saf(l·

jfla) ariscs.92 However, follo:wing that reduccive analysis, the Buddhisc

mctaphysic.ians experienced difficulty in explainiog noc onły perceprual ex·

perience, but also conceprual formuJation of such pen:eprual expericnce.

This accounts for the need to have a chapcer on "associacioo" (sa1'(1Sarga)

following che chapcer on the "dispositioos" (stlf(l.fkiilrl). How is it possibłc to bring~o THE PHTLOSOPHY OFTHJl. MIDDLE WAY

together into association (saf?Zsatga) the objecc (drlJ.!favya) and the subject

(draf!r) in order to have a visual perception (darśana)? Nigarjuna begios this

chapter with a denial ofsucha possibility. Io doingso he is specifically denying

the possibility of an association of evencs that ace considered to be ułcimacely

distinct, and this idea is being emphasized in Kumarajiva's translation of

XlV. 1. The problems of idencity and difference chat arise as a result of such a

reductive analysis are once again deatly brought our in this chapter.

15. Selfnature (s11libh1111a). The problem of associacion (saf'!JJarga), discussed

above in the specific context of seer, objecr of seeiog, and seeing, arose as a

result of admittiag a self-nacure (svabhava) in each one. of these phenomena.

This provided Nigarjuna with an opportunity to come into grips with the most

difficulc issue he had to deal with, self-nature or substance. In our earłier

discussions we have shown how the Sarvascivadins utilized thls conception to

explaio the relationship between a cause and an effect, Nagarjuna's basie argument against this notion of self-nature js that it contradicts the conceptioo of

the occutrence (saf!Jbhava) of an event depending upon causes and conditions

(bett~, pratyay4). Nagarjuna's understanding of self- namre is that it is not

·made (akrtaka) by anything clse. It is not dependent upon causes and conditions for its existeoce; hence independent. A "caused substaoce," according to

bim, is a contradiction in terms. This analysis should, therefore, be suppleme.nted by bis analysis in Chapter I. As we have pointed out there, Nagarjuna was not denying eithe.r dependently arisen pbenomena or dependent atising. He was merely showing the inconsistency in explaining causalły conditioned

phenomena in terms ofself-natute. lt is in the presentchapter tbat he is giving

a definition of self-nature that contradicts the ootlon of dependent arising or

causation. He says: "lndeed, an unmade self-nature is also non-contingent

upon another," (akrtn'm.al/ svabhavo hi nirapekfai{ paratra ca) (XV.2). The

argument in Chapter I is tben repeated to show that in the absence of selfnature, thete can.not be other-natute (parabhava). Buddha's faroous discourse

to Katyayana, discussed at length at the beginning of this lnrroduction, is then

quoted in order to reject the "existent" (bhiva) or "self-nature" (svabhava) and

the "non-existent'' (abhava) or "other-nature" (parabh1iva). These thcn arc

aligned with views regarding existence (astitva) and non-existence (nastitva) .

Existence (astitva) is funher defined as the original or primordiał existence

(prakrtt), a conception developed in the Siinkhya school of Indian philosophy

which had close affinity, ifnot identity, with the Sarvastivada conception ofexistence. The empirical and logicaJ difficulties iovolved in this conception are

then laid bace. Reiteration of the face that the beliefs in self-nacure and other:-

nature, in the ccistent and the non-ex.isteot. in existence and oon-existence,lNTRODUCTION )1

lead to bcliefs in permanence and aonihilation respectively provides a co.ntlusion to this rather significanc chapter.

The topics taken up for discussion in this seccion (Chapters Ul-XV), as

pointed out above, deaJ with elemencs of experience (dharma) which were

originalły explained in terms of dependence , but which were complicated by

the introduction of the notions of self-narure (svabhava) and other-narure

(parabh'iit!a), of metaphysicał identity and absohae difference, by some of the

. later Buddhists. Nagarjuoa's attempt in this section was mainly difected at get·

ting rid of the cooception ofsclf-nature or idcotity (the notions of other-nature

or differcncc falling apart as a result). This is the way in which he attempted to

estabłish the noo-subscantiality of clements (dharma- nairatmya). The nonsu bstantiałicy of the human personalicy (pudgala-nairalmya) turns out to be his

next cooccrn.

PART 111 (Pudgalt1-nairal11J.ya)

16. Bondage and release (Bandhana-mokfa). The recognicion of a permanent

and eternaJ self (atman), even though it raised epistemologicaJ difficulties,

enabled the early Indian thinkers to expłain many ideas łike karma a.od survival, bondage and release, in a more comfortable way. The Buddha's deniaJ of

sucha metaphysicaJ enticy gave rise to cnormous philosophical problcms. The

questioo was often raised: "Which self will be touched (or affected) by actions

performcd by a non-self. "9l So long as the docttine of dependent arising was

understood properly, the Buddhists coułd consistently descirbe the manner in

which a person may be said to perform an action and reap its consequences.

However, as emphasized earlier, the Buddhist metaphysicians created moce

problems with theit interprecacion~ of dependence chan they solved. These

n1ecaphysical views were foremost in Nagarjuoa's miod when, after examining

the probłems relating to suffering, etc., he proceeded to analyse the problems

of bondage and release (bandhana-mokfa), action and consequence (karmaphala), and so on.

Bondage (bandhana) can be of severaJ sorts. Human be.ings arc fettered by

the pleasant objects they perceive, the ideas they form, and finally the process

of becoming (bhava) itself. Craving for becoming (bhava-tr!?J'i) is looked upon

in Buddhism as one of the most troublesorne bonds. This craving for becomiog, while leading to suffering in the presenc life, kceps the individual wandering in samsaric existence, subjecting him to repeated births and dearhs.

Dcach, pcrsonificd as Mara, carries with it a snare (pasa) which very few52 THE PHILOSOPłJY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

humans can escape. The present chapter, therefore, focusses its attention on

this bondage to the life-process.

Wh.ile the discussion of the Sarvastiviida conceptio~ ofsclf-nature (wabhava)

1ingers along in the ncxt few chapters, the Sautrantika theory of a

transmigrating personality (pudgala) emerges into prominence in the present

section. When it is said that ''dispositions transmigrate" (.raf!U/iaral/ saf!Uaranft), what is assumed is chat there is a subtle essence in the dispositions that

enabłe them to be perpetuated. Niigarjuna's argument herc is more diałecticał.

lf dispositions arc permanent, then therc is oo point in speaking of their

transmigration. For, transmigration implies moving from one position to

anothcr, disappearing in one place and appearing in another. If something is

permancnt, it is always present and thcre- is no quescion of its ceasing and arising. On the conuary, if thiogs arc impermanent, in the sense of being compkcdy destroyed (11ccheda), they will never transmigrate. Nagarjuna,

therefore, .maintains that jf a human being is Jooked upon in the above manner. ir is not possible to speak of his 'cransmigration (XVI.1).

The impression one gets from the available uaoslatioos of XVI.2 is that

Niigarjuna rejects the theories ofaggregatc:s (skandha), faculties (fiyata.na), and

elements (dhitu).94 Yet, what is <leady stated herc is che early Buddhist posi·

tion: "lt may be assumed that a person transmigrates. Yet such a person,

sought for in the flvefold way, in the aggregates, spheres and dements, does

not exist. Who then will transmigrate?"

Thus, the transmigration chat is denied is chat of a subtłe personality.

However, if transmigracion is understood as the contiouation of the faccors of

the human personality on the basis of causal dependcnce, Nagarjuna may not

have any objection against it.

The notion of bondagc that is ,criticizc:d tutns out to be the bondage of a

substaotfaJ entity to such things as dispositions. Jt is similar co che ootion one

finds in the Indian tradition where the permaoeat "self' (atman) is said to be

in bondage co the psychophysicaJ personality which is impermanent. Hence

Nagarjuna's argurilent that anyth.ing that is of the nature ofarising and passing

away (utpada-vyaya-dharmin) is ncither bound nor rcleased. What is being

criticized herc is not the simple notions of bondage and release but those that

takc into considcration a substancial subject and its attributes.

The cooclu~g v~rse could easily lead to much misuoderstanding if the

significance of the relativc terms "whcrc/there" (yatra/tatra) are ignored. The

context specified herc with these tełative terms is what ca.me to be discussed

befóre, namely, the assumption of a substantial su,bject and the attribution of

various attributc:s to it. Thus, in a context where,some substantial subject is at·

tributed with something called freedom (nirvi~a samliropa) or is strippc:d of

the life·pr91=ess (st1f?Zfarapdar1a'!a), thereiń there is no sense .in mllkiog._alNTllOOUCTION 53

d.iscrimination (11ikzlpr1) bctween frecdom and bondagc, for what is real, namcly,

the substancial subject, will rcmain the same. Or else, where nirvana is "teified"

(sam'iirop11) and the life-process is eliminated (apakar1a1Ja), therein too there is

no sense in ma.king such discrimina.tions. These being totally different from

one another, the knowledge ofone would have oo relevance to the understanding of the other.

17. Action and conse1111ence (karma-phala). Buddhism, in coiurast to the

theistic rcligioos of !odia, advocated human responsibility in the ease of boodage as well as release. Chapter XVII chat follows therefore deals with the notions of human action (karma) and its consequences or fruits (phala).

Ioada's analysis of this very lengthy chapter is very confusiog. He assumes

that verses 1-19 contain the popular vicws on karma, while in verse 20 Nagar-.

juna finally explaios the uue position ofthe Buddha who spoke of "emptincss"

(śunyafii).9> Yet, verses 2 and 13 unequivocally attribute certain views to the

Buddha, as well as the Pratyeka-buddhas and the Sravakas. The contents of this

cbaptcr therefore deserve car:eful scrutiny.

The doctrine of karma is clearly statcd in XVU.1: "Sclf-resttaint as well as

bcncfitcing others-this is the friendly way and it constitutcs the seed that

bears fruit, herc as well as in the ncxt life."

lfNigarjuna was a Mahayanist, as many have poraayed him to be, then he

certainly could not deny this "friendly way" (mai/raf!' dha~). for ocherwise

he coułd not qualify as a bodhisatt11a. Rcstraining oneself and benefirring

others arc actions chat necd to be recognized by a bodhisa1111a. These arc herc

dcscribcd as bcaring fruit (phala) in this world as well as in tbc next. Nagarjuna

was not µnaware of the fact that accord.ing to the Buddha, actions arc to be

dcfined in terms of volition (cetana). Whiłc vołition itselfcould be considered

an action, anything that is volitional also falls undcr the catcgory ofaction. This

is the implicat.ion of the Buddha's statcment inAńgultara· nikiiyfJ'J6 and Nagarjuna is scen to elaborate on this statement at XVll.2.

Nagarjuna asserts that ąccording to the Buddha thcre are two main typcs of

karma: volition and volitional. These arc further analysed into a varicty of karmas that werc also recognized in the early Buddhist rradition. He gives no indication that all thcse karmas arc not real in the sense that they do not produce

fru.itS or conscqucnces. However, in XVIl.6 he raises a quescion which clearly

embodies the patticular form of inquiry carried out by the Buddhist metaphysi·

cians with which he disagrecs. The inquiry is as follows: "Docs karma rcmain

even at the time it has not acta.ined maruriry? (Ti/fh11Ji apakakii/iit?).

Therc can be łitde doubt as to who would raisc such a quescion. WhiJe a

pragmacic Buddhist may say that karma is what it is because it produccs consc-THE PHlLOSOPHY OF THB MIDDLE W AY

qucnces or fruitS (phala), a substantialist could not resist asking the question:

"Yet, does not the effect (phala) pre-ex:ist, before karma reacbes its maturity?"

Such metaphysical inquiries, as pointed out earlier, Jed to the belief in ao

underlyiog substance (wabha11a), which was criricized and rejected by Nagarjuna in Chapter I. And hece Nagarjuna is ooce again asserting the view that

such inquiries lead to the beJief in permanence (niiya~) . If one were to reject

sucha notion of permanence, theo karma and effect are separated in sucha way

that once the karma ceases, ie will not producc any consequeaces (niruddhaf!J

sal kif!l phalaf!l janay#yatt) . Thus we are back again in the permanenceannihilation (fiif11ata-uccheda) syndrome.

Verse 7 introduces the notion of a scries (saf!ll'iina) upheld by the atomistic

Sautrantikas, and the difficulties this generates are chen examioed in che few

verses tbat follow.

lt is rather uofonunate that this new situation arisiog from the metaphysicalJy

oriented qucstion raised in verse 6 came ro be igoored by those who dealt with

verse 12. The term efa (this, such) in XVll.12 refers specificaJly to the sort of

thinking (ka/pana) involved in XVII.6 and Nagarjuna maintains that such

thoughts engeoder a multitude of insuperable difficulties (ba4a11rli ca mahataś

ca dofiif!). lt is this particular way of thinking chat is considered to be inappropriate (nopapadyale).

lndeed, at XVll.13, Nagarjuna suggests anotber way of thinking (ka/pana)

which is more apptopriate and which was extolled by the Buddhas, the

Pratyeka-buddhas and the Sravalcas: Lilce an imperishable promissory noce, so

is debt as well as action. lt is fouńold in terms of realms and indeterminate in

terms of prima! oarure."

According to this, karma is imperishable like a promissory note. Ooe's debt

(rtJa) remains effective at least as Jong as the promissory note lasts. Even though

there is no continuiry of karma (and, it in this case, borrowing), that is, it does

noc contioue in any subcle or substantiaJ way, the responsibility for that karma

cannot be deoied once that karma is performed. The Buddha, the early Buddbists, and Nagarjuna were not prepared to say that the promissory note one

signs is urueał and therefore to be igoored. The responsibiliry and commitment

remains long after the docurnent is sigoed (maybe even if the document were to

be lost or desrroyed).

The idea that one is responsible for one's own actions has been emphasized

by the Buddha. A statement in the Dhammapada reads: "Neither in the sky

nor in the middle of the ocean nor haviog entercd into a cleft of the mountains

is tbere a place on earth scen remainiog where a person would be releascd from

his cvil actioos, "97 The cxistence and the popularity of a sirnilar statcment

amoog the Buddhists who preserved their literature in Sanskric has aJready

been referred to. The.re is łitdc doubt that Nagarjuna was aware of this st:ttement. This conception of the imperisbablc nature of karma thus turns out to belNTRODUCTION 55

an imponant conception in Nigarjuna, primarily because he was not prepared

co accept the notion of substance (svabhi11a) or self(atman) to cxplain this pro·

cess nor was he wiUing to deny the effectiveness of karma with che denial of

substance or self. As such lnada's statement that Nagarjuna "with equal force

condetnns any idea ofan iodestruccible continuing action {avipraf!afa)" is SUI·

prising.98 Neither the Buddha nor Nagarjuna nor even Vasubandu (who compiled the Karmasiddhiprakraf!ll) were saying that karma itself remalns m·

destructible. Avipra1{iifa-karma or the imperishable action refers to the responsibility a person has for any karma that he pe.cforms and how that karma will,

dependirrg upon circumstances, bear fruit (phala). The simple notion of

human responsibility is what is upheld hece, not the metaphysical notion of the

fruit or result that lies hidden and gradually attains matudty, as was implied in

the question raised by the Buddhist metaphysiciao,

Therefore, without any hesitation Nigarjuna atttibutes the conception of

the imperisbabłe (avipraf!llŚ4) karma to the Buddha hirnself: "Emptiness,

bowe-aer, is not annihilation; life-pt<x:ess is also not permanence; imperishability

is of ac~on- such is the doctrine taught by the Buddha." (XVII.34)

The·most significant assertion here is that the rejeccion of permanence and

annihilation and the acceptance of emptiness and saf{lsiira (or the life-process)

do not imply the rejection of the relationship between action (karma) and con·

sequence (phala). The imperishable nature (avipr4f!iifa-dharma) of action

merely implies the possibility of action giving rise to coosequences, and this

need not involve the notion of an underlying permanent substance in action.

The three vecs~ chat follow arc criticaJ of the concepcion ofkallna dut is based

on the recognition of self-nature. Such a conception, as explained at XVII.24,

conflicts with:' all che accepted conventions (vyavahara) and would imply the

denial of merit and demerit (pu11ya.piipa) and such other dis~inctioos

(pravihhiiga). ·

Action (karma), looked upon as something subsr.antial (sviibhavika), not only

implies the production of a result (11ipiik11), which is already existing in marui:e

form (vipakva)(XVII.25), but also goes against the admitted purity or impurity

ofaction. Ifaction has its own nature, then defilement (k/efa) also will have its

owo nature and how these two natures could come together will never be

satisfactorily explained (XVIl.26-27).

Moving on to XVII.29 without keeping the above definition of action (karma) in mind , it is easy to assume that Nagarjuna rejects action as something

dependently ariseo and, therefore, there is neither action nor agent. On the

contrary, verse 29 simply rejects the possibility of an action being dependently

arisen, if that action were to be substaotlal (svabhavik.11).

Thus the deniał of action (karma) , agent (kart[), and consequeoce (phala), as

well as ofone who experiences the consequences (bhoktr) . comparing them to

created forms (nirmilakiikiira) or to mirages and imaginary eotities, needs to be56 TH!l PH!LOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

understood on/y as refem'ngto the 1ub1111ntialconceptions of these phenomena

and does not reprcscnt an unqualified dcnial of such phcnomena (dharma).

18. Self(iitman) . The exa,minacion ofselfnature (svabhava) was undertaken by

Nigarjuna after a dctailed analysis1ofall factors ofexperience (dharma), such as

aggregates, spheres, and elements. The subjects coming under the two previous

chapters (XVI•XVII) pertained to bondage and freedom, action and consequence. Therefore, a close scrutiny of the notion of a personal self(atman) and

all other concepts wociated with it, such as selfishness, idencity, or pride, was

coosidered to be relevant. Hence the subject-matter of Chapter XVIIl.

The c.onception of a permanent and eternal self(atman) arose in relation to

the conception of the psychophysic.al persooality (n'iimariipa). The untenabiłity

of the fortner has already been alluded to in Chapt.ers VIII-XI. In the present

chapter, howcver, a further question in tclation to the notion ofselfneeds to be

examined, and that pertains to the mannet in which the notion ofself(atman)

leads to bondage (bandhana). .

Nigarjuna begins this chapter with the assercion that if the self (atman) is

identical with the aggregates (skandha). then it will be subject to arising and

ceasing (utpadtJvyayabhag). If it is different from the aggregates, chen it will

not have the charactcristics of the aggregates. Having raised such qucscions

regarding the existence of the self, Nagarjuna proceeds to show that it is the

belief in a permanent and cierna/ self that gives rise to notions of possession

('iitf1Jlya). Absence ofpossessiveness (nirmama) and of pride (niraha'f!'kara) a.re,

therefore, the inevitable consequences of the appeasement (fama) ofthat beJief

in an eteroaJ self(XVIII.2). For similar reasons, the belief ~at there is a person

who is without self1Shoess and pride is also not appropriate (XVIll.3).

The use of the z/i-formuła at XVIIl.4 as aham-iti and mama-iti is imporcant

in thatit implies the denial of"theories" pertaining to "oneself' (aham) as well

as "self-possession" (mama), rathe( than the simple reflexive uses of these

.terms. When such metaphysical views arc abaodoned, gmping (upiidiina) as

well as rebitth (janma) arc avoided. The cessation of the defilements ofaction

(karma-klefa) is then declated to be release (moll!a). The vikalpa that leads to

such defilcmencs of action is, therefore, not any and every focm of conceptuaHzation, as some of the translations seem to suggcst, but only the

discrimination or thought of substantial (s11iibh'ii11ika) entities such as 'I'

(aham) , rcjected at the bcginning of this chapcer, and subscantial evenJS like

action (karma) and effect (p/Jala), criticized in the previous c.hapcct. The belief

in such substantial entitics and events gives rise to the feeling of"possession" as

"this is mine" (mama), whiclr in ruro produces obsessions (prapanca). Such

obsessions can be preventcd by the petception of emptincss (śUnyatii) relating

to the notion of"self'' (itn;an) referted to above. To speak of"emptiness" apartlNTRODUCTION 57

from this conteit is to make it not ooly "nihiliscic" (ucchedt1, XVIII.20) but

aJso absoJutistic and hence a metaph)'skaJ "view" (drffi, XVIII.8).

A super:ficiaJ glance at XVIII.6 may leave the impresśion tbat Nigarjuna

viewed truth or reality as being beyond conceptualization. However, a more

careful consideration ofthe contents, especiaJly in the light of the teachings of

the Buddha as embodied in che ''discourses" would indicate that this is not the

case, Nigarjuna seems to have been fully cognisant of the Buddha's use of the

term "self'' (Pali, atla; Sk. 'iitmt1n) to explain individuality, and his atcernpt to

reject a metaphysicaJ entity when he spoke of "no-self'' (Pali, flmlllfl, Sk.

anatman). This does not involve two languages: a ptovisional ot ordinary and

philosophical.99 Tt is a question of two definitions. lf the "śelf' ' is defined as a

permanent and subStaDtiaJ entity, the Buddha was ready to negate it with his

conception of"no-self'' (11n'iitman). lf it was not defined as such, he bad no difficulty in utilizing that conception in his discourses. Nigarjuna's understanding of the Buddha's intentions is clearly demonstrated in the first line of

XVUI.6, when he said: "The Buddha's have made known the conception ofself

and taught the doctrine of no-seJf." When, in the second line, Nigarjuna

maintained: "They have not spoken of something (kafcit) as the self or as the

non-self," he was certainly denying the conceptions of self-natute (svabhava)

and other-nature (parabhiva) of phenomena admitted by the Sarvastivadins

and the Sautrantilcas respectively.

With the above statement Nagarjuna couJd have concluded his chaprer on

the "self' (atman). However, there was one mote significant issue to be resolved. Up to this point he was discussing an embodied self, a selfassoc.iated wirh a

psychophysical personality. The question regardiog the self that is freed from

the psychophysical personality ałso had to be examined, for it was the belief of

the substantialists tbat when a person attains freedom his permanent and eternal self, dissociated Erom the psychophysicaJpersonaUty, concinues to exist after

death. The two verses that follow (XVIIl.7-8), therefore, arc iotended to oplain the Buddha's view regarding the nature of a person when be attains

parinirv'iir,a.

What happens to the freed person al death was clearly expressed by the Buddha. He ceases to exist, is not rebom, his birth has waned (khi'!'iij'iitt), and there

is no further existence for him. 100 Yet, ifsomeone were to ask him the question

as to whetherthat person exists in some form after death (param marmfa), the

Buddha was not willing to say anything, primatily because there was no

episcemological l>asis oo which'any predication can be made. 101 With verses 7

and 8, Nigarjuna is attempting to state this very same idea. "When the realm

of thought has ceased, that which is to be designated ałso bas ceased."

"ReaJm of thought" (ciJltlgocara) that has ceased (nivrtta) can refer to the

pc~son who is frecd (Pali parinibbultl, Sk. pari-nirvrta) without his thought being (e-established (appati{(hitena cittent1). 102 The difficulties that would arise if58 nrn PH1tOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

someone were to ask the further question as to what happcns co him when his

thought proccss has ceased or is not re-established is thcn e.xplained. "That

which is to be designated has also ceased." This is ideocical with the Buddha's

statement: "That by which one shouJd spea.k of him does not cxist for him"

(yena naf!l 1)(Jjj"u laf!l tarsa n'aJtht). •0~ Indeed, the term dharmata is used in the

verse to refer to the narure of the freed one who has passed away. lt is not possible to ~en whether he has ariseo (utpanna) after death or whethcr he has ceased

to e.xist (niruddha) after death.

One of the epithets by wh.ich the "enlightened one" (buddha) carne to be

described is tathagata, mcaning "one who has thus gone." This term gave rise

to much controversy probably because of the metaphysical implJcations of the

term "thus'' (tatha). And it is interesting to note chat in the early discourses

whenevcr the qucstion regardiog the nacure of the freed one after death is raised

the term used to rc:fer to him is tathiigala.

The term tatha ("thus" or "such") involves the epistemologicaJ problem of

"reality," as opposed to no tatha ("not thus"). Hence the sccondary derivative

taccha (Sk. tathya) carne ro be used in the sense of what is true or reaJ. •04 Jt is,

therefore, not surprising to see the term tathiigata being utilized when ever the

quesrion regarding the de1ti'ny of the freed one is raised,1os for in the eyes of the

ordinary man no ocher question would be more important thao the ultimate

de.rtiny of the freed one. AJ; meotioocd earł iec , for cpiscemologicał rcasoos, the

Buddha cefused to make any assertions, either positive or negarive, ccgarding

this problem. Nigarguna's application of the fourfoJd negation (catu1kot1) to

the conccption of"suchoess" (tathya) comes immediately after his discussioo of

the nature (dht1rmal4) of the frced one who has rcached his finał destiny. It is

the same context in which the Buddha himself applied the fouńołd negation.

The four-corncred negation is always uscd by the Buddha to avoid metaphysics,

and the desciny of the lalhiigata was one of thosc popular mctaphysical isrues.

