Trung Luan(4)

"everything exists" (sarvam astt) in .the form of substance (svabhava). Nagarjuna is simply allowing that metaphysicał qucstion to be setded by the usc of

ihe fourfołd proposicions tbat negate cach other.

Indeed, this is not presented as the "teaching" or "message'' (śiisana) of the

Buddba, as Inada seems to understand. Quite on the contraty, it is an "admonition'' or "advice" (anufiina) in regard to the manner in which spccułation

about "everything'' can be resolved, nameły, by detnoristrating the inevitable

self-contcadictions. In other words, he is stadng that the question regarding

"everything" cannot be settłed by aoy form of 4iscussion, a view clearly expressed by the Budcłha in his famous "Discoutse on Everything;, (Sabba-sutt11, sec

commentary on IX.3), which Nagarjuna was probabły, conversant with.

9. Apara.pratyay4'f!Z śanltJ'f!Z prapańcair aprapancita'f{I,

nirvika/pam an'iinartham etat tattvasya lakfatJa'f!Z.

lndependently realized, peaceful, un'obsessed by obsessions, without

discriminations and a vańery of meanings: such is the charactedstic of

truth.

MKV(P) p.372; MKV(V( p. 158.

This is one·ofthe most iJllportant statcments ofNagarjuna, quoted often byhis

dassical as welł as modern interpreters. The most receot translatioo and inter-ExAMINATION OF SELF 271

pretttion comes from !nada and, as such, it could be consider~d a digcst of the

existing vicws. Hence, it is appropriate to quote Inada's rendering of this verse

in full. lt reads as follows:

Non-conditionally rclated to any cntity, quiscent, nonconceptuafucd by conceptual play, non-discriminative and nondiffercntiated. Thcsc arc the charactcristics of reality (i.c., dcscriptive of one who has gained the Buddhist truth) (p.115).

The term apara-pratyaya is herc taken to mean a special kind of rclation that

trarucends any form of empirical conditionality. Śiinta signifies "quicscence," a

quicscence resulting from the avoidance ofany cooceptuality, probably the sort

of pcace and quiet experienced by one who has temporarily stoppcd the func- .

cioning of the six sense facultics by reaching the state of cessation (nirodhasamapatti, or sanńa-11edayita-nirodha). lt is where the dicbotomy of subject

and object is compJetcly dissolved (nir-11ikalpa) and where the variegated expedences of the world, the variety of meanings or fruits (n'iinartha), is

climinated. Truth, in such a context, cannot be very different from that of

either the Upanifads or the Vedanta. lt is the flushing out of all conceprual

thinking (citta-vrtti-nirodha), thereby transforming the empirical expecience

into one of absolute, ułtimate truth or reality.

However, a glance at the "Discourse to Katyayana," the primary source for

Nigarjuna's formulation of the "middle way," will reveal the untenability of

such an explanation.

Even though the verse seems to desccibe the characteristics of truth or reality

(tattvasya lalt1af!t1f!J), every preceding scatement points to the means by which a

conccprioo of cruth is arrived at. Hence, it is one of the most important

scarements on epistemology. The most salient fearures of this epistemolgoy acc

already clearly embodied in the Buddha's discourse to K.atyayana, presented in

the form ofan answer to the question 'as to what "right view" (samma-dittht) is.

The concencs of the verse can be analysed in the light of this discourse in the

following manner.

The term apara-pratyaya does not refer ro a uuth chat is non-condicionally

rclated to any entity. Rather, it explaios the manner in which koowledge

(n'ii11a) is attained by one who has „right view'' (samma-diftht). After rejectiog

the metaphysical views penaiolng to permanent existence (atlhifii) as well as

the belief in a permanent and substantial personal entity (alla .. . rne). a

belicf that will require the testimony ofsome ocher person who cłaims to know

the absolute bcginning of things, the empiricist Buddha daimed that

knowledge (of one who has right view) ~curs withouc having to dcpend upon

anorher person (aparf!-·Pa&cay'ii flaf!am evassa ettha holi, S 2. 17). Ir is272 THE PHtlOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

knowledge for which one does not have to depend upon another, primarily

because it pertains to arising and ceasing of empi.deal phenomena. It involves

personal vcrification. a verlfication that can be accomplished by someooe

before one l:iegins to formulate any right view.

Man's search for a permanent entity, white he is equipped with limited

epistemological resources, leaves him with unresolved questions. He continues

co doubt. H·e is constantly perplexed and croubled. Looking for permanence,

he misses the empirically given. The ,search for the unseen "beauty queen"

(janapada-kaljiinT, D 1.193; M 2.40) makes him forget the immediatley relevaot questions (M 2.40). As such, he has no peace of mind. How.everI ifhe were

to direct his attention to what is immediately given, .and understand the

human predicament in its context without being ioquisitive abouc

metaphysical entities (dukkham eva uppa1/amana'f!t uppa1jati dukkha??i niru/

jhamana?!J nirujjhatiti na kańkhati 114 vicikicchatt; ibid.), his mind would be

peaceful (Siinta_'f!l). The Buddha, in one of his very famous scatements, insisted

that when a reflecting person understands the arising and ceasing of

phenomena, all his doubts disappear (Ud 1). Such peace of mind is achieved,

not by ignoring what is relevaot in the human cootext, bur by igooring the irrelevant and irresolvable metaphysical issues.

Such a state of peace (flintt) cannot be achieved so long as one is bound by

·one's prejudices (11piiyup'iidiinabhinivesa-vinibandho, ibid.,) This is the

"obsession'' (prapańca) chat Nagarjuna is referring to in the present cootext.

The discourse to Kat.yayana has no reference to any conceptuał proliferation.

How such obsession~ have further stre.ngthened and encouraged the search

for ułtimate truths, contriburing to indiscriminate discrimioations,- soch as

those of existence and non-existence - (bh'iiva-ab.h.ava) . or self--narure and other-

'narure (s11abhava-p11rabha11a), has akeady been explained by Nagarjuna. These

are the disctiminations that are to be avoided in the search for truth. Nirvikalpa.refers to the absence ofsuch discrimioations.

A pluralistic view of the world is not incompatible with dependent arising

(pralityasamulpada). Pluralism in the context of dependent arising doespot

imply the existence ofself-contradictory truths. It oeed not necessarily lead' to a

oorion of an Absolute that transcends such self-contradictory truths. The

critedon for deciding what is true io the cotllext of dependent arisiog is consequence or fruit (artha). When the Buddha maintained that "truth is one; chere

is no second" (eka'f!t hi sacca'f!t na dulijam aflhi, Sn 88'1), he was certaioły

referring to this pragmatic criterion of truth based upon the notion of dependent arising, not an absolute truth that uaoscends all forms of duality and

plurality. Nagarjuna's characterization of truth as "not having a v.ariety of

meanings" (ańiinariha'l(Z) reflects more the Buddha's owo concepcion of truth.

To summarize, the conception of truth and the epistemołogical means on

the basis of which it is formulated all point to the face that the truth under con-EXAMINATION OF SEl..F 273

sideration is the "dependendy arisen" (prafityasamutpanna). The principle of

dependent arising (pratfty4Samutptida) is merely the expression of the manner

in which "dependently arisen" phenomena are explained . They are rwo sides of

the same coin. ·

Yet, as reiterated befote. the greatest misunderstandings created by the

metap'hysicians were in regard to "dependently ariseo phenomena"

(prafityast1mutpanna-dharma). Therefore, after examining the epistemoJogical

means by which the conception of truth "as dependently arisen" is arrived at,

Nagarjuna, in the verse thac folJows immediately„ takes up the metaphysical

ioterpretations of the concept of dependence.

10. Parfitya yad yad bhavati na hi t?ivat lad eva tat1

na canyad api tat tasmtin nocchinnaf!t niipi śaśala'f!J-.

Whatever that arises depencling upon whatever, that is not identical nor

clifferent from it. Therefore, it is neither annihilated nor eternal.

MKV(P) p. 375; MKV(V) p.150.

Whatever is arisen dependent upon (pratftya) another, that is, the dependencly

arisen (prafityasamutpanna). is not appropriately expJained in terms of identity

or difference. As empahsi.zed so often by Niigarjuna, absoJute identity involves

permane.nce and absolute difference implies annihilation. Dependent arising is

the middle way adopted by the Buddha in eluc'idating change and causation.

11. Anekdrtharr1- ananartham anucchedam aśaśvata'f!J-,

etat tal lokanathanii'f!t buddhaniif(J fiisanamrta~.

That is without a variety of mean.ings or one single rneaning, it is not annih.ihlcion nor i~ it eternal. Such, it is reminisced, is the immottal message

of the Buddhas, the patrons of the world.

MKV(P) p.377: MKV(V) p.160.274 THE PHILoSOPHY OFTIIE MrooLE WAY

The metaphysics of identity or ofdifference, of one or ofmany. of permanence

or of annihilation, n1ay be provcd or not provcd. So far the cvidcnce has not

becn found thac would providc justifu::ation for any such notions. The only

known cvidcncc poioes co che f~cc that things arc changing and arc depcodently

arisen. Such change and dependent arising do not fali wichin the duality ofone

or many. of anni.hjlation or permaneoce. Dependent arising is what has bcen

koown so far. Unlcss a raclical change occurs in the conscicution of things, this

dependent arising will continue co be. Such is che immorcal ceaching of the

Buddha.

This, agUn, is Nagarjuna's rcflection on the cpiscemology ofdependent arisiog . .

12. Sambuddhan'iimanulpiide śiiivalii/niif!l punaf? kfaye,

jfłiinaf!l prateyka-buddh'iin'iim asaf!Ut1rg'iil ptavartale.

Whcn the fully enlightencd oncs do not appcar; on the warung of

disciplcs; the wisdom of the sełf-cnligbtcncd ones procccds without

association.

MKV(P) p.378; MKV(V) p.161

The Buddha's ceachings were perpccuated by a long line of disciples (śravaka).

lf that lineage were to be interrupted, stili ie is possible for his teachings to

reappear. Nagarjuna was probabły aware of the metaphor of che "ancient city"

(nagar11) whose discovery is compared to the discovery of "dependent arising"

by the histori~ Buddha himself (S 2.104-107; Tsa 12.5 [T11irho 2.80b]).

Therefore, concradicting many a cradition chac depended heavily on an uobroken concinuity as the primary source of the knowledge of che Buddha's

ceaching, Nagatjuna is herc maińtaining thac such widsom (iflana) can occur

cvcn without any concact or association (a.saf!J.sargal) chrough the selfcnłighccned ones (pratyeka-buddha).CHAP'fER

NINETEEN

Examination of Time

(Kala-parTk!a)

1. Pratyutpanno 'niigataś ca yady afilam apek,ya hi,

prtJtyutpanno 'n1igalaf ca kale 'lite bh1J11qy1Jti.

Ifthe present and the future exist contingent upon the past, ,then the pre~

sent and the future would be in the past time.

2. Pratyutpanno 'niigalaś ca na stas t(Jlrapunar yadi,

pratyutpanno 'niigataś ca sy'iitiim, kathaf!J 11pek,ya tam,.

Again, if the present and the future were not to exist therein [i.e., in.the

past], how could the present an,d the future be contingent upon that?

MKV(P) pp.382-383; MKV(V) p. 163.

As mencioned at XVII.14, the conception of time was an imponant factor in

the explanation of the fruits of action (kllrma-phala). All actions do not bear

fruit immediately. Indeed, the problems were magnified by the Buddha's

·recognition of.the possibility of the survival of the human pcrso.nality through

countlcss łives. The Abhidharn1a łists four categories of karma in terms of their

fruitioning, ałJ of which can be trac;ed back to the discourses th~mselves. The

four categorics arc as fołlows: (i). kąrma ·that fruitions immediately~or in the present life (dit1ha-dhamma-11ed4nzya); (ii) kuma that fruitions in the next life

(upapa;ja-11ed4nlya); (iii) karma·that fruitions in some after life (apartipariy11-

vedanlya); and (iv) karma that·produces no fruitioning (ahosi-kamma)(Vism

p.601). Tbe use of the metapbor of "the imperishable promi$.$Oty norc'' by

Nagarjuna was necessitated by the fact chat some karmas ptoduce consequeoces

on a subsequent occasion. .

Thus, the conception of time becomes invariably bound up with the notion

of karma. As such, whatever metaphysicaJ speculations that emerged with the

27.~276 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

doctrine of karma, such as those mentioned at XVII. 7·10, also carne to be

assodated with the concepcion of time. Analysing time as a separate enticy, the

metaphysicians assumed that if there were to be any mutuaJ relaciooship between the present and the future on the one band and the past on the other,

then, since they are distinct entities, the present and the future wiU have to be

inherent in the past. In ocher words, the past produces the present and future

from within itself. This is the identity version ofcausation (s11atotpattz). A fur.

cher implication of chis is th~t if one knows the past, one also knows with ab·

soluce cenaincy what the present and the future would be. These, indeed,

reprcsent some of the basie speculations of the Sarvastivadins.

3. Anapek,ya punal/ siddhir 11afi1a'!l vidyale tayol},

pr11tyutpa11110 '11aga1af ca lasmiit kalo na vidyate.

Moreover, non-contingent upon the past, their [i.e. of the present and

future] establishment is not evident. Therefore, neither a present nor a

future time is evident.

MKV(P) p. 383; M.KV(V) p.163.

The present verse embodies Nagarjuna's criticism of the ootion of cime referred

to in XIX.1·2. Taken away from tharcootext, this will appear co be a compJete

rejection of the very notion of rimc. However, Nagarjuna's cdticism pertains

only to the cootingencc (apek{a) uoderstood in the light of a theoty of inherence. On a previous occasion (X .-8-12), Nagarjuna has convincingly

demonstratcd the difficulties involved in explainiog conti~gence or reJativity in

the context of theories of ideotity (which is also implied in inherence) and dif.

ference.

Nagarjuna's argument seems to.rcad as follows:

1. Majorpremiss:

The present and the future arc not scen to be cstablished non·

contingent upon the past.

2. Middle term:

Contingeoce of the present and the future on the past impLies

the substan tial existeoce of the present and the future in the

past, which is not evident.EXAMINATION OP TTME

3. Conclu1ion:

Therefore, the present and the future, as substantiaJ entities,

do not exist.

277

Ignoring the middle term, so clearły _defined at XIX.1-2, Nigarjuna's condusion will appear to be an absolute rejection of time. lt wouJd then read as

follows:

I . Pint premisJ:

The present and the future are not contingeot upon the past.

2. Secondpremiu:

The present and the future arc not non-contingent upon the

past.

3. Minor premi.u:

The present and the future cannot be both contingent and

non-cootingent upon the past.

4. Conclusion:

The present and the future do not exist.

4. Etenaiv'iiva.ri/(tlu dvau krame'!a panvartakau,

uttamadhama-madhjiitlin ekatv'ii'rlif!t1 ca lak/ayet.

Following the same method, che remaining two pcriods of [time] as well

as related concepts such as the highest, the lowest and the middJe, and

also identity, etc. should be characteńzed.

MKV(P) p.384; MKV(V) p . 164-.

Nigujuna is insistiog that the same argument be applied to the concept of the

present in relation to the past and future, and to the future in relatioo to the

past and present. In addition, he maintains that this analysis can be extended

to similar concepts like the highest, the łowest, the middle, etc. In all chese

cases, the metaphysicaJ issues emerge as a result of the abso/ute distinctions that

are being made. Such absolutc distinccions arc being ofren made in logical

analyses, and are oot supporced by empirical evidence. Time, aJ experienced ,

cannot be analysed into three water-tight 'Compartmeots as past, present, and278 THE,PHILOSOPHY OP TiłE MIDDLE WAY

'

future. (See Introduction, for an explanation of the experienced time by a

modern psychologist.)

5. Niistito grhyate kii/al? sthitaf? kilo na 11idyale,

yo grhyetagrl:iitaf ca kii/4'7 prajnapyate kathaf!J.

A non-static time is ,iot observed. A static time is not evident. Even ifthe

unobserved time were to be obse.rved, how can it be made knówn?

MKV(Pj p.385; MKV(V) p.165.

A non-static time is a tempoial flux. It is what the ioterpreters of the

Abhidharma referred to as the "flowing present" (santatipaccuppańna, DhsA

421), where the future cootinues to flow into the past througb the present. Any

attempt to grasp it would be futile, for by the time the attemp~ is.made the

present has disappeared into the past. In order to grast> it one has to stop the

flow. Hence the metaphysicians recógriized a static moment (sthitt~k/a'!a) .

Nagarjuna has already analysed the .implications of such t.heories in Chapter

VII. Thus, time understood in terms of distinct momentary entities could not

account for experience. This metaphysical theory viewed the present as the

momentary present (k.haf!a-paccuppanna, loc,cit.). Even if the non-graspable

time were to be grasped, Nag~rjuna's question is: "How can it be made

known?'' The; empiricist is. therefore, lcft with a specious time (prob;ibly an

addha-paccuppanna). lt is specious because, when aoy attemptis made to

gra.sp it independent of temporal events, it vanishes like a mirage. ft cannot be

made knowa. by any means. Absolute time mak:es oo sense for Nagarjuna.

6. Bhavaf!' prafity{I k.alai cet kalo bha.11ad rte kuta//, .

na ca k.aicana bhava 'sti kuta/? kalo bhavt!yati.

lf it is assumed that time exists depencling upon an existent, how can

therc be time without an existcnt? No existent whatsoev.er is found to exist. Whcf<' can tim.e be?

MKV(P) p.387; MKV(V) pp.165-16~ ,IExAMINATION OP 'nM1! 279

An cxistent (bhi11a), since it represcnts a metaphysical encity baving its own

nature (s11abhiva), has already becn rejected by Nigarjuna. Time (u/a) denied

by bim is an absolute time. lt Is time that is real as momenta.cy entities (k/a'!a)

·or something that is flccting (ianta11) on its own. In the present verse, Nigiirjuna is maintainiog that two independent encicies- an cxistcnt (bhii11a) and

time (u/a)-cannot be dependent upon one another. If they are dependent

upon one another (bhi11tlf'!l pralitya ulaś &et), then there cannot be time independent -of an existent. An existent as such is non-exisrcnt. Whence can

there be time? This is a rejection not oftempora! phenomena, but onJy of time

andphenomenaas well as their mutuał dependence so long as they arc perceived as independent entities.CHAPTER

TWEN1Y

Examination of Harmony

(Samagn-parz k!a)

1. Hetof ca pratyay'finiir.n ca ilimag1yii;ayate yadi,

phalam asti ca samagryaf!l iiimagrjii1ayate kathaf!'.

lf the cffect were to arise Crom a harmony ofcause and conditions, and if

it wcre to exist in the ruumony, how can it atisc from the hacmony?

2. Hetof ca pratyayanaf!J ca samagrfii jiiyate yadi,

phalaf!' nasti ca iiimgryaf!' J1imagryii jiiyate kathaf!l.

Ifthe effect were to arise fcom a harmony ofcause and conditions andifir

wcre not to exist in the harmony, how can it arisc from the harmony?

MKV(P) p.391; MKV(v,J p.168.

The term uscd in the carly discourscs for "assemblage'' is sangali (M

1.111-112). For example, the eye, the visible form, and visual consciousncss arc

said to co~e together (sangatt) in contact (ph(Msa). Herc, the eye, visible form,

and visual coosciousness arc compatiblc factors, and not incompatiblc.

However, as evcnts carne to be distioguishcd in the Abhidharma, the intccprctcrs of the Abhidharma had to be concerned moce with "harmony''

(iiimagii) chan with simple "assemblage" (1ańgatt) . The concep tion of "harmony" thus carne to atuact Nigacjuna's attention, even though he will return

to the notioo of "assemblage;. later on in tbis chapter.

Nigarjuna's anerhpt at the beginoing of this chapter is to examinc the con·

ccption of harmony and to pccvent any metaphysical interpretation of it.

Metaphysical speculacions wece further advanced by the S:uvastivada distinction berween cause (helu) and coodicioo (pralyaya). This lattec discinction,

supponed by the Sarvastivada conception of self-nacure (s11abha11a),

culminated in the idea of self-causacioo (111ata u1pattt).

280EXAMINATION OF H A.RMONY 281

For this reason, in the very first verse, Nagarjuna takes up three ideas: (i) harmony, (ii) distinction betweeo cause and condicions, and (iii) the arising of an

eff.ectfrom a harmony of cause and cooditions. (Note Nagarjuna's use ofhelu

in the singular and pralyaya in the plural.)

Nagarjuna's critidsm is mainly directed at the idea of self-causation. If the

fruit arises from the harmony (siimagrya, abJacive case) of a cause and a set of

cooditions (helo!/ pratyayanaf!Z ca), then it is already existent in che ham1ony

(samagry'iif!Z, locacive case). H ow then can it arise from the harmony

(1amagrya)? The causal process presenced in this manner implies che idencicy

between "harmooy of cause and conditions" and the fruit or eff.ect that arises

from it. The ideotity theory of causatioo was already criticized in Chapter I.

Similarly, as stated atXX.2, if the fruit or effect atising ftom such a harmony

were not to be in the harmony, chat is, if the cffect is different from the harmony, it can never arise from that harmony. This is a criticism of the nonidentity theory of causacion discussed in Chapter I. These two vecses, therefore,

state the difficulties involved in accepting theories of identicy and difference.

3. Hetoś ca pratyayanaf!Z ca Iamagryam asati cel pha/af!Z,

grhyeta nanu iiimagryaf!Z iiimagryiif'(Z ca na grhyate.

Ifit is assumed chat the effect exists in the harmony of cause and conditions, should it not be observed i.n the hatmony? Howcver, it is not

observcd in the haunony.

4. Helol ca pralyay'iin'iif!Z ca Iamagry'iif'(Z n'ii1ti cet phala1!1-

hetavaf? pratyayaś ca Jyur ahetu-pratyayaif? ItJ'fn'iil/.

If the cffect were not to exist in the harmony of cause and conditions,

thcn the cause and conditions would be comparable co non-cause and

non-conditions. '

MKV(P) pp.392·393; MKV(V) p.169. ·

lf the identity theory is valid, rhen the fruit could be observed (grhyela) in the

harmony itself, eveo before it is produced through such harmony. However,

Nagarjuna assumes chat ie is not observed or grasped .in this manner. Once284 THE PHILOSQPHY OF TI-lB MJDOLE W AY

become the transformation of the cause, then itfollows that tbere is a rebirth of a cuase that was already bom.

MKV(P) p.396; MKV(V) p.17L

Among the variety of causes that were formulated to account for a continuous effect (nif:;anda-pha/a) are complementary (sabhaga) ·and universal

(sarvatraga) causes (Akb p .94). Explaincd in the light of the theory of

moments, a universal cause would mean the contiouous acising of the same

cause in order to account for the cootinuous effect. The continuous effect

(ni.fyan4a-phala) thus turns out to be a cransformacioo (sarp,krama11a) of che

cause (helu). Nagarjuna refuse:i to recognize the rebirch of the same cause that

has ceased.

10. ]anqyet phalam utpanna?(l. niruddho 'sthaf!'gatal/ katharp,,

tz!thann api katha~ hetuf? phalena janayed vrtal/.

How can a cause that has ceased, has reached its end, give rise to an effect

that is already arisen? How can a cause, even though enduńng, produce

an effect, when it is sepatated from the latter?

M,KV(P) p.397; MKV(ll) p .171.

Throughout the present analysis we have indicaced that the philosophical

rnethod adopted in the Abhidharma did not create any metaphysical problems

until the interpreters adopted a theory of moments that were foilowed by

theories of identity and difference. The vadety of causes (hetu) and conditions

(pratyaya) , even though not presented in such detail and in identicaJ terminology in the discourses, is not incompatible with the teachings embodied

therein. However, even a cwsory glance at the manner in which the interpreters of the Abhidharma struggled with these different causes and conditions

. {see AK cbapter ii; Akb pp.38-tlO) is sufficient to indicate the magnitude of

tne probtems they were faced with.

Nagatjuna concinues his analysis showing how a cause that has ceased (nirurldha) or one that remains (tt!fhan), yet is distinct from the effect (phalena

vrtaf?), could never give rise to an effect.EXAMlNĄTION OF HARMONY

11 . Atliii11rta'1 phalenasau katarm1jjanayedphala'f!J,

na hy adurva 11a dr!f11a 11a hetur janayaJe phalart1.

What causc, evenif it wcre not separated from the effect, will give rise to

the effect? A cause does not produce an effect eitber impercepcibly or

pccccpribly.

M.KV(P) pp.398-399; MKV(V) p.1 72.

285

When the analytical process was carried to its extreme, many evenrs, whicb

under norma! cootexts would not have been quescioned , c:une to be doubced.

For example, inscead of a reJaced event, analysis produced two: a relarion and

an event. Wheo the norma! empiricist criceria wece adopted in the Jatter case,

one was compelled to assume chat the relation is not perccived in che same way

as the evenr is perceived. The metaphysician was thus compeUed to insist upon

the subscantial existence of the relatioo. "Birth is the arising of whac is to ~e

born and this does not take place wichout causes and conditioos," so says the

Abhidharmakofa (janyaJya Janik.ii 1atir na hetu-pratyayair vina, ii.49). The

bhii1ya on this passage concinues to argue about che narure of this "birth"

(jatt), insisring that the genetive case (!a/{ht) (as io che sracement, "arising of

what is to be boro") makes no sense if birtb (jiitz) is not perceived in the same

way as "that which is to be boro'' (Janiki.i) is perceptible. The Sautrantika

Vasubandhu argues against this position saying chat "óumbers, Hmits, distinction, union, analysis, ochcrness, sameoess" are recognized as reals (salwa) in

the speculatioos of the herctics (llrthakara), and chat these arc oecded only to

establish the knowłedge(but/dht) of the reality of"the one, the dual, the great.

·the individuated, the uniced, the separated, the other, the same, etc." To illustrate his point of view. he refers to the example of "the union of fo1m"

(iiipaJya sa<f!Jyoga) and maincains that the generive ca~e indicates the ownnature (svabhava) of"form." However, in his owo Sautrantika view ie is a merc

designacion (pr(ljflaph~matram, Akb p .79).

Ie is this conttoversy 'rega.rding the reality or urueality of numbers, conjunctions, disjuoctioos, etc. (a concroversy thac has contioucd to plague

philosophers in the modern world) that Nigarjuna is referring to in the present

verse when he uses the terms rlr!fva (seen) and adr11va (unseeo).

12. Niifftmya hy affJena phalasya saha he111na,

naj'iitena na jiitena sa1!Jgatir1atu vidyate.,286 THE PHILOSOPl-tY OF11l1l MIDDLE W AY

Incłeed, the assemblage of a past effect with a past or a future or a present

cause is not evident.

13. Na jatasya hy a1atena phalasya saha hetun1i,

1iiifftena na1atena saf?Zgatirjiitu 11idyate.

Indeed, an assemblage of the present effect with a furure or a past or a

present cause is not evident.

14. Niijiitasya hij'ątena phalasya J(lha hetuna,

niijiitena na n(#fena Sll'f'!Jgatirfiitu 11idyate.

Indeed, as assemblage of the future effect :with a present or a future ot a

past cause is not evident.

MKV(P) pp.400-401 ; MKV(V) pp.172-1 73 .

After analysing the conceptioo of "harmony" (i1imagfi), Nagatjuna now retums

to "the eadier notion of "assemblage" (saf?Zgatt)(see commcnts ón X:X.1). The

notion of assemblage may not have caused philosophicaJ problems for the early

Buddhists who adópted an empiricist theory of change and causation . But, for

Nagarjuna, the coaceptioa of assemblage, like the aotion of harmony , does

not work, so long as it is associated wich the metaphysical conception of time.

Vasubandhu , as a Sautrantika, himself raises the more radicaJ questlon as to

how the mind (1!l4nas) chat has alreądy ceased cąn assemble with future and

present concepts (dhaffl!a) and mental consciousness (mano-11ijf1ana) in order

to produce contact (Akb p. 143, manindriyasya punar niruddhasy'iinagalavarta1nanabhjii??Z dharma-rnanovijń1in1ibhy1i'f'!J katha1'?1- sa'f'!Jnipataf?). He then

refe,rs to a variety of insights (bhedar!f. gata buddhayaf?) of different teachers,

and the controversy appears to be too complicated. He dismisses them saying:

"Enough of this argument" (ala1'?1- prasangena). Nagarjuna's reluctance to accept any one of these views is, therefore, the result ofhis realizatioo that they

are all metaphysical views not allowing for any definite answers or solutions.

15. Asatjii'f?Z sa'f'!Jgatau hetuf? kathaf!J janayate phala?'(l,

saly41'?1- saf?Zgatau hetuf? katha'f'!J janayate p hala'f'!J.EXAMINATION OF H ARMONY

When an assemblage does not exist, how can a cause produce an effect?

When an assemblage exists, how can a cause produce an effect?

MKV(P) pp.401-402 ; MKV(V)p .173

287

Here the causc (hel'll) is defined in terms of assemblage (Jaf?/,gatt) which is

either existent (Jat) or non-existcnt (a.rat). A cause defined in such a way turns

out to be substantialist or non-subsranrialisc. The former implies permanence

and the lattcr, annihilacion. Nagarjuna rejects boch.

16. Hel'llf? phalena fUnyai cet kathaf?Z janayate phaiaf?Z,

hetul? phalenafunyai cet kathar?t janayate phalar?t.

lf it is assumed that the cause is empty ofan effect, how ran ie produce an

effect? If it is assumed thac the cause is not empty ofan effect, how can ie

produce an effect?

MKV(P) p.402; MKV(V) p.173.

Turning atound, Nagarjuna now takes up che concepcion of the effecc or fruit

(phala). If che cause is empty (Junya) of che effecc, it can never produce an effect. Neither is it appropriate co assume that the effect is produced by the cause

if it is already in the causę, hence nor empty (afunyar?t) of the effecr.

17. Phalar?t notpatsyate 'Junya1n aśUnyar?t na nirotJyate,

aniruddha,n anutpannam aśUnyarrt tad bhavzjyati.

A non-empry effen will not arise; a non-empcy effect will not ce-.tSe. For,

the non-ceased and non-ariseh will also be the non-en1pty.

MKV(P) p.402: 1HKV(V) p. 17-i.

This verse should clarify the meaning of the famous terms atnruddharri ("nonceased") and anutpanna1?1 ("non-ariscn") morc rhan any ocher scatement of288 THE Pl-OLOSOPHY OF TI-IE MIDDLE wAy

Nagarjuna. Whatever phenomenon (dharma) is characterized by Nagarjuoa as

"empcy" (śunya) is without self-nature. 1f something possesses a self-nature,

chen it is not empty (aśunya). As such, it can neither cease nor arise (anirodham

anutpadaf!t), Thus, an effect or fruir that is not empty and therefore is possessed of self-nature will nor arise (notpatsyate) nor cease (na flirotsyate) ,

18. Katham utptTtsyate śunyarrz katharri śUnJll'f!Z nirotJyate,

funyam apy aniruddharp. tad anutpannarp prt1Sajyate.

How will the empty atise and bow will the empty cease? lfsomething is

empty, it follows that it is non-ceased and non-atisen.

MKV(P) p.403; MKV(V) p .174.

Taken by itself, this verse can be used to justify the view that accotding to

Nagarjuna "emptiness" (sunyaf(i) is the ułtimate truth beyond all forms of

description. Hence the negative d~scription: "non-ceased'' (ant'rttddha'f!Z) and

"non-arisen" (anutpanna'f!Z).

However, considered along with XX.17, whkh rcjects the notioo of identity

presented by the Sarvastivadins as self-nature (.rvabhava). which according to

Nagarjuna is "oon-empty'' (afunya), what is referred co as "empry" (śUnya) in

the pi:eseot verse is mo,re apptopriately understood as a reference to the nonidentity theory of the Saucrantikas. It may be remembered that the first Buddbist school to deny the Sarvastivada ·theo.ty of self-nature was the Sautrantika

school. How che Sautrantika theory of "emptiness'' or ''absence of substaoce"

(nil/-svabhava) and their theoty of "momeotary destruction" (kfaf!a-bhanga)

Jcd to a denial of both arising and ceasing has already been pointed out (VIl.17

ff.).

As such, the present stacement of Nagarjuna, following upon his refutation

of ideotity, must involve a rejection of difference. the rwo extremes that he has

pe(Sistencly criticized. In other words, che Sarvastivada and Sautrantika

theories both rendcc acising and ceasing mcaningless.

19. Hetol? phalasya caikatva'f!Z na hij111ii,papadyate1

hetol/ phalasya canyatvaflZ na hijat'Upapadyate,EXAMINATION OP HARMONY

The identity ofcausc and effcct is indecd not appropriatc. The difference

becwcen causc and cffect is indeed not appropriatc.

20. Ekat11e phala-hetvol/ sjiid aikyaf'!Z janaka-janyayof?,

Prthaktve phala-hel11ol; sjiit lu/yo hetur ahetuna.

ff thcre were to be identity of cause and cffcct, thcn thcre would be

onencss of produccr and the producc. lf there werc to be differcncc betwccn cause and effect, thcn the cause would be cqual to a non-cause.

21. Phalaf'!Z svabhiiva-sadbhutaf'!Z kif!l hetur janayi/yati,

pha/af!l s11abhiivasadbhulaf'!Z kt?p hetur janayi,jali.

How is it chat a causc will producc an cffect which comes to be on its own

naturc? How is it that a cause will produce an effect which docs not come

to be on its own nature?

MKV(P) pp.403-404; MKV(J1 p.174.

289

The impłicacions of the theories of idcntiry and difference discussed at

XX. 17-18 are further elaboraced in these t:htee verse.

22. Na cajanayamiinasya hetutvam upapadyate,

hetulvanupapattau ca phaktf'!Z kasya bhavi-ryatz:

Moreover, the causa! efficacy of something that is not producing is not

appropriate. In the abscnce of causa! cfficacy, co what will the cffcct

belong?

(MKV(P) p.405 ; MKV(V) p. 17).

Identiry and difference are thus shown co miłitate against noc merely arising,290 THC: PHILOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE WAY

bu t also causal or dependent arising. Causa! efficacy (hetut114f!J) is rendered

mcaningless if there were to be no production, chat is, if the arising of an effect

cannot be accounted for by a cause, which is the result of the Sarvastivada and

Sautrantika theories. If causaJ efficacy cannot be accounted for. how can one

speak of an effect or fruit? ·

23. Na ca pratyaya-hetunam iyavz atmanam anatmanii,

ya samagfi janayate sa kathaf!J janayet phala1!t.

Whatever harmony of causes and conditions there is, ie is noc produced

by itself or by another. ff so, how can it produce an effect?

MKV(P) p.406: MKV(V) p. 175.

After producing an exhauscive analysis of the relationship between a cause

(helu) and fruit or effect (phala), Nagarjuna returns to the question with

which he began che chapter, the harmony of causes and condfrions. Once

again, rcfuting the identity and non-idencity theories, he insists that whatcvcr

harmony there is, ft is not produced by the causes and conditions cither from

within rhemselves (atmana = svabhavala) or from outside (anatmana =

para1af?). Wben harmony cannot be explained in any ofthese two ways, chen it

is not possible ro assume chat an effect can arise from a harmooy so expJ.ained.

24. Nasamagfi-krta1!} phala'f!l nasamagii-krtaf!J phala'f!l,

a.rti pratyaya-samagfi kuta eva phalaf{Z vina.

The effect is not made by the harmony, nor is it not made by a harmony.

Where iodeed can there be a harmony of condirions wichout an effect.

MKV(P) pp.406-407; MKV(V) p.176.

The effect is not produced by a harmony of causes and condicions explained in

the above mann er. Nor is ie produced by a non-harmony. Nagarjuna's finaJEXAMINATION OF HARMONY 291

qucstion is: Where can chere be a harmony without a fruic or effect? This fioal

conclusioo need not be understood as a deniaJ of fruit or effect. On the contrary, ie can be the assertion of a pragmatist who insists that chete canoot be a

harmony of causes and conditions without a fruir or effecr.CHAPTER

TWENTYONE

Examination of Occurrence and Dissolution

(Sa'f(Jbhava-vibhava-partkffi)

1. Vina 1111 Jaha va 11asti vibhaval; J111?Zbhave11a ""'~

vina va Jaha va nasti saf'!Zbhava/J vibh11ve1111 vai.

Dis.1olution docs not exi.st either without or with occuuence. Occurrencc

does not exist either without or with dissolution.

2. Bh1111t!yati kathaf'!Z 11iima 11ibha11a'1 Jatr1bha11a1(l flina,

vinaiva janma maraf!a'fl 11ibha110 nodbha11af!Z 11in"ii.

How can there be dissolution without occunence, death without birth,

dissolution without uprising?

MKV(P) pp.410.411 ; M.KV(V) p.178. ·

The terms Sllf!lbhava and vibhava need to be cransJated keeping in mind the

purpose of this secrion. lt is an attempt on the part of Nagarjuna co cxplain the

life-proccss (saf!Mara) or the human pcrsonality without resorting to a theory of

self or soul (iitman1 pudgala) cooside1ed to be eternal. As mentioncd earlier,

this whole section is devoted to the cstablishing of the idea of nonsubsrantiality of the human person (pudgala-nairatmya)..This has to be achiev,

cd not onJy by showing the untenabilicy of the theory of permancnce or eternalism , but also of a conccption of annibilationism.

Thus, in this particular chapcer satr1bhava, in the sense of ocCUirence, pcrtains to the "birth" (janma) of a human being conditioned by various factors,

without any underlying permanent entity passing from one life to another.

Vibhava, in the sense of dissołution . mcaos "death'' (mara11a), and herc there'is

no implication of compłetc annihilation. In the life-proccss, binb is thus not

the absolute beginning, nor is „death the absołute end.

292EXAMINATION OF 0 CCURR!lNCE AND D ISSOLl!TION' 293

The first two verscs deny the occurrence of death wichout (t1inii) binh or at

the same time (saha).Just as much as death docs not occur without birth, there

is no up-rising (udbhava) witbout dissolution (vibhtJva). This is an empirical,

rather than a logical, analysis of birth and death. A rationalist can argue that

"all human beings arc not monal,'' for everyone who has becn born has not

died. Such a rational argument did not prcvent the Buddha from acccpting

mortality as a fact of life. For him, the evidencc lies in the fact that so fu all

human being who have died had been born. However, this does not lead the

Buddha to assert the metaphysical view that death is inherent ~ bitth.

3. Sam.bha11enai11a 11ibha11a'1 katha?(' saha bha11i1yati,

na janma-maraf!a?!J caiva?(' tulya-kiila??Z hi 11idyate.

How can there be dWolution ałong with occurrence? Indeed,

simultaneous binh and death arc similarly not evi.dent.

Jl;U(V{P) p.411 ; JUJ(V(V) p.178.

This is an explicit rejection of che metaphysical view chat death is inherent in

binh. lf the life-proccss (sa?('..riira) werc to be understood as a seties of momentary existences (sa11Jtana, sa'f!'talt), as the Saucrantikas believed, theo the sceds

ofdeath should occur at the very moment of birth. This logical explanation was

not accep~able to che empiricist Nligarjuna.

4. Bhavqyali katha'f!' nama It1'f!'bha110 vibht1114f'!t vina,

anityalii hi bhave!u na kadiitin na vidyate.

How can there be occurrence without dissolution, for the impermanenre

in existences is never not cvident.

'MKV(P) p.412;_MKV(V) p.178

Occurrencc (sa'!Jbha1111), as an absolutely new beginning. is rejccted herc, when

Nagarjuna affirms that without dissolution occurrence does not cake place.294 THE PHrr.OSOPH\' OF THE MIDDLE WAY

lndeed, the discourse to Katyayana utilized the cmpirical argument that the

belicf in a permaoent entity is abandoned wben one perceives the cessation of

the world (loka-nirodhaf!J ... yathabhufaf?1- sammappanflaya passato yiiloke

atthita sii na hotz). Nigarjuna's argument herc is not that "there is another

realm or aspect of beingwhich peopłe havc always overloo~ed. Thisis the realm

or aspect ofbhiiva, [which] refers to the truły dynamie worldly existcnce" (as !nada seems to assumc, sec p.125). Rather, it is a rejection of bhava, piimarily

because impermanence (anityatfi) is incompatible with bhava, which impłies

permanence. In fact, Nigarjuna was probably aware that the Buddha bad

always employed the term bhava to expłain the process of"bccoming," instead

of the absuact term bhiva. Indeed bhiva, or its more resuicted form svabhava,

is equivałent to astitva (attht'tii) and more often Nagarjuna understood the

term in that sense.

5, Sa?'(Jbhavo vibhavenaiva kathaf!l saba bhavi/yflti,

na janma- marafłlZf!' ctiiva tulya-kalaf!l hi vidyate.

How can occurrence be evident ałong with dissolution? Indeed,

simułtaneoos birth and death are similarly not evident.

At XXi.3, Nigarjuna ąuestioned the feasibility of asserting that death occurs

together with (saha) birth. In the present verse, he is questioning ' the validity of

asserting the occurrence of birth together with (s11ha) death. In other wofds, he

is questioniog the feasibility of asserting an invariable connection between

death and rebinh, an iovariable connectioo that is never asserted by the Budcłha. Io fact, what the Buddha asserted was that a dying person, depending

upon conditions, can be reborn. An invaribfo relacionship betweeo death and

rcbirth was admitted only by the substantialists.

6. Sahinyonyena 1ii siddhir vininyonyena va yayoi;,

na vidyate tayol, siddhil( kath11n nu khalu vidyate.EXAMJNAIION OP 0 CCURRENCE AND D JSSOLUTJON

'fhe occurrence of things, either together or separateły , is not evjdent: lf

so, how can their establishment be evident?

MKV(P) p.4l5 ; MKV(V) p. 180.

29)

This cooclusion ofNagarjuna is related to his criricisms in the previous verses.

He is simply questioning the metaphysical assertioos relating to occurrence and

dissołution , birth and death.

7. lqayasya St11{1bha110 niisti nfikfayasyasti Stl'f?'Jbhaval/,

k!t1Jfl5ya vibhavo niisti vibhavo nak1ayasya ca.

Occurrence of that which is waning does not exist, nor is there occurrence

of that whicb is not waning. Dissolution of that which is waning does not

exist, nor is there dissołution of the not waning.

MKV(P) p.415 ; MKV(V) p.180.

The term k!aya was used in the Buddhjsr texrs in the cootext where warung or

compJete extinction is implied. Whereas the term nirodha could mean ce.asing

that coułd be followed by arising (utpada) and, as such, they could be used as

comp lementaries to explain change and impennanence as well as dependent

arising, the term k!aya had no such complementary term except irs negation,

a-k!aya, which impJies permanence. For t:his reason, Nigarjuna was able to

maintain chat there is neither absolute cessation (k!aya) nor perrnanence

(a-k!aya) of both occurrence (sa?'(lbhava) and djssolution (vibhava),

8. Sa'f?'Jbhavo vibhavaf cai11a vina bhavaf?Z na 11idyate,

sa?'(lbhava?!Z vibhat1a7!1- oaiva 111'14 bh4110 na 11tdyate.

Without an cxistent, occurrence as weU as clissolution arc not evident,

Wicbout occurrence as well as clissolution, an existent is not evident."

296 TuE PHllOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W Ay

9. St1f!Jbht111011ibhavaśc11i1111 n11 śunyasyopapadyate,

It1f!Jbht1flo tJtbha11aś caiva nafUnyasopapadyate,

Either occunence or d.issolution of the empty is not appropńate. Either

occurrence or d.issolution of the non-empty is also not appropriate.

lO. Sa'f!Zbhavo 11ibht111aś caiva naika ity upapadyate,

Itlf?Jbhavo 11ibha11aś ctlitJa na nanety upapadyate.

lt is not appropriate to assume tha.t occurrencc and d.issolution are identical. lt is not appropriate to assume that occucrence and d.issolution arc

diffcrcnt.

MKV(P) pp.416-418; MKV(l1 pp. 180-181.

lt is probab1y the use of the term bhava at XXl.8 that Jed !nada to assume chat

it represents a unique realm ofexistence recognized by Nigarjuna. However, if

we arc to keep in mind the two metaphysical schoołs- Sarvastivada and

Sautrlintika-and their metaphysical doctrines of identity and difference, it is

possible to interpret the statement in verse 8 as wcll as the two verses chat follow

as straightforward criticisms of these two schools.

For example, a Sautriincika who denies a bhiva or .wabhava can maintain

that occurrence and dissolution can take plac:e without a permanent entity

(bhava, s11abha11a). Occurrence and dissolution woułd then mean the absence

of continuity. Nagarjuna denjes this.

On the conuary, a 52.rvascivadin can maintain thar a bha11a oc wabhava can

exist without occurrcnce and dissolution, and this would account for continuity

but negate difference. Tbis too is rejected by Nagarjuna.

Similarly, occucrence and dissolution arc incompatible with the "empty''

(fUnya), as understood by a Sauuancika, or the "non-empty" (afUnya) as ex.-

plained by the Sarvastivadin (see XX.16-18).

Furthermore, occurrence and dissolution arc neither identicał (naika) nor dif·

ferent {niini) in a metaphysical sense.ExAMINATlON OF 0 CCURR.ENCE AND D ISSOLUTlON

11. Drśyate saf!JbhavaJ cai11a vibhavaJ cai11a te bhavett

drśyate saf!lbhavaJ caiva mohad vibhava e11a ca.

lt may occur to yon chat both occurrcnce and dissolution are seen. How·

cvcr, both occurrence and dissolution arc scen only through confusion.

MKV(P) p.419;,MKV(v,) p .181.

297

It would be a folly to assume that occurrcnce and dissolution arc perceived

(driyate). Neither the Buddha nor Nagarjuna would be willing to assert this.

Occurrence and dissołution in themselves are not perceivabłe . They are seeo onJy in rełation to phenomcna that occur and dissolve. The metaphysicaJ issues.

that arose during Niigarjuna's time as a result of the cxtremist aoaJysis of

phenomena 1nto cvents and relations have ałready been referred tp (see

XX.11).

12. Na bhaiiajjayate bhavo bhiivo 'bhavan na/iiyate,

nabhavaj1ayate 'bhavo 'bhavo bhavan na;ayate.

An existe.nt does not arise from an existent; neither does an existent arisc

from a non-existent. A non-cxistent does not acise from a non-existcnt;

neither does a non-existent arise from an existen't.

13. Na svato j'iiyate bhaval; parato naiva jayate,

na wataf? parataJ caiva;ayate jiiyate kutaf?.

An existent does not arise from iuelf, or from another or from both itself

and anothcr. Whcnce can it then arise?

M.KV(P) pp.419-421; M.KV(v,) p .182.298 THE PHILOSOPHYOFTHE MIDDLE WAY

Bhiiva and abhava referred to herc may be compared with the sat and 11.fat in

the pre-Buddhist Indian philosophy. The unresolvable metaphysical questioos

that plagued Indian philosophy for centuries, ąuestions such as "Did existence

(sat) arise from non-existence (t11at)?" 01 ·vice versa, have once again been in~

ttoduced into Buddhist thought by the Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas.

The idencity and oon-idencity th.eories of causation, theories of self-causacion

and exteroaJ causation, and many other metaphysical views thatemerged in theBuddhist uadicion are repeatedly mentioned and rejected by Nagacjuoa.

14. Bhavam.abhyupapannasya śaśvatoccheda-darfana??Z,

prasajyate sa bhavo hi nitya 'nityo 'tha va bhavet.

For him who is engrossed in existence, eternatism or annihilarionism will

necessarily follow, for he would assume tbat it is either permanent or impermanent.

MKV(P) p.421; MKV{V) pp.182- 183.