Nagarjuna could noc have been uoaware of the metaphysical assenions of the

prc-Buddhist thiokers who assumed chat a "freed self' ('iitman) becomes uoited

with the all-pervading universaJ self, the reality in cverything (saroattt). The

dangcrs involved in the Sa,-vastivada concepcion of substaoce (1vabbava) in

everything (saroaf?Z) and how such an idea could influence the intcrpretation of

a ta1hagata or tathya was, indeed, evident to Nagarjuna. Thus, we have ewo

metaphysicaJ issues combined herc-one of "everyching'' (1ar11"f!l) and the

othcr of tathya-aod the fourfold negation was the only reasonable soJucion

that Nagarjuna could provide. To explain the conception of "suchness"

(lathya) going beyond the context of the problcms of "everyching" and che

"thus gooe one" (talhiigata) after death would undoubtedly lead to a discortion

of the philosophicaJ standpoint of Nagarjuna.1NTRODUC1JON 59

As mentioned befote, the Buddha was not williog to speculate on the nature

of the freed one afcer death (param-marafła) but that he was willing to speak

positively about what happens to him at death. In a passage in the Ańgutt4ranikaya the Buddha's understanding of this state is succincntly expressed in the

following verse: "This is the last body and is the essence of the higber life. In

regard to that this perfect knowledge has arjsen without depending upon

another." (Asekhafiii'f!ll'f(l uppa„na'l(J antimo ya'f!' ·samussayo, yo saro

brahmacariyassa tasmzftJ. aparapaccgya.)106 This realization is elsewhere explained

in a stock passage: "Birth has been eliminated, the higher life has been lived,

clone is what needs to be done and there is nor aoocher of this flife)." 107

This is the highes.r realization that one can attain and is referred to in the

discourses as anfUi.10s lt is the result of the moraJ perfection one attains by be·

ing freed from the three poisons: greed, hatred, and confusioo. lt is finał nirvana, and may jusdy be called the ultimate morałtruth about the world (see p.

15 above). As such it is to be realized by oncsolf and is not a state to be known ·

by depencling upon another (aparapaccaya ).

When, therefore, concluding the discussion of the freed one after death,

Nagatjuna proceeded to speak of tattva ("reality"), he was not refeniog to an

"ultimate truth" per se but to the realization and attaioment offreedom from

birth. Hence he asserts that the knowledge of this truth is not dependent on

another (aparapratyaya). lt is peaceful (fiinta), uoobsessed by obsessions

(t1prapancita). and, hence, non-cliscrimioacive (niroikalpa) and noncontradictory (ananartha). Nirvikalpa does not necessarily mean the absence of

the subject-object discrimination. It means the abseoce of any discrimination

based upon one's likes and dislikes, one's obsessions. Conceptions of identity

and difference, permanence and annihiliation arc theri rejected as beiog partof

the Buddha's teaching. This is because thiogs arc recognized as being

dependencly areisen (prafitya ... bhavatt).

The conclusion of the chapter represeots Nagarjuna as one who remains

aloof from the so-called Hlnayana-Mahayana conflir.t. He asserts that in the

noo-emergeoce of the Buddbas and the waoing of the Sravakas, the knowledge

of the "truth" continues co be perpetuated by the Pratyeka-buddhas, even

without association with the Buddhas. The need to depend p,rimarily upon an

unbroken tradition or an uninterrupted line cf pacriarchs for the perpetuation

of the "true docttine" is discounted hete.

19. Time (kala). Io the discussion of the notion of imperishable action (atlipraf!'iifa-karma) discussed above, .two more conditions relevaot to tbe fruitioning of karma were mendoned, namely, time (kala) and harmony (fiimagff).60 nrn PHllOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

These two topics constitutc the subject mattcr of the next ewo chapters.

Time was conceivcd in a moce empirical way in the early discourses. Itnpermanence (aniccafii) was explained there in terms of the temporaHty of evcnts.

As meotioncd in the analysis of the conditioned (VII). such temporality was

understood as arising (uppiida), ceasing (vyaya) , and change of what cndures

(thitassaaflfJathatta). However, the problems created by the Sarvastivadins and

the Sauuantik:as by their analysis of time and temporałity have already been

ałluded to (sec the discussion of the "Condicioned" above). There, the focus

was more on the substantiality of eventS (conceived as bhii11a) and the difficulties that arise as a result of attcmpting to place such "existents" (b/J4va) in

the context of tempol'ality. The present chapter is devoted to the conception of

cime itself, especially time as analysed by the metaphysicians into discrete

moments (k!M!tl). Nagarjuna's analysis brings out the disastrous implications

of such a notion of time and could approptiatdy be compaced with an analysis

provided by E. R. Clay and enthusiastically adopted by William James in

Westetn philosophy. Examining the ordioas:y notion of cime, Clay says:

The relation of cxpcrience to time has not been profoundly

studied. lts objects arc givcn as bcing of the ptesent, but the part of

time referrcd to by the daturo is a very different thing from the conterminous ofthe past and future which philosophy denotes by the

oame Present. The present to which the datum refers is teally a part

of the past-a recent past - delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named the

specious present, and łet the pas't, that is given as being the past, be

knowa as the obvious past. All the notes ofa bar of a song seem ro

the Hstener to be contained in the present. All the changes of place

of meteor seem to the beholder to be contained in the present. At

the instance of the termination of such a serie~. no part of the time

measured by them seems to be past. Time, then, coilsidered

relative to human apprehension, consists offout parts, viz,, the obvious past, the specious present, the real present and the future.

Omitting the specious present, it consists of three . .. noneotities- the past, which does not exist, the future which does not

exist, and their contetcnlnous, the present; the faculry from which

it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious present. 109

Nagatjuna's analysis indicatcs, in a similar way, how a metaphysical notion

of time would lead to the abolition of the very notion of time as "specious."

Furthermore, the metaphysical notion of time, as propounded by the Satvastivadins and the Sautrantikas, also involved the conception of substantial ex-lNTitOOUCTION 61

istence (bhtiva), the denialofwhich would resułt in the deniaJ of that panicular

conception of time.

20. H4rmony (s/if!JtJgn). The anaJysis of the causal process in terms of discrete

momentaiy event.s eliminated the possibility ofexplaining harmony as part and

parcel of the eventS that combine to produce the effect. With such discrete.

events harmony becomes an attribute. Such a problem was not faced by the

Buddha wheo he expiained dependence of events because such events were

recognized as related events rather than discrete ones. Thus, the Buddhist

metaphysicians were compelled eithcr to accept an immediately contiguous

cause (samanantara.pratyaya} where each event is caused by an immediatdy

preceding event, or make barmony an attribute of such discrete events so that

their assemblage could provide.a rationale for the production of the effect. The

problem of causation recciYed the foremost attention of Nagarjuna, as is evi- .

dent from Chapter I. The difficulties involved in explaining the arising of the

fruit or effect (phala) on the basis ofa metaphysical nocion of harmony _are further elaborated herc. Once again, what is denied is not the arising of the fruit

or effect, for that was the central philosophy of Buddhism, but only the mannet in which such arising is described by the metaphysicians. Hence

Nagatjuna's conclusion: The effect is not made by the harmony, nor is it made

by a oon-harmony. "Where can there be harmony without an effect?" (XX.24).

21. Occurence and dissolution (1an.zbhava-.vlbhava). This chapter condudes

Nagarjuna's examination of the nature of the human personality as it gradually

;

evolves or dissolves depending upon one's actions (karma). In the "Discóurse on

the Knowledge of the Beginning" (Aggaflffli-suttanta). 110 the Buddha speaks of

the evolution and dissolution not only of the world, but also of the human personałicy . This discowse was intended primarily to refute the rather static cooception of the world and the social order presented in the Indian philosophica1

and religious uaditions. Without commirting hlmself to any notion of an absolute beginning, the Buddha spoke of a period of dissoJution (satp11at{a)

followed bya long period ofevolution (11ivafta). Io spite of the Buddha's reluctance to get involved in the discussion of such theories, because of the

epistemological difficulties, be was compelled to do so by the unfortunate

moraJ and ethical implications of the Indian caste·system . Even though the

discussion of the world-systems is race in the early discourses, the evolution as

weU as the d.issolution of the human persona1ity through Jong periods of time

constiruted a popular subject. The process of the evolution and dissolution of

the human persooality ·carne to be designated sa'l(lfiira {life-process) or bha11a62 l'HS PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W/\Y

(becoming) and was contrasted with the Indian notion of life as eternal ex·

istence (atthit'ii, Sk. astilva).

While the concepts ofatlhiflz (existetlce) and n' atthitii (non-existence) wece

.used in the pre-Buddhist literature, the Buddha, realizing the rnetaphysical

implications, avoided them and instead utilized the notion of bhava (becom·

ing). No sooner than the Buddha explained the human personality as a process

of becoming, the metaphysidans of che traditional schools of Indian

philosophy began speaking ofbhava (instead ofastitva) and abha'Va (instead of

n'iistitva) when speaking about.existence and oon-existence respectiveły. ewo

terms which wece not popular in the Indian tradition before rhe Buddha.

The Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas, who were lured into this substan·

tialist trap as a result of their analysis of the process of becomlng (bhava) ioto

discrete moments, formulated che notion of a "secies of becoming" (bhavaIa'f?Zf4tt), instead of the "stream of becorning" (bhava-sota) referred to in the

early discourses. Buddhaghosa, who introduced these different interpietations

ioto the Thervada tradition in the South and South East Asian countries (circa.

sixth cenwiy AD), discinguished between three different nocions of the present:

I the specious present (addha-paccuppanna),

the momentary present (khaf!tJ-paccuppanna), and

111 the flowing pi:esent (sa'f?Ztati-paccuppanna). 111

,,

li

He proceeded to identify che.se with the differetu;stages in the developmenr

of the Buddhist thought, maintaining that the "discourses" (suita) advocated

the first, that some othet Buddhists (probably the Sautrantikas) spoke of the

second, and chat the commentaries acceptcd the third.

Nagarjuna, compiling his treatise during the second century AD after the

Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika theories had come ioto prominence, could

not have been uoaware of these differences. In the present chapter he was

therefore critidzing the metap4ysical notion ofa "series of becomiog" (bhavasa'f?Zfati), a series of disjointed or disconnected momentary (k!a11ika) existcnces,

rather than the conception of becoming as founulated ~y the Buddha. Thus.

after a critidsm of the notioo of bhava-sa'f?Ztati, in the present chapter, Nagarjuna is able to spcak of bhava at XXVI.7-8 without rejecting it. He carefuJly

avoids the concepts of bhava and abhava as weU as svabhava and parabhava

throughout the text. Thus, che denial ofbhava-sao/tati need not be consttued

as a de.nial ofbhava or bhava-sotP which occur in the discourses of the Buddha.

The problems discussed so far relate primarily to the oature of the human

personality, its survival, and its morał responsibility, and Nigarjuna's endeavor

is to establish its non-substantiality (pudgala-nairlit1nya). The chapters that .l NTRODUCTION 63

follow deal with the non-substantiality of the person who has· attained

freedom .

22. "Thus Gone One'' (tathagata). A host ofepithets wete used to desr..ribe the

attainments of the person who was able to understand the narure of human existence and overcome the , sufferin~ associated with it. Two of therp. stand prominent. These were buddha or the "enligbtened one" and tathigata or the

"thus gooe one," and even these two terms were used synonymously. The first

of these describes the ideal achieved by one who was aspiring for knowledge or

unde.rstanding, an aspiration cleady expressed in the famou·s Upani~adic

statement: "Prom darkness, lead me to light," (tamaso miir{Jjyntitgamaya).112

In the Upani/ads, this enlightenment was nothing short of"omniscience" (satvajfia),t19even though this term was not used in a technical sense. For the llud- .

dha, enlightenment is attained as a result of the realization of the means and

limits of knowledge (see the above analysis of the Kaccayanagotta-sutta).

The second cpithct, ltTthagata, led to morc misunderstanding and rnisinterpret1nion in the Buddhist context. As the term impues, it cxplains the ultimate

goal to be achieved by such enlightenment. lt represents an attempt t o answer

the aspirations of the human beings who were looking ft>r immortality avoiding

the endless cycle of births and deaths. In the Upani.fads it is expressed in the

staternent: "From death, lead me to immortality," (mrlyor maf?t amrtaf?t

gamaya). 11 ~ According to the Upani.fads, the "enlightened ooe" who under·

stands the nature of the ·real self (atman), upon the dissolution of the

psychophysical personality, is united with the universal idea! self (brahman)

and thereby enjoys eternal life. The Buddha, who was not willing to admit the

cxistence of sucha state, merely maintained that the "enlighteoed one" (b11dt/ha) is also freed from continuous becoming (bhava). Hence, the tathagata or

the "thus gone one" is conuasted with one who is subjected to becoming

(bhava) or re-becoming (punabbhava).

With the attainment' of enlightennleOt and freedom from grasping

(upadiina), the freed one leads a happy and contented life, white at the same

time not longing for a future existence. Enlightenment (bodht) is synonymous

w.ith waning of craving (laf!hakkhaya), However, the unenlightened person,

bound by craving and grasping,,not only looks for eternaJ life beyond the grave

(param marat{a), but a1so expects to sec something more mysterious and aweinspiring (acchanya-abbhuta) iri the life ofa freed one who is alive. It is for this

reason that two major questions were raised in relation to the conception of a

tathagata. The first is the question as to whether the tathagata is identical or

differeot from the psychophysical pers0oality.11-' The second is the question as

to whether the tathagata survives the destruction of the psychophysical per~

sonality. 11 ' This may explain why, in th.e early discourses, whenevet such ques-64 TuE PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIDDLE WAY

tions wece taised they wece raised more in relacion to a iathagata thao in connection with a buddha.

Thus, after a detailed examioation of the problems of human existence,

problems sucb as action, morał responsibility, or becoming, it was natural for

Nagarjuna to direct his attention to the questioos pcrtaining to the cooception

of ultimate goal as envisaged in Buddhism. In doing so, he was compelled to

deal, first of all, with the meaning of the concepi tathagata.

Nagarjuna's examination of the lathiigala follows the line of analysis found

in the early discourses. While early Buddhism coofronted pcoblems relating to

the tonception oftathagata because it was understood 1n terms of the notion of

a permanent and eteroal self (atman), Nagarjuna is hece struggling with the

same conception as explained in relation to the notion of a real subs•ance

(s11abha114). Nagarjuna was not willing to consider the tathagata, conceived in

such a metaphysical way, as identical with the aggregates (skandha). Th.is was

the Sarvasdvada position which Nigarjuna was rejecting (XX.Il.2). Nor was he

prepared to accept the alteroative suggcsted by the Sautrantikas, who emphasized non-identity or difference~ The notion ofanatman (no-self) referred

to at XXII. 3 is really the coo(eption of ''other-nature" (parabhava) that was

propounded by the Sautrantikas. loada'.s explanation that "the vse of the term

anatman hece is not to be confused with the cardinal Buddhist doctrioe by the

same term,"116 therefore needs to be qualified as the "cardinal early Buddhist

doctrine." for the Sautrantikas were guilty of propounding a tbeoryofanatman

which emphasized real difference. Nagarjuna was therefore ready to assert that

a tathagala conceivcd in terms of cithcr "sclf-naturc'' (svabhiiva) or "othernacure" (parabhava) is not evideot.

The question whether the Jathagata is dependent is taken up next. Its

dependence or independence is then rejected prirnarily because once again it is

understood in terms of substantial dependence (svabhiivata upadanatp,) or

substantial independence (which is the implicacion of "otber-nanue" or

parabhava)(XXlI.9). Views of tathigata as "empty" (śu11ya) or "not empcy"

(aśu11ya) are coosidered, and these again are particular viewś (expressed in the

iii-formula) and are therefore rejected.

How the notion of a living tath'iigala, conceived·ofio ·a rather metaphysical

way. leads to the beliefin a tathagata after death is explicitły stated by Nagarjuna at XXII. l3. Nagarjuna's argument is that jf the tathagata were to be conside.red empty in terms of self-nature (svabhavatal/), any thoughr of his beiog

existeot or oon-existent after death (para'(J-nirodhat) is not appropriate. This,

indeed, is the view expressed by the Buddha in the early discourses. 111

The concluding-statement of this chapter is rather significant, especially in

view of the narure of the "freed one" (nibbuta) or "freedom" (nibbana) as

enunciated in the early discourses. We have already pointed out that freedomINTRODUCTION 65

(nibbana) is a state unconditioned by dispositions (asańkhata) . It is not a state

chat is uncaused (appaftccasamuppanna). The tathagata is, therefore, uncondiciooed by dispositions but not in-dependent. Elsewhere Nagarjuna insists that

there is nothing in the world that is in-dependent (XXJY.19). The tathagata is,

therefore, like the universe (jagat) wherein the principle of depcndence

(prafiJyasamutp'iida) functioos. He has no self (atman) or substance

(s11abhava), as it is in the case of the universe (jagat).

23. Confusions (11iparyasa). The reasons for the misunderstaodings that prevail

rcgarding the narure of the enlighten.ed one (buddha) or the "thus gone one"

(tathagata) as weU as aoyching that takes place in the universe (jagat) are then

raken up for examination. Once agaio the nucleus of the chapter can be traced

back to the early discourses.

A discussion of the four types ofconfusions (11ipalliisa) relacing to perceptions

(sanna), thought (citta) , and views (diffht) is met with in the Ańguttar.anikaya.118 The basie confusions rclatiog to thesc three differeot functioos are

given as follows:

1. Perceiving, thinking and viewing what is impermanent as

permanent.

2. Perceiving. thinking and viewing what is not suffering as suffering .

3. Perceiving, thinking and viewing what is non-substantial as

being substanciaJ.

4. Perceiving, thinking and viewing what is impure as pure.

The first three of these, in that particular order, arc generally .referred to as

the three characteristics (lakkha11a) of human existence, that is, impcrmanence

(anicca), suffec.iog (dukkha), and oon-substantiality (afllltta). Nigarjuna has

already dealc with these concepts at length (see Chapcers 11, Xll and XVlll).

Hence, he begins his analysis with the last, namely, the pure (Jubha) and impure (afubha). Thesc indced are value judgmeotS made by the human beings

and scrve as the foundacion of the reli.gious and spiritual life. However, in the

eyes of the substantialist phllosophers, these were ulrimate qualities, each having its owo narure (.rvabha11a) . With the first rwo verses, Nigarjuna sets the

tone of his criticism of tncse qualities, which aJlows hirn to move on to ocher

types of confusions subsequently. Whilc the interplay berween the qualities of

Jubha and aśubha arc mentioned in verse 11, Nigarjuna's refuration of the66 THE PHlLOSOPHY Of rnE MIODU! WA.Y

ultimatc reality of thcsc qualitics is bascd initially upon his rccognition of the

dependent arising of both.

The notions puricy and imputity, łike any other entities, have no ultimate

substaotial standing. Thcy are based upon lust (riiga), hatred (d11e1a), and con-

.fusion (moha), wbich io turo arc the productS of thought or conccptualizatioo

(sarrz~pa) . The ccssation of Just, ha.tred, and confusion is generalły equaced

with "frcedom" (niffla„a). Hcncc, ie is geocrally assurocd that nirvt11!a is

beyond any conccptualization or thought. Tbis seems to be the manner in

which the notion of a "non-conceprual" and ultimatc reality (paramiirtha)

carne to be attributed to Nagarjuna and, hcncc, to all Madhyami.ka philosophy.

Early Buddhism refers to two forms of thought or conceptualization

(sa1r1kappa), che more comprehensive and, therefore, right rhought or conceptualization (sammii-sa1r1kappa) and the moce rcsuictcd and, thcrcfore, wrong

thoughc (micchii-sQtrJkappa). This is in no way different from whac Nagarjuna

discusscd in Chaptcr:XVIJ {12-13). wherc he distinguished thoughts(k.alpana)

chat arc pro~r (yojyale) from those chat arc inappropriate (nopapadyale).

In many instanccs, "thoughts" (sa1r1kalpa) and "dispositioos" (saf!l.Skii-ra).

two terms chat are semantically related, function in simiłar ways. This is artcsted to by Nagarjuna's treatment of them. We have alrcady notcd how be

characterized "dispositions" as "confusions" (mr,r.i){XIII.1 - 2). This definition

was, in face, attribuced to che Buddha himself. In the presenc concext, speaking

of "confusions" (11iparyasa), Nagarjuna introduces the notion of sa1r1kalpa and

proceeds to defrne it io terms of its consequenccs, namely, tbe generation of

Just, etc,

A carefuJ analysis of the notioos of sa~alpf1 and Jaf!l.Skiira in relation to

frecdom or ninili11a may clarify an importaot epistemological problem, l:roth in

early Buddhism and in Nagarjuna. We bave already referred to che fuoction of

dispositions (sankhara) in the context of carły Buddhism. They cannot be

eliminated exccpt at death, and arc, thcrefore, to be appeased (samalha,

upasa,na). This process of appeasement is to be acbieved by not clioging on to

any of che past disposirions whcn one has co deal with the problem of underscanding any situation. Hence, nibbana carne to be designatcd asankhata.

When speaking of the thoughts or concepts (sa1r1ktdpa), however, we are

prcscnted with two types, che right and che wrong. The right ones are to be

cultivated and the wcong ones eliminaced, a process not recommended in relatioo to dispositions. This dichotomy betwcen right and wrong thougbts could

have unsatisfactory implkations. Right choughts may be takeo as pointing to

true events ot phenomena, white the wrong ones ma.y indicate che absence of

such events or phenomena. This, indeed. was che subsrantialist trap which both

the Buddha aod Nagarjuna were anempcing to avoid. Therefore, without takiqg right choughts in the sense of absoluteły uue ideas correspoading telNTROOUCTrON 67

ultimate facts, that is. as having substance or self-nature (s11abha11a), Nagarjuna

wants them to be treated as empty (śUnya), not in the sense of absolute nonexistence (abhava) but in a more pragmatic sense of being abłe to produce consequences. Thus, while wrong thoughts (mithy'ii sa??Jkalpa) are productive of

Just (raga), hatred (dvefa), and confusion (moha), right thoughts (samyak

sa??Jkaipa) give rise to fieedom froro Just (vairagya), compassion (karot{?i,

adve;a), and knowledge (praj'ifii).

The entire cha:pter on "confusioo" (11iparyaśa). is therefore, devoted; not to

an ouuight rejection of the simple discriminations ofputity and impurity, etc. ,

but to a vehement cricidsm ofsoch discriminations based upon the notions of

absolute existr.Qće (astitva) and absołute non-existence (nastiJva).

24. Truth (satya). Thus we are led to the most important discussions in Nagatjuna, namely, the conception of the fout noble uuths (arya salya). The contents of this chapters have generared much discussion as well as controverty during the centuries that fołłowed its compilation. Ąt the same time, this chapter,

more than any other, will serve as a glowing testimony to the fact that Nagarjuna was simpły restating the ideas expressed by the Buddha in the eacly

discourses, rather tban bringing <.i.bout a Copernican revolution in Buddhist

thought.

In the early. discourses, the fou r noble truths were meaot to explaio the

nature of human ex.istencc., bóth in bondage and in freedom, avoiding the extremęs of permanent existence (atthitii) and nihiListic non-exisrence (n'

atthita). The difficulties encountered by che Buddha in ma.king this view ofexistence iot.etligible to the substantialist thinkers of India are evident from the

kind of criticism thcy levelled against the Buddha. Very ofteo they criticized

him as a nihilist (n. 'atthikt#ilida, ucchedavada), insiscing that he advocated the

annihilation and destruction of che conscious being (s11to sattaua uccheda?!J

viniisaf!ipannapett). 119 This was not because the Buddha denied the existence

of conscious human beings, but because he was notwillingto accept an cternal

and immutablc self (attnan) in them. For he often insisted th.at a conscious

human being is empty (sunna) of a permanent and eternal self (atta) as well as

anything penaining to or bclonging to a sdf (attan-iya). 1l 0 The <leniał ofsucha

self or substantiality was not onły in relation to a human personalicy but also in

connection with any experienced phenomena (.rabbe dhamtnli artatt"ii). 121

Nararjuna was placed in an identkaJ situacion as a result of his rejection of the

Sarvasdvada conception of self-narure. (s11qbhat1a) and the Sautrii;ntika theory

ofother-nature (parabhiiva). The theoty of nón-substantiality (anatman) or emptiness (funyatii) that he attempted to explain in the ,prev.ious chapters was not68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

palatablc to the subst.antiaJist philosophers who raised the objeccion discussed

in the first sbc verse of the preseot chapter.

In the first instance, these substantialiscs, who understood empcincss as

"notbingoess," assumed that empti,ness leads to a denial of the four noble

truths, including a denial of the noQle fruits (arya-phaliint). These noble fruits

are elsewhcre referred to as fruitS of the ascecie life (1am4nath(l.Sa =

fr(ff1ii11yiirtha,•22 fiimafińaphatą123) . Secondly, they felt that it also leads to a

denial of the fruits (phala) ofordinary human life (laukika), iocluding fruits of

all the ordioary morał and social conventions (sa1!J11ya11ahara) such as good and

bad (dharma-adharma) (XXIV.6).

Underlying this two-fold cricicism thcre seems to be a basie assumption.

Whcreas in the carly discourses the four noble trutbs could account for the

fruits ofordinary human existence (i.c.• of the path, magga) as well as the fruics

of the higher life (i.e. , freedom or nibbina), it seems that when the above

cricicism of cmpciness by the substantialists of the Buddhist tradition was

presented, the four noble truths werc looked upon as referring primarily to the

higher life. Hence the need to present an additional criticism chat cmpciness

contradicts even the worldly (laukikan).

Nagarjuna's attempt here is to collapse these rwo As.mes inco one and treat

them undcr one rubric, namely dependent arising (prafilyasamutpada) (XXIV.40), which is the central philosophy of Buddhism.

For this reason, having made the inicial remark that his critics were not conversant with the use or purpose of emptiness and, therefore, are troubled by

both empciness and its meaning (XXIV.7). Niigarjuna immediately proceeds

to explain the two truths, instead of the four truths.

Nagarjuna sees the Buddha as expouodiog two truths:

1. the truch of worłdly convencion (Jok4-Sa1!Jvrti), and

2. the truth in terms of ultimate fruit (paramiirthataf?).