Nigarjuna is here presentiog the inevitable conclusions chat a person involved

in·speculacions relacing to bhiiva will reach. If the bhava is assumed to be perrnanent , he will end up with a notion of eternalism. lf. on the contrary, the

bhava is looked upóo as beiog impecmanent, then he will assert annihilation.

lt may be noted that the Sarvastivadins who were involved in the nocion of

bhfiva, carne up with the bdief in an eternal self-nature (1vabhava) or

substaoce (drr;vya). The same involvement led them to assume the momentary

destruction (kfa11a-bhańga) of impermanent qualities or characteristics of

bhi11fJ.

15. Bhava1n abhyupapannasya naivocchedo na śafvattt1rt,

udaya-vyaya-sa'l'(tt?ina// phala-hetvor bhavaf? sa hi.

[On the contrary,] for him who is engrossed in existence. there would be

neither annihilationism nor eternalism, for, indeed , becoming is the

senes of uprising and ceasing of cause and effert.EXAMINATION OF 0 CCURRENCli AND DISSO[UUON

16. Udaya-·vyaya-sa'f(tliinal? phala-hetvor bhaval; sa cel,

vyayasyapunarutpatter hetucchedaf? prasajyate.

lfie is assumed that becoming is che series of uprising and ceasing of the

cause and effecc, tben with the cepeated non-arising of thac which ceases,

it will follow that there will be annirulation of the cause.

MKV(P) pp.422-423; MKV(V) p.183.

299

The Saucrantika position was no moce differeot. They assumed chat bhava is

oone other than bhava, the process of becorning represented by the series

(sarpt'iina) of arising and ceasiog of effect and cause (phala-hetvol?) As such ,

they believed chat cheir coocepcion of ex.istence docs not come under either

eternalism or annihilationism.

Howeve.r, Nagarjuna has a different perception. He 3:-SSumes that if the process of'becoming (bhava) is analysed into a series of arisi'ng and ceasing of effect

and cause, as the Saurrantikas did, one is compelled to recognize che nonrebirch (a-puJ'lllT-utpattt) of chat whicb bas ceased, and there would be compłete annibiłacion of the c.ause. This is simiłar to the argument used at XXI. 7.

17. SadbhavaJya svabha11ena nasadbhavaś ca yujyate,

nirva11a-kale coccheda~ praśa111'iid bhava-sarptatef?.

The non-existence of thacwhich possesses existence lit tttmS ofsetf-nature

is noc appropriate. [On the contrary,J at the time of fceedom, there will

be annihilation as a result of the appeasement of the stream of becom.ing.

MKV(P) pp.423-424; MKV(V) pp.183-184.

Nagarjuoa's attcncion is now direcced at the Sauvaotika view , for it is chat

whfrh finally contribu ted to the "personalist theory" (p11dgala-vada) of the

Yatslputriyas. The Sauuintika will dismiss the Sarvastivada view, insisting

that there is no way in which nif'll'ii11a can be cxplained in terms of their nocion

of self-narure (svabhat•a) , especially because whac is really cJÓsting (sadbhava)

oo its own (svabhavena) cannot become a non-cxiscent (asadbhava).300 THE PH!LOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WAY

However, the Sautrantika will say that as a result of the appeasement of the

sedes ofbecoming (bha11a-saf!Jfat1), there is annihilation at the tltne ofnirva„a.

Having stated this position, Nigjrjuna proceeds to analyse its implications.

18. Carame na niruddhe ca prathttmo yujyate bhavaf?,

carame nanimddhe ca prathamo yujyate bhavaf?.

It is not propec to assume that thcre is first becoming whcn the last has

ceased. Nor is it proper to assume that thete is first becoming when the

last has not ceased.

MKV(P) p.425; MKV(V) p.184.

The Sautrantika tbeory of a series of momentary existences is under investigation here. As meotioned before, the Sauuancikas were often faced with the

problem of explaining arising (utpida). Thus, Nagarjuna argues that the first

(moment of) becoming (prathamo bhava4) cannot occur when the last (carama)

has ceased, for there will be nothing·to give rise to the former. This is what was

referred to as the cessation of the cause (hetuccheda) at XXI.16. The other

alternative is to assume tbat the enticy of the last moment has not ceased

(aniruddha), and this, of course, makes it difficult for the first becoming to occur at all.

19. Nirudhyaniiine carame pr11tha1no yadijiiyate,

nirudhyamiina ekaf? syaj1aya1nano 'jJaro bhavet.

If the fust were to be born when the kst is ceasing, then that which is

ceasing would be one and that which is being boin would be another.

MKV(P) p.426; MKV(V} 184.

Assum'.e that the first becoming occurs at the time wheo the last is ceasing

(nirudhyamana). NQ:garjuna insists that, in that case, whac is ceasing is oneEXAMINATION OP 0CCURRENCE AND DISSOLUTION 301

thing and what is arising is somcthlng complctcJy diffcrent (aparo). Nagarjuna

is herc referring to the implications of the theory of mo.menrs, namely, the

recognition of absolute discinccions.

20. Na cen nt'1Jdhyamanaś ca j'iiyamiinai ca yujyate,

iiirdha1p, ca mnyate ye1u leju skandhe!U1ayate.

Ii it is assetted th.at the ceasing is also the being boro, this would not be

proper. For, in th.at.case1 whatever that is born in rełation to the aggrcgates, would also be dying at the same time.

MKV(P) p.426; M.KV(V,J p.185.

Furcher complications will arise if it is assumed chat something chat ceases is

aJso arising. Nagarjuna is not prcpared to acccpt such an occurrence because

this would m can the simułtancous death and birth of the aggtegates.

Thcrefore, an occurrence is not explained by a scrictly momentary theory of cxistence advocated by the Saucrancikas.

21. Evaf!l fri!v api kale!u na yuklii bhava-saf!ltatil?,

tn!u ka/e!U ya na.stiiii k.athaf!I bhava-SPT(Jlatil?.

Thus, the stream of becoming is not proper in the context of the three

pcńods of time. How can there be a s.tream ofbecoming th.at does not aist during the three periods of time?

MKV(P) p.427; MKV(V) p .185.

The conclusion is inevitable that the series of becoming (bhava·Sllf?llah) is not

appropriately explaiocd in terms ofthe three pcriods of time, a concept which ,

as shown in the previous chaptcr, is not empirically grounded .CHAPTER

TWENTYTWO

·Examination of the Tathagata

(Tathagata-pafik.ra)

l . Skandha na n'iinya~ s~t1ndhebhyo n'iiJ?!Jin skandh'fi na tefu sal;,

tathagataf? skandhav'iin na kata1110 'tra tathagatal;.

The tathiigata is neither che ag.gregates noc different from them. The aggcegates are notin him; nor is be in the~ggregates . H e is not possessed of

the aggregates. In such a context, who is a tathagata?

2. Buddhaf? .fkandhan upadiiya yadi nasti svabhii11ataf?,

rvabhavataś ca yo n'iisti kuta!? sa parabhavt1taf?.

lfa Buddha were co be dependent upon the aggregates, he does not exist

in tenns ofself-nature. He who does not exist in terms ofself;nature, how

can he exist in terms of othec na~re ?

MKV(P) pp.432-436; MKV(V) pp.187- 189.

ln addicion co some of the terms used by the Buddha to refer to his owo

achievements, his disdpJes used a vast array of epithets in extolling his virtues.

It is significant to noce that none of these epithets caused so much

misunderscanding as the one under discussion in the preseot chapter. narriely,

tathagata. lt seems chat the very cooceptioo of tathagata iovited

misundetstanding.

l"he term can be rendeced inro English as "thus-gone" (tathii-gata) . The

conception of one who has "rhu>-gone" immed iateły brings to mind the idea of

an ''agent'' (sec Chaptcr 11). lt was. thefefore, ioevitable tliat when questions

relaring to rhe "destiny'' of r.he enlightened one were raisttd. they were always

ralsed in relation to a tath1ig11ta.

30~EXAMlNATION OF TATHAGllTA 303

Nagarjuna was aware that questions pertaining not only to the final desciny,

but also to the nature of the living sa.int were raiscd during rhe Buddha's day. A

discussion between Sariputta and a monk named Yamaka, who had enten:a.ined rhe belief rhat a lathagala is annihilated after death (param maraf!a) is

repocced in rhe Saf!'yutla-niliiiya (S 3.109-115; Tsa 5.2 (Tairho 2.30c-3lcl).

Reading the first part of this discussion, one gcts the impression that Sariputta

was 'ieluctant to identify the tatliiigala with the five aggregates or to distinguish

the tath'iigata from the aggregatcs. On rhe basis of this, it is possible to come to

the condusions, rhat rhe tathagala is linguiscically cranscendeot.

However, if the discussioo is followed to the very end, one can clearly sec rhat

such a conclusion is not warranted. For Sariputta is not willing to admit a

talhagala in an absolute sense (saccato thetato), comparable to the

metaphysical "self'' (a/man) that was considered to be pcrmaoent and eteroal.

Indeed, toward the end ofrhe discussion, Sariputta movcs from the conceprion

oftalh'iigata to the notion of"self' (atta) and refuscs to admit a self rhat is identical with or different from the aggregates.

Nagarjuna, as if he had read this discoursc:, begins the present chapter in an

idencical way, first ma.inta.ining that tłle tath'iigata is neither identical nor different from the aggregates, and then proceeding to questioo the existeocc or

non-existence of the talhagata after death. As in che Sa'1pyulta passage, Nagarjuna immediately qu,alifies his rcfereoq:: to ,the living tathagata, insisting that

the tath'iigata or the buddha under invęscigation is one possessed ofself-nature

(s11abha11a) and beoce similar to the nodon of "self' (a~ta) rejectcd by Saripuna.

Nagarjuna thereupQn uses his f'amous argumcnc that if the tathagata is not

found in cerms of self-nature, he cannot either be found in terms of ochernature (para-bh'ii11a).

3. Pralitya para-bh'iivaf!' yal/_ so 'natmety upapadyate,

yai canatm'ii sa ca kathaf!' bha11i;ya1i tath'iigataf?.

He who is dependent upon other narure would appcopriatelf be without

self. Yet, how can he who is without self be a tathiigata?

MKV(P) p .437; MKV(V) p.189.

If self-oature (s11abh'ii11a) wece co be equivaJent co self (atman) as an enticy in304 'THE PH!LOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

it.self, tben whaccver is of "other-nature" (para-bhiiva) will be "no-self'

(aniitma). "No-self' in this parcicular sense, which implies absolute difference,

i.s not acceptable to Nagarjuna, for ie i.s a recognition of a difference between a

tathigata and the psycbophysical pcrsonalicy.

4. 'fadi niisti svabhii11aś ca para-bhavafl kathaf{Z bhavel,

svabha11a-parabha11abhyaf{Z rte kal; sa tath'iigalal/.

lfthece exists no sclf-nature, how couJd thcrc be other-nature? Without

both self-nature and other-n.ature, who is this tathiigata?

MKV(P) p.437; MKV(V} p .190.

The idea that if there were to be no self-oaturc other-nature too would not be

evidcnt was already emphasized at I.3. A third metaphysical alte.?nacive that

uacscends both self-narure and other-natuie is herc denied. ·

5. Skandhan yady 11nupadiiya bhavel kaicil tathagatal/,

sa idiin"im upiidadyad upadiiya tato bhavet.

lf there were to be a tathligata because of non-graspiog on to the aggrcptes, he should still depend upon them in the present. As such he

will be dependent.

MKV(P} p.438; MKV(V) p. 190.

In the early di.scourses, a person in bondage and therefore in a state of suffering

(dukkha) is explained in terms of the five aggregates of grasping (upadiinakkhandha) . A person who is freed is said to be withbuc gta.sping (anupadiina),

buc not wfrhout the aggregates. The gerund upadiiya was used in the discourscs

to express two different meanings, namdy, (i) ''clinging to" (sec an-upadiiya,

Vin l.14; A 1.162; 4.290, etc.) and (ii) "depcoding upon" (D l.205, kii/an ca

I'"""Jafl ca upadiiya). lt was onJy in the farmer sense that a person was said roEXAMINATION OF TA11iAGJ\TA 30S

be freed from the agg~egates, not jo the latter sense. Yet, with the development ofsubstantialism, that is, when a freed person carne to be looked upon as

being totally different from the one in bondage, cach having his own nature

(.wabhi11a)(see Chapter XXV), the freed one was pcrceived not only as one not

gr25ping (anupidiiya) on to the aggreg:ites, but also as one who is independent

of the aggregates. lt is this subsrantialist interpretation chat Nagatjuna is

criticizing when he points out chat ifa tathagata were to exist without grasping

on to the aggregatcs (skandhan anupadiiya), he will still be dependent upon

(11padadyad) tbem ac the prcsent time (idiinl'?I), that is, as long as he is aJive.

Nigatjuna was thus going back to the Buddha's owo definicion ofa freed one.

6. Skandhan capy anupadiiya nasti kaścit tathagataf?,

yaf ca niisty anupadiiya sa upidiisyate kathaf!J.

There exists no tathiigata independent of the aggtegates. How can he

who does not cxist depcndentły be graspcd?

MKV(P) P.438; MKV(V) p.190.

Nigarjuna seems co be using the passive vcry upadiisyate in an

epistcmologicaJ sense. In the previous verse. he maintained thac a living

tathagata should be dependent upon the aggregatcs, even thougb he docs not

grasp on to them . Herc Nagarjuna is re-asserting the same position, wheo he

says: "There exists no tathagata who is jndependcnc of the aggregates." The

reason for this is that such an independent tathagata, being a mctaphysical entity like the atman, cannoc be grasped or known.

7. Na bhavaty anupadattam upadiina'!' ca ki'!'cana,

na c"ftsti nirupiJdiJnaf? kathrJf'!ICrJna tathagalaf?.

There is no sphere of non-grasping, nor is rhere something as grasping.

Neither is there someone who is without grasping. How can there be a

tathiigata?

MKV(P) p.439; MKV(P) p.190.306 THE PHJLOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WA't

The metaphysical speculacions regarcling identity and differcncc (svabhava,

parabha11a) leave the dependent or the gcasped (up'iidatta), depeodeoce or

grasping (up'iidiina) as well as the one who is free or independent

(nirupadiinaf?). wichout any basis. How can there be a tath'iigata?The fact that

it is only an explaoation in terms ofidenticy and difference that is rejected herc

is dcarly inclicaced in the verse that folJows.

8. TatJ11'iinyatven11 yo nlirli mrgyamiif!aś ca pancadh'ii,

upiidiinena sa katha~ prajflapyate tath'iigataf?.

He who, sought for in the fivefold manner, docs not exist in the form ofa

different idcntity, how can tbar tathagata be made known throogh

grasping?

MKV(P) p.439' MKV(V) p.190.

The substancialiast explanation of a tath'iigata would imply that he has completely uaosformed himself in to a different entity, chat is, a tathagata having

his own-nature (wabh'iiva) with no relatiooship to the person in bondage .

However, examining the fivefold aggregates, no such encity can be dis<:overed.

Such a tath'iigata cannot be explained in terms of dependeoce (upadiinena).

Thus, the conceptioo of depeodence (up'iidiina) is incompatible witłi both

idcoticy and difference. What is denied herc is neither dependence nor a

tath'iigata, but merely the mctaphysical approaches co both dependence and

tath'iigala.

lnstead of rranslating tatt11a and anyatva and as idencity and diliereoce, we

bave rendered che phrase as "different idenity" since it occurs in the singular.

9. Yad aprdam uptliinatp tal wabhavan na vidyate,

s11abh'ii11ataś ca yan nasti kuliJJ tat parabhavatal}.

This grasping is not foond in terms of self-narure. How can that which

does not exist in terms of self-namre come 10 be in terms of

othcr-natwc.?

MKV(P) pp.439-440; MKV(J1 p. 191.ExAM1NATI0NoF TAm°AcATA 307

Just as much as a tathagata cannot be e.xplaioed satisfactorily by rełying upon a

theory of.identity (111abha11a) or difference (parabhiva), eveo so grasping itself

(upadiina) cannot be found in terms bf self-oature or other oature. In other

words, ie woułd not be appropriate to cxplain grasping as an inevicable act or

tendency in human beings.

10. Evarrz fUnyam upadiinam upadiita ca sarvafaf?,

prajnapyale, ca fUnyena ka1harrz funytlJ 1a1hiiga1af?.

Thus, grasping and gra.spec arc empty in every way. How can an cmpty

tathagata be made known by somcthing that is empty?

MKV(P) pp.440-441 ; MKV(V) p.191 .

Thus, grasping as well as the one who grasps are empcy in every possible way.

They are devoid of aoy substance.

For the substantialist, the lalhagala as well as the aggregates have substance

or owo-.nature, even though they arc clifferent from·one another. The substantialist can cxplain the tathigata, whose self-narure (svabhiva) is freedom, contrasting him with the one who is in bondage as a result of his being a "graspcr"

(upadiitr) and whose nature is discina (para) from that of the tathagata.

However, witb Nagarjuna's deniaJ of self-narure, thar sharp dichotomy aJso is

dissolved. Hence Nagarjuna's insiscence chat an empty tathagata cannot be

made koown in relation to an equally empty ''grasper" (upidiitr) or "grasping"

(upadiina) referred to in the previous verse.

11 . ŚU.nyam iti na vaktavyam Qfunyam iii va bhavet,

u6hayarrz nobhaya-f!J celi prajnapty artha'J?'J tu kathyate.

"Empty," "non-empty," "both'' or "neither"- thcse should not be

dedared. lt is expressed only for the,purpos·e of communication.

MKV(P) p.444; MKV(V) pp.192-193.

Note again the use of the·tli-formula. Nagarjuna is rejecting any theonzing308 iHE PHllOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

rcgarding either the "empty"·or the "non-empty" or both or neither. Neither

the cmpty nor the non··Cmpty should be ceificd. These terms arc used onJy for

the sake of communicating or exprcssing an cxpe.rience which, being dependent (prmtyasamutpanna), has no static self-narure (svabhava), and as such

canooi: be demarcated and reified. The subtle difference between vaktavya

("should be declared") and kathyate ("is spoken of, isexpressed!') should not go

unnoticed. For Nagarjuna, dedaration ·and expression a.re two differcnt ac·

tivities, the former caJling for unqucscioiled acceptance, a sort of cacegorical

1

imperative, the laner.lcaving room for modificatioo depending upon the contcxt.

. This stacemeot of Nagarjuna is better understood in the light of the analysis

of conceptS provided by a modern philosopher like William James who

recognizes a pragmatic view of language and truth, in contrast to substantialist

philosophers like Plato for whom "concepts" arc the incorruptible reals.

,

12. Siifvafiifiiśvatiidy atra kutal? rante calu!faya??J,

antananfiidi capy atra kuta/? ś'iinte catu1faya??J.

HÓw can the tettalemma of e,ternal, non-eternal, etc., be in the peaceful?

·How can the tetralemma of finite, infinite, etc., be in the peaceful?

Mk1/(P-) p.446; MKV(V) p.194.

~

Siinta is.an appeased one. It is the tathagata who has appeased the dispositions,

'obsessions as we11 as the object (sec comments oo V.8). For him, ·the fourfold

metaphysical alternacives eicher cegarding the duration of phenomena such as

erernality (śaś11ata) and oon-eteroality (aśiiśvata) or regarding the extent of

phenomena such as the finite (anta) and the infinite (ananta) do not exist. He

has stopped brooding over the past and ruoning after the future.

13. Yena griiho grhrtas tu ghano 's5ti tathagtrtaf?,

niis5ti sa vikalpayan nirortasyiipi kalpayet.

Discriminating on the bas.is of grasp.ing or the grasped, and firmly in-EJw.łJNATION OF TA m AGATA

sisting that a tathilgata "exists" or "does not exist," a person would think

similarty even of one who has ceased.

MKf/(P) p.447; MKV(V) p.194 .

309

The Buddha's reasons for the rejection of the notion of tath'iigata in the

Sa11Jyutta passage refcrred to above (see comments on XXII.1-2) are clearly emphasized by Nagarjuna. The Buddha rejected a tath"(igata bccause his existence

was asserted in a real and absołuce sense (saccato thetato): When Nagarjuna

spcaks ofa dogmacie grasping (gt'1ih11) on to something as the real or substantial

(ghana) existence or non-existence (asfiti . . . niisfitt) ofthe tathagata, he was

expressing the sentiments similar to those of the Buddha. Fu!thennore, arguing in a.sim.ilarway as the Buddha did, Nagarjuna maintaińs that the same sort

of substantiałist specułations lead to the views regarding the existence and non'-

existence of the tath'iigata even after his death.

Hece chere is no denial of a talhag4ta, but only of a substantial entity. The

verse tbat follows is unequivocal in this regard.

14. Svabhavataś ca :fUnye 's1nif?IŚ cinfii naivopapadyate,

para'f{l nirodhad bhavati buddho na bhavatiti.Va.

When he is empty in terms ofself-nature, the thought that the Buddha

exists or does no~ exist after death is not approptiate.

MK.V(P) p .447; MKV(flj p.194.

Hete the term asmin, in the locative absołute construction (asmin s11abbii11ataf

ca f unye), refers to the t11tliiigatt1. Ifthe tpthiigata who is alivejs,empty of selfnature, then it ~not appropriate to assume that he exists or does not exist after

death. lt is only the substantialist thinking (cintii) that leads to the

metaphysical quescions which wece left undedared (avyakrta) by the Buddha.

15. Prapancayanti ye buddha'f{l prapańcafitam 4vyaja7[1,

te prapa11cah4taf? s(lf't)e na paiyanti tath'iigata'f{l.310 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THB MIDDl.li WAY

Those who geo.erate obsessions with greac regacd to the Bpddha who has

gone beyond obsessions and is constant, all of them, impaired by obsessions, do not perceive the tathiigata.

MKV(P) p.448; MKV(V) p.19~ .

Here we radically differ from the prevailing cxplanations that prapańca means

thought distinct from reality (see !nada, p . 135). Having rejected the moce

widespread view that Buddhisrn recognizes an "unspeakable" (a11acya) and "indefinabJe" (anirvacanlya) truth or reality (tattva) , which Jeads co the above iqterpretatioo ofprapaf!_ca, we have reodered the term as "obsessioo.'' .

The Buddha remains ałoof from obsessions (prapańcali'ta"!t) . As such, he is

not understoocł or grasped by those who are obsessed. A person who is obsessed

with the idea of identity will understand the Buddha in a way .different from

·one who is obsessed with the idea of difference. One wilJ say that he "exists"

(astt) and the othec will insist that he "does nor exist'' (niistt).

The Buddha who has overcome such ''obsessions" is "not so variable"

(a11yaya?fl) . His perceptions are not variable in the same way as those of the

unenłightened ones who are dominated by obsessions. Nagarjuna could not

have been unaware of the defin:ition of the Buddha as "one who has become

stable and ste;JY'• (fhita1'{1- ane1jappatlaf!l, A 3.3 77; fhita7?1 ciltaf!Z, S 5.74).

The term a11yaya in the present coutext expresśes the same idea of stability and

steadfasroess achieved by a Buddha. This is not to assume his permanent ex-

1St • eoce.

16. Tatliiigalo yat s11abh'ii11t,M tat s11abh'ii11am idaf!I jagat,

tathagato nil/s11abha110 n'i'1s11qbha11am idaT!l jagat.

Whatever is the self-naturc of the tathiigata, thac is also the self-nature of

the universe. The tathiigata is devoid ofself-nature. This universe is also

dcvoid of self-nature.

MKV(P) pp.448-449; MKV{V) p.195.

The first statement of Nagarjuna may be takeo to mean thac there is a self-

. nature of the tathigata which is identical with ~hat of the universe. This wduld

be justification for the belief in a permanent entity wh.ich is identical witb the

reality of the universe, comparable to the atman and brahman of the HinduEXAMlNATION OP TAmAGATA 311

uadition. However, Nagatjuna irnmediatdy sounds the warning that there is

noc such self-nature either in the lalliiigata or in the universe. Trus would mean

that non-substantiality (nairiitmya) applies not only to the individual (pudgala

= tathagakl) buc also co all phenomena (dharma = jagat).CHAPTER

TwENTY THREE

Examination of Perversions

(Viparyasa-pank!a)

1. Sa~alpa-prabht1110 rago d11efo mohtli ca kathyate,

śubh'ii1ubha-viparyaiiin sa1{tbhavt1nti prafitya hi.

Lust, hatred, and confusion are said have thougł}tas their source. Perversions regatding the plea.sant and the unpleasant arise depending upon

these.

MKV(P) p.451; MKV(V) p.197.

Followiog upon a discussion of the tathagata in reJation to the world, a discussion thac avoided absolute identicy and ab$olute difference, Nagarjuoa rakes

up the questioo regarding perversions (11iparyasa) which makes a difference between a person in bondagc and one: who is freed.

The four perversions are discussed by the Buddha at Anguttara 2.52. Tbey

pertain to percepcions (saflflti), thoughts (citta), and views (diftht). Perversion

(vipalliisa) of perceptioo or thought or view occurs with the identification of

t. the impermaoeot with the permaoent (anicce niccan tt) ,

11. the not unsatisfactory with the unsatisfactory (aduk.khe dukkhan h),

UL the non·substantial with the substantial (anattani alta ti),

and

1v. the unpleasant with the pleasant (tliubhe śubhan lt).

It is important to noce that perversion ii is.based upon perversion i, and

perversion iv is based upon perversion iii. While perversions li and iv relate to

subjective attitudes, perversions i and iii arc cognitive in nature.

The rccognition of subjective perversions (i.e. ii and iv) does not mean that

those experieoces 1eląting to whith pervcrsions arise do nor exist. lndeed, experiences of the płeasant (śubha = man'iipa) and unpłcasanc (aśubha =

312EXAMINATION Ol' PERVERSIONS 313

amanapa) sensations occur even in the enlightened ones (Iti11uttaka 38). Perversion is the wrong identification of these exp~riences . However, the same cannot

be said of the cognitive peNersioos, for the Buddba would be reluctant to

assume that there is an experience corresponding to something that is either

permanent or substaotiaL

For Nagarjuna, perversions ii and lv arc not due to purely inteUectual or

cognitive incapacity on the part of the indlvidual. Tbey are due more to the

subjective elements dominating thoughts sur.h as lust and hatred, wbicb acise

along witb thoughts (sa1{Zkalpa-prabhavo). even though these lattcr are not

part of the wodd ofexperience. Th.is explanation of Nagarjuna is based upon a

passage in the St11(1yulla wherein the Buddha identifies desire (kQ,ma) with

thoughts of lust (sa1{Zkappa-rag4) without confusing it with whatever is

beautiful (citrint) in the world (sec S 2.22; Tsa 48.20 [Taisho 2.345b]}.

As such, itis not surprfai.ng to see Nagarjuna beginnibg his analysis with the

last of the perversions, namely, the identification of the pleasant with the

unplcasant (a.śubhe śubhan Jt), a subjective perversion that is based upon the

cognitive.confusion (i.e., anattaniatfii tz). Nagarjuna was probably interested

in beginning his analysis with the subjective perversion because the metaphysicians, who carried che analytical process beyond its limit, bad difficulty in accounting for the emergence ofsensations such as the pleasant and the unpleasant.

2. Subhiśubha-viparyaiiin saf!Jbht111antiprafitya ye,

te svabha11a11 na 11idyante tasmiit kleśa na tatl'llataf?.

Whatever perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant that occur

dependendy arc not evident in terms of self-nature. Therefore, the

defiłements acc not in themselves.

MKV(P) p.453; MKV(V) p.197.

The perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant are dependcntly arisen. As

mentioned before, they are tht products of 1ust and hatred; they arise within

the individual. For this tea,son, they are not found in themselves (na

s11abhavataf?). Whatever defilments (.kleśa) occur as a result of such perversions

ćannot be pa.et of the expetiemced world. Rather they related to the way in

which the world is·perceived by.the individual. lt is ooly in this sense that they

are looked upon as being unrcal (na.tattvata'f?).314 Thra PHlLOSOPttY OF THE MIODLE W AY

3. Atmano 'JtittJa-n{istit11e na krJtha'f?Ztc aa sidhyatal;,

lam vinastitva-nastilve kleSiin'li'f?J sidhyatal; katha'f!'.

The existence or the non-existence of the self is not established in any

way. Without that, how can the existence or the non-existence of

defilemenu bć-·established?

MKV(P) p.453; MKV(V) p.198 .

The perversión regarding what is pleasant and unpleasant has been traced back

to the pecversion whcre the non-substantial (anatman) is .identificd with che

substancial (atman). The substantial and the non-substantial, in the eyes of the

mctaphysiciari, pertain to existence (flJtitva) and non-cxistence (n'1isti111a)

respectively (see V.8; XV. 71 11). The discourse to Katyayana .rejects both thesc

views as being metaphysi1=al.

Nagarjuna is herc insisting that neithc.r the 6cistence not the oon-existence

of a metaphysical self can be proved. lf there were to be no such self, then the

defilcments associated with such a self also cannot exist. In the absence of a

substantial self, ifonly the defilernents wece to exist, then they should have selfexistence, which was an idea denied at XXIII.2. Tuus, neither the substantial

existence ofa self noc the substantial existence ofdefilrnents can be established.

4. KllIJacidt/ hi bhavanfime kiesa!? sa ca na .ridhyati,

kaścid aho 11in1i ki'f?Z(;it s411ti k/eSii na kasyacit.

These defilements, indeed, bclong to someone. Yet, such a person is not

cstablished. In other words, in the absence of anyone, these defiłments

seem ło exist without belonging to anyonc.

MKV(P) p-453; MKV(V? p. 198.

Not onJy are the defilments not established as substantiał elements, they can·

not be proved to exist even as attributes. If defilements are considcred as

belonging to someone(.kaścia) who issubstantially existing. the abscoc~ofsuch

a substantial entity would mean the absence of de(llemcnrs as attr.ibutes.Ex.AMlNATION OF PERVERSIONS

5. SvaA'iiya-dr1#11a1 kleśiil? k/ifte santi na pancadha,

waliaya-dr1!i11at kii/ta'!' kleie1v api na pancadha.

The defilments arc like the view of one's own personality. Within the

defiłed, they arc not found in the fivefold way . The defiled is like the

view of one's own personality, for even within the defilements it is not

found in the fivefold way.

MKV(P) p.454; MKV(V? p. 198.

315

This is a ńutber cdcicism of the substantialist notions of "defilemenrs" (klefa)

as well as of the "defiled" (k.li$1<1). Such substantialist perspectives arc comparable to the views regarding an "embodied person" (111ak.aya-dr1/1), who is

not obtainabłe when that personality is analysed into the five aggregates.

6. Svabhavato na vidyante fubhaiubha-11iparyajiil/,

prafitya k.atamiin kfefiil? iubhafubha-viparyayan.

The pcrvecsioN regarding the pleasanc and the unpleasant arc not evident from the standpoint of sełf-nature. Depending upon which perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant are these defilements?

MKV(P) p.455 ; M.KV(V) p. 199.

Just as much as botb the deft.lements (k.leia) and the defiled (k.li;Fa) arc not evident in substantial form, so are the perversions that give rise co dcfiłements .

Tbey too arc not fouod in aoy substantial way. The question theo is: What is

the nature of the perverson relating to the pleasant and the unpleasant depending upon wbich defilements are said co arise?

Here there is no denial of perversions nor the deftlements. What has been

quescioneq is only the way in which theso are cooceptualized.

7. Rupa-fabrla-rasa-sparf'ii gandha dharm'iiś ea 11Z{ilidha~,

vas/fJ ragasya dve/aJya mohasya ca vikalpyale.316 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

Material form, sound, taste, touch, smeU and concepts- these are

discriminatcd as the sixfold foundations of lust, hatred, and confusion.

MKV(P) p.456; MKV(V) p.199.

Analysing !ust, hatred, and coofusion in terms of the four perversions, it may

be maintained that Just and hatred arc subjective attitudes, while confusion

refers to the cognitive aspect of understanding (sec com.ments on XX1lI. I),

even though the cognitive and artirudinal aspects are dependent upon one

another. The present statement of Nagarjuoa implies the dependence of the

attirudinal as well as the cognitive aspects ofexperience upon the sixfold objects

of sense experiencc.

8. Rupa-fabda·rll.fa-spari"ii gandha dharmaś ca kevaliif?,

gandharvanagarak"iir7i maficz~svapna-sa?rt,nibhaf?. ·

Material form, sound, taste, touch smell as well as concepts-all these are

comparable to the city of the gandharvas and resemble mir.ages and

dreams.

MKV(P) p.457; MKV(V} pp.199·200.

The similes of the "dreamH (svapna) and the "city of the gandharvas"

(gandharva-nagttra) have already been employed, a.long with •:ilJusion"

(maya), to refute the substantialist cxplanation of the dispositionally concłitioned phenorncna (sa??ZskrtaXsee VII. 34). The six objects of experience referred to at XXIII. 7 arc indeed dispasitionally conditioned. They arc not objects

that arc found in themselves (s11abh411ataf?). Nor arc they absoluteły noneXJstent.

9. AśubhtTf{I va fubhaf(t vapi kutas teru bhavi[yati,

maya-puru!a-kalpe!U pratibimba-sametu ca.ExAMINATION OF PERVERSIO"NS

How can the pleasant and the unpleasant come to be in people who are

fabrications of illusion or who are comparable to mirror images?

MKV(P) p.458; MKV(V) p.200.

317

What Nagarjuna has been criticizingso far is a substantiałist theoi:y ofthe pleasant and the unpleasaot (svabhtii/alo , .. fubhaJubha11iparyayan XXIII.6).

His argument in the prescnt verse is directed against the belief that such

substantial expeticnces can occur in thoughts of hwnan beings who are

themselves non-substa11tial, and who a.ce comparable to mirror images or reflections (see commentary on :XVII.31-32).

10. Anapek!ya :fubhaf!Z nti.rti afubhaf!Z prajńapayemahi,

yatprafitya fubha'f!t tasmtic chubhaf!Z naivopapadyate.

We make known that the unpleasant does not exist without being conti,ngent upon the pleasant, and that the pleasant, in its turo, is dependent upon that [i.e. the ®pleasant]. The.refote, the pleasant [in itself] is

not appropriate.

1I'. AnapekfyiiJubhaf!Z ntisti :fubhaf!l prajfJapayemahi,

yatprafityaśubhaf!Z ta.rmad aśubhaf!Z naiva vidyate.

We make known that the pleasant does not exi$t without being contingent upon the unpleasant, and that the unpleasant, in its turo. is

dependent upon that [i.e., the płeasant] . Therefore, the unpleasant [in

itself] is not evident.

MKV(P) pp.458-459; MKV(V? p ,200.

This is a elear refutation of the substancialist views of both the pleasant and the318 THE PHJLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

unplcasant. Nagarjuna insists that thcy ace dependent upon one another. Thcy

arc not independent experiences wherc one is repłaced by another, as in the

case of the theory of"attainmcnt" (praptz) and "oon-auainment" (apraptt)(see

comments on .XVI.10, XXIV.32).

12. Avidyamiine ca fubhe kuto rago bhavi,yah~

aśUbhe avidyamiine ca kuto dvefo bhavifyali.

When the pleasant is not evident, whence can there be lust? Wben the

unpleasant is not cvident, whence can there be hatred?

MKV(P) p.459; MKV(V) p.201.

Io addition to being mutuaHy dependent, the plcasant and the unpleasant provide a foundation for the subjective tcndencies such as lust and hatred. Thus,

lust would be non-ex.isrent if the pleasanc were not cvident. Similarly, hacred

would be non-ex.istent, if the unpłeasant wece not evideot. This, indeed, is the

conclusion of the Sa'f!'yutta passage referred to at XXIII.1. In that context, the

Buddha was not denying the pleasant and the unpleasant expericnces in the

world. He was simply insisting chat when such experiences occur a wise man

resuainrs his ycarning (chanda) for it.

13. Anitye nityam ity evaf'!J yadi graho viparyayaf?,

nanilya1p virlyate funye kulo graho viparyayaf?.

Iftbere were to be grasping on to the view, "Wbat is impermanent is permanent," then there is perversion. The impcrmancnt is not evident in the

contcxt of the empty. How can there be grasping or pecversion?

MKV(P) p.460; MKV(V) p.201.

So far Nagarjuna has endeavored to show thac the perversion regarding the

pleasant and the unpleasant is che result of a cognicive confusion which led to

che belicf in a substance ot self (atman). Wich the present statement, Nagar-Exl.MINATION OF PERVERSIONS 319

juna begins co analyse the conception of impermanence (11nity11) in order to explain che lathagata's cognitive uoderstanding of the world of experieoce. This

understanding enables the tathagata co eliminate the perversion relating to

happiness and sufferlng.

Herc, the perversion pertains to grasping of the impermanent a:s the perma·

nent. lfso, the perspectivc in wbich the lalhagata looks at the world should be

one of impermanence. Unforcunatcly, the notion of impermanence chat

dominated the Buddhist tradition during Nagarjuna's day was more a

metaphysical one (see commentaries on Chapter Vll) than an einpirical one.

For the metaphysician, the absence of permanence implied the reality of the

momeocary. Nagacjuna rightly believes that as much as grasping after permanence is a perversion. so is grasping after the reality of the momentary ( =

k1an.1'lla). The deoial of permanence does not commit oneself to the ocher ex·

cceme of momentary.destruction (k/an.a-bhańa). Emptiness (śunyafii) does not

imply any such momentariness. ·

14. Anitye nityarn ity eva~ yadi graho viparyayaf?,

anityam i~y api gr'iihaf? śiinye kif{J na viparyayaf?.

lf gcasping on to the view, "What is impermanent is pecmaoent," is

perversion, how is it that even the grasping after che view, "What is e1npty is impermanent," does not constitute a perversion?

MKV(P) p.462: MJ...'V(V) p.202 .

It is possible for someone to raise the quescion as to whether grasping after the

empry would irself be a perversion, just as much as grasping after che permanenr or the impermanent would consritute perversioos. Nagarjuna is herc raising this question and chen proceeds to answer it in the following verse.

15. Yena grhr;ah' yo grliho grahTt'ii yac ca grhyate,

"paśantani saniiitJi tasmad gi?iho na vidydttte.

That througb which there is grasping, whatever grasping there ~. the320 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W/\.Y

grasper as well as that which is grasped - all these are appeased.

Therefore, no gcasping is evident.

MKV(P) p.465; MKV(V} p.20.3„

The middle path enunciated in the discoutse to Kacyayana avoided the two extremes relating to philosophical understanding and explanation. This was

achieved thro1Jgh che appeasement of dispositions and the elimination of

grasping. Because of non-grasping, all che metaphysical qucstions relating to

the faculcies (yena grh11iit1), the proces.s of understanding (griiha), the person

involved in such understanding (grahtfii) as well as the object of uąderstanding

(yac ca grhyate), come to be appeased. The appeased one (fanta) does not continuc to taise questions or doubts beyor.d a certain limit, not because he knows

evetything nor bccause he does not care to know, but because he is aware of the

conflicts generated by any pursuit of koowledge that gocs beyond experience.

The facr chat grasping for emptiness can conscitute a sort of petversion

(f'iinyatii dr1tz) has alrea.dy been e.xplained by Nagarjuna (XIU.8). This does

not mean that t he very conception of emptiness is invalidated in the same way

as the conceptS of permaoence and momentariness would be invalidated, The

reason ff!r this is thar the notions of permanence and substance as wełl as of

niomentarioess arc not empirically grounded compared with dependent aiising, non-substantiality, or emptiness. Both the Buddha and Nagarjuna would

categorize the formcr under wrong thoughts (mithya sa1?Jka/pa), while tbey

would consider the latter as right or appropriate thoughts (saf!Jyak saf!Jka/pa,.

ka/pana yatra yojyate, XVll. 13), The verse thar follows should be understood

in such a conteXC. This· indeed is the finał conclusion of Nagarjuna in the

Kiirika (sec XXVII.30).

16. Avidyamiine grahe ca mithfii va sa1nyag eva va,

bh11ved viparyayaf? kasya bhavet kasyaviparyaya/i.

When grasping; wrongly or rightły, is not evident, for whom woułd the.re

be perversion and for whom woułd chere be non-perversion?

MKV(P) p.466; MKV(V) p.204.EXAMINATION OP PERVERSLONS 32l

With grasping gone, whether it be for the right thing or the wrong thing, the

enlightened one does not involved himself in any substancialist thinking

rdating to perversion or non-perversion. This is the state of the saint who has

anained freedom from grasping (anupiidaya vimuktt).

17. Na capi vipafftasya sarrzbhavanti viparyayaf?,

na capy t1vipantasya 1ambha11anti viparyayaf?.

Perver.sions do not occut to one who is ałready subjected to pcrversion.

Pervcrsions do not occur to one who has not been subjected to pcrvers1ons.

.

18. Na 11iparyasyamiint1$ya sarrzbhat1anti t1iparyayal/,

1111rJrfasva 111ayaf!Z kasya sa1(Zbha11anti viparyayaf?.

PerveISions do not occur to one who is being subjected to pcrversioru.

Reflect on your own! To whom will the pervcrsions occur?

MKV(P) p.467: MKV(V) p.204.

Upon reaching sucha łevel of morał and intellectual development (as referred

to in the previous verse), one does not get involved in mecaphyskał spcculations such as whether pcrversions arise in one who is a1ready afflicted by pcrversions, or not afflktcd , or is being afflicated. The speculation thac is avoided

pertains not only to the past and the future buc also the present. As such he

avoids the m·etaphysics discussed in Chapter Il. When perveisioos themselves

are not per~eived as being substantial, how can one consider a perverse person

as a substantial entity.

f9. Anutpannii katharrz nii1114 bhavi,yanti viparyayaf?,

11iparyayef11 a1atesu 11iparyayg-galfli? kuta/?.

How coułd there be non-ariscn pcn;ersi~ns? When perversions are noc322 THE P!łllOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE W AY

bom, whencc can there be a person who is subjccted to perversions?

MKV(P) pp.467-468; MKV(V) p.20).

Picking up the argument from the previous verse, Nigarjuna is bere specifically

rejeccing the substantiałist ootions of perversions as well as persons who arc

pervcrse. lf perversions are substancial or having self-narure (s11abha11a), they

cannot be considered as arisen (utpanna). When they are non-arisen or unborn

(ajata), there cannot be a person in whom these would arise, for they cannot

serve as attribuces.

20. Na svato /iiyate blia11af? parato naiva jiyate,

na s11ataf? parataś ceti viparyaya-.gata/t kutal/.

An existent does not arise from itsełf, nor does it arise from another, nor

both itsełfand other. Ifso, whence can tbere be a person who is subject to

pcrversions?

MKVP) p.468; MKV(V) p.205.

This verse, which is not available in KumlirajTva's translation, represents Uł application of the analysis ofsubstancial existence (bhava) in Chapter I to the problems of a substantial petsoo or eotity. It is aJmost identical with XXl.13.

21. A Jmi ca luci nityaf!Z ca sukhaf!Z ca yadi vidyate,

atmii ca luci nityaf'!l ca sukhaf!Z ca na 111paryayaf!.

If either the self, the pleasant, the permanent, or the happy is evident,

then neither the self, the pleasant, the pcrmanent, nór the happy constitutes a pcrversion.

MKV(P) p.468; MKV(V) p.205.

Nagarjuna began his examinacion of pcrversions (11iparyasa) utilizing rhe sameEXAMJNATION OF PF.RVERSIONS 323

terms used br the Buddha at A 2.52. In the preseot verse, he adopts a slightly

different terminology in referring to the perversions. Instead of fubha and

aśubha, he uses the p~ of terms śuci and .aśuci. and instead ofadukkha be has

sukha. This latter terminology was indeed utilized by che interpreters of

Abrudharma when discussiog the perversions (see Akb p.286). As such, it is a

elear indication that N:igarjuna was conversant withg the early discourses as

much as he was familiar with the Abhidharma commenrarial Hterature.

Nagarjuna's argument in the present verse coułd lead tp misunderstanding

unless it is seen in the context of his previous sta.cements abouc the perversions,

expecially at XXIII.20. lf the self, the pleasant, the petmanenc, and the happy

arc evidenc as selfexistent entitzes, chen, indeed, they do oot constitute perversions. Unfortunately, Inada's uanslation does not seem to bring out this strong

sense of "exist" that Nagarjuna is implyicig here.

22. Niit11Jii ca fuci nitya?!I- ca -sukha'f!J ca yadi vidyate,

anal1nii 'śucy anitya'f!J ca naiva du-1/Aha?!I- ca vidyate.

Ifneither the self, the p~easant, the permanent1 nor the happy is notevident, chen neitbec the non-self, the unpleasant, the impermanent, nor .

the $nffering would also be evident.

MKV(P) p.469; MKV(V) p.205 .

Having rejected the substanciał existc;nce of the four perversions, Nagarjµna is

·here emphasiziog their relarivicy. 1-ł.owever, relativicy in this context need not

be understood as applying in an identical way to all the four perversions. As

pointed out earlier (see comments on XXIU.1), the four perversioos deal with

rwo different categoties, the cognitive and che attirudinal. The fact thar

anatman and anitya are conceptually related to atman and nitya does_not mean

that the latter are cognitivcly bascd. They arc relative only at the .cooceptual

leveł . On the contrary, fuci and aiuci as wełl as sukha and du/?kha arc part of

experiern;e, even though chere coułd be confusioo regarding theit identificadon.

23. Evaf'{Z nirudhyate 'vidya r1iparyaya-nirodhanat1

avidjiiya?!I- tJiruddhayaf'{Z sa'f!JSkaradya?!I- nirudhyate.324 THE PHILOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE W/\Y

Thus, with the cessation of pcrversions, ignorance ceases. When ignorance has ceased, the disposition.s, etc. come to cease.

ltfKV(P) p.469; M.KV(V) p.206.

The distinctioo betwcen the two kinds of perversions meotiooed earJier

(XXlll.t ,2i) seems to be juscified by the.present sratement. Wben the perversions cease, the immediate resułt wouJd be the ccssatioo of ignorance (a11idyQ).

This would pcn.ain to the more cognitivc pcrversions (i and iii). The cessation

of igoorancc would aJso mean the cessacion of the perversions relatiog to

dispositions; that is, pcrversions ii and iv.

24. Yadi bhutal/ 111abha11ena klefal/ keiidd hi lllZJyflcit,

kfllh.11rt1 n'iima prg/:iiyeran kall 111abh'ii11art1 prahasyati.

lf, indeed, certain dcfile!bents ofsomeonc have come to bt: un the basis

of sclf-naturc, how could they be rclinquished? Who cver cou1d relinquish self-nature?.

25 . Y.ady abhutal/ svabhavena k/efal? kecidd hi lllZJyaciJ,

kathaf?Z fiiima pral:iiyeran ko 'sadbh'iiva?!J prahasyati.

lf, indced, ccnain dcfilcments of someooe havc not come to be on the

basis of self-oature, how could they be relinquisbed? Who ever could

rclinquish non-existence?

'

MKV(P) p.471; MKV(V) pp.206-207.

Nagarjuna's conclusion in this chapter is that the dcfilemeots (kleśa) , whicb arc

the rcsults of the pcrvetsions discussed abovc, cannot be elim.inated, and ,

therefoce, there could be no lalh'iigata, if the.se defilements are łooked upon as

being either substanciaJ; i.e,, something that has come to be (bhuta) havingEXAMINATION OF PERVERSIONS 32~

self-narure (s"Vabhiiva) or oon-substantial, i.e., sotnething that has not come to

be (abhuta) because of ics having no real nature (asadbhava). In either case,

there can be no abandoning of defiłeroe.nts and hence the achievement of the

state of tatliiigata.CHAPTER ·

TwEN1YFOUR

'

Examination of the Noble Truths

(Arya-satya-parzkfa)

1. Yadi śunjam ida'f{Z sqrvam rtc/ayo niirti na vyayql{,

caJun{iitn iirya-satyanam abhaPas te prasa/yate.