Nagarjuna had aJready devoted twenty one chapters (I-XXI) to the cxplicatioo of the first of these truths. Causaliry, space, time, motion, the human personality, action, consequence, good and bad-all of chese have been deałt wich

ac lcngth. Explanations of these in terms of absoluce existence or nihiłiscic nonexistence were rejected in favor of dependence (pratityasamutpada) and ,

therefore, of emptiness (funyatii). Artha or fruit of existence, wh.ether that be

good or bad, was rccognized. Attempts oo che part of the metapł\ys icians who

wanted to perceivc with absoluce certainty how a cause produces an effec;c were

abaodooed, sincc such attempts Led to the recognition of unacceptable entities

such as self (atman) oc substance(111abha11a). The abandoning ofsuch attempcslNTRODUCTION 69

did not lead l'fligarjuna on to the other extreme ofdenying any connection between cause andeffect, action and consequence. The element of uncertainty involved in the cause-effect relationship made him moce cautious tban either the

Sarvastivadins or the Sauttantikas, and hence he was mote defeosive and

negative in his descriptioru. Yet in no way did he want to abandon that princi·

ple of explanation, Chapter XVII on "The Examination of Action and Consequence" (K11mra-phala-paiikfa) being the most illustrative example.

The fact that a human being, having understood the nature and functioning

ofphenomena (dharma/;), attempts to achieve various desired results (artha) by

manipuJating such phenomena, was well known to Niigarjuna when he spoke

of both Ja?(lsliiiras and sa'(Jkalpas, However, the possibility of achieving

ultimate freedom (ni1'1l'ii1Ja) or the ulcimate fruit of existence

(paramiirtha)(somecimes referred to by the Theravada tradition as agga·phala,

Sk. agra-pha/4124), has now been questioned by_his opponents. Again, withouc

falling ioto the extremes of existence and oon-exiscence and recogniziag the

emptiness ofall dependently arisen phenomena, Nagarjuna had to explain the

fruits (artha) as well as the ultirnate fruit (ptTramiirtha) ofeidstence, fa speaking

of these rwo truths, if he had assumed that the latter traoscended the former,

ht> would be presenting the ideas atttibured to the so-called Mahayana, rather

than quoting the ea.tly discourses or refening to the teaehings of the Buddhas,

Pratyeka-buddhas and the Sravakas. This, however, is not the case, for his explanation ofartha as well as paramiirtha is couched in the same łanguage, and

that was the Janguage of dependeoce and empriness. Hence his famous dic-

·rum: "Withour rdying upon convcotion, the u1timate ftuit is not taught.

Without understanding the ulcimate fruit, freedom is not anained"

(XXJV.10). .

Artha as well asparamartha are tru.ths (satya)~ The for.mer is not presented as an

un-trurh (a-satya) in relation to the latter, as it would be in a.o absolutistic

uadition. Neithet is the former sublated by the latter. There is no indication

whatsoever thac these are two truths with different standing as higher and

Iower.

The fruits of ordinary human cxistence (artha), understood in terms of t:Jermanent existence (svabh?i11t1) conflicred witb everything in expe.deoce: "If you

perceive the existence of the existence in terms ofself-nature, then you will also

perceive these a non-conditions" (XXfV. 16). This would lt>ad to a denial of all

phenomena such as effect (karya), cause (kara11a), agent (kartr), doing

(karatfa), action (kriya) as well as arising (utpada), ceasing (n.irodha), and fruit

(phala) (XXIV. 17). This compelled h.im to make the most famous of his

staements: "We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptine.ss.

That is dependent upon conventioo. That itself is the middle path''

(XXIV.18). Everything is placed in one basket, the basket of "dependent aris-70 THE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MroDl.E WAY

ing'' (prafityasamutpada). "A thi:ng that is not dependently arisen is not evident. For that reason, a tbing that is non-empty is, indeed, not evidenr

(ibid. 19).

With that analys.is, Nagarjuna was ready to defend the four noble truths,

reconciling it with his cooception of emptiness (ibid. 20-21). 'Whoever

perceives dependent arising also perceives sufferiag, its arising, its ceasing and

the patb [leadiog to its ceasing]," (ibid 40).

Buddl:ta's statement in the Majjhima-nikaya: "He who perceives d~pendent

arising also perceives the dh111nma," could not bave received better confumation from a disciple who was removed from the Buddha by ar least six centuries.

2S. Freedom (ni1iiina). This is undoubtedly the most significant chapter in the

book. The interpretacion ofthe contents of this chapter by Stcherbatsky12' has

d~minated the Western understanding of Madhyamika thought for a con·-

siderable pedod of time. Elsewhere, we have disagreed with Stcherbatsky's interpretation of early Buddhism, ·allowing hi:m his interpretation of

Madhyamika phiłosophy. Since Stcherbatsky's perception of Nagarjuna was

colored by his understanding of carly Buddhism, the rejection of the latter

shoułd mean the rejection of the former too, if we are to consider Nagarjuna's

philosophy as a continuation of the ideas of early Buddhism. Without devoting

much time to an examination of Stcherbatsky's views at this point, we will present the conrents of Ch?-pter XXV in the light of the analysis of Nagarjuna's

ideas that we have already presented.

Other modern scholars have rejected Stcherbatsky's ideas and have presented

views about nirvana that do not appeac to accord with what Nagarjuna has said

in the previous chapterse.. One of these is the view presented by Inada that nirvana represencs the ''uncreated realm'' (as4'(Jskrt4). 126 The view that nirvana, as

tJS4f!lJkrta, belongs to the "uncreated realm," a view which is popular with both

the so-called Theravada and M9.Myana interpreters (especiałly of the modern

world), may lose its tenab,ility ifthe cootents of this chapter are analysed in the

Jight of what went before rather than in isolation.

Th~ attempt to explain Na·garjuna's conception as one that is found in the

Mahayana tradition is based upon a complete misreading of Chapters XVI-XXI

of the Kiin'k'iis that deal with the notion of the human person~ity, human

behavior, and morał responsibility. Such a misreading compels Inada to reject

the va!ue of the two chapters (XXVI-XXVU) that follow the chapter on nirvana

(XXV), saying: 11With the discussion of Nirvana in the last chapter the treatment from the standpoint of Mahayana had basically come to a close. In this

chapter and the finał one to follow , Nagarjuna goes into the analysis of the

Hlnayana 4óctrines."121lNTRODUCTION 71

Our aaalysis of the Kiin'kii1 so far did not reveal any specific Mahayana doctrine presented by Nagarjuna chat may be contrasted with the so-called

HToayana, and we have therefore no reason co look at Nagaruna's cooception

of nirvaoa as chat of Mahayana or reject the last two chapters of the ueatise as

being cepresentative of the Hlnayana docuines. In fact, to assume that such an

outstanding philosopher as Nagarjuna, who presented the world with such a

beautifułly executed philosophical classic, could simply add two chapters utterly irrelevant to the basie theme of his work does not contribute either to the

understanding of his philosophy or an appreciation of his genius.

Nagarjuna begins his analysis of nirvana anticipating the same kind ofobjection that the substantialist raised againsc reconciling "empciness" with the four

noble truths. "If alJ this is empty, there exists neither arising nor ceasing. [As

such) through the relinquishing or ceasing of what does one expect freedom?"

(XXV.l).

lt is necessary to keep in mind herc the conception of a thing (dharma) that

the substantialist envisaged, which was the main subject ofscrutiny on the part

of Nigarjuna. The substantialist had cliffi.culty with the conception of empcioess (śunyatii) primarily because an existent or phenomena (dharma) for him

was one that posscssed sdf-oature (111tZbha11a). As emphasized earlier, if not for

that assercion of the substantialist, Nigarjuna had no reason or provocation to

compose the present treatise. This is dearly evideot from Nigarjuna's immediate response to the substantialist: ''If all this is non-empty, there exists

neither arising nor ceasing. Through the relinquishing and ceasing ofwhat does

one expect freedom?" (ibid. 2).

For N:igarjuna, to say thac soroething ~ not empcy (fZfUnya) means that ie has

subscantial existence (s-v11bha11a) during the past, preseot and future, and ifso it

would be meaningJess to speak of its arising and ceasing. This would certainly

rcnder "freedom" impossible.

Once again, keeping the substantialist view in mind, would it be possible to

speak of "freedom" (nirva'!a) as the relinquishing of something that is

substa.ącial and the attainment of someching completely new or different. This

was another importanc assertion of the substantiaJist. For him, "freedom"

represented a ~otałly different state of cxistence (astilva), an existence that is

not only perrnaneot and eternal but also perfccdy blissful and happy. Freedom

or niroatfa tbus curns out to be a metaphysical notion, like the Hindu

brahman, uncaused, uocreatcq and, therefore, beyond aUspadaJ and tempora!

determination. Consideriog these two views, namely,

1. the substantialist conceptioo of ordinary existeoce, and

2. the substancialist notion of freedom,72 THE PHTLOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE WAY

Nagarjuna proceeds to define freedom (nirva,,.a). "Unabandoned and

unachieved, unincerrupted and impermanenr, unextlnguished and nonarisen- this is caUed freedom" (ibid. 3).

Here are three sets of negations, and unless we are careful .in analysing these

three as .ret.r, .it is possible to arrive at condusions not inteoded by Nagarjuna

himself. The follow.ing analysis of the sets will be made not only on the basis of

the coocepcioo ofnirolif!a presented .in early Buddhism but also .in the light of

the substancialist views that Nagarjuna was confronted with,

1. Unabando11ed'andunachie11ed(aprahT.,,.am a.ramprap/411t): lt

(nirvat1a) is neither casting offnor reaching. These two activicies

arc complementary, and hence to be taken together. Casting

off something and reaching for something completely differenr represents the substatitiallst ot absolutist way of explaining freedom (A.'VI. 10). The attainment of freedom from

the threc poisons of Just (raga), hatred (dve1a), and coofusion (moha) by a person who is understood as ''beińg in a process of bec;om.ing" (bhava) conditioned by various fattors (not

merely the three poisons) need not be explained .in terms of

the dual function ofcasting off and reachlng. While on the one

hand, one may be casting off the three poisons and not

everything, on the other ha.od there is noth.ing that is reached

for. lf there were to be seomthing to be Ieached for, chat

would again be a source of bondagc tathcr than frecdom.

2. Uninlertupted andimpermanent (anucchinnam afaś11atam):

It is neithet interrupted nor eteroal. These again are complemeotary. Cutting off something completely and attaining

a state of permanent existence is once again part of the

substantialist conception offreedom. As explained in relation

to the previous chara<:teristics, a person who has attained

freedom cercainly curs off the three poisons. However, this

does not mean that "what is distinguishable is also separable"

(Humean cxplanation of distinction). ln the Buddbist cootext, a human being who has ełiminated the three poisons,

that is, the Buddha or the arhant, still continues to be a

human being with a body as wełl as the associated fedings.

perceptions, dispositions, and coosciousness, and this continuation is on the basis of "dependent arising" (pafic·

casamuppada). Separation of "buddhahood" f.tom that

psychophysical petsonality led ro all the metaphysical issucs

that the Buddha as welł as Nagarjuoa were try.ing to deal with

(see Chapter XXII on "The Examination of Tathagata).

Hence the state ofBuddhahood, ifsucha terminology can beINTRODUCTION

used in any meaningful sense, did not signify either a complete interruption or eternality.

3. Non-ceased and non-arisen (aniruddham anutpannam)~ lt is

neither ceased nor arisen. Considering this pair of com-.

plementary characteristics independently and in isolation

from everything that has so far been said by Nagarjuna, it

would be very easy to assume that nirvana, in his view,

tranścends all descriptions and characterization. However, if

wbat has been said about arising and ceasing, espedally in the

chapters on "The Examinacion of Causality" (Chapter I) as

well as in "The Examination of Dispositions" (Chllpter VII)

were to be tak.en seriously, one would refrain from such

generalizatlons. Instead, the conceptions of arising and ceasing, as weU as the arisen and the ceased, would be placed in

the context of a substantialist view of either exitence (astitva)

or oon-existence (nastitva).

, Just as much as ordinary existeoce (bhava) and its fruits (art/Ja) cannot be defined utilizing the substaotialist conc;eptions ofarising and ceasing. even so existence.(bha11a) and its

ultimate fruit (pata1'iiirtha) cannot be expla.ined on the basis

of a simiłar conceptual framework.

73

This, indeed is what·Nagarjuna wants to emphasize in the verse that

follows (XXV.4) where .he cakes up the notion of bhava ( =svabhava):

"Freedom is not an existent. (If it were,] ie would foUow that it has the

characteristics ofold age and death. Indeed, there is oo existent without old age

and death."

A substantialist speaking about the characteristics of the existent will have to

maintain that the existent, by its owo narure, is invariably associated with old

age and death. This woułd mean that no one wiH be able to attain freedoro,

uriless he becomes a different sort of existent, an existent that is totałly different from what he is. This, indeed, is the absolutist's ootion offreedom. 1t is

a total freedom that has nothing to do with ordinary human existence

characterized by old age and death. And fot th.e Buddha as well as for Nagarjuoa

freedoro makes no sense in soch a context.

On the conrrary, if the existent (bhava) is defined as freedom (nirva'!a), and

an existent by definition is "clispositionally determined" (sa1!Jskrt<1), freedom

jcself woułd be "dispositionally determined'' (11irva11am sa7!J.Skrta1!J bhavet).

However, there is no existeot that is not dispositionałly determined (na

asa1!Jskrto hi vidyate bhaval?). Therefore, freedom coułd not be an existent.

Having expressed his view that nirvana cannot be understood as an existent

(bhava) in a substantiallst sense, Nagarjuna, utilizing the argument from74 TuE PHllOSOPHY OF THE Mloou: way

relativity he used in Chapter I to refuce "other-nature" (parabhava), proceeds

to rejecr the view that nirvana is a non-existent (abh1ivt1).

Most of che confusion regarding che contents of this chapter can be cleared

up and the relationship betweeo early Buddhist and Nagarjunean conceptions

of freedom can be established by a careful examination of the following two

verses:

Whatever is of the nature ofcoming and goiąg , chat occurs contingentły or dependentły. However, freedom is indlcated as noncontingent and independent.

The teacher has spoken of relinquishing of both becoming and

other-becoming. Thetefore, it is proper to assume that freedom is

neither existence nor non-existence (XXV.9-10).

Nagarjuna is hece rciterating the exuemely important distinction made by

che Buddha between bhtWa and bh'iiva. Discussing the contents ofChapter XXI

("The Examination of Evołution and Dissołution'') , it was pointed out chat in

the early discourses the term bhava (becom.i.ng) was utilized by the Buddha to

expJain the human life process. Human life as a wandering (Ia'f!Ziiira) was

characterized by two motivations or cravings (tan.ha), the first of wbich is craving for cootinued becoming (bhava-la1Jh'ii) or survival (punabbhava) . This is

one of the most dominant motivatioos for action. When continued becoming,

with its attendant suffering or frustrations, fails to satisfy a man, he desires to

''bc:come something else" (vi-bhava), the attainment of permanenc and eternal

happiness in heaven ór in the state of brah,,.,11111 being only one of them.

According to the Buddha this process of becoming something else, i.e„ the

dissolutipn of the present existence and the anainm~nt ofa permanent state of

existence is anothcr form of craving (vibhava-laf!ha), which. instead of

leading on to the desired form of existence, contributes to further becomiog

(punabbhava). ·

Afcer having rcjected the conception of self (iitmart) understood as permaneot existence (atthifii. astitva), the Buddha used the term bhava to explain·the

proccss of becoming. The metaphysicans, as pointed out before, immcdiacely

brought back the nodon of atman or astitva into the Buddhist doctrine when

they began speculating on bhava, two species of which were "self~nature"

(s1111bhiiva) and "other-nacure" (parabhava). Nagarjuna seems to havc bcen

wełl aware of the Buddh'as discourse on becoming (bhava) and other-becoming

(11ibh(1vt1). He realized that this was the life·process or the wanderi.ng (sa'f!ZI'iira)

that the Buddha spoke of. In addition, he was also aware chat, while eocouraging the people to abandon both becoming and other-becoming, the .Buddha

did not preseot a per.mancnt and eternał life (bhava, M#tfla) or complete an-INTRODUCTION 75

nihilation (abha11a, n'iistiffla) as "freedom'' (niroa„a). This awareness is succincdy presented in X:XV. IÓ quoted above.

lf Nagarjuna's analysis of bha11a-11ibhava and bhava-abhava is compacible

with the Buddha's own analysis ofbhava-vibhava and atJhilii-n 'atthilii (astil11a-

11iistit11a), Nagarjuna will be confonted with the same set of problems that the

Buddha faced in explairung freedom„ Thus, after rejecting the explanation of

free.dom in terms of bha11a-11bha11a or a combination or denial of both

(XXIV.11-16), in the next rwo verscs Nagarjuna refuses to use such terminology

to cxplain the freedom attained by the enlightencd one, either while he is stili

alive (ti[fhamiina = sop'iidise1a-nibbana) or when he passes away (para<f!Z

nirodhad = anupadisesa-nibbana) (XXV.17-18).

. This leads Nagarjuna to make a remark which elicited two polar inrerpretaooos:

The life-process bas nothing that distinguishes it from freedom.

Freedom has nothing that clistinguishes it from the life-process.

Whatever is the extremicy of freedom and the ei:ctremity of che

life-process, between them not even the subtlest something is evident (XXV.19-20).

The two polar interpretations to which these statements led arc as follows: The

adbereots and sympathizecs of Mahayana has ioterpreted thcse statements as

implying essential identity of sarp.sara and nirvaoa, which they rccognize as a

uniquely Mahayana view of nirva.na that goes beyond even the Buddha's owo

explanations. The so-called Theravadi.ns for whom such idenrification is racher

unpaJatable have condemned it by saying that this represents a cornplete abe.rrac.ion of the salient teachings of the Buddha as represented in the early

discouJses. However, a careful and sympathetic examinatjon of these two

sratements, placing them speci.ficalJy in the context in which they wece made ,

would certainly eliminate such conflicting views and lead to a better

understanding of both the Buddha and Nagarjuoa. Io order to do so, it would

be oecessa.cy to examine two of the key terms that occur in these ewo verses,

nameły, 11ife1af!a and ko#.

Thesc two terms arc better understood in the philosophical background in

which Nagarjuoa was writing. Though the background in which the Buddha

presented his views about nirvana was nor as sophisticaed, ie was not different.

The distinction made by the essentialists of the pre-Buddhist traditioo benveen

ordinary human ex:istence (sa1!Jsara) and the state of freedorn (nirva1Ja) led

them to ewo cootraclictory condusions. First, a person has to completely abandon one in order to reach the ocher. It was not only attachment to the seoses or76 THE PHJLOSOPHY OFTHB MIDDLE WAY

the objects ofsense that had to be abandoned, but the se1lSes or the objects of

sense themselves. Freedom was thus reached on the basis of a non-sensuous insight, and the "freed one" (nibbuta) js one who has developed a form of knowing that transcends all forms of sensory perception, including the duality of

subject and object. This was the state of nzf'liiit!a enjoyed by the "freed one" as

long as hi~ body, together with the senses lasted. However, when tbat

psychophysical personality is destroyed at death, the "freed one" enters into the

stare of eternal and blissful life (brahman). Secondly, since such an absolute

distinction between sa'f!IS"iira and nirv"iif!a could not explain how one could

reacb a state that is qualitatively distioct, the essentialists also had to believe

that underlying sa'l(liiira is the reality (atman) that reaches nirvaf!a.

Oo the one h;uid, there is a point at whid, a ttansitionis made from boodage

to freedom, a transition from one state of existence to something that is compJetel'yand absolutdy differeot, so much so that the one has nothing to do with

the other. Oo the otber band, there is a subtle personality (at1nan) that concinued from che time of the ocigio of existeoce and which lay concealed within

the psychophysical personality.

With the developmeot of metaphysical speculations in Buddhism, it was not

surprizing to see two similar conclusions reached by these metaphysicians,

especially the Sautrantikas. On the one hand, the Sautraorikas emphasized

distinctions (11iśefa11a) in· order to reject a permanent and eternal substance

(svabhava). Yet, when the oeed arose for an explaoation of the identity of

bondage andfreedom, they insisted upon a "seed of release" (mok1q.mja) (sec

anootation of X:XV.19-20). Thus, the first of these ewo verses (19) is intended

to reject the Sautrantika notion of distinction (11iśe1af!aL while the second (20)

purports to deny tbeir concepcion of "the seed of release". which is not at ałł

differentfiom the Sarvastivada conception of substancc (svabhiiva).

Before and during Nigarjuna's day, uaditionaJ Indian phiJosophy was also

dominated by two similar essentialist enterprises, namely, detetcnioing identity

(sariipya) and differences (viśe/an,a). The specu łations of the Siokhya school

concentrated on the problem of idencity-. The possible influence of this school

on the Sarvastivada theories has already been noted elsewhere. 128 The Vaise~ika

school, as its name implies, focussed on the distinccions (Yisep1~a) in the hope

that such a process would evenrually lead to the discovery of the nature of

ultimate reality. Some of the specuJations of the Sautrantika school reflect this

trend. The notions ofself-nature (svabhava) and other-narure (parabhava) were

the direct results of such an esseotialist search .

Thus, when Nagarjuna says: "The life-process has nothiog that distiogu.ishes

it from freedom. Freedom has notlllng that distinguishes it from the 1ifeprocess" (XXV.19). to assume that he was presenting an identity of sa'l(liijralNTRODUCTION 77

and nir1iiif!t1 would be too hasty a cooclusion. In fact, such an assumption

would undermine all the atte.mpts he made to refute the notion of identity in

the pteceding chapters. lnstead. Nagarjuoa's attempt in this chapter is focussed

on a deniaJ of any ultimate substance, a dharma, that would make either.

sa'l(Jsara or nint1af!a, either bondage or freedom a unique entity and this, indeed, is what is emphasized in the conduding verse: "The Buddha did not teach

the appeasement ofall objects, the appeasement ofobsessioos and the peaceful

as something to someooe at some place," (XXV.24).

The method of criticism adopted herc is in no way different from that he

utilized in Chapter l in his rejection of the metaphysical theories of causality. ln

that chapter, there was oo denial of a cause (pratyaya) ot an effcct (artha) and the

arising of the latter depeodiog upon the former, so long as these two events and

thei.r mutual dependence is not explained on the basis of a theory of selfnature or other-nature. Similarly, in the present chapter, there is no denial of

the four noble ttutbs that include the fruit and the ultimate fruit

(param?irtha). so long as these are not cooceived ofin the form of unique entities (bhava, svabhava), which indeed was the way in which the Satvastivadins

and the Sautrantikas defined dharma. The concluding verse ofthis chapter is

not properly explained except in the background of these two definitioos,

namcly, the Sarvastivada definition ofdharma as "that whicb upholds the unique and generał characteristics" (sva-iiimanya-lak.yar;.a-dharaf!1it dharmaf?)129

and the Sautrancika definition that refers only to "unique characteristics" (svalak.faf!a) .H~

26. Human persoMlity and its survival (di1'iidmańga) . Any reade.t who has

ploughed his way through the preceding chapters of Nigarjuna will certainly

be baffied by ~he conteots of Chapter XXVl on the "Examinatio.o of the Twelve

Factors" (Dvad4iii11ga-pank.ffi). By the time he ćompleted {eadiog the first

twenty-five chapters, wherein the conception of "emptiness" (śiinyatfi) occurs

in aJmo.st every other verse, he would be imbued with that concept to such an

extent that it would become a dogma, a dr..f!i, rather than a merc method of

analysis. Therefore, Chapter XXVI would make no sense at all. Thus he would

get the impressioo that ir merely deals with the Hlnay~na docuine, having no

rełevance to the basie teaching~ of Nagarjuna and, therefore, of Mahayana.

TłUs is confirmed by the fact that there is no negative comment made anywbere

in the chapter and no mention of the famous doetrine of emptiness. Another

person can come to a roore drastic concłusion. He may assume that this chapter

is łike an "illegitimate child" and could not be the work of Nagarjuna.

Contr.uy to all these widely held opinions, we teod to look upon this and

following chapter as the actual conclusioo of this most valuable treatise. They78 THE PHJtOSOPHY OP THE MIDDLE W A Y

arc intcgtal parts of the work, and without them one gets only a distorted view

of Nagarjuoa's thoughts.

It was mentioned earlier that the onJy d~coursc that Nagarjuna mentións by

name is the KiiJyayanavavada, and the significance of this fact cannoc be over·

emphasizcd. Herc the Buddha was rcsponding to the question raised by Kaccayana as to what "right view" (sammii-dit1h1) is, compared with "wrong view"

(miccha-diftht). Nagarjuna has devoted most of his energy trying to darify

what "wrong views'' arc and occasionaUy spoke of "right views" (sec malysis of

chapter XVI!). If he bad concluded his treatise with Chapter XXV, he would

have rcad ooly a section of the Buddha's discourse to Kaccayaoa and ignored

the Buddha's owo ~conclusioo in that discourse. The two extreme views of

existence and noo-existence were rejected by the Buddha, not because he

had oo views to propound, but because he had a betrer or more appropriace

one to offer. And this appropriate view is explained in the conclusion to that

discourse.

The appropriate view is the middle position specified as dependent arising,

which is iotcnded as an explanatioo of how a human beiog, conditiooed by

various factors, attempts to bccome this or that and wanders aJong in a ceaseless

process of birtbs and deaths. The cheory of personality consiscing of the twelve

factors cxplaining such bccoming thus curns out to be the philosophical middle

position, and the noble eightfold path (magga), avoiding the two exuemes of

behavior, represencs the practical middle patb inteoded to achieve the cessation

of that process of becoming (bhava) and sufferiog (dukkha).

If the Kiityayanavavada served as che foundation of Niigarjuna's philosophy,

and there does not seem to beany doubt about it, it would have been impossible for him to overlook the conclusion of that discourse. This indeed is rhe rationale for a whole chapter on the concept of a person explaioed in terms of the

twclvcfold formula of causation.