Ifall tbis is empty, then the.re exists no uprising and ceasing. Theseimply

the non-existence of the four noble truths.

MA'V(P) p.475 ; MKV(V) p .209.

Nagarjuna's discussion of the four trutbs was an inevitable consequence of his

analysis of perversions (Chaptet XX.lll) which, in its turo, was occasioned by·a

need to explain the perspeccive of a tathagata (ChapterXXII). The foUI uuths

refer to the problem of suffering, the subject matter of two of the perversions,

namely, mistaking the unpleasant for the pleasant (aśubheiubhan tt) and nonsuffecing for the suffering (aduf?khe dul{khan tt).

Verses 1-6 In the pr~ent chapter pose one major problem faced by the Buddhist (or even by the non.Buddhist) in explaining suffering (duf?kha) and,

therefore, the fout noble truths, when placed in the context of "emptiness"

(fiinyata). Th~ important questions arc: Who are these Buddhists (or nonBuddhists)? Why arc they .faced with such a problem? .The answers to these

questions 'ate found in the Abhidharmakofa-bliii1ya of Vasubandhu.

Vasubandhu refers to a theory proposed by some: "Thete indeed is no feeling

of happiness" (nasty eva sukha vedana) and "Evetything is suffering or unsatlsfactory" (duf?khaiva tu sarva'f!Z)(Akb p.330). There is very Little doubt that t.his

interpretacion of the Buddha's teaching emerged with and was continued until

modern times by thinkecs and scbolars belonging to the Brahmanical tradition.

By ignoring a simple yet extremely imponant pronoun (namely, idaf{Z, ''this"),

the Brahmanical interpreters transformed the Buddha's teaching from an em·

pirical to an ab~ołutistic system. Thus, the Buddha's scatement: saroam ida'f{Z

dul(khaf?' ("all this is suffering'') turns out to be an unquaLified universal statement: saroa'f{Z duf?kha'f!Z ("everything i:s suffcring''). Similarly, a specific statement such as sunyam idaf!'J saroa'f{Z ("all tłi.is is empty") turns out to be another

326EXAMlNATlON OF 1HE NOBLE Thurus 327

absolutisti<:: one, sunyaf(t sarvatp ("everything is empry," a problematic not

noticed by Inada, p. 144). I

Threatened by such a problematic situation, the Buddhist metaphysicians

wete driven to the extreme position of asse.tting absolute forms of happiness,

when they insisted: "Happy feelings do indeed ex1st in terms of unique

charactcr" ((IJty eva s-11alakfa11atal/ suk.ha vedanii, Akb p.331}. Yet, realizłng

that the Buddha did oot prcsent the world as a ''bed ofroses," they were compelled to admit that there. arc eonie experiences that arc inherently unsatisfactory (S11abhti11enai11a duf?kha, ibid., p .329).

Thus, not realizing that this was all due to a Brahmanical misreading of the

Buddha's discowses and assuming that there is a genuine problem, the Buddhist metaphysicians carne to admit both suffering or unsatisfactoriness

(duf?k.ha) and happiness (suk.ha) as substantially existing. Instead ofcorrectiog

the Brałimanical misreading, they struggled for an explanation:

When [the Buddha] declared: 'Ooe should perceive happy feelings as suffering,' [i.e. , che perception of one who has ełiminated

the perversions,] both [hap~incss and suffering] arc available

thercin. Happiness is inherently so, because there is pleasantness..

However, eventually there is suffering, because ofits chaoging and

impeananent nature. When that [feeling] is perceived as hap·

piness, it contributes to enlightenment, through its enjoyment.

Wheo it is perceived as suffering. it leads to release, by being non·

attached to it. (Akb p.331, Yad uktaf(t "sukh'ii 11edanii dul;khe ti

dra/(a11ye 1' li ubhayaf(t tasyam asti. Sukhat11a?tt ca svabhavato

ma1ilipat11iit, duf?ka?tJ ca paryaya~o 11ipari111imanitya-dharmat11iit.

Sit tu suk.ha.to drfyamana buddhaya kalpate, tad asviidamz.t,

duf?khato drfyam1in'i!_ mokfaya k.alpate, tad 11alragyad tli)

The substance·tt~rminology in the above passage should. make it cleat as to

which Buddhist school wa5 presenting tbis·eicplanacion. There seems to be no

quescion that it was authored by the Sarvastivadins. Thus, it was their desire to

uphold the cónception of substance that made them uncomfortable with the

notioo of "the empty" (śUnya) . The substantialists were prepared to wrestle

with the conceptions of substance and causation and, as shown earlier, they

produced substantialist theories of causatioo. However, they could not do the

same with the concepcion. of "the empty" (śUnya) , even though "emptlness"

itself may be amenable to such substantia1ist interpretations (see XXIV.14).

It is in order to highlight this problem that Nagatjuna begins the chap.ter

with a reference to "the empty'' (funya, as in y,adiśiinyam idaf(t saroaf(t) .rather

than to the abstract conception of "emptiness" (ftinyalii}. In Nagarjuna's328 Tu1ł PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W/\Y

mind, to preserve the non-subscantialist and non-absoJucistic standpoint of the

Buddha, what needs to be restored is "the empty" rather chan "empciness.''

because the latter is dependent upon the former, whereas any emphasis on the

latter could wipe out the former, as it happened in the case of' the absolutists

and the substantialists. In presencing che metaphysicians dilemma in this man·

ner, Nigarjuna was more concerned with the mistake of his Buddhist counter·

pans than with the misreadings of the Buddhist texts by the Brahamincal

chinkers. For this reason, he makes no reference to Such misreadings as "sarva'f!t

sunya'f!t. , "

2. Parijna ca praliii'!'f!t ca bhli11an'ii .r'iikfikarma ca,

caturtiiim iirya-saJyiinam abha11iin nopapadyate.

In che absence of the four noble truchs, uoderstanding, relinquishing,

cuJtivation, and reali~tion will not be appropriate.

MKV(P) p.477; ll'!KV(V) p.210.

Understanding (parijn'ii) pertains to the first of the four noble truths, namely,

chat suffering exists. Rclinquishiog (prah'ii1'!a) refers to the second, narody, the

cause of suffering, which is explained as craving (tr!t{ii). Realization (i?ik#karma) applies to the third, namely, the state of freedom from suffeting, which is

nirvana. Cultivation or practice (bha11ana) involves the fourth, namely, the path

leadiog to the cessation of suffering.

3. Tad ab/iiiv'iin na vidyante caw'iiry iirya-pl>a/iini ca,

phaliibhave phalasthii no na santi pratipannak'iif?.

In the absense of this [fourfold activity], the four noble fruits would .not

be evident. In the absence of the fruitś, neither those who have attained

the fruits nor those who have reached the·way [to ~uch attainment] exist.

MKV(P) p.477: MKV(V) p.210..

· The non-absolutiscic standpoiot of eady Buddhism is clearly embodjed in theEXAMlNATION OF THE NOBLE TRUTHS 329

doctrine of the four fru.its (arya-phtlla) . Even though freedom without grasping

(anupadii vimuktz) is sometimes referred to as the one goal (ek4y11na), yet a

deliberate attempt to assert degrees of attainments where some arc considered

to be inferior to others is conspicuously absent, Like the relay of chariots

(rathavinlta), one segment of the path is as imporcaat as the other,

''dispassion" (vairagya) being one dominant attitude permeating all segments.

This has an imporcant bearingon the concepcion of ttuth to be discussed soon.

4. Saf!lgho n'ihti na cet santi te 'f!tm puru!a-pudgaliif?,

abhaviit carya-satyanaf!I saddharmo 'pi na vidyate.

If the eight types of individuals do not exist, tbere will be 110 congregation. From the non-existence of the noble trnchs, the true doctcine would

ałso not be evident.

MKV(P) p.478; MKV(V) p.210.

Inada was probably assuming that cet refers to thought (citta) when he

translaced pan of the first line as "the eight aspiracions of men do not exist,"

whereas it could be more ~ppropriatdy read as a cooditional particie.

The assoc.iation of the ttue doct.tine (sad-dharma)with the fout noble truths

(tiry11-1a1y11) to a point whe:te the abse.oce of th,e łatter implies the non-existenc~

of the former should nacurally raise questions regarding the more popular

assigoment of doctrines to the var.ious sehools where the four noble truths are

assign~d to the . so-called H~nayana with the superior Mahayana having

somethiog more to offer, Such an assignroent. becomes really questiooable

when a greac Mahayana thinker like Nagarjuna himself admits of such a cor·

relation (XXIV.30).

This equation is also signlficant for another very important reason: Dharma,

as ''teaching" also means a "statement" of doctrine. Some modern linguistic

philosophers would prefer to use the term "truth" primarily. in referring to

statements rather than to facts. Sad-dharma, .identified with truth, seems to accommodate such a perspective. ·

S. Dharme casati sa'!l-ghe.ca kathaf'!l buddho bhavifyt#'i,

evaf!J. tnf!y api ratnani bru11lir1111f pratibadhase.330 THE PH!LOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

6. funyaliif(Z phaltrsadbh'iivam adharmaf!l dharmam eva ca,

sarva-sa'{Z11ya1111har'iif!Jf ca laukikan pratibadhase.

Whcn the doctrinc and the coogregarion arc non-existent, how can there

be an cnlightcncd one? Spcaking in this .manner about cmptiness, you

contradict the thrce jewels, as wcll as the reality of the fruits, both good

and bad, and all such worldly convenrions.

MKV(P) pp.478-489; MKV(V) 210-213.

At this point the metaphysidan brings up the notion of"emp tiness" (1unydta).

For him, emptiness is a problem, not because of any othcr reason, but because

it implies "the emp ty" (finya), and this latter lcaves no room for substantial existence (sad-bh'iiva) of the fruits (artha) of both good and bad as well as alJ the

worldly conventions-.

Inada's transłation of dharma and adharma as propeł and improper acts is a

couective to his earlier rendering of these rwo cerms as factor and non-factor at

Vlll.5. However, his rranslation of saf!J11ya11ahiira as somcthing additional to

dharma and adharma can be quc:stioned in the light of the use of vyavahara at

XVII.24, wherc a similar, but not idential, set of categories (pu11y11-p'lipa,

"merit and demerit") is referred to as vyavah'iira. Jndeed, this particular use of

the term 11y1111ah'iira ( = Illf!lV[lt) will throw much light on an undc:rstandiog of

the distinction becween the ewo truths discussed at XXIV.8.

7. Atra bmmal; iunyatiiyfif(Z na tvaf(Z 11etsi prayojanam.,

iunyaliif!J iunyalllrthaf!J ca talli etJam. vihanyase.

We say that you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness. As such,

you ar-: tormcnted by emptiness and the meaning of emptincss.

MKV(P) p.490; ltfKV(V) p.213.

Looking at the nacure of the objections raised by the Buddhist metaphysiciaru

against the notion of "emptiness," Nigarjuna is insisring chat they do not

undersund "the purpose of emptiness," (iunyat'iiyam. prayojanaftZ). Does rhis

mean chat "emptiness'' has a functional or pragmatic vaJue, rather than beiogEXAMINATION OF THE NOBIJi TRllrHS 331

an absolute concept? Does it need to be substantiated by "the empty," rather

than merely substantiating "the empty." Which is more important, "the empty'' or "emptiness," or arc they of equal importance? if "the empty" is considered to be important, "emptiness" would be a merc idea with no grounding

in experience. Ifthe ''emptincss'' is looked upon as being important, the empty

would ruro out to be a fabrication. If both arc considered to be equaUy important, there could be circularity in re~oning based upon them. However, ifthe

empty is considered to be the basis of experiencc, and emptiness is derived

frorn chat cxperience, this Jatter could be provisional and remain to be corrected in terms of future experience. In such a case, the circularity involved in

arguing about tbem could be easily ełiminated. ln the next three verses, Nigarjuna proceeds to provide very specific answers to most of these questions.

8. Dve satye samupaśritya buddliiinfi'T{Z dharma deśana,

loka-.sa'f?Jvrli-satya'f?J ca.stttya?'p ca paramarthatal;.

The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths:

tnith relating to woddly convention and truth in terms of ultimate fruit.

MKV(P) p.492; MKV(fl) lp.214.

This has turned out to be one of two most discussed verses in Nagacjuna's

Kiin'/ca. Modern disquisitions on the conception of two truths could perhaps fili

severa! substantiaJ volumes. Instead of plodding over trodden ground, the preseot discussion will be confined to a comparison of the conception of two tnlths

in early Budcłhism and the metaphysical vetsion presented by the interpreters

of the Abhidharma, with a view to clacifying Nagarjuna's position.

Nagarjuna's version will be ex:amined in the light of the problems posed at the

beginning of the pi:esent chapter, as wełl as his refcrence to woddly conventions

in the previous chapters.

In the Su1ta-nipat41 the Buddha condemned any arcempt to uphold a view

(di!!ht) as the u!timate (paramaT?J)(Sn 796ff.). Refusing to recognize any

knowledge of "things as they really.a.re," and ma.king a more sober claim to

knowJedge of "things as they have come to be'; (yathabhuta), the Buddha was

reluctant to accept any notion ofparamattha as "ultimate reality." Instead, he

claimed to know "the dependently ariseo" (pa(iccasamuppanna) and, on that

basis.• formulaced the cooceptioo of ''dependent arising" (pa{iccasamt1ppada).

In such a context, it was more n1eaningfuł for him to speak ofattha (Sk. artha)332 THE PHJLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

and paramattha (Sk. paramartha) in the sense of fruit, consequence, or result

( = phala, as in s'iimańfJa-phala, "the fruit of reduseship"). Tbus, a good action is one that is fruitful (attha-sa1?,Zhita) and a bad, unfruitfuł (an-atthasa?phita). ·

The Buddha also recognized that views about good and bad, puricy and impurity, are in most cases relative convencions (Sn 878-894). According to the

same text,'good (kusala) and bad (akusala) are conventions that vary depending

upon contexts (sammutiyo puthujja, Sn 897). These are che ways of the world

(loka), often charactecized as sam1nut1~ 11ohara (D 3.232) or panfJatti (S

4.39-40). However, there is no indication that, sioce these are relative conventions, the Buddha advocaced the transcendence of both good and bad.

Having defined the good as the ftuitfuł, the Buddha characterized the

ultimate good :as the ultimatelyfruitfu!. The termparamattha was thus used to

refer to the "ultimate fruit'' rathet than ''u.ltimace realicy." Sammuti and

paramattha are therefore oot two contrasting truths. Theformer is a mixed bag,

while the latter represents the ultim.ate ideal. As a result ofanaining nibbiina.

which is the complete eradication of lust (raga), hatred (dosa), and confusion

(moha), the Buddha found himself enjoying an ultlmate fruit, withour hurting

hirnself or others (na attantapo na parantapo, D 3.232). Parama.ttha thus

becomes the mora.I ideal as reflected in the Buddha's own att.ainment df

freedom and happiness.

The theory of dependent arising (pra!f.ccasamuppada) expla.ining the

phenomena that arc dependently arisen (paficcasamuppanna) thus accommodates the four truths as well as the two truths. All ttuths being pragmatic,

there is herc no place for an "absolµte or ultimate reality." The Buddha's

epistemological scandpoint does not allow for such speculations.

This, howevec, was not the case with the metaphysicians. lt is significant to

noce tbat when the Buddhist metaphysidans were faced with the problem of

reconciling the four truths with their conception ,of substance (s11abha11a), they

were compelled to fall back on the conception of two truths (Akb p.33).

Howcver, their interpretation of the, two truths is totaHy different from the

Buddha's and, in fact, seems to be contrary to it. Here again, Vasubandhu is

our source.

As a Sauttantika metaphysician, Vasubandhu refers to the two truths (satya)

and surreptitiously moves on to a discussion of existents (sat): sa?fZvrtt~sat and

paramiirtha·sat (A,łb p.334). He tbeo provides two examples to illustrate the

. nature of saf!lvrti-sat. The fust is a 'pot' (ghatą) . There canoot be knowłedge of

a pot when it is broken ioto pieces. The second is water (ambu). Water is not

knowa independent of the knowledge of "form" (riJpa). Contrasted with these

two is knowłedge of theparamartha-sat. 'Materia! form' (ritpa) is an example of

such existeoce. Io this case, wheo an object is broken down inro its ułcimaceły

irreducible elemenrs, namely, ;uoms (paramii1'Ju), there is knowłcdge of the

"unique narure" (s11abhava = s11a/ak!a1Ja?) of such acoms. For the metaphysi-ExAMJNAT!ON OF IHE N OBIE TRUTHS 333

cian, that unique nature, whether it is called svabha11a qt s11alakfa'la, has ałways

remained an epistemological enigma.

This interpretation of the two truths is totalły abseot either in the earły

discourses or in the canonical Abhidharma. In the so-called Theravada ttadition, it appears for the first time in the ooo-canonicaJ tcxts (Mi/n 160), coouibutiog, as it did in the case of the Sarviiscivada and Sautraocika schools, to

insoluble problems such as the duality of mind and matter. Vasubandhu's

statement of the two uuths- .raf(lvrti and paramiirtha-in the above contcxt,

where he was r~cordiog the interpretation of the Sauuiintika view, remains in

sharp contrast to the spirit of the Buddha's teachlng on "noo-substantialism."

This shouJd certainJy provide an interestiog background to the analysis of

Nigarjuna's owo version of the two cruths.

9. Ye 'nayor na vijananti 11ibhagaf!I- .ratyayad11ayof?,

te tatt11af(l na vijananti gambhiraf(l buddha-ślisane.

Those who do not un'derstand the distinction becween these two truths do

not understand the profound troth embodied in the Buddha's mcssagc.

MKV(P) p.494: MKV(V) p.215.

Niigarjuna is, of course, criticizing his opponents for not understandiog the

Buddha's rnessage. If so, Niigarjuna's owo explanacion of tbese two trud~

should not come anywhere close to the one discussed by Vasubandhu, according to which the .raf(l11(ti reprcsents a merc designac:ion, not an ultimate reality

or paramiirtha. It is an ootologkal speculatioo whkh is not supported by the

Buddha's own conception of dependent arising.

10. Vyavah'llram anaśritya paramartho na defyate,

parav;.rrtham anagamya nirvaf!tlf!Z tiiidhigamyate.

Without relying upon convention, the ultimatc fruit is not taught.

Without uoderstanding the: ultimate fruit, frecdom is not attained.

MKV(P) p.494; MKV(V) p.216.THE PHILOSOPHY OFTHll MIDDLli WA Y

Unless one is committed to upholding a theory of linguistic or concepcual

transcendence of ultimate truth or reality, there seems to be no reason to

restr:kt the use of the terms saift'11rti, vyavaharai or prajńapti to refer primarily

to linguiscic convention. These terms cou1d and did stand for any kind of conveotioń, whether it be llnguistic, social, political, mora! , or religious. As menti.oned earlicr (sec comments on XXIV.8), all such conventions are pragmacic

a.ud contextual. As such, trutb rclati.ng to them would also be pragmatic and

C00textual.

The fact that in the two p.tevious instances when Nagarjuna used the term

11ya11ah'{ira (XVll.24; _XXIV.6), he used it in the context of a discussion of

morality, is of utmost significance. It is in this same conteitt char the Buddha

used the ceon vohara (D 3.232 an(lriya-vohara == muiavada, etc., and ariyavohara = musivlidii verama1fi, etc.) as well as the term sammuti( = sa'f?1-vrtt~

Sn 897, 911). 'fhese, tberefore; arc the morał convencions of the world (loka,

laukilut, sec XXIV.6) that are pragmatic, yet contextual. Howevet, an ideał

mora! trutb caonot be suictly confined to a particular context. It needs to be

mote universał and compteheosivc. This, indeed, was the Kancian problem. If

Nagarjuoa was following the Buddha's solution to this problem (see comments

on XXIV.7), he couJd not have ignored the pragmatic component in the

universal morał principle formulated by the Buddha. A morał law that is incapable of accommodating any exceptions can be uttcily useless and even

hatrnful. As WilliamJames once remarked, "There is ałways a pinch between

the ideał and the actual which can only be got through by łeaving part of the

ideał bchind" ("Morał Philosophies and Morał Philosophers," in Essays in

Prag1natiJm, ed. Albury Castell, New York: Hafner, 1948. p . 78). This is

because the ideał is an abstraction out of the coocrece and, thetefore, needs to

be modified in the light of new concrete siruations.

Nagarjuna's statetnent "Without relying upon the conventional, the

ultimate.fruit is not expressed" (vyavahara1n aniiśn"tyaparamarlbo na deJyate),

expiains ooly a one-way relation, not a one-one relationship. He is not saying:

"Without relying upon the ultimate fruit, the conventional is not expressed."

Thus, he was rejecting a deontological morał principle cha• provides an absolute source of all morał ideas with no concessions made for individual or con-

. .

crete situations.

The second line emphasizes the need to have some undetstanding of that

mora! principle before one could think of attaining freedom (nir1iii11a).

However, it is possible to argue that this morał principle issue:i out of the Buddha's attainment of nitvana, aod that without attai~g nirvar,a one wiU noc be

in a position to understaod wbat chat principle means. Neither the Buddha nor

Nagarjuna would advocate such a position. lf ooe wcre to first attałą freedom

and then look for a morał ptinciple to account for ie, one c.ould sometim~ end

up in wayward fand es, utop1as, aod ballucina:tions. for this reasoo , .~oEXAMINAllON OFnrE NOBLE TRUTHS 335

underscanding of Jaf!Wrti (''worldly fruit, laukika artha) and, depending upon

that, gaining some knowłedge ofparamartha ("ułtimate fruit," lokuttara artha)

could serve as a guide for the attainment of freedom (niniiit1a). In the

Thefigatha we come across an iostance where a disciple claimed rhat he perceived che fauldess dhamma (addasat(' vira}a-f!l dhammat(') and the path co

freedom, while she was still !eading a household life (agarasmirp vasanfi 'ha11J).

Subsequently, she left the household life and attained freedom from all

dcfiłcmenc.~ (Thig 97 ff.) . It is true that the Buddha attained enlighcenment

and freedom by sheer accident. This is why he was reluccant co·tecognize any

teachcr (see M 1.171). Yet, before preaching about ie.to co the world , he spent

much time refleccing upon it, as a scientist continues to verify a discovery he has

made befoce making ie public. Nagarjuna probably assumed chat peopl.e could

have the beoefit ofthe Buddha's expcrience and not waste time experimenting

with practices that ~he Buddha hirnself fouod to be fruitłess (an-artha).

11. Vinaśayati durdu(ii 1Unyalii manda'fTJedhasat(',

sarpo yatha durgrmto vidya va du;prasadhita.

A wrongly perccived emptiness ruins a person of meager intelligence. lt is

lilcc a snakc th:at is wrongly graspcd or knowledge that is wrońgly

culrivared.

MA. 'V(P) p .495 ; .ł!KV(V) p.21 6.

Having explained the two truths, and establishing an important relationship

between the conveotional and the ideał , the particular and the universal.

Nagarjuna returns to the conception of "emptiness" (Jiinyata) that gave rise to

the met.aphysicians' problems. The abstracr-conception of emptincss (JUnyata,

reprcsenting an abstract noun}, derived from tbe experience of "che cmpty"

(śunya), could be as destructive andfatal as a wrongly grasped snake. How the·

emphasis oo the ideał and the universal to the utcer neglect of the panicular ot

the situational has wrought hav~c can be known tl)r9~gh a carcful and unbiased study of human bistory.

12. Ata.f ca pratyudii11rtta'!' cittarp deśayiluf!' munel/,

dharmatr1 mat11asytr dharmasya mandair duravagahalii-f!l.336 THE PHTLOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE WAY

Thus, the Sage's (the Buddha's) thought recoiled from teachlng the doctńne having reflected upon the difficulty of undemanding the doctrine

by peopłe of meager intelligence.

MKV(P) p.498: MKV(V) p.217.

This is a reference to the inddent related in the "Oiscourse on the Noble

Qu~st" (AriyapariyeJana-sutta, M 1.167-168) where the Buddba explains the

nature of his enlightenment as weU as the events immedia.rdy preceding and

succeeding his attainment of enlighteomeor. Niigarjuna could not have been

unawarc of the oature of the Buddha's eolighreoment as described in this

discourse and also the reasons for the Buddha's reluctance to preach the doc·

trine. The Buddha's statemcnt reads thus:

lt occurred to me monks: "This dhamma won by me is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understaod, tranquil, excellent, beyond a

ptiori reasoning, subtle, intelligible to the learned. But these

human bdngs arc delighting in obsessions (alaya)', delighted by

obsessions, rejoicing in obsessions. So tbat for the human beings

who are rejoicing in obsessions, delighted by obsessions and rejoicing in obsessions, this were a mattec difficult to see, that is to say,

dependent arising. This too were a matter difficult to sec, that

is to say, the appeasement of all dispositioos. the renunciation of all

auachmeot, the waning of craving, the absence of lust, cessation,

freedom. But ifI wete to tcach the dhamma and others were not to

understand me, that would be a weariness to me. that would be a

vexation to me.' (M 1.167)

This passage should dispel any doubts regarding the ·naru:re ofthe Buddha's

reasons for his ini~ial reluctance co preach. le was noc because of any intellectual

incapacity on the parr of the human beings, but mostly because of the emotional difficulties chey would have in brcaking away frorn the accepted theories

in which they have fouod safety and comfott, a sort of 'mooring' (alaya),

especiaHy in accepting a less absolutistic and fundament?Jly non-substantialist

(anatta) philosophy and a way of life. As iodicated above, the phrase used by

the Buddha to refer to the attitude of the human beings is alaya-ratii

("delighcing in alaya," where alaya is derived from 4 + Vli implying some

sort of mooring or obsession). Alaya represents an obsession for not only the

pleasure~ of sense, but aJso ideas, dogmas, theories, etc.EXAMINATION Of THE N OBI.E Th.UTHS

13. SUnyafiiyam adhilaya??t yaf!t puna'1 kurute bha11an,

dofa-prasańgo nasmakaf!t sa fiinye nopapadyate.

Furthermore, if you wece generate any obsession with regard to emptiness, the accompanying error is not ours. Thac [obsession] is not appropriate in the context of the empty.

MKV(P) pA99; MKV(V) p.21 7.

337

A.dhilaya has been rendered as "repeatedly refuced" (Inada, p.147). However,

the term is more closely related co alaya (see commentary onXXIV. 12) utilized

by the Buddha to refer to emotiooal attachment or obsession for views. Nagarjuna seems to be saying .chat the metaphysicians are generally fascinaced by

clear-cut and well-formed theories, abscract concepts, which they rcvere as

divine, while the concrete percepts are looked \.\pon as belonging to the brute

(see William James, Some Problems ofPhilosophy, p.34). This paves che way

fot an extremely important statement by Nagarjuna regarding śunyalii° a.ód

funya.

14. Sarvaf!t ca yujyate tasya śUnyata yasya yujyate,

sarvaf!t na yujyate tasya fUnya??t yasya na yujyate.

Everything is pertinent for whom empriness is proper: Everytbing is not pertinent for whorn the empty js not proper.

MKV(P) p.500; MKV(fl/ p.218.

This terse stacement of Nagarjuna, represencing an extremcły valu_?.b~e assessment ofthe two concepcs of"emp tiness" (śunyata) and "the empty" (funyaf!t),

can be comprehended only in t)le background of his previous statement (X:XIV.13). Ie is a cricicism of the absołucistic aod substantiaJist enterprise wherein

abstract concepts Jike "empciness" reccive a divine status thercby becorning

compatibłe wich anything and everything in human experience, like the

Platonie "forms". whcrcas any emphasis on the concrete leaves everything .338 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

banging in the air. Plato's "forms" . Spinoza's "substance", Vedanca "Brahman"

and Lao-czu's "Tao" - all these are fascinating abstract concepts that fit in with

everything. Even if one does not have to movc on to the ocher extrcme, as did

Hume with his "impressions". and the Sautrantikas with tbeir "atoms"

(paramaf!u). any recognition givcn ro the concrcte, to plwality, to the flux

tends to disrupt the sense ofsecurity one enjoys in a world of abscractions. The

Sarvascivadins raised objections against ''the cmpty" (fiinya)(XXIV. l-6) not

becaust there is an actual conflicc between the notion of "the empty" and the

theory of four truths, but because the cooception of "the empry" con.flicted

with their ootion of subsrance (s11abhava) which rhey were holding on to with

great enthusiasm. The faule, as Nagarjuna points out in the following verse, is

theirs.

15. Sa tva~ dofin atmaniyan 11Jmasu paripatayan,

aśvam evabhim"1ah sann aśam evasi 11ismrtah.

. . . .

You, acuibuting your own errors to us, ace like one who has mounted his horse

and confused about it.

MKV(P) p.502; A1KV(V) p. 218.

As mentioned previously (sec commenrs on XXIV.14), the problem faced by

the Buddhist metaphysicians was in regard to reconciling "the empty" (funja)

with che four noble truths. This was because they were explaining the four

truths in relation to the oorion of substance (svabhava) and the notion of

subsrance d early cooflicted with the concept of "the empty." lf Nagarjuna had

mercly reJied upon the abstra.cc concept of "empciness'1' (fUnyafii), ignoring

"the cmpty" (fiinja) , the Buddhist metaphysicians w<Śuh:ł not have run into

difficułti es, for "cmpciness," being the abstract concept could easily be reconciled with the notioo of subscance. As such, the p.coblem was created by the

metaphysicians when they emphasized the non-empirical "substance'' to the

ncglect of the empirical phenomena, as is dearly evident from Nagarjuna's

statement that follows. Nagarjuna was, therefore, reminding them thac they

wece riding their owo horse wichout reaJizing it.

16. Svabha11'(itlyadi bhav'iina~ sad-bhavam anupaśyasi,

ahętu-pratyay'iin bhiva~ 1vam evaf?Z sati paiyasi.EXAM!NATION OF THE NOBLE TRUTH·s

Ifyou pccceive che exisrence of the existents in terms ofself-nature, then

you will also perceive these existents as non-causa! conditions.

MKV(P) p.502: MKV(V} p.219.

339

For Nagarjuna, any existcnt is a causally conditioned existcnt. Such an existent

is clearly imcompatible with a self-nature or substance, che łat ter being permancnt and etefual by definition. This would mean that Nagarjuna's conception

of "cmptioess" (funyata) does not partake of any such characreriscics. Eveo

though "empriness" and "sclf-nature" are borh abstractions from conctete experiences, Nagarjuna woułd continue to maintaio the pcimacy ofsuch concrete

expericnces, which are "che empty," and insist that "emptiness" is dependent

upon "the empty." while the meraphysicians would consider sclf-nature to be

independent, thereby divorcing it from the concrete.

17. KJirya'f!l ca karar,at?J C111°11a kanara?'!' kara'f!tlf?J krifit?J,

utp1ida'f!l ca nzrodhat?J ca phalaf!J ca pratilfiidhase;

You will also contradict [the norions of] effccc, cause, agent, pctfoanance

of action, activity, arising, ceasing, as weU as fruit.

MKV(P) p.503: MKV(V} p.21 9,

How the recogrunon of self-narure (svabhava) contra4icts all forms of empiricaJ knowledge, knowledge recognized by the Buddha relating to dependent

arising, morał behavior (karma), and responsi biłity (karma-phala), has already

been explained in detai l in the numerous chapters that precede. Herc Nagarjuna is simply summarizing all his conclusions.

18. Yal; parfi1yasamu1p{idqf? funyat1it?J laf!' praca/qmahe,

s1i prajnaptir upadiiya pratipat sai1Ja madhyami.

We state tbat whate"er is dependent arising, tfult is emptiness. Trun is

dependent upon convcntion. That itsclf is the middle path.

MKV(P) p.503; MKV(V) p.219.340 T"HE PHllOSOPHY OF TiłE MIDDLE wAV

Thece see.ms to be no other staccmcnt of Nagacjuna more conuovecsiaJ than

this one. An cntirc school of Chinese Buddhism emerged as a rcsulc of the intcrprctatioo (or misintcrpretation) of this verse, [sec Hajime Nakamura, "Tbc

Middle Way and the Empcincss View," Journal of Buddhist Philosophy, ed.

Richard S. Y. Chi. (Indiana University, Bloomingtoo , Indiana,) l

(1984):81-1 ll].

In the first line, Nagarjuna is prescnting an equation: Dependent arising

(pralityasamutpada) is "emptincss" (fUnyata). Jnada's rendering of this line is

an improvement on Nakamura's, since che lactcr assumes that herc there is a

reference to the evcnts (op. cit. , p.81), racher tban the principle in terms of

whicb the events arc explained. As emphasizcd earlier, "dependent arising"

and "emptiness" arc abstract concepts derived from concretc empirical evcnts,

"the dcpendently arisen" G"ralitya.ramutpanna) and "the cmpty" (1iinya)

respcctivcly. Unless this relationship between the abstract and the concrete is

clearly obscrved , the incerpretacion of the second line of the verse will remain

for evcr obscure , as scems to have happened since Nagarjuna composed this

ueat1se.

The second line refers to the middle patb (madhyama pratipat). The question is: In wbat way cao dependent arising and empciness, which arc

synonymous, represent a middle path? The answer to this question is in the

statement , sa prajnaptir upadiiya.

If this phrase wece to be transłated as, "It is a provisional oame" (Inada,

p. 148) or as "That is a temporary dcsignation" (Nakamura, p.81 ), which arc

standard uanslacions offered by most schołars, chen in che explanacioo of

dependent arising and emptincss one will be committed either to an extreme

form of oominalism or a sirniliarlyextremisc absolutism. Io such a case, dependent arising or emptincss would either be a mere descripcion wich no basis ln

cognitive expcricnce or it would be an cxperience that is ineffabk. The former

alternacivc would conflict wich everything Nagarjuna was trying to esrablish,

narody, the reality of atising and ceasing, of human behavior, etc.

(XXIV16-l7). The latcer alternative would rendcr any philosophic.al enterprise

meaninglcss and would uodermine Nagarjuna's asscrtioo ac XXIV. 10.

Taking Jaf?Z11fh: 11ya11ah"iira, and prajiiapti as synonyms, as was intended by

the Buddha bimself (D 3.202), and considering the contexts in which Naga rjuna was using the terms saf?Zvrti and 11ya11ahara (XVlI.24; XVTV.6,8)- namely, in relation to discussions ofworldly conventions, the most importaot among

them being good and bad, dhartnalariharma (and this sense is caprured by Inada' s own translatioo of saf?Zvrti and 11yavahara, see p. 146)- it would be more

appropriate to chacacterize both "dependent arising" and "empciness" as being

the universal truths rather chan ahso/uJe truths. This would mean that bothEXAMJNATION OF THE N OBLE TutrrHS 341

saf!Jvrti (and, therefore, 11ya11ahara and prajflaptt) and paramartha arc

"thought conscructions" founded on experience. As such, chey are not absolutely rea.I or absolucely unreaJ. This, then , wou.ld be the midd.le position

(v1adhyama pratipat). Tb is middle path could be adopced in understanding all

forms of experience, whether they be Lioguistic, social, political, ·rnora1 , or

religious. Whiłe a1J convencions, whether chey be situational (saf!Zvrti) or ideał

(para11Jiirtha), are expłained in terms of dependent arising, the conceptioo of

"the empty'' (sunya) eliminates che absolutistic sting at the level of the situational , and "empciness" does so ac che level of the uoiversał. (See comments on

XXlV.19 that foJłows.)

19. Apraliya-samutpanno dharmaf? kafcin na vidyate,

yasmat /(ZJmad aiunyo hi dharmal/-kafcin na vidyate.

A thing chat is not dependently arisen is not evident. For thac reason, a

thing that is non-empty is indeed not evident.

MKV(P) p .505; MKV(V) p.220.

After clarifying the oaturc of che universal cooventions, Nagarjuoa recurns to

the situational. for it was this lacter chat caused problems for the metaphysicians. The metaphysicians realized that "the dependently arisen"

(pra/ity(ZJamutpanna), so long as it is considered to be "the empty'' (fiinya),

conflicted wich their nocion ofsubscance (svabhava). Therefore, they were looking for "the dependencly arisen" that is not empty of substance.

However, for Nag:trjuna, substance (svabhava) is not dependently arisen

(XV.2). A thing that is not depcndently arisen is not evidenr. Thcrefore, a

substance is also noc evident. A substance bcing non-empty, the absence of a

substance woułd mean the absence of the non-empty (a-fUnya).

This is a elear and unequivocaJ denial of substance (svabhava), of the nonempty (a-funya) and of the in-dependent (a-prafftyasamutpanna). and. the

assertion of the non-subscantial (nil/-svabhiiva), the empty (sunya) and the

dcpcndently arisen (praffty~amutpanna). In the hope of being an absolule

non-ahsolutist, if someone were to propose chat both alternatives- svabhava

and nil/svabhava, aiunya and Junya, aprafftyasamulpanna and prafityaramul·

panna- are crue (or false), the empiricistN:igarjuna, following che Buddha (Sn342 THE PHJLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

884) would insist that only one of these ałternacivcs is crue (ekaf{l hisaccaT(J).

and not the second (na dutiya'!J). This means chat neither the Buddha nor

Nagarjuna could be characterized as absolutiscs.

However, if the two alternatives were to be two metaphysical altcrnatives,

then both the Buddha and Nagarjuna would be compelled to ncgacc them.

Takco out of context, wabhiiva and nzf/11111bhii11a could appear as mccaphysicaJ

alternacives. So could a!unya and filnya. Yct, apralitya.samutpanna and

pralitya.samutpanna, as understood by the Buddha and Nigarjuna, could not

be easily coo-.:ened to metaphysiall alceroatives. The reasoo for this is that the

termpralityasamutpanna, beiog a past parcic~ple, does not refer strictly to any one

tempora! experience, whcther it bclo_ngs to the past, present or future, nor does

it traoscend ternporality altogether. Whil_e it has a present connotacion, it is not

divorccd from the pasc. lt i~ . therefore, a term most appropriately used to

describe the events perceived by the Buddha through his "knowiedge of things

as they have come to be" (yathabhuta-fiii'la) . lt refers to the events experiencep

in the so-całled "spedous present" (see comments on XIX.4).

lt is this empiricistprajnapti that servcs as a corrcctive to any propos3.I which

would turn either pralityasaf!Jutpada or śunyata into an absolute truth , ineffable and a-tempora!. lt is, indeed, the philosophical middle path referred co at

XXIV. 18 and the Buddha's discourse to Karyayana.

20, Yady afunyam idatp. saroam udayo na.Ili na vyayal;,

catu"Jam iiryasalyiiniim abha11as te pra.rajyate.

Ifall this is non-cmpty, there exists no uprising and ceasing. Thcsc imply

the non-cxistencc of the four noble truths.

MKV(P) pp.505-)06; MKV(V) p.220.

By rescuing the philosophical middle pach from aoy absolutistic or substantialist incerpretation, Nagarjuna has sec the foundation for the explanation of

the Buddha's doctrine of che four noble truths. The facts of arising and ceasing

arc central to the fouc noble uuchs. lf tbere ever has been a permanenc enticy,

an encity that is noc empty of a subsrance. then dependence as wdl as the four

noble truths would have been falsified. No such entity has been discovered so

far. Hence the four truths have remained valid.Ex.J\MINATION Ol' THE NOBLE TRUTHS

21. Aprafftya-samutpannaf!Z kuto duł/khat!' bhavir.Jati,

anityam uktaf!J dul,khaf!J hi :at sviibhiivye na vidyate.

How can there be suffering that is not dependently arisen? Suffedng has,

indeed, bccn described as impermanent. As such, it is not evident in

tcuns ofself-nature.

MKV(P) p.506; MKV(V) p.220.

Nigarjuna is herc: returnjng to the interpretation of suffering by the substantialist metaphysicans (sec comments on XXIV.l), who held that suffering exists

in terms of self-nature. He is reminding che metaphysicians that the Buddha's

conception of suffering is founded not onły on the idea of dependent arising

but also the notion of impermanence. Io face, the perversion regarding the notion of impermanence is aJso the cause of che perversion regarding the concepcion of suffering (sec comments on XXIII. l).

22. Svabhiivalo vidyamanaf!' Ju°r!J puna!? samude1yate,

tas1'!iiit samudayo n'iisti funyafiif!''P,r,atibadhatal/.

How can that which is evident ih ~euns of self-nature risc again?

Therefore, for one who contradicts cmptiness, there exists no [conception

of] arising.

M.KV(P) p .506; M.KV(V) p .221.

Throughout the treatise, Nigarjuna was refusing to recognize that the conception of self-nature or substance leaves any room for the recognition of arising

and ccasing. This was contcary to the attempr on the part of the metaphysicians. Nigarjuna is herc insisring that the conception of arising (samudaya)

makes no sense at all when applied to self-oature.

Self-nature is not something that comes and goes. lt is oot 20 occutreoce. lt

is thece for ever. As such. it contradicts the theory of emptiness which is intendcd to explain the occuuencc of cvents. Empciness, as ment:iooed earlier

(XXIV. 18), is synonymous with "dependent arising."344 THE PHJ(QSOPHY OF THE MIDDll WAY

23. Na nirodhaf? 1vabhii11l!11a Jato duf?khasya vidyate,

1vabhavaparya11a1thaniin nirodhaf!t pratt'badhiise.

The cessation ofsuffering that exists in terms ofself-nacure is not evidenr.

You conttadict ccssation by adhering to a notion of self-nature,

MKV(P) p.507; MKV(V) p. 221.

Just as the notion of self-nature conuadiccs the idea of arising, it also renders

che conception of cessacion meaningless. Note the cmphasis on the present participle, santa (left untranslated by lnada, p. 149), used in relation to duf?kha,

implying "suffering that exists" in terms ofself-nacure. The notion of exiscence

defined in this manner has already been criticized by Nagarjuna (1.6). In effect

Nagarjuna is saying thac the nocioo of exiscence (sat) may be compatible with

che conception of self-oature, but ie is not appropriate io the context of "chat

which has come to be" (bhuta).

24. Svabhavye sati m'iirgasya bhavanii nopapadyate,

ath'iisau bh'iivyate m1irgaf? 1viibhavya1?J te na vidyate.

When self-narure exists, the cuJtivation of the path is not appropriace.

And i.f che path wece to be cultivated, tben no self-nature associated with

it [i.e., the path] woułd be evident.

M.KV(P) p. 507; MKV(V) p.221.

The priociple of sclf-nature (svii.bhiivya, noce the use of the absuact noun instead of svabhiiva) explaios the way in which self-nature funcri~ns . !hus, if

somechings are assumed co have self-nature , whac is assumed is that chings happen on cheir own (svo bhavo) without the support of anything else. la tbis

sense, chey arc independent. If rhe pach (marga) Jeading to che ccssacion of suffcring (duf?kha) were to be explained in cerms of self-narure, ie means chac che

way will work out on its own , wichouc any effort on the part of one who is expecced to cultivate it. If one is expected ro cułtivate the pach, it means chat one

has to make an effort. Ie does not happen auromatically.EXAMINATION OF 'rHE NOBIE TRUTI-łS

25. Yadii dul/ka'fP samudayo nzrodhaś ca na 11idyate1

miirgo duf?kha-ntrodhatvat k.atamal/ prapayz'!yati.

When suffering as well as its arising and ceasing are not evident, through

the cessation of suffering where will the path lead to?

MKV(P) p.508i MKV(V) p.221.

345

Insisting upon the recognition of self-nature, the metaphysicians were compelłed to deny the fact ofsuffering as well as its arising and ceasing. lt would,

therefore, be meaningless to speak of a path leading to the cessation of suffering. Substancialist speculation leaves only two ałternatives: either there is cessatióo of suffering or there is no cessation of suffering. If the fact is that there is .

cessacion ofsuffedng (dul;kha-nirod/;atva). thtre is no room for a path. It happeos in any case. If the fact is that there is no cessation ofsuffering, then it is

meaningless to think of a path. FaraJism being the consequence of both standpoints, the notion of a path Jeading to any goal is rendered uttetly meaningless.

26. Svabhavenapatijnanaf!' yadi tasya puna!/ kathaf!',

parijnanaf!' nanu kila svabliiivaf? samava.rthitalf.

lfnon-undetstanding is due to self-nature, how can one come to possess

understanding subsequendy. Is it not the case that self-nature is fu:ed?

MKV(P) p .508; MKV(V) p.222.

lnada's rendering of nanu kzla svabhavaf? samavasthital/ as "self.nature, in·

deed, oever re.mains fixed," seems to be based upon a rnisuoderstaoding of

the impon of the particie nanu which simiJly means: "is it not the case that,"

rather chan a simplc negacion. If self-oarure is something that "never re·

ma.ins ftxed," what we ate presented here is the so-całled Spinozao solution

to the problem ofsubstance. Nagarjuna was not willing to accept such an interpretation of self-nature, for if self-narure were understood as changing,

the whole purpose of formulating the notion ofself-natute by the substan-346 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

tialists would be defeated. Therefore, he was simply asking the question; "Is

it not the case that self-narure is fixed?" He is, io fact, insiscing that if ie ~~

not fixcd, ie is not a self-nature. A change of subst.aoce was, io the eyes of

Nagarjuna, a self-conuadiction.

Hence he argues: If there is any inabili:cy to understand suffering because

such ioability is inherent, is through self-pacure, then there can never be ics

underscand:ing. Something chat is inherently uoknowable can oever be

subsequently known. Thiś is the most telliog criticism of self-nacure

(wabha1111) as it is employed in the explanation of the path to freedom

(niniiif!a).

27. Praha„a-iiikfatk.ara'!e bliii1111na caivam eva te,

ptmjłfiivan na yujyante catv'iiry apiphaliini ca.

As in the case of understanding, this [i.e., the explanation in terms of

self-oature] is not proper in relation to the activities of relinquishing,

realizing as well as cultivating. And so would the four fruits be [improper).

MKV(P) p.509; MKV(V) p.222

An uoderscanding (parijłfii) of the nature of suffering (duf?kha) is a necessary

prerequisite for its relinquishing , the reaJizaciotJ of freedom , and che cultivation of the path leading to freedom. In the previous verse, Nagarjuna ex·

plained how a belief in self-nature would create difficulties in explaining

understanding (parijmi) or its absence (apanjfia).

The same di.fficulries are associated with the explanation of the relinquishing

(praha1'!t1) of suffering, the realization (s'iikfatkara11a) of frc~dom and che

cultivation (bhivanii) of the path. To highlight these difficulties, Nagarjuna

concentratcs on the fruits or consequeoces (phala).

28. Svabhaveniidhigata'l'(t yaJ phala'l'(t tal puna!? kathar(t,

śakya1'(t samadhigantu1'(t sy'iit svabhava'l'(t parigrh11ataf?.

How could it be possible for a person, who upholds a theory of self-Exł.MINATlON OF THE N OBT.Jl TRUTHS

nature, to realize a fruit that bas already becn realized through self-·

nature?

MKV(P) p . ~10; MKV(VJ p.222 .

347

A person betieving in self-oatwe aJso admits that a fruit is obtained by that

means. lf a fruit has not been achieved through sdf-nature it can never be

achieved in any ocher way. lt is an either/or situation. Accept it as occurring on

its own or it will never occur. This is a substantiatist view of frcedom (nirvaf!a ,

which will be taken up for detailed treatment by Nigarjuna later on). This, indeed, is a fatalistic or a deterministic explanation of causality. Either the effect

exists in the cause or it does not (see discussion of artha [ = phala) at 1.6).

29. Phaliibhave phalaslha no na stfntipralipannaktil?,

saf?i.gho nas# na cet santi te '1tau puntfa-pudgaliil?.

In tbe absence of the fnilts, tbere arc neither tbose who have attained the

fruits nor those who have reached the way [to sucb attainmeot]. If the

eight types of indivjduals do not exists, there will be no congregation.