Part IV (Conclusion)

27. Views (diftht). Buddha's deniaJ of a permanenc and eccrna.I self (alman)

and his expla.oation of the human personality and its survival of death io terms

of the docuine of dependent arisiog have remained unpaJacable co most

philosophers ever since he presented them. Veridical memories of past existences being connected with prcseot cxpcriencc as a result of meditation, as in

the case of the Buddha and many othcr ascetics, and sometimes without any

such practice or effort,ui have received a cwo-fold interpretation in the hands

of these philosophers. Some have assumed che existence of a permanent and

eternal self or subscracum to account for such phenomena, even in the absenceINTRODUCTION 79

of so~called empirical evidence (empiricism as understood by the Buddha?) to

suppon che belief in a permanent and eternal self. These are the eternalistS

(1assakJ-vadin). Others have rejected not only the belief in Jl permanent and

eternal self but also the veridical, though spo.radic, memodes as mere

hallucioarioos of deranged minds. These are the annihilationists (ucchedavadin). The.se rwo views have prevailed in the world until the present day, just

as similar views regarding the relationship berween cause and effect have

survived. The reasons for the prevaleoce of such views were explained briefly

by the Buddha in the K11Ccliyanagott-111tta when he spoke of indinacions

(upliya), grasping (upadiina), and iovolvemenc (abhinit1e1a) on the part of

the human beings. More decailed explanations wece given 1n other discowses.

Wherher there were to be veridica1 memories of past lives oc not, the Buddha

recognized chat human beings were proae to ask tbree types of questions

regarding exisceoce:n2

1. "Did 1 exist in the past or no.c?" (Ahosif?Z nu kho afitam addhanatp,, na nu kho ahoJif?l afitam addhanaf?l). This, accordiog to the Buddha, pertains to the prior end of existence

(pubbanta), and is pcompted by a desire to know the first

beginn.ig of things, including oneself.

2. "Will I exist in the future or not?" (Bhavissami nu kho

anagakJ'I?' addhtina?!J, na nu /ćho bha11is.rami antigtitdf?l addhana'f!J) . This i>ertains to the future and is prompted by a

desire to k'11oW the fina} end of things, including one's own

destiny.

3, ''Do 1 exi$t in the present, or do I nor exist in the pcesent?"

(Ahaf!J. nu kho asmi, no nu kho as1nt) , This pecrains to the

status of one's present existence.

The Buddha felt that such speculations 1ed to a wide variety of views (dt{(ht),

sixty-t:Wo as specified in the Brahmajiila-suttanta, 133 of which permaoent ~xistence (althila, sassata-dt/!ht) and annihilation (n'atthita, uccheda-dif(ht) are

foremost. Even though the Suddha recognized veridicał memocies of past existences, yet because of the absence of any empirical evidence to support the

hypotbesis ofa permanent and eu:rnal substratum as wełl as the difficulties involved in predicting future ev~nts with absolute cerrainry. the Buddha questiooed his disciples as to whether it is appropriare for them to "brood over the

past" (pubbarllaf?Z pafidhaveyyath,a) or long for the future (r1paranla'f!t

'iidhaveyjiitha) or be unnecessarily skeptical about the present (paccuppannaf?l

addhanaf?l a1jhattaf?Z kathaf?lkatlii assatha). He advised them that instead,

with the resources available, they shou1d. try to understand rhings as they have80 THE Pl-lllOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

come to be (yathabhutatp) and work out freedom from suffering. Getting

enarnoured of aoy view, whether it is appropciate or inappropriate, would lead

to futther bondage and suffering. Hence the Buddha's advice to his disciples:

"Without gr~ing on to a view, being endowed with proper perceptioo and

motality, and haviog restrained ooe's greed for pleasures ofsense, one avoids a

furure birth."134

1t is sigoificant to note that Nigarjuna's finał chapter on "Views" (dittht)

deals with the same issues. He begins his chapter with a refetence to the three.

epistemological inquiries ofhuman beings in rdacion to the past, preseot, and

future, which give rise to various views on the narure of man and the universe.

The first three verses present in identical terms the Buddha's own expłanation

of these views as stated in the passage from the Majjhima-nikaya quoted above.

These inąuiries and graspings (upqt/ii11t1) lUe chen understood as the reason for

the variety of views discussed in verses 4-28. As the notes oo these verses would

iodicate, these twenty-five verses deal with the variety of views discussed by the

Buddha in the Brahmajiila-suttanta, thus providing underuable evidence that

Nagarju.na had access to most of the discourses of the Buddha that carne ro be

preserved in the Nikayas and the Agamas, and tbat he was merely restating the

origi.nal message of the Buddha rather than providing a philosophical justification of a sectarian view.

The variety of wro11g views (micch'if-di{!ht) was rejectcd by the Buddha

primarily on pragroatic grounds, that is, because they do not lead to freedom.

and happiness. u, They neither bring about worldły fruits (attha) nor they contcibute to the ulcimate fruit (pttramattha), i.e., freedom and happiness. lnstead

they lead to dogmatism, conflict, and suffering. The "rniddłe position" as the

right view (samma-di{!IJt), whether it be dependent arising (paficcasamuppiida) or non-substantiality (anatia), or as Nagarjuna puts it, "absence ofselfnarure" (nif!J11abhi11a) or emptiness (f.unyafq), Jeads to worldly fruits as well as

the ultimate fruit. However, if that right view wece to become another dogma,

it would cectainly cootribute to conflict and suffe1:ing, thereby Josing its

pragmacic value. In other words, a right view is one for which there cannot

be grasping, for if one wece to grasp it it would tum out to be a closed view not

an open one. This expłaios why Nagarjuna condudes his chapter on "views,"

and along with it his famous treatise, with a salutation to the Buddha, a salutation that clearly reflects his knowledge of the Buddha's attitude towards

dogmative·views (as embodied in the verse quoted prcviously):

I revereotly bów to Gautama who, out of compassion, has taught

the true doctrinc for th'e relinqu.ishing of all views. (XXVII.30)INTRODUCTION 81

NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL ENTERPRISE

The above anałysis of the cootents ofNagarjuna's Kiinliii and the annotatioo

ofindividual verses d1at follow provide ample evidence to support the view that

his pcimary objective was to reject the substantialist or essentialist thoughr that

emerged in the Buddhist philosophical ttadition as a rcsuk .ofthe speculations

ofthe Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas. The fact tbat he depended upon the

teachings embodied in the early discourses, or the fact chat che Kiirika is hece

looked upon as a grand commentary on the Kaccayanago1ta-111tta, in no way

minimize his contribution to the bistory ·of Buddhist ·thought. What is most

significant is the manner in which he proceeded to examine the subtle and

complex metaphysical issues that blinded che Sarvastivadins and the

Sautrantikas in a background in which speculative philosophy had reached a

high watermark, both among the Buddhists and the ttaditional Indian

philosophers. Ni.garjuna probed into almost every aspecc of thefr speculations,

whethet relating to epistemology, ontology, morał philosophy, or philosophy

oflanguage. He linked disjointed concepts and dissolved the hardened and the

solidified. Concepts of identity and difference, substance and qualiry; selfnature and other-nature, permanence and annihilation, ęven in thei( most subtle and imperceptible forms. never escaped his penetrating intellect. lt seems as

if he had read the Buddhist discourses, manuals, and commentMies, examining

every sentence, every word, and every syllable. Even if one cannot discover any

tangible evidence to provide that he was a "freed one". a nirvr.ta, the Kiin'kii,

indeed, bears ample testimony to .liis supreme intellectual starure.

Epistemological Jnvestigations

Nagarjuna was an empiricist par excellence. However, .the fundamęntaJ

metaphysical assertion of most rationalists, and even the empiricists during his

day. was the cogito, the atman that sees itself before it comes to perceive

anything eJse. Nag;irjuna had oo hesitatioo in demolishing this metaphysical

idea at the vety outset. "Seeing oneself' (svatmiinaf!Z darśanaf!Z) is rejected, not

on the basis of any di.alectical argument, but simply on the grounds of its nonavailability (flT.2). Comparable to the manner in which David Hume refused to

accept the notion of a cogito, Nagarjuoa proceeds to sl!ow that the so-called

process of "seeing oneself' is do more than "the arising of consciousness

depending upon the eye and visible form" (cak1u-rupe·prafityaivam ukto

vijfziina-Jaf!lbhavaf?). III. 7). that is, a perception of some color, shape, etc.

Howevcr, Nagarjuna differs from Hume in not recognizing these ,perceptions82 THE PHILOSOPHYOPTHE MtDDLE WAY

as momentary and discrete impressions on the basis of which we construct our

world-view. Momeotarjness, along with its philosophically unacceptable consequeoces, was rejected, especially in his treatment of "motioo'' (g11tiigata, Il)

and "time" (kii/a, XIX).

Thar Nigarjuna was rejecting sense experience i11 fo11or ofa special intuicion

is not ac all cvidenr from his treatment ofsense expecience in Chapter III. His

relendess criticism of a mctaphysical cogito does not mean that he was evading

the problem. On che contrary, he was quocing a scacemeotfrom the Buddha co

show what a non-mecaphysical description of sense experience could be. That

descriptioo in terms of "dependence" is funbcr clabo~tcd in Chapter :XXVI

where he presented a quite positive explanation of the human personaJity as

weJI as its experiences.

Indeed, if"emptiness" (funyalii) were to be an "ultimate reality," there was

no reason wby Nigarjuna sbould noc have devoted at least one chapter of bis

work solely to explicate this conception·and provide ioformation regarding its

epistemological basis. At least a chapter on "wisdom" (jna11a), explaining how

it penetrates into the ineffablc ultimate truth, abolishing aJI linguiscic conventioos in the process, would have established the basie philosophical standpoinc

aruibuted to the Mahayana schools by most classicaJ and modern scholars. No

such attempt is made in the Kiiriliii. On the coouary, the term that he most frequencly uses is paśyati, meaning, "perceives." He uses it in the same sense in

which the Buddha utilized it in th~ "Discourse to Katyayana." Often what he

claims not to perceive (napaiyatt) is self-nature or substance (svabhiva) or permaoeot existence (bh'ii11a, asli/1111). What he claims to perceive (pafyalt) is

dependendy arisen phenomena as vlell :ąs dependent arising. Such perceprioos

are not presented as che results of a special inruitioq, but primarily of the

absence of igoorance (4,virlya) or confusion (muii) created by onc's disposidons

or incli.nations for the extremes of substantiaJ existence and nihiliscic nonexisteoce.

Picking up the most impoctant epistemological theme from the Buddha's

discourse to Kacyayana, Nagarjuoa is insisting that when one perceives chrougb

widsom (jfiana) the arising and ceasiog of phenomcna, one abaodons the two

metaphysical explanatiooS' of that experience. Indeed, the theme chat is emphasized is not the perr:eplion,ofa non-Wsing and non·ceasiog ultimate truth,

bur rather the no11-perception of a metaphy~ical enticy that is oon-acisiog and

non-ceasing. Thus, for Nigarjuna, sense ex~Frience, explaincd as a process of

dependence, serves as the foundation of human knowledge. Concentrating his

attention on this foundation of human knowledge and understanding, Nagarjuna not only leaves out any discussion ofspeciaJ intuitions not related to sense

experience, but also avoids any refereoce to the SO·called "extraordinary perceptioos" (abhijifii), probably because such perceptions had by this time come to be}NlJlODUCl'ION 83

considered absolutely independent ofsensory experience, even though this was

not the way in whic.b the 8uddha per~eived them . 1'~ Nag.1i'rjuna may have been

awate that, even according to the Buddha, human beings whose six sensory

faculties arc not functioning properly could not develop such perceptions. For

example, in the early discourses, one canilot come across any reference to someooe who is blind by birth developiog "clairvoyance" (dwba-callkhu) or one who

is deaf evolving the capacity for ''clairaudience'" (dibba-sota).

Furthermore, Nagarjuna seems to have ditected rus attention more to the

fundamental problems that generated metaphysical theories. And the problem

ofsense experience, indeed, was at the very top of that list.

As reiterated in the above analysis of the Kiirika as well as in the annotation

of the text that foUows, the empińcist Nigirjuna continued to insist upon

evidence from experience for any idea before ie is accepced. The repeated us of

the pbrasses: na vidyata (meaning "not evident,'' "not known," "not

petceived," etc.) aad nopalabhyate (implying "not obtained" or "not

available") bears ample testimony to his predominantly empiricist attitude. In

the absence of any positive evidence that Nagarjuoa rejected sense experieoce

and accepted a higher "intuition," there is no reason to doubt chat he was calł­

ing for evidence that is provided by sense experience. In fact, whenever the

phrase na upapadyate ("is not proper," "not appropriate") is used to describe a

situation, it wouJd often follow a statement implying chat it is not evjdent (na

vidyata). this means that rational or Jogical arguments atte.mpting to draw implications need to be strongly grouoded on empirically verified permises. A

thesis had lo be first found fault with before its ancithesis is faulced. "Selfnature is not evident" (na hi svabhavo. , .vidyate), not because "othernature" (parabhava) is not evident, as would seem to be the case ifNagarjuna

were to merely utilize the method of reductio ad absurdum (prasanga). Selfoature (svabhiiva) is noc evideot, because it is not available i.n expecience. It is

only aftet such a straightforward empirical statement that Nagarjuna proceeds

to reject "other-nature" (parabhiiva), for this latter would make no sense

without the conception of"self-nature." Indeed, it is the unknowabiHty ofselfn.arure (avidyamiine svabh?ive) that destroys the very conception of othcrnature (1.3), not simply the relativity of the two differeatiated concept.s.

Onto/ogy

Just as much as the assercioo of a cogito led to the belief in a substantial

agent, apudga/a, the lop-sided attempt to dissolve that coacept insisting that it

is dependent upon the elements of experience (dharma) led to a substantia!lst84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

view rełeating to the objective world. The conception of a person was replaced

by a substanciaJ worJd. The Buddha bad spoken of obsession (prapaflca) as che

reason for sucnworld-views. Hence his emphasis on the "appeasement of obsessions" (prapańcopaiama) as a means ofovercoming metaphysic;s. Looking at° the

philosophical background in which the objective world bad replaced the cogito

as an ultirnate reality, Nagarjuna was more specific.in insisting upon the "appeasement of the obje~·· (drfl.!ftWyopaiama) as a means to attaining true

knowledge (V.8).

In fact, the Sarvastivadins and Sauuantikas, whiJe denying the substantiality

of che human person (pudgala), had rnoved to the other extreme ofadroitting

the substantiality of elements .(dham111). This problem being foremost in

Nagarju na's mind, he devoted the second part of his treatise to its refutation.

Io this case, he reaJized that even ccitical philosophy bad fallen prey to the ot.

dinary human search for security and absolute certainty whea philosophers,

compe1led to give up something that provided them with some sort of certainty

(and in chis case the cogito), wece clinging like leeches to an objective wocld as

an ultimate reality.

1fNigarjuna were to be an empiricist Jike the Buddha, he could not confine

hiroself to a world of abstract ideas. He knew that the Buddha was a ''verificationist" (ehipassika) and that this invoJved concrete "identificacion" (co use ct

term popular in modern philosopby). 1n Thus, che conception of a person

begins with an identifiabJe and rc-identifiable "form" (rupa). Whilc the Ęuddha recogni:zed the possibility of experiencing formless (artip11) states, it is not

very dear whether he bad accepted "forroless" persons. However, unlike some

modern philosophers who would consider the "body" or materiał form to be

fundamental and, therefore, ulcimately real, leaving a1l otber conscitueóts as

being secondary, the Buddha wouJd merely look upon che "body" as a

necessary but not sufficient part of the human person. For him, feeling

(vedana), perception (1ańfla) , dispositions (1ailkli?ir11), and coosdousness

(vinfiii'IJll) were as important as the materiał body in making any identi.fication

or re-identification. Thus, the eliminacion of the oogito by expJaining it as

something that is dependently ai:isen (pa{icc4.Iamuppanna) did not mean the

recognition of the uJcimate reality of thesecondici·ons upon whic.h it depeoded.

Hence the Buddha's famous dictum: "Al1 things are non-substantiaJ" (1abbe

dhamma·anatta).

For this reason, Nagarjuna's first major enterprise in the Kiirikii is to

escablish the non-subscantialicy of the elements (dharma-nairatmy11) . This całled for a cririque of the Sarvastivada conception of substance (svabhava). As

mencioned earlier, che epistemologicaJ mechod by which he tried to achieve

this was "appeal to"experieoce" . In othet words, he was calling for identifią1tion

of substance, which nooc of his opponents were able co do.

However, Nigarjuna believed chat an ideutification ofan eventcan be madel.NTRODUCTION 85

on .the basjs of "fruit" or "effect" (arlha), for, according to bim, io the absence

of a fruit, one cannot speak of a condicion or non-condition (1.14). This is a

pragmatic theory of truth or reality. However, jfhis substantialist opponenrs

were to insist tbat the substaoce can be identified through irs fruit ot effect,

Nagarjuna's immediate response is that the fruit or effect is dependent upon a

condition (or a set of condfrions), whereas substance is not. The definirion of

substance (s11abhava) as "having its owo (svo) existence (bhavo)" stood in the

way ofNigarjuna accepting his opponenes explanation. "How can a substance

be condicioned?" (s1111bh'iivaf? krklko nama bhavt~yali puna!? katha~ . XV.2)

grumbled Nagarjuna. For him, the conception ofa "dependent substance" was

no mote t~an a ~elf-cootradictioo (XV. I).

Having criticized the substantialist theory of elements (dharma) , Nigarjuna

had to teturn once again to the cooccption of a person, evcn though he bad

begun his treatment of the non-substantiality of elcments by rejecting· a.

substantialist conception ofa person (Chaptei: Ul). The reason for this is not far

to seek. The Sautrantikas, who had themselves tejected the Sarvastivada ćonception ofsubstance (s11abha11a), were surrepcitious1y iotroduciog a subtle personality (pudgala) to account fot human behavior, ~oraJ responsibility, bondage: and frecdom. Chaptets XVI-XXVI were, therefore, dcvoted to the expJanation of the human personality without falling into the substantialist trap.

Unlike some of his predecessors and most of his .modern day admirers,

Nigarjuna was indeed cogoisaot of the possible dangers involved in a "noosubstantialist discoutse." He was aware that the idea of non-substantiality could

eliminate even the empirical conception of a person (pudgala) and ofelemcnts

(dharma) and enthrooe itself as the ultimate truth or reality. Hence his rather

bold dedaration: "Those who arc possessed of the view ofemptiness are said to

be incorrigible." (Xlll.8)

An absoł utistic view of emptiness would certainly contradict his empiricist

method that calls for identification as a test of uutb or reality. "Non·

substantiality" (nairatmya) or "emptiness" (funyata), taken in rhemselves,

would be as absuact and uoidentifiable as a substance (s11abha11a). lndeed, as

pointed out earlier, the notion ofa substance was rejected because it could nor

be identified with anything in experience. Therefore, there was no excuse what·

soever for replad ng "subsrance" wich an equally undefinabłe or unidentifiable

coocepdon of "emptiness" or "nothingness." "E.mptiness!' (flir!yata)

distinguished from "the empcy" (funya), "non-sul>stantiality" (nairatmya)

separated from "the non-subst'antial'' (nairatmya-dharma) or "dependent arisi.ng" (pratityaramutpada) differenciated from "the dependently · arisen"

(prafftyasamutpanna-dharrna) \\muld be as unidentifiable and therefore

nonsensical as any other· metaphysical conception thar Nigarjuna was

endeavoring ro refute.

Thus, for Nigacjuna, emptiness (Junyata) was no more than what is implied86 THE PHILOSOPHY OFnm MIDDLE wAY

in the scacement: "All this is empty" (sllf'tlam ir/af?J Junyam). The scatemeot,

"All this is empty," is not idencicaJ with the scatement, "All is empty," (saroaf?1

funyam). In face, as pointed out in the anootacion, nowhere in the Kiźn'kii can

one come across an absolute statemcnt such as "All is empty." lt is iodeed

significant that even when malcing a universalized stacemeot Nagarjuna retains

the demoostracive "this" (idaf?J) in order to elimioate the absolutist scing.

The question whether one can speak of "empciness" (JUnyat'ii) of

"emptiness" (Junyat7i) is often raised in discussions of Nagarjuna's "middle

way." Por example, one could maintain chat "emptiness" itself is an idencifiable parcicular on the basis of which a universaJ "empciness" coułd be idencified. The language udized by N:igarjuna docs nor permit sucha fligbt into

the realm of the Absolute. His conception of "the empty" (fUnya) is a particular. Yec this particular is not equivalent to a parricular "empciness"

(ś unyatii) abstractcd from a concrcte situacion. To movc from "the empty" to

"emptiness" is an altogether differeot process. The former is grounded in an cxpcrienced situation of an eveot with a charactcristic, while the later begins wich

a characteristic sans the event.

This careful avoidance of any absolutism or substantialism in reJacion to the

conceptioo of "dependent arising" (prafftyasarnutpada) as well as "emptiness"

(Jiinyatii) was dedared by Nagarjuna as the "middle path" (ptaJipat saiva

madhyamii, XXIV.18). That "emptiness" is a "dependent convencion"

(upadiiya prajnaptt), for it is dependent upon and, therefore, identifiable in

cetms of, "the empcy" (fUnya). Nagarjuna assercs that- ''emptiness" so identified would elimioate aoy dogmatism or obsession (adhilaya) and, aJong with

it, any erroneous views (do1a-pra.rańga, XXIV.13).

This, undoubtcdly, is a beautiful rcscoration of the Buddha's conception of

"non-substantiality" (anatttJ). However, the modern interpretacion of Nagarjuna seems to move in a totally different directon. Modern scholars, favoring an

interpretacion by Candrakrti made knowo to chem by T. R. V. Murci. insist

chat Nagarjuna had no thesis of his own (svapak/a) to present. This Vedantic

incerpretation prescnts Nagarjuna as a critical or analyticaJ philosopher whose

sole funcicon was to crit:icize or analysc (vigraha) views presented by others

without having to recognize or uphold a view of his own. Such an interpretatioo has led to two more related theories being attribured to Nagarjuna. The

fi.i:st is the admission of the ioadequacy of conceptual thinking, and therefore

of language, to express the ultirnate truth. The second is the aruibution of a

coacept of ultimate truch in the form of "absolute emptiness" or "absolute

nothingness" inexpressible through otdinary human linguistk apparatus,

Thus, we are led to one of the most troublcsome quescions relating to Nagarjuna's philosopłiicaJ enterprise.

Io che annotation of the dedicatory verses ofthcKiirikii, we have suggesced a

different rcading which would make ie possible for Nagarjuoa to make thelNTRODUCTION 87

claim that he is presencing a right view (1amy(lg-drf!t) when refuting the inappropriate views advocated by his opponents. Furd!ermore, Nigarjuna clearly

indicateŚ that philosophicaJ enterprise consists not only of analysis (vigraha) but

aJso explanation (vj"iikhjiin11) (IV.9). This would provide legitimation for the

most positive explanation of the Buddha1s view in Chapter XXVI, in- addition

to ocher positive statements made by Nagiirjuna elsewhere (e.g„ Chapter

XVU).

However, the two most troublesome questions regarding ultimate re~ity and

the inadequcy of language still remain, primarlly because of the manner in

which the Vedantic scholars interpreted three related terms utilized by Nagarjuna. These arc praftiiirtha, nirvikalpa, and sa'l!,Zvrti.

For most scholars who have been nurtured in a predominantly substantialist

philosophkal or religious tradition, paramartha means ''ultimate reality," nirvikalpa iroplied "the non-conceptuą1 ," and Jaf!lvrti stood for "lar:iguage." In

understanding these three terms in this maooer, did modern translators and interpreters impose theiI owo substantjafut outlook on Nigatjuoa's thought?

The first test of the validity of such translations would be a comparison of the

implications of these three traoslations with the Buddha's own conceptions of

"dependent arising" (prafftytJJamutpada) and "non-substantiality" (anatman),

all of which Niigacjuna ac<!epted with reverence.

Philosophy ofLangu4ge

The term 1af!111rti (Pali, sammult) was never used in the earJy discourses

to refer el(clusively to language. Analysing the Buddha's philosophy on the

basis of the early discowses, it was pointed out·that sammuti, voh'iira, and

pa~fiatli were terms used to refer co any convention, not merely linguistic convention. T)le specific terms used by the Buddha to refer to language are nirutti

(etymology) and adhivac4na (definition or St!mantics). Nagarjuna's use of the

term abhidheya, meaning "that which is to be designated,'' (XVIIl.7) would

provide us with a term that he may have used if he bad a need for refercing to

Janguage. Such :i term would be adhidhana and would not be semancically

much different from the tetm adhivacana used by the Buddha.

However, for Nagarjuna, the abhidheya or "that which is to be designated"

ceases with the cessatioo of citta-gocart1 ("the ojbect of thought"). Thus,

anything that is not the object of thought, that is non-conceptual (ni'.rvi.kalpa),

is also not describable. If so, Niigarjuna had no reason to compose more than

four hundred verses rryiog to explain the indescribablc. It would be a fruitless

attempt on the part of any philosopher, let alone one who is extołled as an

"enligbtened one" (budt/h4).88 THE PHILOSOPl"IY OF THll MIDDLE WAY

lf Nigarjuna was ttying to explain soroething and in that pcocess was utiliziog language, he would be dealing with the conceptual or the object of thought

(citta-gocara). Accordingly, anything that is conceprual would ałso be the object of thought, and the noo-conceprual (nif"IJika/pa) could not be an object of

thought. A truth that cannot be thought of, let alone one chat cannot be

spoken of, would be as metaphysical as the conception of atman in the

Brahmanical speculatlons. Nirvikalpa would, thetefore, mean something else.

In the course of the analysis of the Kiirik.ii, it was pointed out that Nagarjuna

was critical of a spedfic form of discrimination, a discrimination that produced

polarities in human thinking. These coosisted of existence and non-existence,

substance aod quality, self-narure and other-nature, permanence and annih i ła·

tion. In such a context, nirvikalpa would refer co polar discriminations, not any

and every form of discrimination.

This lcads us to one of the mosr conuoversial discriminations that the

metaphysicians of the Buddhist tradition as welł as their couoterparts of other

substaotialist traditions made with regard to bondage and freedom. Chapter

XXV of the Kiin"k'ii is devoted to an analysis of tbis metaphysical issue. In

Chapter XXIV, when Nigarjuna spoke of saf!'vrti and 11ya11ah'iira oo the one

band and paramiirtha on the other, be was paving bis way for a discussion of

the discrimination between bondage and freedom.

Nigarjuna, who provided every indicacion that he had read the early

discourses, could not bave been unawarc that the Buddha used the terms sammuti and 11ohara (11y1111ahara) moce ofcen in the sense of morał conventions.

Tbese morał convencions pertained to good (dharma) ~od bad (adharma).

Thus, whenever he used the term 11ya11ahara, Nagarjuna was referring co the

morał convcncions of good and bad (dharma-adharma) (XXIV.36) or merit and

deroerit (p1''!-Ja-papa) (XVU.24). These moral conventions are accepced not

because they are mere conventions agreed upon by consensus but because they

work. They are pragmatically grounded. They produce fruits or conseąuences

(artha). Such convencions provide a basis for idea~ conventions referred to as

para„iiirlha ("highcst fruit or consequence"). Yet, to safeguard the ideał from

becoming a merc ideał and not a fact, Nagarjuna insists upon the

dependence of the ideał on the concrete. A quotacion from William J ames,

eveo though extensive, seems to be relevant herc.

If the cthical philosopher wece only asking after the best imaginable system of goods he would indeed have an easy task; for aU

demands as sucb are pn·ma facie respectable, and the best simply

imaginary world would be one in which every demand was gratified

as soon as made. Such a world would, however, have to have a

physical constitution entirely different from that of the one which!NTilODUCTION

we inhabit. It would need not only space, but a time, of n-climensions, to include all the act:s and experiences incompatible with one

another here below, which would then go on in coojunction-such

as spending our money, yet growing rich; ta.king a holiday, yet getting ahead with our work; shooting and fishiog, yet doing no hurt

to the beasts; gaining no end of experience, yet keepiag our

youthfuJ freshaess of heart; and the like. There can be no question

chat such a system of things, however brought about, would be the

absoluteJy ideal system; and that if a philosopher could create

universes aprion', and provide all the mechanical conditions, that is

the sort of universe which he should unhesitatingly create.

But this world of ours is made on an entirely different pattero,

and che casuistic question is herc most tragically praccical. The acrually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all thac is

demanded; and there is always apinch betweeo the jdeal and the

actual wbich can only be goc chrough by leaving pan of the ideał

behind. 1!•

89

In a similar way. Nagarjuna, following the pragmatic teachings of the Buddha, could not clivorce paramarlha from Jaf!111rti (i.e., the ultimate fruit from

the fruit of cveryday life of a h11012n being).Just as much as "emptincs.5" is based

upon "the empty," even so paramiirlha bad to be based upon the Jllf!l11(1i.

Without any reference to the concrete concepcs ofgood, any notion of ultimace

or ideaJ good would be not only meaniogless but aJso "fruitłess'' (an-artha) and

tcrribly harmful (as proven by many such instances in the .bistory ofmankind).

Thus, for Nagarjuna, ultimate good is not one chat transcends ordinary notions

of good, but merely an cxtension of the so-called goodness rccognized in evcryday łue (11yavahara).

The sharp clichotomy between the orclinary ootion of good and the ideal

good is thus brokeo down. lt is significant to noce chat wheo speakJng of two

truths Nagarjuna utilized the terms sa?'(Jvr# and paramartha. Yet, when he

proceeded to explaio cheir rełationship , he utilized the term 11yavahara, thereby

establishing the synonymiry ofJflf!Jvrfiand 11yariahara. The fact that Nagarjuna

was not prepared to create an unbridgeable chasm betwecn Jaf!111r1i or

vya11ahiirt1 on the one hand and paramarlha on the other is clcarly exprcssedin

his famous statement that without the farmer the latter is not expressed

(11yava/iiiram arziiśritya paramiirtho na deśyate , XXIV.10).

Sinl.ilarly, without understanding the ultimace fruit, freedom is not obtained

(paramiirtham anaga11zya niniiif!tJ'f?l nadhigamyate. ibid.). This would meao

that frecdom (niniiif!a) itselfis not something to be sharply distinguished from

Iaf!jsara or ordinary human life, even though they are not idencical. Freedom

would not be absolute freedom that has nothing to do with human life. lt is no90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W A'I

more than the absence of certain coostraints (such as greed, hatred, and confusion) in the life of a human being. It is, therefore, the life of an ordinary

human being that is gradually transformed, through the cułtivatioo of mora!

precepts, into one of morał petfection. This transformation (ratber than

transcendence) is what is implied by nirrlii'fll.

Mora/ Philosophy

The morał life that leads to the transformation of the human personality is

cleady explained by Nagarjuna in Chapter XVII. The absolutistic interpretation

of Nagarjuna's conception of"emptiness" constrained many of his modern admirers from discussing his views regarding karma and survival,

even though these were part and parcel of the·Buddha's teachings. The discussion of karma and survival in the Kiiriliii was thus considered to be

"HJnayanistic," having nothing to do with the so-called Mahayana. As such,

the Buddha's owo views regarding these issues turo out to be "J-ITnayanistic" or,

at least, were intended for those low-witted disciples who surrounded him.

Contraty to this view, our analysis of the contents ofChapter XVII, placed in

t he background in which Nagarjuna lived, shows that he was more positive

than his modern day disciples in his treatment of karma and survival. Nagarjuna's major endeavor in this chapter is to rescue the Budda's discourse on

morał responsibility from the ha:voc created by the substantiałist thinkers who

assumed karma to be either substantial or performed by a subsrantial agent.

His was not an attempt to dissolve the conception of karma in favor of an absolutistic notion of "emptiness,"

lndeed, the chapter begins with a reference to the Supreme Sage (paramar!t)

whose docuine he was about to expound. Speaking of the morally good life,

Nagarjuna uses the term dharma, instead of karma, and this may have confounded the modern interpreters. The term dharrna, as explained earlier in the

discussion of the Buddh~$ philosophy, was used both in an ontologicał sense

and in an ethicaJ context. Nagarjuna himself followed this P.ractice, as indicated in the annotation of the Kiirikii (see XXIV. 36). Thus, in the present

context too, dharma me.ans good karma and these are identified as (i) selfrestraint, and (ii) benefitting others. Nagarjuna's selection of these two types of

action as the foundation of morał behaviot is significant: They are an echo of

the Buddha's own first sermon to the world that advocated a middle path beĄ

tween two extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification. The ''Middle

Way" (miidhyamika) philosopher par excellence could nof have ignored the1N1"RODUCI10N 91

ethical middle path of the Buddha. He knew the implications of that fi.est sermon. Self-restraint, but not self-mortification or sclf-immolation, c-0nstitutes

one of the foundations of morał life. In this regard, Nigarjuna was not advocating the extremist form of behavior sometimes extolłed as the ideal of a

bodhisattva both in the Theravada and in the Mahiiyana. Sełf-rcsttaint is a

nece$ary prercquisite for any akruistic activity, which .is the second of the virrues extołled by Nigarjuna as a "friendly way" (m11itrat?Z dharma'!J).

The irnplicacions of the maral Jife recommended herc should not go unnoticed.

In spite of the exceedingly popular theme emerging among the Buddhists during Nigarjuna's day that emphasized extreme altruism, Nigarjuna seems to be

playing a rather moderate tune recognizing the Buddha'ś own words in the

Dhammapada (166): ''One should not neglect one's own welfare through ex~

cessive altruism. Having understood one's own welfare, one should be devoted

to true welfare."

A reader of the early cliscourscs. cannot but be impressed by the ideał of

human behavior advocated by the Buddha:. The noblest person according to

the Buddha is one who avoids suffering for himself as wełl as others (attabyabadha; parabyabadha).139 Thus, a noble action should be one that contrib1;1tes to one's own happiness as well as the happiness ofothers. This invołves

•

(he recognition that, while abandoning a belief in a metaphysical self, one has

ro cułtivate compassioo for one's own person. At the same time such compassion should be extended to others as well. Nagarjuna seems to have picked up

th.is theme well when, unlike many Buddhist writers of his day, he emphasised

that self-restraint and benefitting others are both acts offriendliness (maittam) .

He was simply insisting: "Be a friend to yourselfand be a fricnd to others." This

would certainly be opposed to the ideał that caUs for complete and unqualified

self-sacrifice, including self-immolation. Thus Nigarjuna, the founder of the

''Middle Way" (Miidhyamika) school, could not have recommended amore

sober morał life than one which avoids the rwo extremes of destroying onself

and destroyiog others.

. These two friendly way'5 are recommended by Nigarjuna because they arc

fruitfuJ not only in the present life (iha) but also in an after-life (prelyt1). There

could be no doubt tbat herc he was recognizing the possibility of human survival. The st1rruara or "life-process" referred to at XXIV.10 need not be confined

to this prcsent life~lone. On the cont.rary, it refers to the continuity of tłłe li.(eprocess through scveral births and deaths, refetred to as pu""1bbharJa in the early

discourses. That continuity, along with its attendant suffering, is to be

eliminated by the development of.wisdom (jfl'iina) which for Nigarjuna consists in the avoidance of all metaphysical views (dr1ft).92 Tm PHILOSOPHY OF TH!: MIDDLE WAY

Knowledge Leading To Freedom

Knowledge that leads to freedom is not omniscience (sarvajflafii). Nowhere

in the Kiirika does Nagirjuna refer to omniscience, even though it w.Is a

popular theme among the 'fheravadins and the Mahayanists. In the absence of

omniscience, what form of knowledge could lead man from bondage to

fceedom? Nagarjuna refers to "a wise one" (vidriiin) who, _through his ~ercep·

tion of the na.wre of truth (tattva-darśan'iit), does not accumulate disposicions

(saf!Zskara) that lead to wandering (saf!Zsiira)(XXVI.10). Thus, for Nigarjuna,

as it was with the Buddha, the problem lies in the accumulation and put:su.it of

one's disposicions. Yet without following the dispositions a human being is

unabłe to deal with the nther complex and cxcessive sensory input. The "big

blooming buzzing confusion" of experience has to be faced without the aid of

omniscience. The task is reodered exuemely difficult because the dispositional

teodeocies tbat are a neces.sary means of dealing with sucb experience also lead

to extremes, especially when these d_ispositions arc dominated by óne's łikes

and dislikes. When they are dominated by likes and dislikes, they produce

perspcctives oo the basis of which one looks at the world , two of these being

cternalismand anni.hilationism. In order to adopt a middle palli avoiding these

two extrcmes, one needs to eliminate the likes and dislikes and thereby appease

one's dispositions. A pe.rson who has achieved the state of the appeasement of

dispositions (Ia'!Jsliiiropaśama) (and this would include the appeasement ofthe

object of perception (dra1tavyopaśama), whether that o.bject be the cogito ór

the real external world) is said to have attained erilightenment and freedom,

Such a person is cnlightened bećause he comes to perceive things as they łiave

come to be (y11thabhutajłi11na = t11tivadarfana), and he is free because he does

not adhere to any dogmacie view that rules out other possibilities. The difference between a metaphysical view cricicized by the Buddha as well as Nagar·

juna and the "middle position" (madhyamiipratipat) accepted by both is that

the former is a closed view while the latter is an open one. An open view does

not subscribe to an absolute discrimination as eitherI or. The very idea ofopeoness imiplics non-grasping (a1111p"iitliina). Thus, whcn both the Buddha and

Nigarjuna emphasized the renunciation of all views (!arva-dr1t1~praha11a),

thcy were insisting upon abandoning all forms of dogmatism with regard to

views. For them, non-attaC.hment to views does not necessarily mean having

"no-views."

Inappropriate rendering of Sanskrit tet:1Il5' into English seems to have con·

ttibutcd in some measure toward the myth that Nagarjuoa bad no view to ex·

press.140 The passage often quoted in support of this myth occurs in

Nagarjuna's Vigrah11vyii111Jrla1ii (29): "IfI would make any commitment whatevd',lNTRODUCTION 93

from that I woułd iocur such error. Oo the coouary, I do not have a commiuneot.

Therefore, there is no error on my part."

The term that occurs herc is pratijfla, which has beeo translated as a simple

proposition or statemeot. lt is much more thao a simpłe proposicioo or statement. lt is a commitment and should be contcasted with vyiik.hy1in(I, "explanation ," (IV.9). While avoiding the former, Nagarjuna continued to resort to the

fatter (see ałso XVII.13, etc.). ·As such , it would be highly inapprop.riate to

compare Nagarjuna's philosophicaJ method with that ofLudwig Wittgenstein,

fot example by quoting bim as follows: "Philosophy simply puts everything

before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. -Since everything lies

open to view, there is oothing to explain.''1• 1 In fact, this quotacion

misrepresents Wittgenstein's owo approach to metaphysics: The most important part of the statemenr has been omitted. lt reads: "For what is hidden, for

example, is of no interest to us." If this c.tucial statement is retained, then Wittgenstcin's thought can certainly be comparcd with Niga.rjuna's or even the

Buddha's. This oroitted part of the statement makes it abundantly elear that

wbat Wittgenstein was not willing to cxplain is "wha~ is hidden," and this

"something'' is, indeed, comparable to what Nagarjuna was rcfcrring to as

kif!'Cit or kaicit, -that is, the hidden substance in phcnomena. Neither "the

empty" (ś"iinya) nor "emptiness" (Hi11yata), neithcr "the dcpendently arisen"

(ptalftyasamutpanna) nor "depehdent arising'' (prafityfl!4mutp4tla) represeot

a hiddeo something whkh Nagarjuoa was rcluctant to explain. On the con·

trary, if it ćan be shown that Wittgenstein did not provide any explanatiorz of

experience, or did not attempt to formulate in linguistic terms what a tcue experience is, as opposed to a confuscd one, then he could certainly be enlightened

by the language of "emptiness" or of ''dependence" adopted by the Buddha

and Nagarjuna.94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

NOTES

1. S 2.16-17; T.ra 12. 19 (Taisho 2.85c).

2. S 5.420-424; Tsa 15.17 (Taisho 2.103c).

3. For a detailed historical study ofthe Kathivatthu, see S. N. Dube. Cross

Cu"ents in Early Buddhism, New Delhi: Manohar, 1980. The study, of this

work will be greatlr facilitated by the recent PTS publication ofa more carefully

edited version of Buddhaghosa's commcntary by N . A. Jayawickrema.

4. Lung-1h11-p 'u-1a-ch'u11n, Taisho 2047.

5. Kenneth K.. Inada, Niigfirjuna. A Tramlation of his

Miilamadhyam11kakiirikli witl; an lntroductory Rrsay, Tokyo: The Hokuseido

Press, 1970, p.3.

6. DhsA 76.

7. Sdmp p.43 ff.

8. Vin 2.241; see inoutnerable refereoces co the Chabbaggiya as miscreant.S

whoseconduct was responsible for the formulation ofmany a rule ofdisciplioe.

9. Kp 105.

10. Sdmp p.45; see aJso MKV p .306.

11. T. R. V. Muni, Centrfł/Philosophy ofBuddhism, London: Allen & Unwin, 1960, pp.49- 50.

12, Mark Siderits, book review in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 8

(1980): 192.

13. A. K. Wardcr, Indian Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970,

p .376.

14. Karikli XV.7.

15. s 2.17.

16. Tsa 12. 19 (Taisho 2.85c).

17. Kp 60- 61.

18. Ibid. , 56.

19. See Whalen Lai, "Chinese Buddhist causation theoties: An analysis of

the si.nicie Mahayana uodecstandiog of Pr4/1!J1JJ11m11tpada," Philosophy East

and West, 27 (1977):241- 264.

20. Richard H. Robinson, &r/y Miidhyamika in lndia a11d China, Madison:

University of Wisconsin, 1967, pp.83- 88.

21. Rg-11edo x.90; aJso Brhadiira„yaka Upani„ad 1.4,11- 13.

22. See David J . Kalupahana, Causality. The Central Philosophy ofBuddhism, Honolulu: The University. Press of Hawaii, 1975, p.39.

23. S 2.17. Cf. Tsa 12. 19 (Taisho 2.85c).

24. D 1.12 ff.; Ch'ang 14. 1 (Taisho l.88b ff.). For a detailed treatment of

these views, see K. N. Jayatilleke, &rly Buddhist Theory ofKnowledge, London: Allen & Unwin, 1963, pp.23- 168„

25. Ud 1.

26. D 1.58-59; Ch'ang 17.1 (Ttlisho1.l07a).INTRODUCTION 95

27. Ud80.

28. M 1.262-264; S 2.28, 70, 96; Ud 2; Tsa 10.7 (Tais/Jo 2.67a); 14.16

(Tai.Iho 2. lOOa), etc. See Kalupahana, Causality, p.9ó.

29. S 2.18.~ Tsa 12.20 (Taisho 2.86a); sec also Kalupahana, Ct1us4'ity,

p.5-6.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. S 2.25; 3.3-4; Tsa 12.14 (Taisho 2.84b).

33. Ibid. Also M 1.167, 324, 325.

34. M 1.415-417; Chung 3.4 (Tais.ho l.436a ff.).

35. Thag 304.

36. M 1.395; also 3.237.

37. Sn 68.

38. See Kalupahana, Cau.sality, pp.177-183.

39. M 1.160-175; Chung 56.1(Taisho1.775c ff.).

40. MKV pp.264, 492.

41. Ibid., p.374.

42. D l ,202 (where all four terms iiimafJfla, nirotli, vohara andpaflfJatliarc

used as synonyms); Sn 897.

43. Sn 897.

44. Ibid., 903.

45. Ibid., 897.

46. S 3.70-73; Tsa 10.5 (Tai.Iho 2.65c-66a).

47. M 3.230; Chung 43.5 (Taisho 1.70la f.) .

48. M 1.395; 3.237.

49. Inada, Niigarjuna, p .6.

50,~ See Kalupabana, Causality, pp.148-149.

51. Ibid. pp.149-150.

52. Sak.11 p .11.

53. Kalupahana, Causality , pp.152-153.

54. See Jicyo Masuda, 1'0rigin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist

Schoołs," (A translation of the Hsuan-Chwang Version of Vasumitra's

Treatise), Asia Major 2 (1925):17. ·

55. T. I. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception o/Btt:ddhi.rm andthe Meaning of the Term 'Dharn141 ' London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923, pp.37-38;

Buddhist Logic,·Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of The USSR, 1930. I.4-5.

56. Jayawickrema, KtJth'iiv1111huppakarllf!t1·a(!hakatliii1 London: ?I'S, 1979,

p.X'V.

57. K11u, p. l ff.

58. Ibid. p.IIS ff.

59. Ibid. p.456 ff.

60. See Hajime Nakamura, Indian Buddhiim. Osaka: Kansai University of

Foreign Studies, 1980, p.159. ·

61 . Kp 52.96 THE PHtt:OSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

62. Karilia XVU.13; XVIII.12.

63. Marvin Sprung, The LucidExposition ofthe Middle Way. The Es1ential

Chapters from the Prasannapadii ofCandrakzrli, Boułder; Prajna Press, 1979.

64. Central Philosophy ofBuddhism, p.134.

65. Translated into French by E. Lamotte, in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhique, iv (1935-1936).

66. MKV pp.324, 390.

67. See Kalupahana; "The Buddhist Conception ofTime and Temporality,''

in PEW, 24 (1974):181- 191.

68. Ibid. .

69. The Pn'nciples of Psychology , New York: Henry Holt, vol. I, 1908,

p.609.

70. Brhadarar!yaka Upanzjad 1,4.11-14.

71. See Swami Satptakashananda, Methods of Knowledge. According to

Advaita Vediinta, London; Allen & Unwin, 1965. pp. 41 ff.

71.. Niigarjuna, p.54.

73. M 2.87.

74. Ak 2.62cL

75. MKV p .135.

76. S 3.38; Tseng 12. 15 (Taisho 2.607C).

77. Sakv p.174.

78. S 3.36; Tsa 2.25 (Taisho 2. 14a); S 3.103; Tsa 2.26 (Tai..rho 2.14b-15a).

79. Ud 80.

80. Sn 916.

81. See J. A. B. Van Buitenen, "Studies in Sankhya," Journal of the

American On.enta/ Soci'ety, 76 ( 1956):153-157.

82. See, for example, the Agama version at Tsa 34. l (Tai'sho 2.214b).

83. S 2. 18 ff.; Tsa 12.20 (Tai.sho 2.86a).

84. Dhp 165.

85 . lbid. 278.

86. Sn 886.

87. Some Problems ofPhzlosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1979. p. 33.

88. M 1.482.

89. See Sn 796-803.

90. M 1.111-112; Chung 28.3 (Taisho l.604b).

91. !nada, Niigar/una, p.148.

92. M 1.111- 112; Chung 28.3 (Tais.ho l.604b).

93. M 3.19; S 3.103; Tsa 2.26 (Taisho 2.15a).

94. !nada, p.102.

95. Ibid„ pp . 104-10~.

96. A 3.415; Chung 27.5 (Tai.rho l.600a).

97. Dhp 127.·

98. Jnada, Nfigar,iuna, p.lo4.INTRODUCTJON 97

99. Donald Mitchell, "Buddhist theories of causation-commentary,'' in

PEW, 25 (1975): 102.

100. M 1.184; Chung 36.2 (Taisho l.658a).

101. Sn 1076.

102. S 1.120: Tsa 39.11 (Taisho 2.286a).

103. Sn 1076.

104. M 1.395; also 3.237; Chung 43.5 (Taisho l.703c).

105. M 1.426; Chung 60.6 (Taisho l.·804a-b); M l.483ff.

106. s 3.83.

107. M 1.184; Tsa 39.1 1 (Taisho 2.286a).

108. See Kalupahana, "Anna," in Encyclopaedia ofBudt/h1:S1n, cd. G. P.

Malalasekera, Colombo: Government of Ceylon. 1961,- 1.693-696.

109. James, Tlie Pn.nciples ofPsycho/ogy , vol. I, p. 609.

110. D 3.80 ff.; ChiJng 6.1 (Taisho l.36b).

1 l l. DhsA p.421; see Ka1upahana, "Schools ofBuddhism in Early Ceylon,"

The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities, Peradeniya: University of Ceylon, 1

(1970):159-190.

112. Brhadaraf!yaka Upan1jad 1.3.28.

113. Ibid.

114. S 3.110; Tsa 5.2 (Taisho 2.3la-b).

115. Ibid.

116. lnada, Niig'iitjuna, p. 132.

117. S 3.110; Tsą. 5.2 (Taisho 2.31a-b).

118. A 2.52.

119. M 1.140.

120. S 3.54: Tsa 9.4 (Taisho 2.56b).

121. M 1.228; S 3.133; 4.401; A 1.286; Thag 678; Dhp 297; Tsa IO.7

(Taisho 2.66b-67a); Tseng 32.4 (Taisho 2.668c).

122. The Giindhan Dharmapada, ed.]. Brough, London: Oxford Uoiversity

Press, 1962, 190. (also see p.240).

123. D 1.51; Ch'ang 17.1 (Taisho l.I07a ff.) .

124. Petavatthu, ed. Minayeff, London: PTS, 1888, 57; Apadana, ecl. M. E.

Lilley, London: PTS, 1925-1927, 395.

125. The Conception ofBuddhist Nirvana, Leningrad: Academy of Sciences

of the USSR, 1927.

126. Jnada, Niigarjuna, p .153.

127. Ibid„ p. 160.

128. Kalupahana, Causality, p.150.

129. Sak11 p.12.

130. See Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, 4.140.

131. See Ian Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggesti11e ofReincamation, second

revised and enlarged edition, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,

1974.

132. M 3.94- 99; T.ra .2.25 (Taisho 2.13c- 14a),98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WJ\Y

133. D 1.12 ff.

134. Sn 152.

135. D 1.191 ff.

136. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy. A Hi1ton'cal Analysis, Honolulu:

The University Press of HawaH, 1976, pp.21-23. _

137. P. F. Strawson, Indit1idual1, New York: Doubłeday, 1963, pp.2 ff.

138. "The Morał Philosophers and the Morał Life," inE.rsays t'.n Pragmatism,

cd. A. Castell, New York: Hafner, 1948, pp.77-78.

139. M 1.89-90, 369-370, etc.; Chung 25.2 (Tgisho 1.586a).

140. See Chris Gudmunsen, Wittgen1tein andBuddhism, London: Harper

& Row, 1977, p.44.

141. Philo1ophical lnvestigations, te. G. E. M. Anscombc, New York: Macmillan, 1958, 126, as quoted by Gudmuosen.SANSKRIT TEXT,

TRANSLATION AND

ANNOTATION____DEDICATORY VERSES

Anirodham 11n11tpiidam anucchedam aiiifvalaf!',

anekartham aniiniirtham aniigamam anirgarm1.tp,

yal? pralilyasam111piidaf!' prapal'Uopaśamaf!' śivaf!t,

desayamiisa sa'f!tbuddhaf? laf!t vande 11andafii'f!t vara'l!J.

I salute him, the fully cnlightened, the best of speakers, who

preached the non-ceasing and. the non-arising, the oooannihilatioo and che noo-permaneoce, the oon-idcntity and the

non-difference, the non-appearance and the non-disappearance,

the ~~pendent arising, the appeasement of obsessions and the

ausp1c1ous.