30 . Abh'?ivac carya-saty'iinaf!1- sadt/harmo 'pi na vidyate,

dharme casati .sa1{'ghe ca kathl#(J- buddho bhavi$yati.

From the non-existeoce of the noble truths, the truc doctrine would also

not be evident. In tbe absence of tbe doctrine and the congregation, how

can there be an enlightened one?

MKV(P) p .)10; MKV(V) p.222.

Having shown that the explanation of the attainment of the frui~ (phala) of

life is rendered i mpossible or meaningless by the adhetence to the ootioo of

self-nature, Nagarjuna rurns the table on the metaphysiciąns, showing them

how the denial of emptiness (iiinyatii), rather thąn itS assertion, leads to a

denjaJ of all that they wece trying to explain.348 THE PHILOSOPHY Ol' i HE MIDDLE WAY

31. Aprafilfiipi bodh~ ca la11a buddhaf? prasafyate,

aprafi1yapi buddhatiJ ca ta11a bodhif? pra.JajytTte.

Your [conceprion of the] enlightened one implies an independent

enligbtenment. Also, your [conception of] enlightenment implies an independent 'enlighcened one.

MKV(P) p.510; MKV(V) p.223.

Explained in terms ofself-narure, the enli~htened one would be so irrcspeccive

of conditions (apratyaya). Similarly, enl]ghrenment would be achieved irrespective of whether it is a person who makes an effort or not. This substantialist cxplanation ofenlightenment and the eolightened one, in terms chat arc

strictly naturalistic or deterministic, wou ld rendet the activities of the one seeking enlighteoment and freedom utterly meaningless.

32. Yaf cabuddaf? svabhavena sa bodhaya gha{ann api,

na bodhi.sat111a-caryayfi1!1 bodhi1!1 te 'dhigamifytTti.

Wh~oevet is by sclf-nature unenlightened, even though he were to contend with enlightcnment, woold not attain enlightenment thtough a

career off a bodhlsattva.

MKV{P) p . 511~ MKV(V) p.223.

This is the one and only time Nagarjuna, the so-callcd pauon of Mahayaoa,

rcfcrs to the way (caryQ) of a bodhi.sall11a. Yet, the kind of criticism he is prcsenting herc offers no consolacion to those who accept cercain docrrines of

popular Mahayana. Any substaotiaJist theory, according to Nagarjuna's view,

militates against the ca.(eer ofa bodhisattva.

To uphold che view chat a person is by narure u ncnlightencd is taotamount

to saying chat he can never attain the fruit of eolighteruncnt and frecdom by

excrting himself. Sir:Qiłarly, to assert che view chat a person is by narure

enlighccncd, is a potential buddha, or possesses a bodht~citta, makes the attainmcot of enłightenm.ent meaningłess (XXIV.28) or impossible.EXAMINATION OF THE N OBLE TRUTHS

This, indeed. is reminiscient of the long drawn controvcrsy between the Sar4

vastivadins and the Sautrantikas regarding tbe oarure as wcU as the functioning

of good (kusa/a = dharma) or bad (akusala = adharma) thoughts (citta). The

metaphysical problems generated by an extremist analysis in rclation to

phenomena in generał have been explained in Chapters I and Il. The selfsame

metaphysical problems appeared in the explanatioo of moraJ phenomeoa. The

Sarvastivada-Sautrantika controversy relating to the "seed,s that arc of good

nature" (kusa/a-dharma-bija) reflects their iovolvement in sucb mt"taphysical

1SSUCS.

The atomiscic (and, therefore, noo-empirical) analysis of thought (citta) led

the metaphysicians to assume a sharp distinction not ooly becween good

thoughts (kusala-cilta) and bad cho_ughts (t1kusala~citta), but also betw~eo iodividual moments of thought in cach series. whether they be of good thoughts

or bad thoughcs. As such, severa] questions carne to be raised: How does one

good .thought moment givc risc to another similar thought mąment? How can

two different thought moments, one which is good and the ocher which is bad,

co-exist in one moment, especially when they are ·distinct as light and darkness

(7iloka-Jamas, see Adv p .170)? If they cannot co-exist, how can a bad thought

moment give rise to or be followed by a good thought? While the Sarvascivadins urilized the cooceprions ofprapti and aprapli to explain the manner of their occurrence, the Sautrantikas employed the notion ofseed (liija) to

elucidate these problems.

The substantialist Sarvastivadins, who adhered to a oocion of self-nature

(svabhava) were compdled to maintain thac cach vari~ry of thought has its

own-nature, Yet, when they were called upon to explain the occurrencc or nonoccurrence ofgood or bad choughts in an iodividual person's stream of chought

(sa1{Jtana). they asswned that the non-attainment (apriiplt) of one kind of

thought could make room for the accainmeot (pr7ipti) of another kind . The

Sautrantikas, rejecting the noc:ion ofself-nature, emphasized the idea of potentiality (Jaktt) exiscing in che form of seed (bija). Thus, when a good thought

moment occurs, the bad tbought moment can remain latent without

manifesc.ing itself. Tbus, we are left with two potencialicies, one manifescing

itself when the other is not. The terms iak11: bija, and 11iisafla werc all

employed to cefer to such pocenciality.

A discioction carne to be admitted not ooly between good (kusa/a) and bad

(akwala), but also among the good seeds themselves. Thus, chere arc defiled

good secds (sairava-kusala-blja) ·and non-defilcd good seeds (aniifrave-kusala-

/iija), the former accou.oting for worldly goodness and the latter leading to

frccdom (11irva11a). These sceds werc considered to be extrcmely subtłe

(susuk/ma) and remain uocor~pted or undestroyed (na ramudghiila). They

were compared co gołd (kaflcana). A popular stacemenc runs thus:350 THE PHllOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

I perceive his exuemely subtle seed of release lik~ a seam of gold

coocealed in a deft ofelemeotal rocks. (Mo,~,fa-bzjam ahaf?I hy asya

S1'st1k1mam upa/alqaye, dhtitu-p1i1fi'!a-vi11are niliam żva kaflcanam,

Sakv p. 644, see alsoJaini, Ad11 Introduction, p.116.)

Even though this substantialist view is attributed to tłie Buddha himself (see

Jaini, loc cit.) on the basis of the Buddha's statement tigarding the "luminous

thought" (pabh(IJsar(,lf?Z citlaf?Z), we have already provided evidence to the contrary (see Inuoduction), where thought is comp;ued with "gold-ore" (iiita-!'Upa)

rather thao with gołd (suva1111a). As such, oeither..cJ.le theory of the "seeds of

celease" (moksa-bija) nor of the "originally pure mind" (prakrti-prabhtisvaracżtta), which is a predecessor, the Mahayana notion of a bodhi-citta, can be

reconciled with the Buddha's conception of\ non-substanciality (anatta) or

Nagarjuna's view of "emptiness (śunyafii) . The present statement of Nagarjuna is a elear rejection of the substantialist standpoiot of the later interpreters,

which represents a recurrent desire to go back to a pn'ttzordial source.

33. Na ca dharmam adharmaf?Z va kaścijjiitu kan/yatz~

kim afunyasya /<.arta11ya7(t svab6aval/ knyate na hi.

No one will, indeed, do good or bad. What could the non-empty do?

foc, self-nature does not perform.

M.KV(P) p.511 ; MKV(v,i p.223.

Inada, once again. renders the terms dharma and adhamta as factoJs and non~

factors of experience, thereby reacling moce ontołogy than axiology inco the

statement of Nagarjuna. Ą substantialist ioterpretation of good and bad a.llows

no room for their cultivation or performance. If someone; is good in terms of

self-nature, he does not have to 'perform the good; ir is simply there. SimiJarly

with bad. Self-nature (svabhava) implies absolute existence (sad-bhava), not

occurrcnce (sa'f(tbhava, XXIV.22).

34. Vinii dh11rmam 11dhPrmll'f!Z ca pha/af!> pi t411fl vidyate,

dhar~dharma-nimillaf!J "Ca pha"1'f(t lava na vżdyale.EXA.MINATION OF THE N OBLE TRUTHS

As for you, the fruit would be evident even without good or bad. Tbis

means that for you a fruit occasioned by good and bad would not be evident.

MKV(P) p.512 ; MKV(V) p.223 .

351

The consequence of upholding a nocion ofself-narure in morał philosophy are

explicated herc. If good and bad were to be explained in terms of self-nature or

substance, then thete would be goodness and badness "in themselves." These

woułd always be existent. A fruit, if it were ~o arise at aU. from a good action

will ahvays be good and. as such , chere would be identity of cause and effect

(sec Chapcer I). If a good action were to lead to a bad consequence, ie wouJd

not matter at all, as ie is assumed to be the case with, for example, "good-wiU."

This ootion of inrriosic good or bad would render the concept of a cause (nimitta) almost meaningless.

35. Dharmadharma-nimittatrt va yadi le vidyate phala.1?1,

dharmadharma-sa1nutpannam aiunya1{' te ka1ha1{' phalatrt.

If, on the contrary, a fruit occasioned by good or bad is evidcnt to you1

how can you maintain the fruit that has arisen from good or bad to be [at

the samctimeJ non-empty?

J.1.KV(P) p.512; MKV(V) p.223 .

Thus, Nagarjuna insists that rnorał discourse and a subsrancialist world-view arc

incompatible. If something is good by nacure, good in terms of self-narure,

good in itself, chen it musc be always good. Ir cannot be otherwise. Such an absolutistic theory will fail to accommodate some individual or panicular siruations tbat arc in conflict with the theory, but which would cectaioly be valid in

certain concexrs. This was a serious defect in the absolutistic cheory. as explain·

ed by Nagarjuna in the following verse.

36. Sarva-sa1{'vyt111ah'iir'iif?1f ca laukiliiin pratibiidha.re,

yaJ prafttyasamutp'iida-funyaliif!J pratibadhase.3~2 THE PHlLOSOPHY OF TH E M IDOLE WAY

You will contradict all the worldly conventions when you contradict the

empciness associated with dependent arising.

MKV(P) p.)13; A-fKV(V) p .224.

This, ooce again, bighlights the significant rełationship betwcen worldly conventions, that arc siruatiooal or contexrual and the prindple of dependent arising which, as explained earlier, is a univeĆsal. The only way che universal can

accommodate the siruational is when the universal is not looked upon as corresponding co an "ultimace reaLiry." The subsrantialists who assumed that there

is an ultimace reaJiry, rherefore, were faced wich all the insoluable mecaphysics.

Thus the actual function of emptiness is the ełiminarion of this substancialist

sring (see commcnts on XXIV.18).

37. Na kartavya'f!J. bhavet ki7{1-cit anarabdha bhavet kriyii,

karakal? sjiid akuniiirtalJ JUnyataf?Z pratibadhataf?.

For one who contradicts emptiness thece would be nothing that ought to

be done; accivity would be uninitiated and an agent would be nonacnng.

MKV(P) p.513; MKV(V) p.224.

The unfortunate consequences of upholding a subsrantialist theory and denying empciness arc listed herc. lncerestingly, all of them percain co human

behavior and moral responsibiliry. This says much abouc che concerns of

Nagarjuna, who by popular acclaim is more a logician primarily concerned with

language and truch and therefore with ułcimate reality , rather tban a mora!

philosopher iotecesred in axiołogy and, for thar reason, emphasizing the conception of "u łtimate fruit." He is supposed to have scorned aoy specułation

about human behavior (karma), wbat human behavior oughr ro be (kartavya),

and who a responsibile human agent (kurvarJa) is.

In brief, a substantialist view leads co a denial of ~he human element fu ncrional in this w.orłd, an element that is generally described as "disposition"

(saT(lskara). Not only does it negate the world condicioned by human disposirions (i.e., the saT(l.!krta), ie also denies any activiry and creativiry in the natura!

world (sec XXIV.38 that follows).EXAMINATION OFTH!; NOBLE TRUTH~

38. Afiitam aniruddhartt ca ku{astha11} ca bhavi!yati,

vicitr'iibhir avasthabhz}f svabhave rahita11} }agat.

In a substantialist view, the universe will be unborn, oon-ceased, remainlng immutable and devoid of variegated states.

MKV(P) p.513; MKV(V) p.224 .

353

The assumption of a substance (svabhava) would depri.ve the natura! world , the

world of dependent arising, of all che variety (vicitra) and freshness and leave it

sterile and unproduccive. This, indeed, is the Buddha's criticism of erernalism

(sassata-diffht) when he maintained t hat according to rhis view the self and the

world are sterile, immovable, and remaining stable like a pillar," (D J.14; S

3.202, 21 1, etc„ yatha sassato atta ca loko ca vanjho ku{tiffho esikauhayz't{hito):

39. Asarnpraptasya ca praptir duf?kha-paryanta-karma ca,

sarva-kleśa-praha17a11J. ca yady afunya11J. na vidyate.

If the non-empty [is evident], then reaching up to what has not been

reached , the act oft'crminating suffeńng as well as the reunquishing ofall

defilemenrs would not be evident.

MKV(P) p .51); MKV(V) p.225.

The substantialist view would oot onły negate the world decermined by human

dispositions (sa11}skrta) and che naruraJ world of dependent arising

(prafitysamutpanna), but also the ideał world , che world of freedom. Niryana

would remain inexplicabłe in the context of a substantialisc world-view. This is

che subject maccer of the next chapcer. Before proceeding to explain freedom,

Nagarjuna has a quotation from the Buddha (XXIV.40).

40. Yaft prafityasamutpadarrt P<lśyatida'f!l sa paśyati,

dul?kha11} sa1n.udaya1(l caiva nirodha'f?J margam eva ca.354 THE PHJLOSOPHYOFTHE MIDDLE WAY

Whoevcr pcrceives dependent arising also pcrceives suffering, its arising,

its ceasing and the path (łeading to its ceasing].

MKV(P) p.515; MKV(V) p.225.

The Buddha maintained chat he who pcrceives dependenc arising pcrceivcs the

dhamma (M 1.190·191; Chung 7.2 [Tairho l.467a}. Perceiving dependent aris·

ing is not mcrely perceiving "things as they have come co be" (yath'iibhuta), but

also seeing how a human being placed in such a context of dependent arising

experiences suffering (dul/kha); what causes such suffering; what kind of

freedom can be attained and what the path is that leads to the attainmcnt of

freedom and cmancipacion. Dependent arising and the four noble truths arc,

therefoce, the foundations on which the whole edifice called Buddhism is built.

Any school of Buddhism chat refuses to recognizc the centralicy of these doc·

uines would loose its claim to be a legitimate pan of that tradition. These con·

stitute the truths chat Nigarjuna was attemptiog to explicatc in che pcesent

chapter.CHAPTER

TwEN1YFIVE

Examination of Freedom

(Nirvar;,a~partk!ti)

l. Yadi śunyam idarp. sarvam udayo niistina vy4Jal/,

praha„ad va nirodhad va karya nirvaf!am i!ya.te.

If all tłUs is empty, there eństs neithec arising nor ceasing. [As such,]

through the relinquishing and ceasing of what does one expect freedom?

MKV(P) p.'.>19; MKV(V) p.227.

Even though some·of the problems rdating to freedom (nittlaf'!a) have al.ready

been discussed in the context ofa tathagata (Chapter XXII) and the four noble

truths (Chapter XXIV), Naga.rjuna singles out this topie for further analysis,

especially in view of certain grave misconceptions that emerged as a resuJt of a

substantialist world-view. Without making any attempt to determine what

these metaphysical views were, many a scholar has plung.ed himselfinro assertions about Nagarjuna's coaception offreedom and produced views that arc no

less metaphysical than those rejected by Nagaijuna.

The present verse 6cplains the di.fficulties the metaphysicians, who acceptcd

substantial phenomena, cxpeticnced when they attempted to elucidate

freedom. While the ptcvious chapter dealt with the problems the substantialists faced when they accepted a notion ofself-nature and tried to accountfor

che four noble t.ruths, especially the empirical fact of sliffering (duf?kha). the

present context Nagarjuna is primacily concerned with the question offreedom

from suffering. The substantialist dilemma herc would be: How can freedom

(niniiin.a) be explained, if the conception of empciness is ucilized not only to

explain the empiricaJ fact of~suffering but also to elucidate ninii'!a) which,

even though described as the cessation ofsufferiog (du~kha-nirodha), was also

the uJtimace or absoluce reality.

After deoying any substance (111aóhava) in the conventiona! or the contextuał

(11yav11hara). if Nagarjuna had not proceeded to extend that denial to the ideał

(p11ramiirtha), the substantialist could have remained silen.t. Hbwever, when

Nagarjuna univetsaJ.ized "the empty" (i#njll) by saying "aJJ this is empty" (IllT:

3)5356 THE PHJtOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE WAY

vam idaf(J fUnyatrJ)- and that included the substantialiscs' conception of

"ultimate reality" (poramiirtha) understood in various ways, either as "atomk

reality" (parama11u) or the "seed of rdease" (rnok,a-liija) or the "originally

pure thought" (prakrt1:prabhasvarr1-citta)(see XXIV.32)-he was rhreatening

the very foundation of substantialist metaphysics. In the next cwenty-three

verses, Nagarjuna proceeds to demolish that foundation.

2. Yady af unyam z'da17J saroam udayo nfisti na vyayaf!,

prahar(iid va nirodhiid va kasya ntNiiit?am l!Jdle.

'

lfall this is non-empty, thete exists neithecarising nor ceasing, [As such,]

through relinquisrung and ceasing of what does one expect freedom?

MKV(P) p.521; MKV(V) p.227.

As in the previous chapter, it is because of his preference for an empiricai explanation of things in terms of arising and ce~ing (udaya.vyaya) _that Nagarjuna is not willing to accept a mctaphysical substaQce. Hence his argument that

relinquishing (praha11a) a.nd ceasing (nirodha) are meaningless in the contcxt

of the ''non-empty" (afiinya). Thus, for Nagarjuna, the non-cmpiricaJ view is

the one expressed in the form , "All this is non-empty (sarvam idam afUnyatrJ) ,

rather chan .the view presented as "AU this is empty" (sarv(lm ida?(l fUn.:;af!l) . If,

on the i:ontrary , the substanti.µists were to accept the empirical phenomena to

be empty, but noc.ni rvaf!a, srill Nagarjuna could ask the question: lf nif'tl(Zf!a is

a permaoenr and eternal substance, why talk of arising and ceasing, relin•

quishing and abandoning. for suffering (duf?kha) or defilements (kiesa) that

need to be relinquished actually do not affect the originally pure existence?

For Nagarjuna and the Buddha, neither the empirical events nor the

ułtimate fruit wece substantial. Neither samsara nor nirvana were absolute in

. . '

any sense. As such, what Nagarjuna is presenting is not different from the cmpiricaJ view of bondage and freedom explained in the Buddha's discourse.ro

Katyayana. ·

3. Aprahz„am asampraptam anucchinnam aś?i:fvata?(l,

aniruddham anutpannam etan nirva„am ucyate.EXAMINA.1.lON OF FREEDOM

Uruelinquished, not reached, unannihilated, non-eternal, noń-ceased

and non-arisen - this is called freedom.

MKV(P} p.52 l i MKV(V) p.228 .

357

Having rejected a permanent and eternal substance which, as explained earlier

(XXIV.38), "is unboro, unceased, remaining immovable and devoid of

variegatecl _situations," if Nagacjuna were ro explain freedom jn almost idenrial

terms, his philosophy would not be any differen.c from those of his substancialist opponents. Furthermore, it is the subscantialists chemselves who considered freedom (nirvaf!a) as well as the non-defiled good ·seeds (atiiiśra11akusalt:1-btja) oc the seeds of release (mo~a-bija) to be subde (susuk~ma) and

uncorrupted or undescroyed (nasamudghata)(see XXIV.32). This leaves ·the interpreter of the present verse with only one escape-route, namely, to consider

the six negations presented hece to be simple oegations of metaphysical existence (sat) or its associate, non-existence (asat).

How relinquishing (praha11a) becomes probłematic if one we.re to accepc a

self-nature (Jvabhava) has been explained at XiflV.27. The substantialists, as

mentioned in the ruscussion of XXN.32, were left with two distinct selfnatures: the good (kusa/a) and the bad (akwala). 'f.heit problem was how any

one of them, being permanent and eternal, could be relinquished.

If it is assumed that the "seed of release" (moh.a·biJ~) is subtle.and incorruptible and produces freedom (niniiit?a) as the "ultimate fruit" (parama artha or

phala), Nagarjuna's refutation óf ie is dearly stated at XXIV.28. He explained

how the reaching (sa~priipti = sama'dhigamana) ofa fru•it (phalr;) is made impossible by the recognitioo of a perPianent and iocorrupcible selfcnarure. Thus,

when freedom (nirva11a) is explained as rcqlinquishing (prahat1a) and reaching

(sa1!Jpraptz), these should not be understood in a substantialist way. I/ they

were .ro understood, the óoly way to explain the empirical concepcion of

freedom is by negating them. Thus, in freedom there is "oo r.hing1' (na

kaścit)(XXV . 24) - a thing understood as being substantial or haviog sel:fnarure-that is either relinquished (prahT11a) or reached (Ja1!Jprapta).

The other four negations were distussed in relation to the Dedicacory Verses

(as part of the eighr negations). There roo, it was pointed our tłiat che eighc

negations-·were intended to elim.inace the metaphysical nocions of existence

(astilva) and non-existence (naJtitva). The same could be said of the two

couplets in the present verse: anucchinna?!J/afiifvatatrJ and aniruddhaf?l/anuI ·

pannartz.

Thus. the sixfold acriviry- rclinquishing, reaching, interruption, remaining.

constant, ceasing and arising - as explained by the metpphysicians need to be

negated beforc an empiricist theory could cmerge. Such mecaphysical explana-358 T HE PHlLOSOPliYOFTHE MIDDLE WAY

tions can easily be abandoned if their foundations, namely. the metaphysical

concepts of substantial existence (sat or t:!Jtit'lla, bha11a oc s11abha11a) and

nihilistic non-existence (a.rat or nastit11a, abh'ii11a or parabh'iiva), wece to be

given ~p. This, indeed, is the task that Nigarjuna sers up for himself in the

following verses.

4. Bhavas t'iivan na riinia'!af!' jara-mara„a--lak!a1Ja7?1,

praJajet?isti bhavo hi najfl1'a-maraf!af!' virfi.

Freedom, as a matter of fact. is not cxistence, for if it were, it would

follow that it has the characteristics ofdecay and death. Indeed, there is

no existence without decay and death.

MKV(P) p . 524~ M.k"V(V) p.229.

Inada ~es bhava in the present contextas the nature ofordinaty existence. Instead, the term is better explained as a reference to metaphysical existence

(a.rlitt1a), as has been the case with Naprjuna (see especially, XXl .15-16; also

XXV.10). The metaphysicians who admitted bliava or rvabhava as eternal and

perrnanent entities nevcr attempted. an empirkal justification of tbeSe eotities.

They seem to have assumed that these are known through "ominscience" (stlf'tlt1-

J°fł4f11a) . Nigarjuna, realizing the Buddha's attitude toward such knowledgcclaims (sec discussion of Sabba-sutta at IX.3) and, thcrefore, making no

refcrcncc to sucb knowledge at all in the present text, simply noted the implkations of rhls metaphysical speculation and iosisted that such existence (bhava,

s11abhi11a) is invariably associated with charactcristics (/a/qa„a) , Uke decay and

death (jtll''ii-maraf!a). Thus, freedom will not includc frecdom from decay and

death and this would contradict the Buddha's claim that he is freed from the

recurrent cyde of births and deaths. On the contrary, if the mctaphysicians insis.ted that there is no invariable connection between existence (bhava) and

characterisiics (la/qaf!4), then they <.:ould claim that after p11rinirvar1a a freed

peoon can retain the eternal existence and drop the characteristics. N:igarjuna was

qui~e certain that this is an extension of the metaphysical position and is in conflict with the non-substantialist teachings of the Buddha (sec X:XV.17).EixAMINATION OF fREBDOM

5. Bhii11aś ca yadi nirvaf!tlf!I ni111ii1'Jtlf!I Jt1f!IJRrlt1f!I bht111et,

niiJaf!lskrto hi vidyate bha11al/ k11acana Raścana.