Madhyamakavrttif?, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin [abbreviated MKV(P)),p.11 ;

ed. P.L. Vaidya, [abbreviated MKV(V? ,p.4.

These incroduccory verses appcir co be equivocal and therefore could accounc for

most of the co.nflicting views in the rwo major Madhyamika traditions: (1)

those of the Prasańgikas, represented by Candraklrti and attributed by him to

the ~arlier Madhyamika philosophers like Atyadeva and Buddhapiilita, who

.recogniz.ed no views and merely utilized the reductio adabsurdum method to.

refute the views of their opponents; and (2) those of che Svatancrikas,

represeated by Bhavaviveka, who admitted a positlve thesis on the basis of

which they criticiz.ed the opponeots' views. In these verses, the contents of the

Buddba's discourse acc all referred to in the accusative case as anirodhaf!i, anutpada1p, anucchetlttf!t, aśiiśvataf?l anekartha'f!}, ananartha'f!J, aniigama'f!},

anirgamar(l, prafityasamutpada'f!t, prapańcopafamaf!t, fiPaf!t without giviog

any indication as to whether they tefer to one doctrine or s~veral.

Modern interpreters of Nagarj_una, probably following CandrakTrti, whose

commeotary, the PrasannaprJtlii.;·is the ooly one availabłe in its original Sanskrit, have assumed that all these tetms refer to one docuine. namely, dependent arising (parfilyasamutpada). However. as will be shown below, it is also

possible to explain·rhese verseś as referring to several different concepts in the

Buddha's philosophy, thus providing justification for the standpoinr of the

'positivists' (svatantrika) of the·Madhyamika cradirion.

l. Priisańgika interpretation. Cand.rilitti's comments on these verses show

very defioitely how. he moves from a svatantrika interpretation ro a prasangikil

one. He begins his creatise, the Prasanntipadii, by emphasizing the significance

101102 THE PHILOSOPHY OF rHii MIDDLE W AY

of dependent arising (pralityasamutp1ida). Accepting both the gene.tal or

distributive meaning and the particular usage of the term, he explains dependent arising as "the arising of things cootiogent upon causes and conditions"

(hetupratyafiipek.$0 bhatiiinam utpaehl? prafityasamutp1idaf?, pj), contnłs,ting it with the definition offered by those who accepted a theory of

momentariness (Ń.!a'l!ill4-11aeh). Accocding to the latter dependent arisiog

mearu "the arising of those that arc repeatedly destroyed," (pralipraliityanit!J

vinafinat!J samulpida iii, loc. cit.). In fact, Candrak'frti seems to defend some

sort of ".tadical empiricism11 when he raises the questioń : "How can one maintain that there is arising of that which has reached [another) without obtaining

a relacion?" (Ka1ham anenaivapraptel; sambhava itayuktyanupidanena, p.9).

He continues to em1>hasize Nigarjuna's view that "wbatever that has arisen

reaching such and such, chat :~not arisenin terms ofself-narµre" (tat;talprapya

samutpannar{Z nolpannttr{Z tal svabh'iivatal;, pp. 9. 10). This certainly means

t~at the negations in the dedicatory verse are intended tó deny that things are

arisen through self-nature (wabhii11atal?) and there seems to be no impłication

that they are applicable to dependem arising itself.

However, a change of perspective appears when Candrakirti proceeds to cxplain the principle ofdependent arising(prrJfity4111mu1pada). Instead oftaking

dependent arising as the positive middle position of the Buddha, CandtakTrti

applies the negacions to dependent arising itself, as if the negatio~s arc

presented as adjectives qualifying dependent arising. Hence his statement:

"The entire trearise (i.e: the Kdn:ła] purports to establish the absence ofcessation, etc. ofdependent arising," (nirodhidayo na sanlipralityasamutpidasy11,

p. 11).

Th.is łeads Candrakrrti to a posicion of "no-vie\vs" whicb is then identified

with the "appeasement ofobscssions" {prapaflcopaiama) or freedom (nirv'ii11a),

thereby emphasizing its uanscendence. Quotations fcom Nagarjuna as wełl as

Aryadeva are presented as juscificacion for this identification of "dependent

arising'' and "appeasement of obsessions" (p. 16), even though Nigarjun,a

seems to discinguish betwcen utilizing right views (suc.h as dependent arising)

without grasping on to them as the absolute truth. With this.interpretation of

the negations, the dependent arising and freedom, Candtakfrij then moves on

to the contcnts of Nagacjuna's first chapter on the examirtationof"conditions"

(#atyaya) and invołves himself in a lengthy discussion of the Prasarigika and

Svatantrika standpoints.

2. S1iiitantn'ka interpreialion. It is possible to interpret these ełevcn

characterizatioos.as expressiog three major aspect:s of the Buddha's discourse:

a) The eight negations may be ta.ken as a refutation of the faJse viewsb)

c)

D EOICATORY VERSES

(milhya-dr:1t1), primlllily the theories ofsubstantial existence (as#lva) and nihilistic non-cxistence (n'1islil11a), that is, the non-ceasing

(aniiodha'!') of a substantial entity and the non-arising (anutpadaf!J) of a non-existcnt cntity. Indeed, the non-ceased (aniruddhaf!') and non-arisen (an111pannaf?J) arc cquivalcnt to the nonempty (tliinya), a term used to refer to substance (wabh'iiva)

(XX.17). Hence these negations appear in couplets and could be

considcrcd as another w:ay of ptesentiog the non-substantiality

(anatman) not onJy ofphenomena but al~o of those vicws. They arc

noo-substantial in the sense that thcy arc not absolute, as they were

assumed to be by their proponents.

''Dependent aris.ing" (prafityasamutpada) would then stand for the

midcłJe position, which is the right view (samyag-dr:!ft) on the basis

of which the wrong views arc criticized. "Dependent arising" is considered to be the right view, not because it is an absolute trutb, but

because it allows for possible explanations of phenomcna not permitted by thcories of absolute existeocc and nihilistic nonexistence.

"The appeasement of obsessions" (prapałlcopaśama) and "the

auspicious" (fi11a) would be the result of adopting the middle position. This is freedom or nirvana.

103

lntcrpreted as such, thesc verses rcfer to a positive core of the Buddha's

ccachings, alongsidc of the negative aspcct which was intcnded as a rejection of

the hcrctical vicws. Such an interpretacioo would lcave dependent arisiog as the

position from which the Buddha rejccted the metaphysical or absolutc views

and cłlls would support the Svacaatcika understanding of Nagarjuna. If che

analysis of Nagarjuaa's philosophy is undenaken in the light of the "Discourse

to Kacyayana," as is done in the Incroduction to the present work, the above interprccatioo of the dedicacory verses may appear to be moce in confor.mlty with

the Buddha's own tcachings. Such an incerprcratioa would prcscat theKiirikas

as a compact and weU-organized compositioo and eliminatc the accd to prunc

poctions of the text as being irrclcvant or inessential to che main thcme.CHAPTER

ONE

Examination of Conditions

(Pratyaya-partk.[a)

I. Na wato napi parato na dvabhyar(l napy ahetutaf?,

utpann'ii/atu vidyante bh'iiv'iif? kvacana kecana.

No exi'stents whatsoever are evident anywhece that are arisen from

cheinsdves, from another, ftom botłi, or: ftom a non-cause.

MKV(P] p.12; MKV(V) p.4.

The four types ofevents referred to here are comparable to those m~ntioned by

the Buddha at S 2.19-20, namely„ saya1pkata1{tpara1{tkata'f!Ą sayaf!Zkatafl ca

paraf!Zkatrzfl.ca, and asaya?[Zkaraf!Japaraf!Zkaram adhiccasamuppannaf!Z. Instead

of the term utpanna (arisen), which occurs only in the last phrase, herewe find

the occurrence of che term kata (Sk. krta). "done," primarily because in the

Upanifads, which served as background to che Buddha's teach ing, the substaotial self(atman) was 1ooked opon more as a "personal agent," than as a substantial principle (svabhava, pr4k.rti, etc.) . With the sophistication in philosophical

thinking in che later fndian schools., the "personal agent" wa5 gradually r5placed

by an "impersonal substance'' (svabha11a). The S;uvastivadins, who carne to ~ccep t a conception of substance while at the sametime rejeccing a "personal

agent" (pudgala), failed to nocice the similarity if not the identity of their implications. In this verse, Nagarjuna present:s his oegative thesis, which io the

dedicatory verse.he expressed with the eight negations. lt is the thesis that he

undertakes to prove in the first twenty-five chapters. He has not provided any

arguments yet, except saying that these four kinds of events are not evident.

Proł,>ably he fełt that these events needed furthcr ex:pJanatioo before he proceeds to refute them.

However, Candraklrti is all too impatient. His commentary on this verse is

more than one tenth of his eotire work (almost 65 pages), and it is a stupendous

contmentaty filled with lot of metaphysical trivia and diatribes, mostły directed

at Bhavaviveka and the Svatantrika uadicion. After assumi:ng that Nagarjuna

had "no position" (sec note on the dedicatory verses) with which to criticize

105106 Tul! PttlLOSOPHY OF nIB MIDDLE WAY

thcsc four theorics, Cancł.rakitti:scttlcs down to juscify the reductio adabsurdum

by which the iaherent conuadictioos in a thcsis arc exposcd. He rcalizcs that

sclf-causation (s11ata-utpatl1) is based on the bclief in a permanent and cternal

self or substance (wahha11a). Quoting Buddhapalita, he maintains: '"Things

arc not atisen from self," bccause such arising is meaniogless, (lad utpada11a1yarthyat, p.14).' For, thcrc is oo purposc in the arisiog of things that

arc aJ~drcxistent. This ccrtainly is Nigarjuna's cricicism of a substantialist

notion ofa "condition" (pratyaya) at 1.6. However, in the prcsent verse and at

1.3. Nigirjuna appcars to usc the argument from empicicism to dcny the

substantialist view.

Thus, while Nagarjuna was saying that substance is n_ot cvident (na 111dyate)

and. thcrcforc, ioappropriatc (na yujyate), CandrakTrtl was maintaining tbat

substancc is not appropriacc (na yujyate) and, thcrcforc, not evident (na

11idyate). This indced is the diffcrcnce bctwecn cmpiricism and rationaJism, a

differcnce that is soon to lead to the conflict bctwccn the Svatanttikas and the

Prasangikas.

2. Cat117ira'1 pratyajii hetuś ciilambanam ananlartlf?j,

tathaivadhipateyaf!Z ca pratyayo naslipaiłcamaf?.

Thcre arc only four conditions, namely, primary condition, objectively

supporting condition. immcdiately contiguous condition, and dominant

condition. A fifth condition docs not cxist.

MKV(P) p.76; MKV(V) p.26.

Caodrakini's commcnts on this verse bave misłed almost cveryone who

analysed the cootents of this cbapter. He could not have been unaware

thac the theory of four condicions (pratyaya) was presented ~or the first time by

the Abhidharmikas. However, he falled to distinguish tłie Abhidharma theory

(sec AK 2.61-62) from those of the ioterpreters of the Abbidharma, namely,

the Sarvastivadins (like Vasumitra) and the Sautrantikas (see Akb pp.98-100).

He simply assumcd that the cheory of conditions represents an instaoce of extcrnal causation. Heocc his statement: '1'hercfore, sioce things arise froro those

that are exterń:tl. there is arising from another" (tasmiid ebhyaf?parabhutebhyo

bh'ii117inam utpaffir asli par11"1a-utpllllir iii, p.77).ExAMINATION OF CoNDITIONS 107

In th~ first place. such an intcrpretation would Jcave a rathcr tainted image

of Nigarjuna as an unsystematic philosopbcr, for baving spokeo offour causaJ

theocics beginoing with self-causacion (svata-utpaltt), Nigirjuna is here

representcd as elaborating upon the second, namcly, cxteroaJ causation

(part1fa-utp11t11), ignoring self-causation altogethcr.

Sccondly, wbile the four causal theorics mentioned in 1.1 are catcgorically

deoied by Nigarjuna, oo sucb denial is made ofthe four theorics ofconditions

(pratyaya). Thus, unlike Candnkrrti, Nigarjuna sccms to have accepted the

Abhidha.rmika theory of four conditions, without characterizing it cithci: as

self-causacion or as externaJ causation. Mter stating the Abhidharma theory,

Nigarjuna then proceeds to analyse.the views of the interpreters of Abhidharma, and, as the ve.tse that immediatcly follows (I.3) seems to indicate, he found

chat thcse arc the ones who produced theories of self-causacion (wata-utpattt)

and cxternaJ causation (p11rata-11tpa111) out of the Abbidharma theory ofconditions (pratyaya).

3. Na hi svabhavo bha11anam prgty,11.fiidi/u vidyate,

1111idyamiine s11abh'iive parabliii110 na 11idyate.

The scłf-naturc of existcnts is not cvidcnt in the conditions, etc. I.n the

absencc ofself-oature, other-natute too is not evident.

MKV(P} p. 78; MKV(V) p. 26.

These indccd arc the most significant statemeots of Nigarjuna in the present

chapter. The fiest statemcnt is nor a simplc but an emphalic denial (na ht) of

the view that the substancc or sclf-nature (s11a~h'ii11a) of an cxistent is found in

the condition (pratyaya). Since the tbeory ofconditioos is primarily a Buddhlst

theory. and since amoog the Buddhlst schools the first to advocate a theory of

substance (Jt111bliiit1a, dravya) at tbis early stagt was the Sarvastivida scbooJ,

therc can be little disagreemcnt that Nigitjuna's statement rcprcscnts a

outright i:ejection of the Sarvastivada intcrpretation of the conditions.

This denial necds to be carefully analyscd. In the first place, as noted carlier,

the phr2Se usećł to express the deaial is n4 vidyate ("is not evident") and not na

Jujyate ("not propcr") or na upgpadyale ("not appropriatc"). Hence the deoiaJ

should be empirically grounded. Secondly, tbcre is no ouuight deniaJ of the108 Tuli PHILOSOPHYOPTHB MIODLE W AY

"conditions" (pratyaya) but on1y ofsdf-nature (i11abhii11a). Neither the Buddha

nor the early Abhidharmikas assumed that identity, defined as permanent

substaoce or self-narurc, is a necessary condit.ion for the explanation of coodicioos or of dependcnce (prafftyasamutpiida).

When no such absolute identity is perceived, is it the case that absolute difference is perceived? This would be the case only tfthe perceptioos arc confined to the two exuemes (anla), not otherwise. In the ''Discoursc to Katyayana,"

the Buddha maint.ains chat he will teach a "middle position" withouc approaching (upagamma) the two extremes of cxistence and non-existence. This

means chat he was providing an explanation of existence without celying upon

this particular form of explanation. And chat middle position allows for an ex-

1>laoacion of experience or perceptioo of arisiog and ceasing in terms of

dependence. lt is indeed a similar view of existence and non-existence chat

Nagarjuna is denyiog, wirhout, at the same ciroe, denying the docuine of conditions (pratyaya) or of depcndence (prali.tyasamulpada).

4. Knya na pratyayavali niipratyayavali krijii,

pratyaya naknyavanlal/ kn/iivantai ca santy uta.

Acrivity is not coostituted of conditions nor is it not non-consrituted of

conditions. Conditions arc ncithcr constitutcd nor non-constitutcd of

activity.

MKV(P) pp.79-81; MKV(11 pp.26-27. The focmer reads srmty atu,

which is correctc:d in the laccc:r as santy uta.

The term kn'yii, used io philosophical discourse, can convey two m eanings.

First, it ca-n refer to an inherent activity, a power or potentiality (śakti) in

something to produce an effect (llrlha). Activity would then be an embodiment

of a condicion (knja praJyaya11ali) oc a condition would be an cmbodimeot of

activity (praJyayfi knjiivantal/). In either case, the activicy or the coodition is

said to produce the effccc (artha). This, oncc again, is the substancialisr interpretation of causacion. lf the philosophical explaoation of experience is con-

. fioed to the two alceroatives. chen the conuasting view would be chat accivicy

is not an ernbodiment of a cooditión (apratyayavali knja) or thac a condirion isEXAMINATION OF CONDlTIONS 109

not an embodiment ofactivity (pratyayii akriyavantaf;), And Nigarjuna says no

to both extremes.

The denial of the above extremes does not rnean che deoial of a second

meaning chat can be atuibuted ~o both krijii and pratyaya, namely, the

pragmatic view which defines borh in terms of the effect (artha). Nigarjuna

was not unawal:e ofsuch an explanation ofactivity, for in che Buddhist context

kriya is generally identified with arthaknya (-karltra) or simply karitra.

~. Utpadyate prafityeman iti '1ne pratyayiif! kila,

ya11an notpa4yata ime fiivan tiiipratyayalf kathaT(t.

These are conditio.ns, because depending upon them these [others] arise.

So long as these [others] do not arise, why are they not non-conditions?

MKV(P) p.81; MKV(V) p.28.

The first line of this verse presents a definition of a condition (pratyaya) that

would satisfy the pragmatic sense referred to eadier and therefo,re would be acceptable to the earJy Buddhist as well as Nigarjuna. However, Nagarjuna

wants to make sure that rhere areno metaphysical interpretations of this definition ofconditlon. W oułdsomeone assume chat for this.statement to be true the

dependence has to be invariable and eternal? Infact, the Sarvastivada notion of

sełf-nature , in terms of which they defined a condition, implied such eternalism. In spite of the Sarvastivada assertion, no such guarantee can be given

on empirical grounds. [fso, it is appropriate to ask the question as to whet'hcr

the so-całled condition has to be całled a non-condition so long as the effect

does not arise. This means that itis inappropriate to say that a condition is such

by its own naturc (svabhava). Inscead, it bec0mes a condition depending upon

the arising of the effect.

6. Na,iv'ii.rato naiva .ratai? pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate,

a.ratai/ pratyayaf? ka.rya JtJfaś ca pratyayena kiT(t.110 THE PHILOSOPHY OF nm MIDDLE WAY

A condition ofan effect that is either non-existent or trostent is not pcoper. Ofwhat non-existcnt (effect) is a condition? Ofwhat use is a condition of the existent [effect)?

MKV(P) p.82; MKV(V) p.28.

Herc the condition (pratyaya) is exa mined in rdation to che effect (llrtha). Even

though the criticism up to now has bcen directed on the metaphysical notion of

a subscantial condition, and not on a pragmatic definition understood in relation to the effect, the present verse is intended to clacify the nature of the effect. The question is: In terms of what kind of effect sbould a condition be

defined? An existent effcct or a non-existcnt effect? An effect cxistentin terms

ofself-nature needs no suppon for its arising and, as such, a condition would

be meaningless. An effect that is non-existent in the sense of being absolutely

diffetcnt from the condition will not be .telated in any way.to a condicion.

7. Na san nasan na sad asan dharmo nirvartate yadii,

kathaf!J nirvartako hetur evaf!J sati hi yujyate.

Since a thing that is·existent or non-existent or. both existent and nonexistent is not produced, how pertinenc in that context would a- producing cause be?

MKV(P) p.83; MKV(V) p.28.

-This is an examination of the first of the four conditions referred to in l.2,

namdy, a primacy condition (hetu-pr11tyaya). After examining the nature ofa

condition (pratyaya) and the effect (artha) or the causally ariscn phenomena

(prafityasamutpanna dharma), in this and the oext three verses Nig:ujuną is

dicecting his attention to the four specific condicions formulated by the

Abhidharmikas.

In defining the primary conditioo, the A.bhidharma tefers to five of the six

eauses (hetu)(AK 2.61). They arc (1) a "co-operative cause" (sahabhii-hetu) or

factors that work together in producing aoother; (2) the "complementary

cause" (sabhliga-hem)„ which is a cause helping other causes ofits kind; (3) the

"associated cause" (saf!Jpray11ktaka-hetu); (4) the "all pervading cause"

(sarvatrage-hetu) and (5) the "fruitioning cause" (11i/iiiktrhe1u). However, theEXAMINATION OF CONDITIONS llt

intetpreters of the Abhidharma defined a primary condition (betu-pratyaya) as

a producing (nirvartaka) or a root cause (mula(hena hetu upakaraka(fhenapać­

cayo, Vi.sm p.~33). Nagarjuna, io the hope ofclarifying the implications ofthis

definition, raises the question as to whether this condition is supposed to give

rise to an existent (sat) phenomeoa or a non-existent (11Jat) phenomena or

some-thing that is both eicistent and non-existent (sari asat). The eady

Abhidharmikas do not seem to have involved themselves in such speculations

regarding the absolute idencity or absolute difference betweeo a ~ondicion and

itS cffect; hence this criticism ofNigarjuna applies only to the later interpreters

of the Abhidharma cqoception of a primary condition.

8. Analambana evaya~ san dharma upadiśyate,

athanillambane dharme kuta alambanaf?Z puna/?.

A thing that exists is indicated as being without objective support. When

a thing is without objective support, for whac purpose is an objective

support?

MKV(P) P,.84; MKV(V) p.29.

The Abhidharma defines the objectivcly supporting condition as all

"phenomena" (sarvadhamiiil/) (AK 2.61). It was intended to explain the occurren_ce of all ideas ofexperience. Buddhism rec.ognized exterti)al objeccs as condit~ons for the arising ?f.ideas ~f ex~erie~~e (in co~trast to the ideas ~f.imaginauon). For exampJe. tt Js admitted\tbat ·depending upon eye and vJS1ble form

arises visual consciousness" (cakkhufJ ca paficca riipe ca uppa1/ati ązkkhu11inn"iif!af?Z, M 1.111-112), aod these serve as conditio.ns for the ideas of

tierceprual experience.

During the Abhidharma period these various conditions as wdl as the ideas

of e.xperience carne. to be categorized into miod (citta), mental concomitants

(caitta; cet11Jt°ka) , and matedal form (nipa). even„though they were ootsharply

discinguished into substantially differeflt entities ~ miod and· matter. Yet

those who defined these categories u1timatley ended up recognizing mental

substances and materia! substatices, the mental substances have the capacity to

perceive theit owo mental concomitancs (caitta). even though these concomitants are conditioned by materially constituted objects. The mental

substances thus became the subject, the .mental concomitants·the contents of

perception and the materiał form the objective condition. Such speculation not112 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE·MIDDLE W AY

onły łed to the belief in a cogitó, thinkiogof its own subject-matter (cllitta) carcying withit all the metaphysical implicacions; but ałso raised the question as to

the need for an external object (iilambana) as a support for the concomitants.

While the question regarding the cogito is tak.en up by Nagarjuna in Chapter

III, the need for an exrernal objective support is r~sed in the.present veJ:Se.

Thus. it is recognized by Candrakrrti that the question regarding objective

support is raised by Nagarjuna because those whose views he was criticizing admitted a ·cogito (athaivam aniilńmbane dharme sviitmana prasiddhe kim

asyiilambanayogenapariktllpitena, (P) 84.; (V) 29) This is simHar to the refutation of a "materia! object" by the Western phiłosopher George Berkeley. Ifthe

object appears to the perceiving mind in its owo form (i.e. in the form of a

mental imptession) (s1111tma11a prasiddhe) 1 there is no necd for an objective

suppoct(iihmb4114). 1fit docs not appear to be the perceiving mind in its own form,

itwill never be perceived, since the perceiving mind and the materiał object are

of completeły different natures (p~-ratman?). This is indeed not a rejection of

the notion of an objcctive support (til"1!Jbana-pratyaya) per se, but -an objcct

that 1s conceprualized in a metaphysical way, that ·is, as an object constituted

ofa materiał substance distinguished from a mental substance.

9. Anu1pa1111e1u dht1_mze1u nirodho nopapadyate,

niinantar.am ato yukfa'f!l niruddhepratyayaf ca kal/.

When things arc tlot arisen [from conditions], cessation is not appropriate. When [a thing has] ceascd, what is [i~ that servcs as] a condition? Thereforc, an immediate condition is not propcr.

MKV(P) p.85; MKV(V) p.29.

The immediately contiguous condicion (s11ma114ntara-pratyaya) was first formulated by the Abhidharmikas in order to account for cenain kinds of relations

implied in the Buddha's statcmcnts such as: "In this way, monks there is the

immediate (anantara) waning of defiJements,"' (S 3.58). The Abhidharmikas,

therefore, specified the relation as one amoog mind and mcotal concomitants

(ciftacaitlii acaramii uppannii~ saman1111taraf?, AK 2.62). With the acceptancc

ofa theory..of mąments(kfaf!a), the interpretcrs ofthe Abhidharma were faced

wit~ sevcrał questions: Does this relation obtain among cvents of a sirnHar

nature (s11aj1Jtt)? How can the cmergence of dissimilat events be explained?EXAMINATION Of CONDITIONS 11 3

(Akb pp.65-66). The problems arc not different from thosc chat arc associaccd

with the conccpcion ofa series (similar to the problems faced by empiridsts like

David Hume). The question as to how one momencar:y event can give rise to

anothet or how one series could pave the way for a different series was discussed, in relatioo to the'problem of knowledge, especially the knowledge of the

future. Some of the interpreters of the Adhidbarma recognized an unimaginable range of compreheosion on the part of the Buddha (acintyo hi

buddliiin'iif!J b11ddhi11i[aya iii, Akb p.66), which was probably a view ad·

vocated by the Sarvastivadins, who admitted the possibility of knowing che ex·

istence of everything (saffJam astt) bclonging to the past, the present and the

future. The Sauuintikas, who refused to accept such a position, maintained

chat the Buddha follows 'signs' (naimittdo) and that even in the absence of

direct pcrcepcion offuture events (na sik/itkiźnl he is able to predict them on

the basis of "intention" (icchimatrena, ibid.).

Nagarjuna, realizing the difficulcies inherent in such speculations, raises

questions regarding the very cooception of 'arising' in such a cootext. Neither

the momentary eveots1 nor the substances chat were posited to account for the

continulty ofseries ofsuch events, according to Nagarjuna, can be describcd as

''arisen" (111panna). 1f they arc not arisen (anulpanna), their cessation is aJSo in·

conceivable. Jf thcy were to cease momentarily, thcy could not scrve as con~ditions (praJyaya).

10. Bhivana'f!' n11/st1abhavan'iif(l na salta vidyate yataf!,

safidam asmin bhavaffty etan naivopapadyate.

Since the cxisteoce of existcnts devoid of sclf-naturc is not cvident, the

statcmeot: "When that cxists, this comes to be," will not be appropriate.

MKV(P) p.86; MKV(V) p.30.

The notion of dominance was understood in a very generaJ and broad way in

the carly discourscs. For example, oneself (alta), the world (loka). and

rightcousness (dhamma) were considcrcd dominant conditioos_('iirlhip111eyy11)

in the mattcr of refining one's morał li.fe (A 1.147-150). The .Abhidhatmikas

defined the dominant coodition as an active causc (uraf!a-hetu) and this dif.

fcred from the other fivc causes (sec note oo I.7) because ofthe dominant cffcct

of this cause. Dominance, of cowsc, can be of diffcrent sort$. For example, all4 THB PHILOSOPl-IY OF THE MJDDlll WAY

seed may be a dominant cause 0f the sprout, just as much as water is. The

Abhidhat.m.ikas cese(Ved the nocion of dominant condition (or active cause) to

explain the latter kind of relationship, namely, t bat becween water and the

sprout. Hence it was defrned as sometbiog "other than fr.self' (svato 'nye, AK

2..50). However, this distinction between selfand otber ca.me to be "reified" to

such an extreme that the later interpreters of the Abhidbarma were left with

the notions of self-natute (.wabliiiva) and other-oature (parabha11a). lt became

almost iropossible to speak of 'chis' and 'that' without getting invołved in a

discussion of self-11ature and other-nanue. Therefo.re, when the Buddha's formulation of the generał causa] principle as: "When that tiists, this comes to

be," (asmin .rafidaf'{I bhavah) carne up for discussion, the.metaphysicians were

quick to interpret.rat(occu~ring in the locative absolute construction a.rmin sań)

as substantial·existence of the two eocities rcferred to by asmin (that) and idam

(this). I

Here too Candrakrrti, in spite of his Jeanings towatds "no views," presents

dependent arisiąg as a position f.com which to criticize self-nal:!lre or selfexistence (svabhiivl'J). He argues: "Because existeilts are dependently arisen a,nd,

therefore, without sel{-nature, how can tbat statemcnt: 'When that.(exists),' be

intended as an active cause?"' (Bh'ii11an7i7t1- prafitya.ramutpannat1iiit

wabh'iiviibhave kutas tadyada.rminn iti liiiratJalvena vyapadiśyate , (P) 87; (V)

30). Nagarjuaa's cdcicism, therefore, łeaves the Buddha's general formula of

causation untouched, for it was not the Buddba's intentioo to reify either "this"

or ''that."

11. Na ca vyasta-samaste1u pratyaye111 a.rti tat phalat?J,

pratyayebhyah. kathaf'{I tac ca bhaven na pratjaye1u yat.

The effect does not exist in the conditions that are separated or combined. Therefore, how can chat which is not found in the conditions

come to·be ftom the conditions?

MKV(P) p.87; MKV(V) p.30.

Once again, the qucstion raised in the second line: "How can that whicb is

not found in the conditions come to be f.com che conditions?'' is grounded on

the asscrtion or premise menrioned in the first line. What is denied in the fust

line is chat the effect is found in the causa! condicions taken either sepatately or

·togethet. It does not mean a denial of the statement that the effect comes to beEXAMINATION OF COND!TIONS 115

tlepend;ng upon a coodition or a group ofconditions, In other words, it is a rejection of the essentiałist method of looking for the effect even before it comes

to be. A truly empiricist approach would not be concernedwith such ao enterpnze.

12. Athasadapi tat tebhyal? pratyayebhyal? pra1lartate1

apratyayebhyo 'Pi kasmtin nabhipravarlate phala1{l.

Ifthat effect, being non-existent [in the conditions] were to proceed from

the conditions, why does it not proceed from non-conditions?

MKV(P) pp.87-88: MKV(V) p.30.

So far, most of the arguments wece directed against sdf-causation and the

substantial ~xistepce of the effect in the condition that gives rise to it. The t>resent verse is a direct refutation of the view chat the effect is different from the

coodicion, that is, the basie premise of the theory of external causation. As implied by Niigatjuoa, in sucha cootext, the term "condition" l'bses its roeaoing,

for jf the cause and effect were sharply distinguished, one could maiotain that

anything can come out of anyching. lt is in, fact, the contrary of the substantialist view: ''Nothing comes out of nothing."

13. Phalaf!I ca pratyayamayaf!I pralyayaf ctisvayammayal/,

phalam asvamayebhyo yat tal pratyayamayatrt kathaf!J.

The effect is made of condition.s, but the conditions are themselves not

se1f-made. How can that effect made of conditions [arise] frotn what is

not self-made?

MKV(P) p.88: MKV(V) p.30.

The first line of this verse contains two assertions. First of these is chat "the effect is made of causal conditions" (ph4l41?1 pratyayamayatrt), wbich is already

negated .at 1.4 (kriyti na pratyayavafi) where the term kriyti is equivalent in116 T HE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

meaoing to the term pha/41'(1 in the present context. So does the term

pratyayavafi convey the same roeaning as pratyayamayaf!I. lt is a statement

asserting the identity betweeo the condition and the effect. However, the next

statement impłies difference between the condicions chat give rise to the.effect

and those ocher conditions that produce the conditions themselves, fot the

former arc not "self-made" (asvayamm1Jfiih). This, thcrefore, is a theory that

attemprs to accommodate both idencity and difference in the causa} process,

and N:igatjuna sees this as a self-contradiction. lt is indeed a rcfutation of the

third theory of causation negated at 1.1, namely, causation through both self

and other (dvabhya11J).

14. Tasman na pratyayamayaf!I napratyayamaya'l!I phala'f!',

.ram.vidyate phaliibhavat pratyayapratyayal{ kutaf?.

An effect made eidier of corulitioJlS or of ooo-conditions .is, therefore,

not evident. Because of the absence ofthe effect, whete could conditions

01 oon-conditions be evident?

MKV(P) p.89; MKV(V) p,31.

Thus, the ideotity ofcondition and effect (pratyayamaya?(l phala'f!'), as implied

in the identity theory of causatlon, as well as the difference between condition

and effect (apratyayamaya?(l phalaf!I), as envisaged in the non-idencity tbeocy

ofcausation, arc both not evidenl: (na.rllf(Jvtilyate). The second statemenc is, iodeed, the finał condusion of Nigarjuoa in this immensely significant chaprer.

A supetficiaJ .interpretation of this statement is bound to leave the impression,

generally popular among the intcrpreters of Nagarjuna, that he rejccted any

form of causation, induding the arising ofan effect depending upon a cause or

coodition or a group ofsutji causes or conditions (prafftyasamutpada). Hence,

Nagarjuna is perceived as a trancendenralist who recognized an "absolute"

beyond all linguistic expression. (Following the prevalent inteipreration, the

presenr author bimself has taken that position, sec Buddhist Philosophy ,

pp.129-141). A morc careful cont?tual analysis would reveal that the effect

"fphala) Naprjunawas referring to in this verse, as well as in the entire chapter,

is one that is identical with the cause or different from it. Ir is only an effecrExAMINATION OF C ONDITIONS 117

understood in sucha mannet, as clearly iodicated in the present statcmcnt, that

he was categoricallydcnying. If no such cffect is secn, why spcak ofa conclicion

(pratyaya) that is idcntical with an cffect, or a non-condition (a-pratyaya) chat is

diffcrent from the cffcct?CHAPTER

Two

Examination of The Moved and the Not-moved

(Gatagata-parz k.ra)

l. Gata"!I- na gamyate tavad agataf!l naiva gamya1e,

gatagatavinirmuktaf!l ga,nyamana'f!I- na gamjate.

What has been movcd, in the first instance, is not being moved. What

has not becn moved is also not being moved. Separated ftom what has

been moved and has not been moved, present moving is not known.

MKV(P) p.92; MKV(V) p.33.

The positive stacement: "What has moved is being woved" (gata'f(I. gamyate)

does, indeed, carry the i.mplkation ofa permanent substantial entity, an entity

with which movement was associated in the past and whlch is also presently

moving. N:igarjuna's negative statement is, therefore, a denial ofsuch an entity. Yet, this denial may be interpreted as involving the opposite view, naniely ,

that an entity that was previously not associated with movement is at present

movińg , that is, the entity that is presendy moving is completely different from

the previous entity.

s

(man moves)

NP VP

i. (moving) man moves

jj, (non-moving)man moves

iii. (movlng and noo-moving) man moves

118'Ex.\M!NATION OF TuE M OVED AND 1"HE N OT-MOVED 119

If the two positive assertions: (i) "What has moved is being moved ' and (ii)

"What has not moved is being m011ed," ate accepted, then we have a present

moving which is with and without prior movemenc. This is io a way selfcontradictory. lt is like saying thac "a first cause is both caused and uncaused,"

or chat "a mover is both moved and urunoved." Nagatjuna would appear as a

traoscendentalisc if he had assumed the "present moving" (gamyamiina) which

has the characteriscic of both ''moved and not-moved." The substantialist

petspective was thus contribucory co three views, all of which were not acceptable.

2 . Ce!fii yatra gatis tatra gamyamiine ca sa yataf?,

na gate nagate ce1ra gamya111ane gati.s tataą.

Where there is movement, there is morion. For which reason movement

is in the present moving, and not either in the moved or in the not movcd, for that reason motion is available in the prescnt moving.

MKV(P) p .93: iWKV(V) p.33.

If a Cartesiao perspeccive wece to geoerate metaphysical views such as those

prcseatcd by the Sarvascivadins, one way of etiminating such mecaphysics is by

adopting the "Humean" perspective that emphasizes the "immediate present,''

without any reference to the past or the future. However, such an unrelated or

independent static present may once again lead to a subscancialist reductionism. The only way to gec rid of such ''essencialist" perspectivcs, both of the

racionalists and of some of the empiricists, is by adopc.ing a moce

"phenomenologicaJ" explanation where, inscead of a "present," one speaks of

"presencing." If so, presenc movement (gamyamiina) could simply mean "motion" (gati, cejfa) which is not found either in the past or the future. Having rejected the substaotialisr implicatioos of the Sarvascivada in the previous verse,

Nigarjuna is here specuJating on the mcaning of che alteroative views of the

Saucrantikas, who wrcscled with the problems of atomie discreceness as welJ as

the experienced continuity. only to reject them in the verse chat follows.

3. Gamyamana.sya gamanaf!Z kathaf!Z niimopapatsyate,

ga"Jyamiinatn hy agamana??J yadii naivopapadyate.120 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WAY

How appcopriate would be the movement of the prescnt moving? For.,

the non-movement in the present moving is certainły not appropriatc.

MKV(P) p.94; MKV(v,l p.34.

As pointed out earlier, the statement "Man moves," can have two possible

metaphysical "deep structures." The same could be said Óf tbe assertion, "The

present moving moves." ·

s

present moving moves ( = maa moves)

NP

(i) aoa-movlng ( =aoa-moviog man)

(ii) moving ( !: moving maa)

VP

moves (involvcs aon-moveroent,

(agf1111Pna).

moves (involves two movements,

(dvigamnna).

Aftcr obsetving these two mecaphysical implications of the statcment:

"moveme.nt of the prcsnt moving," (gamyamiinflJya gamanaf(') , Nagarjuna

seems to take up the first altcrnative for e:Xa.mination and maintains that a present movemc.nt, conceived in such a manner, is indeed a non-movement

(gamyamanatrt hy agamanaf(').

The Tibetan versions (texc as well as commentaries) seem to preseJVe this

original reading [sec MKV(P) p. 94, note 2] as do all the Chinese uanslacions

(sec Inada, pp.44-45), induding Kumarajiva's. As such, the available reading

in the S~nskrit version as gamyamiine dvi-gamanatrt could·prove to be a scribal

error. This assumptioo is further strengthened by the fact that II.44 that follows

provides a cricicism ofthefir1J metaphysical assumption, while ll.} cake che Ie•

cond metaphysical assumpcion for cricicism.

4. Gamyamana.rya gamanaf?J yflJya tasya p rasa/yale,

rter galer gamyamanaf?Z gamyamiinaf'?l hi gam.yale.ExAMINATION OF THE MOVED AND 11i.E N OT-MOVED

Fot hlm who assens the movement of the present moving; it follows that

there coułd be present moving without motion. [However,] the p.resent

moving, indeed. tnea.ns being mo'Ved fi.e„ the present moving, łndeed ,

takes place].

MKV(P) p.95; MKV(V) p.43,

121

In asserting the·statement: ''The movement of the prcsent moving," one is

compelled to assume chat present moving is independent of mocion 'lUld that

the latter is something attributed ('iidheyaóhutaf!J) to the former. In chat case,

the present moving should be without motion. Hąwever , Nigarjuna seems to

be ready to assume that "the present moving indecd takes place"

(gamyamlinaf!J hi ga.1nyale) without aUowing for such metaphysical implicatons.

5. Gamyamlin11Sya gamane prasakta~ gamana-d11aya1!J,

yena tadgamyamiinll'f!J ca yac c'(itra ga'fft4naf!J puna!/.

A two-foki movetnent is implied in the movement of the J>resent moving: that by which thcre comes to be present moving and, again, the

movement itself.

MKV(P) p.95; MKV(V,l p.34.

This verse takes up che second metaphysical implicacion mentioned in the

analysis of ll 3, narody, "the movement of the present moving" involves two

forms of roovemenc (d11i-gamana1!J). The first is che movement through

dcsignation (11yapadeśa) and the. ocher is the movement in itself

(adhiktlrt1f!abhula). This seems to be the rłistinction between the phenomenal

designation and the "thing-in-itself." Further metapbysical implications of this

understanding arc prescnted in che ncxt verse.

6. D'llaf! gant?irau prasajyete pr11Sakte gamana-d11aye,

gantaraf!J hi tira.rkrtya gamanaf!J nopapadyate.122 THE PHJLOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WAY

lf two movements are allowed, it would follow that there would be two

movers. For, separated from a mover, a movement is not appropriate.

(MVP(P) p.96; MKV(V) p.35.

The assumption of two movemencs, as explained in the previous verse, will imply two movers (dvau gantarau). Hece, then, is a basie assertion of Nagarjuna

with regard to language, namely, that one cannot speak of, say, movement, in

a vacuum. but onły in relarion to soroerhing tbat is moving (gantr). This is the

noo-substantialist approach in Buddhism whlch refuses to recognize a sharp

dichotomy between substance (wabhava) and aruibute (lakfaf!a), a dichotomy

that has become an inalieoable part of the essentialist traditions in Indian

philosophy thar are in pursuit of a truły real or uJtimate entity.

7. Ganliir'"!J cet tiraskrtya gamanaf!J nopapadyate,

gamane 'sati ganta 'tha kuta eva bhavifyati.

Ifit is thought that a movement separ:ated from a movet is not apptopriate, then, wben no movement·exists, how could there be a mover?

MKV(P) p.9.7; MKV(V) p.35.

This .represents a simple refutation of the essc.> 1tialist view involviog substance

and attribute. If there wece to be no movementseparated frorn the mover, then

in the absence of the movemeot there couJd be no mover. The emphasis here is

on the term tiraskrtya (separaced). When there is no such separation and whe.re

the movement is dependent upon (ptafitya) the mover and vice versa, Nagarjuna sees no difficulty.

8, Ganfii na gacchati tiJ.vadaganla naiva gacchati;

4nyo gantur aganttłś ca kas trffyo hi gacchati.

As much as a mover does not move, a non-mover toó does not move.

Other than a mover and a non-mover, what third party moves?

MKV(P) p.97; MKV(V) p. 35.ExAMINATION OF THE MOVED AND THE N OT-MOVJID 123

Nigarjuna's analysis now moves from the present movement to the present

mover. The possible metaphysicaJ implications he perceived in the statement

"present rooving moves," are not l'ery different from those that may be involved in the assertion that a "present mover rooves" (gantii gacchatt). Yet, the

question raised is in a slightly differeot context from that embodied in Il.I

which refers to the past, that is, the moved or the one who has moved (gata),

whereas the preseot verse relates to a present mover (ganfii). It shows that

metaphysicaJ intetpretations can arise not only regarding che past and the

futuie but also in relation to the present.

9. Ganili fjjv(ldgacchafiti katham evopapatsyate,

gamanena vina gant~ yada naivopapadyate.

lndeed, how appropriate will be the view that a mover moves? For, a

mover without movement is certainly not appropriate.

111KV(P) p.98; MKV(V) p.36.

This again is a positive a5se.ccion of Nigarjuna, who would be willing to speak

ofa movement i.o a mover, without having to assume chat there are two entities

iovolved here, namely, a move.r and a tnovement. For him, the mover and

movement are dependent or contingent; one cannot speak of the one without

implying che other. The statement, "A mover without movement is cettainly

not appropriate," is the ultimate refutation of.a substantialist assumpcion rhat

there can be a real entity about whom or which certain attributes can be

predicared, the entity and theattributes being completely different.

10. Pak10 gantli gt1ecbafiJi yarya tasya prasa1yate,

gamanena 11ina gania gantur ga1nafl.IJm icchatai{.

For bim who entertains the view; "A mover moves," and who Jooks for

the movement of a mover, it follows that tbere is a mover witbout movement,

(MKV(P) p.98; MKV(V) p.36.124 TuB PHILOSOPHY OF THB MIDDLE WAY

A mover witbout movement is an entity without an attributc. For the esscntialist uadition, an encity is an cntity "in itself' without any atttibutcS, of which at·

ttibutes arc predicated. An "cn~ity-in- itself'' thus bccomcs indefinablc and indescribable. Nigirjuna has no interest in such spcculations. No prcdication is

meaningful without the prcdicatcd. These arc mutually dependent (pr11fitya)

and not independent (a-pralitya).

11. Gamane dve prasajyete gantfi yady uta gacchati,

ganteti cocyate yena ganta san yac ca gacchati.

If a movcr wcre to movc, then it would follow that thcre will be two

movcments; one in virtuc of which he is spoken of as a mover, and the

other in terms of which an cxiscing mover is said to move.

MKV(P) p.99; MKV(V) p.36.

This is the conversc ofll.5. The statement: "A movet movcs" would imply two

movcments: the first is a movc.r by designation (vyapade1a) and the second, the

really cxistent (sad) mover or "the movcr-in-itself." Whethcr Nigirjuna is

prepared to maintain that all designations arc so wild in thcir impłications or

whethcr such is the case with onły some of them needs to be carefully examined, as in the case of concepts of causal depcnrl: nce.

12. Gate tiiirahhyate gantu~ ganlllf!!. n'iirabhyale 'gate,

n'iirabhyate gamyamiine gantum firabhyate kuha.

Movemcnt is not bcgun in the moved, nor is it bcgun in the not moved.

Neithcr is it initiated in the prescnt moving. Whcreio is thcn movcmcnt

initiated?

MKV(P) p .100; MKV(V) p.36.

Nagarjuna now movcs on to the questioo regarding the origin of movemeot, a

question thac has Jeft a uail of metaphysicaJ speculacions from the vcry earlyEXAM!NAUON OF THE MOVED AND 1HE NOT-MOVED 125

period of philosophical thinking. Mctaphysical speculations regarcling time,

leading to a theory ofexistence aoaJysed in terms ofdiscrete momentary events

into the past, piesent and future, couplcd with the problem of cxplaining the

origin ofeach moment, a seoario cfeated by tb.e..Abhidharmaintcrpreters, pro'-

vided Nagarjuna with the opportunity to utilize a ńletbod comparable to

Zeno's paradoxes in order to expose the meaninglessoess of such metaphysics.

13. Na purvaf!1- gamanarambharl gamya11iiinart1 na va gataf!J.,

yatr'iirabhyeta gamanaf(I agate gamanaf!J. kuta4.

Pńor to the commencement of movement. thete is neithet the present

moving or the moved fto.m which movement is i.n.itiated. How could

there be a movement in the not moved?

MKV(P) p.100; MKV(V) p.37.

Agate gamanll?!J /lulał; ("How could there be movement in the not moved?;')

seems to be the tefutation ofthe idea ofan "unmoved mover'' at a microcosmic

or phcnomcoal level. The interpreters of the Abhidharma were probably aware

of the Buddha's reluctance to cliscuss the absolute origin of the universc. Yet

their way ofhandling the Abhidharma aoalysis, cspecially thcir understandiog

ofchange as momeotary deruuctioo (k!111111-bhańga). left th~sometimeswith

four discrete rnoments (i.e. origio, stasis, decay, and destruction recognized by

the Sarvasti.vadins), sometirnes with three (Le., origin, stasis, and destruction,

as in the case of the TheraYadios) and sometimes with two (i.e., origin and

destruction, as it was the case with the Sautraantikas). In all these instances,

cach preceding moment bad to account for the succeeding moment that is dif·

ferent.

14. Gata1!J. ktf!J. gamyamanart1 kim agata?!J kif!J. vikaplyafe.

adrśyamiina arambhe gamanasyaiva sarvatha.

When the commeru:ement of movement is not being perceived jn any126 THE PHILOSOPHYOF THE MIDDLE WĄY

way, what is jt that is discriminated as the moved, the present moving, or

the not moved?

MKV(P) p. 101 : MKV(V) p. 37.

Unless the metaphysics referred to above is kept in mind, it would be easy to

assume that this verse cepresents a refutation of any form ofdiscrimination of

events as past, preseot, or future . On the contrary, what is being emphasized

herc is that the commencement of movement, as explained in the previous

verses, is not perceived at aU anywhere (sarvathi). As such, a question is raised

regarding the validity of discriminacions or thoughts regarding the past, present, and future, which are based upon that particular conception of the commencement of movement (gamtlnmya 'iirambha). Nagarjuna is not claiming

that there is only one way in which commencement of movement can be explained; he is merely refuciog the metaphysical explaoation of movement and

1ts commencemeot.

'

15. Gantti na titfhati lavad aganfii naiva ti.ffhati,

anyó gantur agantuś ca kas trfiyo 'tha tinhati.

A"i much as a mover is not stationary, so is a non-mover not stationary.

Othet than a mover and a non-mover, what third party is są.tionary?

MKV(P) p.101 ; MKV(V) p.37.

To say that a mover is stationary (gat1.ta ti[thatt) is self-contradittory. To maintain thac a non-mover is stationary (agantii ttj{hatt) is tautological. Looking for

something or someooe (It)(rbhiiva, p11dg11/a) to whkh/ whom the characreristics

of motion. and stasis can be attributcd, one merely ends up conceiving of a

"hare's horn" (śaśa- vt!a11a) or "crow's teeth" (kaka-danta). Such is the essentialist enterprise. This certainly does not mean the rejeccion of the empirical notioo of telativity or depeodeoce of motion on stasis and vic,e ·pena, as in the case

of short and long. lt is indeed a simple refucation of the view chat there are independcnr enticies to which the characteristics of motio.n and stasis can be attributed.EXĄMJNATION Ol' THE MOVED AND THE, NOT-MOVED

16. Ganfii tavat t#fhafiti katham evopapatsyate,

ga1nanena vinii gania yadii nai11opapadyate.

How appropriate would it be [to say]: "A mover. at the moment, is

statonary"? For, a·mover without movement is not appropriate.

MKV(P) p .102; MKV(V) p .38.

127

The argument in the previous verse is made very elear by the present. Empirically, a "mover" without motion is inconceivable, just '1S a pure entity

(s11abli1i11a) without function or characteristics is empirically meaningless. As

such, the statement: "A move(, at the moment, is stationary," can be made

assuming that the entiry that previousły possessed the characteristic of motion

(gamana) has now abandoned it in order to assume a different characteristic,

narody, stasis. The Sarvastivada theory ofpiiiptiand apr1ipti was formulated to

explain such "possessioo'' and "non-possession" after they assumed the

metaphysical notion of a substance or "pure being" (s11qbh'iivt1) (see Poussin,

AK ii.36).

17. Na ti!thati gamyamtinan na gafiin nagafiidapi:

gamanaf(Z saf(Zpravrttil ca ni11r:1til ca gatel{ sa'!'Tiii.

One does not come to be stationary because one is either moving, or has

moved, or has not moved. Movement, commencement and cessacion {of

movement) arc all comparable to morion.

MKV(P) p .102-103: MKV(V} p.38.

The substance/attribute distinction openly endocsed ~y the metapbysicians

cannot account for "stasis" in terms of motion, whether rhar morion relates io

the past, present or future . According to their aoalysis, stasis is disti.nct from

morion and therefore is indcpendenr. So arc conceprs of commencement and

cessauon.128 Tl-łE PHILOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE WAY

·18. Yad eva ga1nanart1 ganta sa eveti na yujyate,

anya eva punar gantti gater iti na yujate.

The view that movement is identicał with the mover is not propcr. The

view that the mover is different from morion is also not proper.

MKV(P) p.104; MKV(v) p.39.

Haviog distinguished substaoce and attribute, the metaphysicians attempt to

sołve the resułtant'philosophicaJ issues either by assuming identity (sa evr1) on

the basis of an eternał substance (s11abhli11a) , theteby rendering the attribute

(lak!a'fa) an ephimera.1 or impermanent come-and·go entity, as the Sarvastivadins did, or by emphasizing difference (anya eva), thereby denying the

substan.ce and accepting fleeting and momentary flashes ofaruibutes without

. any real connections, as the Sautrantikas did . For Nagarjuna, both are inappropriate views. The two verse tbat follow provide speci.fic reasons for the rejection of these two views.

19, Yad eva gamanaf!J gantli sa eva hi bhavedyadi,

eliibhlival; prasajyeta ka.rtul; karmat1a eva ca.

If movement were to.be identical with the mover, it wouJd follow that

there is identity of agent and action.

MKV(P} p.104; MKV(V) p . 39.

ldentity (ekTbhava) with regard to agent and action is here presented .as a

necessary implication of considering the mover and mocion to be the same. The

non-absoJutism in Naga:.rjuna's way of thinki~g woułd leave the agent meaniagless independent of action and vice versa. Nagarjuna will have no difficulty

in speaking of either an agent or an action in an analycical way without reaching

che enremist position of recognizing distinct encities. For him, analysis (vigraha)

was meaningful and practical so long as the limits ofsuch anałysis are observed.EXAMJNA110N OF THE MOYEO AND THE NOT·MOVED

20. Anya eva punar ganfii galer yadi vikalpyate,

gamanaT?Z syad rter gantur gania syiid gamaniid rte.

If the discrimination is made th.at the mover is clifferent from morion,

chen there would be mo"Vement withouc -;;- mover, and mover without

movement,

MKV(P) p. 105; MKV(V) p.39.

129

This verse specifically lays down the limi t~ to which Niigarjuna was prepared to

go with his analytical method. That is, the analysis should not be carried our to

sucb an extent that Jeaves "motion" without a "mover" or a mover without

"morion." Empirical explanation does not allow for such "pure enticies" com·

pletely independent of each other.

21. Ekzbhavena 11ii siddhir n'iiniibliiivena v'ii yayol;,

na vidyate tayol; siddhil; kathan nu kha/11 vidyate.

Whose establishment is not evident either through identity or throqgh

difference, how is their establishment evident at all?

MKV(P) p.105: Hi.KV(V) p.39.

Herc again, Nagarjuoa is examini.og the concepts of substance and attribute.

For him, t:hese are not established either through identity or t:hrough difference. The question theo is: "How is thei.r establishment evident at all?" The

rejection of the substance/attribute distinction as admitced by the Sarvastivadins and the Sautranti.kas does oot mean the rejectioo o( all conceptualizatioos or d~scriminations (vikalpa). lt is this particular form of conceptualizatioo that is being questioned , not any form of cooceptualization.

22, Gatyi yayocyate_ ganta gati'T!l tiif!l sa na gacchalt~

yanniin n4 gati·purvo / ti kaicit kif?lCidd hi gacchati.130 THE P HJLOSOPHY OF TtłE MJDOt.E wAy

Whatever motion in terms of wh.ich a mover is spoken of, he does not

move by that motion. Because he does not exist prior to motion, who or

what is it that moves?

MKV(P) pp. 105·106; MKV(V) p.40.

It is possible for one to speak of a mover dcpending upon motion. However,

when that mover is distinguished from.motion. then we ąre left with a pure entity or person (svabhava, pudgala) to which or whom the mot.ion is anributed

and, in that case, the encity or person should precede·movement. Such an entity or person is not evident in experience. Hence the statement: "He does not

move by that morion."

23. Gatya yayocyale ganta tato 'nyatlJ sa .na gaccha11;

gati d11e nopapar/yete yasmiit eke prag~chali.

Whatever m~tion in terms of which a mover is spoken of, he does not

carry out a motion that is completdy differentfrom ir. A two-fold motion

is not appropriate, since it is only one person that moves.

MKV(P) p . 106; MKV(V) pAO.

The distiąccioo becween the "mover" and "mocion" also does not mean ~hat the

"mover'' carries out a _morion chat is different from himself. Ifsucha distinction

is recognized, then, as explained eadier, there would be two movemeots, the

movement as a result of which one comes to be called "mover'' and the movemeot itself. No such dual motion is found. nor are there two movers correspondiog to the twofołd motion. The/act is that it is only one person that moves.

24. Sadbhuto gam(lnaf?J gantii 1nprakiira~ na gacch4t1;

n7isadbhulo 'pi gamanatlJ 1nprakart11(J sa gacchati,

25. gamanaf'(J sadasadbhutatlJ tnprakaraf!t na gacchati,

tasmarjgaliś ca gania ca g11nt11vyrJ??t ca 1111 vidyale..EXAMLNAT!ON OP THE M OVED AND THE NOT-MOVEO

An existeot movet docs not carry out the movemeot in any of the thtee

ways. Neither does a non-exutent mover carry out the movement in any

ofthe thrce ways. Nor does a person carry out a movetnent, both cxistenr

and non-cxistcnt, in any of the three ways. Thcrefore, neithcr motion,

nor the mover, nor the space to be moved is evident.

MKV(P) p.107; ltf.KV(V) p.40.

131

The conclusion is very specificaJly stated in these two vecses. lt is not any kind of

movet or movement that is cejcctcd as being impossible. lt is the really or

substantially or indepcndencly existent (1ad) mover or movement that is rejected. Th.is is a criticism of etcrnalisrn (iaf11ala-11ada). The opposite view,

namely, a non-rea!, non-substantiaJ and non-independent existence (a1ad) was

the kind of irnpermanence advocated in annihilationism (uccheda-vada)

which, in the Buddhist context, ~ commensu.rate with momentary desttuction

(/qaf!a-bhanga). rather than the impermanence (anitya) advocated by the Buddha on the basis of "dependent arising" (prafftyasamulpada). The coml:?ination of the two metaphysicaJ views of cxistencc and non-existence docs not lead

co a happy synthesis. Change and impermanence undersrood in this

metaphysical way do not contribute toward a reasonabłe and cmpicical explanation of the motion, the movet, or even the space moved.CHAPTER

THREE

Examination of the Faculty of Eye

(Cakfur-indriya-parzk!a)

1. Darś(ln(lf!Z śravaf!llf!Z ghrtif!an.z rasantJ'(J sparśanaf!Z mana!;,

indriyar,i jaefetefiif!Z drllffavyadini gocaral;.

Seeing, heańng, smelling, casting, touching, and mind ace the six

hculties. Their spbeces consist of the object of seeing, etc.

MKV(P) p.113; M.KV(V,) p .43.

Although the traditional Adhidharma dassification lists the "aggregates"

(skandha) ; "spheres" (ayatana), and "elements" (dliiilu) in that order, fot

Nagarjuna, the epistemology, the faculties (induded under spheres) were

more important, primarily because ofthe current controversies surrounding the

concept ofexistence (dharma). Furthermore, even in the discussion offaculties,

Nagarjuna was not so much interested in the faculties per Ie, for therc was not

much controvcirsy regarding the eye, etc. No school doubted the existence of

these faculties. The controversies were centered more on the function of the

faculties, thar is, with regard to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasing, touch, and

thinking. For this reason, after providing a citle for the chapter as "Examination

of the Faculties" (Jndriya-paiikfii), Nagarjuna immediately moves on to an

analysis of the more complicated issues relating to tbeir funcrioos. Hence the

refereace to seeing, heariog, etc., especially as means of identificatioo ofevents

(see, e.g., P. F. Sttawson, lndividualI, New York: Doubkday, 1963, pp.35

ff.) that is so imporcant for an empiricist like Nigarjuna. Even among these

various faculties and their functioos, the most itnportant.epistemologkal issues

were connecced with sed~g. Hence Nagjrjuna's interest in the problem ofseeing or visual perceptioo. Note that the term mana/; is used here to refer to the

function, even though manana woułd be more appropriate in the context.

!his may have been·done to p(eserve the metre.

2. S11am atmanaf!Z c4rśangf!Z hi tat ta„z eva na paśyati,

·n4 paśyatiyad iitmiinl1f!Z katha'f(l drak$y11ti tal paran.EXĄMINATLON Of THE FACULTY OP EYE

Sceing does not perceive itself, its own form. How can that wbich does

not pecceive itself, see otbers?

MKV(P) p.113; MKV(V) p.43 .

133

Nagarjuna was dearly aware of the major contcoversy raging among the

.adherents of the various "esseoti:µist'! schools regarding the problem of perception. Io their search for certaincy, these essencialist schools assumed char in any

act of perception the "most dear and distinct" is the perceptioo of "oneself."

(see Brhlkliiraf!yaka Upanifad 1.4.1). "I think, therefore, I am'' (cogito ergo

sum) was the premise with which the essentialist thinkers of pre-Buddhist India

began their exposicion of percep tion. The Buddha was himself aware of the difficulties involved in such an assumption when he advised his disciples not to

follow such speculations (mant/i ast1iitisabba1?1 uparundhe, Sn 916). White the

Buddha was willing to recognize consciousness or "sdf-consciousness"

(11ifJfiiif!a, 11ijnana) as an imporcant constiruent of the human personality as

well as its experiences, he was not willi.ng co assume a metaphysical substracum

such as the "self' or "I" as beiog the objeot of such awareness. He was clearly

aware thac this Jacter episcemological method was the source of most obsessive

conceprions (mu/af!Z papancasańkhaya, ibid.). However, the later Buddhist

rnetaphysicians, innocently unaware of the implicatioos of such a method,

seem to havc been led in that direction, thereby dragging themselves into the

quagmire of svabhava-metaphysics from wbich they could not ea.sily get out.

The resuit was the description of perception in the Vibha1aprabli?ivrtti (p.32):

The substance calledthe eye U.ofthe nature ofthatwhich sees. ln it

is p.roduced an action ofseeing, when its power is awakened on account of the emerge.~ce of the rotality ofits causes and condicions.

The eye does not apprehend independently of consciousness (vijfiiina), nor does eye-cons<:iousness know the object unsupported by

the active eye. Eye as well as eye-consciousness1with the help ofaccessories such ~ light, cooperate simultaneously toward bringing

che perception of an object. T he 9bject, the eye, the eyeconsciousncss, and the light, cooperate simultaneously coward bringing the perception of an object. The object, the cyt\ the eyeconsciousncss, and the light, all manifest thęir power, i.e., beco1ne

accivc and flash fortb simuJtaoeously. The object appears, the eye

sees, and the eye-conscoiusoess knows it. This is called the direct

knowk:dgc of an object. [Emphasis mine]

Reading through the present chapter of Na~rjuna , one can hardly miss the

tatget of his criticism if one were to keep ·io mind the above passage of the

'134 rHE PHJl.OSOPHY OF THE MIODLI: WAY

Vibhafiiprabhavrtti. These problems will be discussed in their contextS.

However, bcforc taking up the meraphysical issues involved in the abovc sort of

description, Nagarjuna oeeded to eliminate the very source of such

metaphysics, namely, the cogito. For Nagarjuna, the method by which one arrives ar the cogito not only leads ro the belief in a "sva 1itman", but also the

sharp dichotomy betweeo "self' (s11a attnan) and "ocher" (par.a atman).

Therefore, having stated·positively thl\t there is no "seeing of oneself' (svam

atmanatri darśanatrt), Nagarjuna raises question as co the possibility of"seeing

an other" (paraf!J). Thus, the dichotomy bcrween self and ocher in a moce

metaphysical form is not only ethically unacceptable, but also epistemologically

unfounded.

3. Na pa1y'iipto 'gnidr1fiinto darśanasya prasiddhaye,

Ja darfana'1 sa pratyukto gamyam'iinagatagatat''1.

The example offire is not adequate for the establishment ofseeing. That

[fire] together with sccing a.re refuted by [a rcfutation of] the prcscnt

moving, the moved and the not movcd.

MKV(P) p.114; MKV(V) p.43.

While those who accepted the cogito assumed that seeing oneself precedes any

act of seeing, their opponents seem co have used the example of the fire to

maiotain that, Jike fi're which burns cverything but itself, seeing perccivcs

everything else but itself.

The theory of moments (k/af}a) that led to meraphysics in the sphere of

causacion (Chapter I) and cha.age (Chapter Il) did not leave the problem of

perception untouched. lodeed, it was the problem of perception chat was most

affected by a theory of moments, as is evident from the variety ofcootradictory

theories of perception presented by the Sarvastivadins, the Saucrancikas and

the Theravadins (sec Kalupahana, Buddhi.It Philosopl{y, pp.97-107).

Being aware of rrus fact, ~garjuna takes the easy route of referring to his

previous refutation ofchange (Chapter Il). Hence Candrak:Trci's compositioo of

a verse comparable to 11.1: What has beeo seen is not being seen; what has not

been scen is ałso 1:1ot bcing scen. Apart fcom the seen and the not seen, dle prescnt seeing is also not seeo."

The ~ame can be said of that which is puent (dagdhvaf!J), etc. This is whatEXAM1NA110N OPTl-lll FACULTY OF EYE 135

Naga.tjuna means when he says: "That [fi.te] together with seeing are refuted by

[a refutation ofJ the present moving, the moved and the not moved."

4. NiipaJyamiina~ bhavati yadii kifrzcana darśanaf!Z,

darśana?{' paiyafity evaf{' katham etat tu yu/yate.

When some form ofseeing that is not perceiving does not exist, how percinent is the view that seeing perceives?

MKV(P) p.1 IJ; MKV(V) p.44.

The essentialist definition of "seeing" as possessing the "nature of seeing"

(darśana-wabhava) is tantamount to saying that "sceing always sees." This, indced, is the statement with which the Sarvastiv:ada (specificałly Vaibha~ika)

began its description ofperception, as ind.icated by the quotation referred to in

the note to lll.2. In other words, it is not possible to recognize any form ofseeing that is"not presentły perceiving" (na apaiyamiinaf!Z), or there cannot be a

"non-seeing perception." lfsuch be the definition, Nagarjuna raises a question

regatding the appropriateness of the statements, "Seeing per<:eives.''

5. Paśyati darśana?{' ntTiva naiva paś-yaty adarfanaf{',

vyakhyato darśanenaiva dr(lffa cJpy upaga1nyafiif!Z.

Seeing does not perceive, nor does non-seeing perceive. One should admit that a seec is explained by [the aAAłysis ot] seeing itself.

MJ...'V(P) pp.115-117; MKV(V) p.44.

After explaining the difficulties invołved in the statement, "Seeing perceives,"

here Nagarjuna insists thac it is not possible to assert that •inon-seeing

perceives." Just as much as a substantial event like "seeing" cannot be appropriately expłained, even so a substantial entity like a "seer" (dra.ff() also can-136 THE PHlLOSOPHY OFT/-łli MIDDLE W 11Y

not be established. The rejeccion of the latter follows from the refutacion of the

former. This point is further elaborated in the foUowiog verse.

6. Tira1krtya dr(Zf(ii niisty atiraskrtyf' ca darlanaf!I-, .

dra!{avya'f!l. darśana'f?l caiva dra;fary asati te kutai{.

A seer does not exist either separated or not separated from seeing. When

a seer does not exist, whencc can there beseeit1g and the opject ofseeing?

MKV(P) pp.117·118; MKV(V? p. 45.

The metaphysical vie:ws discussed previously lead to two different conceptions

of a "seer" (dra;ft). namely, (i) a seer associated with seeing (a seeing seer),

which is based on a rheory of identity, and (ii) a seer di.ssoci.ated from seeing (a

non-seei'ng seec), which en1phasizes difference. Haviag denied both, Nagarjuna raises the question: "In the absence of a seer. whe.p.ce can there be seeing

and the objecc of seeing?" This question is raised not by a dogmacie

philosopher, but by a critical epistemology. Ir is simpły askiog rhe question,

'Just because you have come up with an unacceptable definition of a 'seer', are

we going to ignorc the fact that there is seeing and also the objects of such seeing? If there wece tó be no seer, how can you account for che percepcion of objccts?" ln ocher words, Nagarjuna, in the way he formulates his question, is

asserting tbat seeing and the objects ofseeing are mutualły dependent upon a

seer. This assertion leads Nagarjuna directly to the starement of the Buddha in

.che early discourses.

7. Prafitya mata-pitarau yathoktal{ putr{l-St11?1bhavai{,

cak;u-rope prafttyaź11a1tz ukto vijfiiina-saf!Zbhavaf?.

Just as the birth ofa son is said to be d~endenr upon the mother and the

father, cven so, the arising of (visual] <:onsciousncss is said to be depęndent upon eye and materiaJ form.

MKV(P) p.118; Ml(V(V) pA~ .EXAMINATION Of THE FACUlTY OF EYE i37

Being a competent and insightful philosopher, Nagarjuna immediateły

perceives the differeoce betweeo the Buddha's analysis and those of his

"substantialist" protagonists. fi,bandoning the misłeading terminology of the

substantialist, Nagarjuna adopts the Buddha's owo terminology to explain the

process of perceptioo: "Depeoding upon the eye and visible form arises visual

consciousness," (Cakkhun ca paficca rupe ca'uppajjati cakkhu-vz"fJifii11a~) (M

1.111).

Even though the three terms used here correspond to the terms used by the

substantialists _:cakkhu stands for darśana , rupa for'dr(Jf(avya. and draftr for vijfiiina- tbe description itselfis different. Here the explanation of visual perceptioo does not begin with the assertion of the cogito in order to end with the

perception ofthe external object, which was one of Nagarjuoa's cricicism of the

substandalist view. Neither is perceptioo defined in a more substantialist way

as in the quotation from the Sarvastivadios which says: "The substance called

the eye is of the narnre of that which sees," (sec nore IlI.2). No metaphysical

jargon is inuoduced herc at all. Without gettiog iovolved in the substancialist

terminology and concepcs, the preseot stacement of perception is based ·encirely

on the principle of dependence (prafityasamutparla) . Thus, visual consciousness is said to be dependent upon the eye ( = faculty) and visible form

( = object). Such an cxplanation immediately climinates the conception of a

substance (s1,1abhava, at1nan) and repfaces it with a principle of "dependence"

(prafity(l.Jamutpada) . In order to illustrate this process of perception, l'figarjuna utilizes the example of the birth ofa son depending upon the rnother and

father

lt .would, therefore, be uofair to think tbat an illustrious. Buddhist

philosopher li.kc Nagarjuna failed to sec the importaat: philosophical differences between the Buddha's explanation of the causałity of perception and

that presented by the mecaphysicians. This verse, therefore, embodies another

of the more appropriace views (ka/pana yatrayojyate, sec XVII.13) that Nagarjuna has been elsewhere attributiog to the Buddhas, the Sravakas, and the

P.ratyeka-buddhas.

8. Draftavya-darśanabhiivad vi.fniinat11:catu1!ayaf!t,

niisfity upiidiiniit/ini bhavzjyantz'punal? kathaf{t.

Ifit is cheview that the four factots1beginnirig with consciousness, do not138 THE PH1LOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

exist, bccause of the absence ofseeing and the object ofseeing, how then

can there be grasping?

MKV(P) p.119; MKV(V) pp.45-46.

Candtak1rti's negativist approach creates a problem in regard to the interpreta·

cion ofthis verse. The use ofche iti:formula needs to be carcfulły handled if we

arc to avoid a gross misinterpretation of Nagatjuna's thoughts at this point.

Nagarjuna has alrcady rcfuced the mecaphysical vicws pertaining to sceing and

seer. However, at 111.6, he was asserting that one cannot speak ofseeing and the

scen withouc a seer. le is possible that somcone may insist: "If thete wece to be

no seeing (darśana, cak!u) and tne seen (dra.f{avya, ropa), then the four factors

(namely, feeling (vedan'ii), perception (IattJjflii), disposicions (faf!Jsk'iir'lil?) and

consciousriess ('vijlłana'f!I.), which conscitute the psycbic part of the

psychophysical personality and hence the equivalent of dr4!tr] arc also nonexiscenc (naslz)." the ih°-formula cooverts th.is to a view or a scatement someone

could express. If so, Nagarjuna's counter·qucstion wouJd be: "How then call

there be grasping?" Surprisingly, Candrakrrti interprets Nagatjuna's question

as implying a deniaJ ofgrasping (na santy upadii.n'iidimty arthal?). However, if

the s"tatem_ent preceding ih° is understood as the view of the opponent, then

Nigarjuna's answer is: "How can you explain grasping?" ln other words,

Nagarjuna seems to be saying: "Grasping existi, for that is what is eliminated

at the moment of enłightenment and freedom (anupadii-vimukft). Grasping is

dependent upon consciousness (vi.fnana) which is, in turn, dependent upon the

eye and visible form. Any other explanation of perception is unacceptable co

me."

Such an explanation is in perfect conformity with the contents of the two

preceding vetses both of which rep.tesent positive statements of Nagarjuna.

9, Vyakhyalaf{J śravaf!am. ghiii'!af!I rasanaf!I sparśanaf{J mana!/,

darśanenaiva j'iintyac. chrotr-Jrotavyak.adi ca.

What has been expfained as hearing1 smelling, tasting, touching, and

ro.ind, as well as the bearer, the sound, etc. should be known i_n the same

.

way .as see1ng.

MKV(P) p.120; MKV(V) p.46.EXAMlNATlON OP THE P,i;cutTY OF EYE 139

Thus, after pointing out the inappropriacness ofcertain metaphysical views perta.ining to visual perception and having stated the B';Jddha's owo explanation of

perception in terms of "dependent arising" (prafftyasamutpada), Niga:rjuna

coocludes chat the other five faculties and theirobjects should be.understood in

the same way as "seeing." This indeed is a very positive explanation of sensory

experience and a faithful representation of the Buddha's teaching as embodied

in the "cliscourscs."CHAPTBR

FOUR

Examinacion of Aggregates

(Skandha-parik.fd)

1. Rupa-karaf!a-nirmuktaf!' na rupam upalabhyate,

fiipe„api na nirmuktaT?Z drfyate fiipa-kara11af!'.

Materiał form, distinct from the cause of matecial form, is not obcałned.

Similady, a cause of materiał form, disrinct from materiał form, is also

not scen.

M.KV(P) p.123; MKV(V) p.48.

From amoog the five aggregares (skandha), Nagarjuna selects materiał form

(riipa), aod not one of the expłicitły psychologicał aggregates such as feeling,

perception, disposicion, or coosciousncss. The rcasoo is dcar. He has already

examined the proccss ofpcrccption and, rherefore, needs to aaalyse the objecc

of perccption, rather thąn perceptioo itsełf.

In the discourses, materiał from (riipa) was anałysed into the four great

elemeots (catfaro mah<1bhUt"ii) and the elcments derived from these four

(catunnaf!' mahabhuliinarri uplidiiya rupaf!J) (M ł.87). In their attempc to

decermine whac these derived elementS were, the Abhidharmikas scanned all

the 'discourses looking for any element (dharma) that would be predominancly

materiał and compiled varying lists. As a result ofspeculation on these different

lists, there carne ro be a distinccion becweeo gross matter (sthula-fiipa) and sub-

. ~

de matter (Jiikpnza-fiipa). Yer, it was assumed chat the four great elements coosticuccd the foundatioo ofalJ forms of matter.

When the question regarding the nature of the four great ełementS was raised, the Buddha maintained chat chese consisc of hardness and rigidity (kakkhalaf(J' khangataf(J) whieh is earth (pafha11t), watery element (apogata) which

is water (apo), the fiery element (tejogalaf!') which is fire (tejo), and the airy

(11ayogala'f?I) which is air (viiyo) (M 1.421 ff.). This expłains the manncr in

which they are experienced. Howevcr, rhe intetpreters of the Abhidharma

began ro de.fine them as "the four elemencs that support self-narure as well as

derived form" (1va/akta11opadiiyarupad/iiira11ad dhatava/J, Akb p.8). An

140EXAMlb/ATJO.N OF ACGREGf\TES 141

almosc ide,icical definition was gradually being offered for the concepcion of

dharma (svasiimanyafak1a11adhara11ad dharma!?, Sakv p. 12) where svalak1a11a

refers to self-nature or substance and samiinyalak1a11a to ' 'generał

characteristics" or ''quality," the łatter corresponding in some way to the derived elements. Tbese ideas appeared in the Theravada uadition only in the

Abhidhamma commentaries and the later manuals and sub-commeotarics

(e.g., sabhav11-iiimanna-lakkha11a'f?l dhareliti' dhamma, Abhvt p.11). Thus,

with the Sarvastivada speculation, two new categories wece emerging-substance and charcteristics-whic.h ułtimately invołved a one-way relationship. The substances serve as the cause (kara1111) of characteristics, but not

vice versa.

Even though these specułations are recorded i.o treacises composed long after

Nagarjuna, they did not originate with such treatises but wece prevałenc during

his day Ór even before, as is evident from a careful reading of the Kan'kii. lt is

the above mentioned substantialist view of materiał form (fitpa) thac is criticized in the present verse. For Nigarjuna (as well as for the Buddha), materiał

form discinct from the cause of ma.terial form (ropa-kara11a = mahabhUta) is

not acceptable. Similarly, a cause of materiał form distinct from mateti;tl form

is also not experienced. Here there is oo clenia! of materiał form , but only a rejection of the idea tbat there is an invisib1e ground of 11111:terial form.

2 . Rupa-kara11a-nirmukte fitpe fitpa'f?l prasajyate,

ahetttka'f?l na casty arthaf? kaicid ahetukaf? kvacit.

When materiał form is. [.considered to be] disrinct f.rom the cause of

matęrial form, it follows that materiał form is without a cause. Nowhere

is there any effect (arthal/) without a cause.

MKV(P) p.123; MKV(V) p.48.

I t is the sharp distinction betwc:en materiał form and its assumed cause that was

posing an epistemological problem for Nagarjuna. In fact, evidence from a

łater Theravada su b-commentary. sc:ems to lndicate that a school witb

Saucrantika leanings was trying to eliminate the disti'ne::tion between thcse two

ideas. Referring to the definition of dhamma mentioned.in rełacion to fV.1. it

is said: "Therc: is no dha1nma over and above the narure ofsupponiog," [na fa