Morcovcr, iffrccdom wcre to be cxistencc, thco &cedom would be condicioned. Yct, an existence that is unconditioncd is not evidcnt anywbere.

MKV(P) p.526; MKV(v) p.230.

359

In rendering the terms Jaf!JSkrta and t1.It1f!llkrta as "condirioned'' and the "uoconditioned" rcspectively, we havc, in the present cootcxt, tried to ret.a.in the

interpretation of the metaphysicians, for it is this panicuJar interpretation that

is being questioncd by Nagarjuna. UndoubtedJy, it is the Sarvastivada theory

which cquatcd Jtlf!IJR[/4 and prafityt1.Iamulpanna that Nagat:juna has in mind

(see commcnts on VTI.1). The implicacioo of this equation is that "the uocon·

ditioncd" (asaf!1Jkr14) is also the "independent" or "uncaused''

(aprafityasamutpanna), an implication not acccptable to both Nagarjuna and

the Buddha.

In fact, XXV.4-6 highlight the sharp distinction the metaphysicians assurned

between frcedom and bondagc (sec Chaptcr XVI, Examinacion ofBoodagc and

Releasc). lt is this sharp distinction, whkh is the foundation of the substan·

ciafuc cxplanacion of freedom and bondage, that is being analysed by Nagarjuna. Unlcss this metaphysical cxplanation is kcpt in view. speculatoins about

Nagarjuna's owo conception offrecdom can turo out to be as wcird as those of

the met.aphysicians.

6. Bh'ii11aś ca yadi nirva11am anupadiiya taf kathaf!I,

nirv'ii'!tlf!l niiiulpiidiiya kaicid bhii110 hi 11idyate.

Furthctmocc, if frccdom werc to be cxisrcnce, how can tbat freedom be

independent, for an independent cxistcncc is ccctainly not cvidcnt?

MKV(P) p.526; MKV(V) p.230.360 THE. PHILOSOPHY OF THE M IODl.f. WAY

Hece agaio we have a metaphysical inte(pcetation of upadiiya (see IV.1-2)

whece existence (bhava), as the permapeot and the eternał , becomes not only

che "unconditioned" (XXV. 5), but also ·the absolutely "independent"

(anupadiiya)(see also ±x!I.5). Nigarjuna is not prepared to equate freedom

with such non-empirical existence.

7, Yadi bh?ivo na nirziiif!a1n abhavaf? ki?p. bhavijyati,

nirvfirta?p. yatra bhavo na nabhavas tatra vidyate.

If freedom is not existence, will freedom be non-existence? Wherein

there is no existence, therein non-existence is not evident.

MKV(P) p. 527 ~ MKV(V) p.230.

The metaphysical notions of existence and noo-existence expressed in such

terms as aststva and nastitva are hece ccferred to as bhava and abhava. They

bcing back the pcoblems ofidentity and differences (see 1.3). Nigarjuna's argu-

,

ment, as at 1.3, is tbat these rwo are relative concepts.

8. Y(ll/y abhavaś ca niniartam anupadiiya t4t katha?p.,

nir.va1!a?!J na hy abhavo 'stt' yo 'nupadiiya vidyate.

Iffreedom .is non-ex.istence, how etn freedom be independent?for there

exists no non-existence which evidently is independent.

MKV(P) p.527 ; MKV(V) p .231.

If there were to be no p ermanent existence, there could be oo permanent nonexistence. If chere wece to be no absolute existence, there could be no nihilistic

non-existence. Just as much as freedom is not absoluce existen~e, it is also not

nihiłisLic noo-existence, Nigarjuna's atternpt in the present chapcet is directly

aimed at getting rid of sucha metaphysical explanation of freedorn . The Buddhists, throughout history, were prone to .make such distinctions, sornetirnes

ignoring the empirical middle position advocared by the Buddha. This is what

Nagar)una intends to explain in the next vr:rse.EXAMINA1 lON OF FREEDOM

9. Ya ajavaf!Z·favz-bhava upadiiya prafitya va,

so 'prafity?inupadiiya nirvfirt-am upac/iryate.

Whatever is of che nacure of coming and going that ocrurs contingently

or dependently. Freedom is, rherefote, indicated as being noncontingentand independent.

MKV(P) p.529; MKV(V) p.23t.

361

Eveo though the Buddha empahsized the avoidance of metap,hysicaJ extremes,

there was indeed a tcndency to distiogulsh saf!Zs'iira and niniii'!a. The cycle of

binhs and deaths, "comings and goings" (iijavaf!Z·fa'llif!Z), was looked upon as

having its owo nature (bhava) which is dependeoce. This is contrasted with the

narure (bhiiva) offreedom which is independent. The inuusion of the substantiałist notions in the form of saT!Jvrti (convention) and paramartha (''ultimate

reality") into the Buddhist doctrine during the scholastic period has aheady

beeo rcfened to (see comments. on XXIV.8). Even though most Buddhist

rhinkers were able to avoid such ontological speculacions in explaining the

nature of the world and freedom, the Buddhist metaphysicians had difficułty

in avoiding such a dichotomy. Therefore, in the next verse, Nagarjuna proceeds to remind the Buddhists of the Buddha's teaching on becoming and

other-becoming (bhava-vibhava) .

10. Parhii11af!Z cabravzc chasta bhav"!ya vibhavasya ca,

tasmiin na bhavo nabhavo nirva11af!J iti yujyate.

The teacher has spoken of relinquishing both becom.ing and otherbecoming. Therefore, it is proper .to assume r.hat freedom is neither existence nor non-existence.

MKV(I() p.530; MKV(V) p.232.

In addltion to the two concepts ofSaf!Zbha11a and 11ibhava, discussed previousły

(Chapter XXI), Nagarjuna introduces another ·pair: bhava and vibhava. lt is

significant to note that when Nagarjuna rejected astitva and nastitva b~ was

quoting the Buddha (XV.7). He does the same when he refers to bhava and

vibhava (XXV. 10). Yet, when he rejects bhava and abhava, rwo concepts that362 THE PHltOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

do not appear in the early discourses, except as suffixcs, Nigarjuna mercly in·

dicates that lhe Buddha realized their implications (bhav'libh'li11a-11ibhavina,

XV.7) and does not present it as a statement of the Buddha. This supports our

previous contention tbat bh'iit!a and ilbha11a represent an attempt to reintroduce mtitva and riiistitva into philosophkaJ discussions by the

BrahmanicaJ and Buddhist metaphysicians.

One significant difference berweeo the concepts of bhiva and abhiva(astitva and riiislitva), on the one hand, and bhavaand vibhava, on the other, is that .

the former arc metaphysical ass\unptions and the latter dcscribc cmpirical

events. As such, the reasons for their rcjection would be different. Bhiva and

abhava arc rejected bccause they arc mctaphysicaJ and, as such, unvcrifiabłe in

terms of the cpistemological standpoint adopted by the Buddha. On the cootrary, bhav~ and vibhava arc experienced processcs of life, namcly, becoming

and ocher-becorńing, and the reason for theit being rejecced is chat they lead to

suffering (duf?kha) . B'hava is the process of becoming conditioned by dispositions. Hence .the Buddha spoke of "craving for becoming" (bha11a-l411h'ii), a

constant thirś'ting to btcomc this or that. Vibhava could mean either ''becoming something different" or annihilation of tbis process of becoming (namcly,

suicide). This was aJso referred to as a form of craving (vibhava-tat?hi).

Howeve.r, the process of becoming and becoming ocherwise could be explained

in terms of metaphysicaJ and, therefore, wrong beliefs (mithyii-drrti) in absolute.existence (bhiva) and nihilistic rion-existence (t1/?h'litit1), respeccively, in·

stead of dependent arising (prt1t1tymt1mutpida). Neither of the metaphysicaJ

explanacioos, according to the Buddha, could serve as the basls for frcedom.

11. Bhavedabhavo bhiivaf ca nirva11af?'J ubhayaf!l yadi,

bhavedabh'iivo bhavaf ca mo/qas tru ca na yujyate.

If freedom were to be both existcnce and non-existence, chen rclease

would also be both existence and oon-existence. This too is not proper.

MKV(P) p.531; MKV(V) p.232.

It is possibłe for someone to assume that "freedom" represents a special kind of

existence which combines both exi,stence and non-existence. Jf it is understood

.. '" .

as some myscerious existcnce beyond exi~tence and non~existence, Nigarjuna

reminds his opponents that it is no more than simple "release" {mo/qa),and

this latter nced not be describeq .' as both existence ' and non-existence . . Release is·ExAMINATłON OF FlUlBDOM 363

no moce than the release from suffering and there is rtothing transcendental

about it.

12. Bhavedabhiit10 bhiit1af ca nittlafłam ubhaya'!I yadi,

niinupiidiiya nifV!ii'!am uP"iidiiyob/jaya'!J hi tal.

Iffreedom werc to be both existence and non-existence, freedom could

not be independent, for existencc and non-existeoce arc, indeed, dependent upon one another.

MKV(P) p.531 ; MKV(T1 p .232.

As pointed out eadiei:, the substantiałist definition o( fre·edom implied independence, rather than non-grasping or non-dinging (sec comments on XXIl.5). Thus, if the metaphysicians were to define freedoro as both existence and

non-existence, it could not be independent as they expect it to be. This is

because existepce and non-existence are dependent.

13. Bhat1ed ahha110 bha11af ca nirva11am ubhya~ katha?"?Z,

tZSflf!1Jkrta~ ca nirvfif!tlf'?Z bh?i11abha11au ca sarrukttau.

How could freedom be both existence and non-existence, for freedom is

unconditioned while existence and non-existence arc conditioned?

MKV(P) p.531 ; MKV(V) p .233.

As in the .previous verse, here too Nagiirjuna is takiog the definition proffered

by the opponent and cdticizing his conception of freedom. This is similar to

the argument adduced by Nagarjuna atXXV.6, except that in the present case

Nigarjuna is insiscing that if something is both existence and non-existeoce, it

could not approptiately be called an "unconditioned." 'The "unconditioned,"

by the meraphysician's definition, is the "inde(>endent" (apratftyasamutpanna),

and an element witb rwo eotities as parts of it will always be conditioned by

those rwo parts.364 THE PHILOSOPHY O!' 'rHE MIODLE WAY

14. Bhaved abhavo bhavaś ca nirvaflam ubhayaf!' kathaf!',

na tayor ekatrastitvam (j/oka-tamasor yathli.

How could freedom be both existeoce and ooo-ex1stence, for theit

simultaoeious ~xistence in one place is not possible, as in the case oflight

and datkness?

MKV(.P) p..532; MKV( V) p .233.

This brings out anothcr aspect of the mecaphysicians' conception of frecdom,

namely , the mooistic implication. Nirvfi11a, looked upon as the "ultimate reality" (paramartha), could not accommodate variety and multiplicity. For them ,

ie is the ooe ultimate truth, everything else beiog provisional. However, Nagarjuna is insisting that they could noc maintain that nirv'iif!a is both cxistencc and

noo-ex1sten ' ce.

15. Naivabliiivo naiva bha110 nirviif!am iti fii 'njanii,

abhave caiva bhave ca s'ii siddhe sati szdhyati.

The proposition that freedom is neitber existeoce nor noń-exiśterice could

be established if and when both existence and non-existence arc

established.

MKV(P) p .532; MKV(V) 233.

Anjanii from (yanj, ''to annoint") can mcan a symbol. Here Nagif.rjuna is not

speaking of logicaJ proof to decide the validity of a symbolism, or a proposicion. Rather, he is interested in the ernpiricaJ justification. Thus, unless both

existence and non-existence, as cxplained by the metaphysician, can be shown

~o have empirical validity, their oegations too would ruean nothing.

16. Naivabh'iivo .naiva bhavo ninia??af?i yadi vi'dyate,

nai11abhavo naiva bhavo iti kena tad ajyate.EXAMINATION Of FREEDOM

Iffreedom as neithec existence noc non-existeoce is evident, by means of

what is it made known as neither existence not non-existence?

MKV(P) p.533; MKV(V) p.233.

Thls seems to be a rather devastating cr1ticism of the more popular view that

freedom caooot be expressed either as existeoce or as non-existence. That is,

it is linguistically transcendent or is ineffable. If the statement, "Freedom is

neither existence nor non•existence," is intended to express the ineffability

of nit;iii'!a. Nagarjuna is questioning the meaningfuloess of that very statemenc. This means that absolute negation is as metaphysićal as absolute assertioo , ''absołute nothingness" is as meaningless as "absolute chingness," and

these arc che absolutes chat are expressed by terms like bh'iiva and abhava.

17. Paraf!Z nirodhad bhagatiiin bhavafity eva nohyate,

na bhavati ubhayaf!t ceti nobhaya'l!Z ceti nohyate.

lt is not assumed that the Blessed One exists after death. Neither is it

assumed that he does not eióst, or both, or neither.

18. T1thamano 'pi" bhagavan bhavality eva nohyate,

na bhavaty ubhayaf!l- celi nobhaya1p celi nohyate.

lt is not assumed that even a living Blessed One exisrs. Neither is it

assumed that he does not exist, or both or neither.

MKV(P) p.534; MKV(f-9 p.234.

These, indeed, are the metaphysicał assertions made regarding the tathagata

(XXII) which both Nagarjuna and the Buddha rejecied. The foundations of

these metaphysical views were the theocies of identiry and difference. This very

important problem is next taken up for examination by.Nagarjuna.

19. Na s_a'l!Zsarasya nirv'iif'!al ki~cid asti 11iśift11Jaf!l,

na nirv1if!asya sartuarlit kif?tcid a.sti viśe[f.l'!fl'f(t.366 'f.HE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

The iifc-pr~ has no thitig that distinguishes it from freedom. Freedom

has no thittg that distinguishes fr from the life-process.

MKV(P) p.535; MKV(V) p.234.

This statement of Nagarjuna has contributed to a major and wide-spread assertion regarding the uniqueness of Mahayana philosophy, namely. the ultimate

identity of sa1{'Jilira and nirvii11a. This assertion may appear to be correct, ifwe

arc to ignore all that has been said by Nagarjuna regardiog the metaphysical

doctrines of. identity (ekatva) and difference (n'iinatva), especially in the

chapters dealing with the tathagata (XXII) and the four truths (XXIV).

Those who upheld the view that this statement is an assenion of the identicy

of Sllf!JSfJf'fJ and nirtiii11a do not seem tó have paused for one moment to reflect

on the question regarding the nature of the identity they were implying; nor

have they attempted to place that conception of identity (if there is one) in the

historical context.

The facr that chere wa's a great urge on the part of the Buddh.ists, especially

after the Buddha's death, to taise him to the level of a supreme being, having

no real connections with the ordinary human world, can easily be seen from the

mote popular Mahayana texts lilce the Lalitavistara · and the

Satldh11rmapuf!t/4.fik11 as welł as the Theravada treatises like the}iilaka-nidiinakathii. Through thac popular perspective, substancialist views regarding the

nature of the Buddha began to emerge among philosophers. These

philosophical views were prominent with the early metaphysicians like the Sar·

vastivadins and the Sauuantikas.

.Nirv'a11tJ, understood as the "ultimate reality'' (paf'l~martha) , came to be

distinguished from sa1{'JS'iira, the unreal, ćhe convention, the impermanent.

The Buddha's owo view chat niniiif?IJ is the "ultimate fruit'' (paramattha), a

culmination of the fruit (111th11) of everyday life, the highest morał peńection

invoJving the eschewing of aJl immoral cooduct (sabba-pap11ssa a.kartT!/111?") and

thepromotión ofgood (kus11/111s11 upp,;11mplll/ii), was gradually being forgotten .

Dharma was gradually being distinguished from the dharma in che dharmaadharma context. The inapprop,riate equation of the pu;,ya-papa distinc:tion

with the dharma-adharma distinction (see commeots on XVJI.24) led to the

belief in a Dharma that transcends che dhamza..adhanna distinction.

However, this was not Nagarjuna's understanding. Vyavah'iira, the contex·

tual or the conven,tional, 1s not provisional in a cheap pragmacic sense and,

therefore, unreaJ. lt is the concrete wichout which the ideal (paranzartha)

makes no sense at aU (XXJV.10). lt is the absolute distinction between

vyavahara and pararnartha rhat is denied in che present verse.

The fact that the Buddhist metaphysicians were involved in Jong-drawnEXAMJNATlON OF FREEOOM 367

phiiosophical disputes with the Brahmanical schools of thought and. therefore.,

the possibility of mutual influences should not be discounted. For example, the

Saurranrika philosophical standpoint resernbles in many ways the standpoint of

the Vaise~ikas . This Jatter philosophy is founded on the basie methodology of

makiog "distinctions" (viśe1arJa). Nagarjuna's present statement can be properly evaJuated in the background ofsuch a methodology.

Indeed, the most sigoificant part of the statement is: na ki1?1-cit asti

11iśefa11a'!' , i.e., "there is no thing that can be taken as a distinctioo," or "tbere

is no distinct thing." (see XXV.20 and 24). The reference to somc metaphysical

entity as "some thing'' (kif?l-cit) is a popular feacure in the early discourses as

well as in the Prajflaparamita-sutras.

20. Nirvaf!asya oa ya kofi/t koti/t saf?Zsara11(1.Jya ca,

na tayor antaraf?Z kif?Zcit susuk1mam api vidyate.

Whatever is the extremicy of freedom .and the extremicy of the lifeprocess, between them not even a subtle something is evident.

MKV(P) p. 5 3 ~ ; MKV(V) p.235.

Haviog rejected a sharp dichotomy between saf?Zsara and niroiif!a, Nagarjuna is

not willing to let the metaphysician discover something ~xttemely subtle

(kif?Zct't suiuk/maf!J), comparaele to the extremely subtle and incorruptible

seed of release (mokfa-blja)(see comments on XXIV.32), between saf?Z.Jara and

nirvii11a. The identity theories of both Sarvastivada and Sańkhya school posited

such subcle encicies to explaio cootinuity. Nagarjuna's present stacement

should be understood in the background of the ideas expressed by these

schcols.

Therefore, the translation of ,he first line as "The limits of nirvatJa are the

lin1ics of ItJf?Zsard' (Ioada, p.158), is not very appropriate. Furthermore, che

first line does noc make a complete sencence. The emphasis in the completc;,

sentence is oo the phcase ~if?Zoit susikpmaf?Z (see XXV. 19), which is

Nagarjuna's major concern hece.

21. Para:?p nirodhad antlidya"f; faśvatlidyaś ca dofaya/f,

m·rvlittam aparantat?'t ca purvanta'f!J ca sam'iifrita/?.368 THE Pl-OJ.OSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE WAY

Metaphysical views relating to the finite, etc„ to the etcrnal, etc„ after

death arc associated with [the problems of] f.reedom as well as the

posterior -and prior exttetńities.

1WKV(P) p.536; MKV(V) p.23).

Herein, reference is made to eight of the ten "undeclared'' (avyakrta) issues.

Nagarjuna perceives them to be associated with the question of freedom, a

freedom 1ooked at from two of the major concerns of.the human bcings, namely, the first bcginning and the ultimate end, the flrst eause and the final cause.

Human concerns like "Where did I come froro?" or "Where woufd I go after

this?" (as will be exlained in the finał Chapter on "Examination ofViews") have

influenced human thinking and often led to metaphysical views about freedom

and bondage.

22. Silnyefu sarva-dharmeftt ki11J anantaf!Z kim antavat,

kim ananta1n antavac c.a n'iint#nta??t nfit111ntavac ca ki'!Z.

23. Kir(I- tad eva kim anyat kir(I- śafvalaf!l kim aś1iśvataf?1.,

aś'iiwata1!l śaśvata'f?Z ca kif?Z va nobhayam apy atai; ~

When all things are empty, why [specułate on] the finite, the infinire,

both the finite and the infinite and neither finite nor the·infinite? \Vhy

[speculare on] the identical, the different, the etetnal, the non-eternal,

both or neither?

MKV(P) p.537; Ml-.'V(V) p.235 .

Empiricist Nagarjuna's fina! fina! qucstion, after presenting such a detailed

aoaiysis of all the ,netaphysical views to which he has devoted twenty-five

chapters, is "Why raise all these metaphysical issues, when aJl experienced

thlogs are empcy?" (śiinyer11 sarva-dharmefu kif!l . .. ). As reiterated before in

the commentary, he is spea!dng about things that are empty (śunya), włiich arc

the empirically given and which are seeo to be dependently arisen

(prałityasamutpanna). H e is not emphasizing the absttact concept,

"emptiness" (iunyata).EXAMINATION OF FR.BIDOM

24. Sarvopalambhopaśa11J11f? prapancopaśamal? śivaf?,

na kvacit ka1yacit kafcid dharmo b11ddhena deśital/.

The Buddha did not tcach the appeasement of all objccrs, the appeasement ofobsession, and the auspicious as some thing to some one at some

pbcc.

MKV(P) p.538; MKV(V) p.236.

369

Inada has broken up the above inro two distinct statements and thereby lost its significance. The first line contaios qualificarions of dharma occurring in the second.

N:igarjuoa's emphasis is on the phrase: kaścil dharmafł, as it was in the case of

the two important statementS made previously in the present chapter

(XXV.19-20). When the Buddha spoke of freedom (nirva fla), which he

quaJified as the appeasement of aH objects (upaklmbha = al11mbana =

dra1ta11ya, cf. drfJ!(avyopaśama at V.8) or the appeasement of obsessions

(prapałlcopafama) or auspicious (Jiva, sec Dedicatory Verses). he was nor refeuing to them as "some thing,'' that is, some cotity having a specific distinction

(viiefaf!a) or subdety (1uiulqma111a). He was oot speaking of freedom in the

way the substantialist cooceived of it.

All these twenty-five chapters are, therefore, negative io characrer and tone.

They were devoted to a rcfutation of the two metaphysical but related views of

existence and noo-ex.istence (astitv'ri-ntistitva). Having cleared up the dust that

had gachered around all the doc~rines preached by the Buddha, Nagarjuna is

now ready to go on to the positive description of bondage and fre·edom as

enunciated by the Buddha in the discourse to Kacyayana. Nagarjuna's ttearment of the metaphysicaJ issues chat ernerged in relation to all these doctrinesdoctrines pertaining to causacion, change, the human personaJity, survival, karma, morał respo.nsibi ł ity, and freedom-is so cxhaustive and compłe te that he

can proceed to explain the Buddha's conception. of bondage and freedom

without any fear ofany one raising any question. Por he has already answered

them all. Herein Lies the greatoess of Nagarjuna as a philosopher.CHAPTER

TwEN1Y SIX

Exarnination of the Twełve Causał Factors

(Dvadasańga-paffk!ti)

l. Punarbhavaya sa??Zskiiran avidyii-nivrtas iridha,

·abhiJa1(1Jk11rute fiit?ts tair gatt~ gacchati karmabhil{.

A personeovdoped by ignorance forms such dispositions in the threcfołd

ways łcading to re-b~oming, and through su.eh actions be moves on to

his destiny.

MKV(P) p.542; MKV(V) p.238.

This chapter is of łitde significance to most Nagarjunian scholars. Inada argues:

With the discussioo of Niniii'!a in the last chapter the treatment

from the standpoinr of the Mabayana had basically come to a dose.

ln tbis chapter and the finał one to follow, Nagarjuna goes into the

analysis of the Hrnayanistic doctrines.... The discussion is

Hfnaya,nistic and it reveals that the source of trouble lies in ignorance which in turn initiates all kinds of meotal confotmations

(satpskiira) (Niigiirjuna, p. l60).

While disagreeing totalły with this interpretation, I propose to show chat thls

chapter represents the mosc positive explaaation by Na:garjuna of the Buddha's

teachings oo boodage and freedom as enunciated in 'the vast collection of

discourses, with the discourse to Karyayana as the pivot.al text. lndeed, without

the positive te.i,chiogs pl'esented hece coming after the negative analysis in the

last twenty-five chapters, it is rather difficult to see how Nagarjuna could claim

to be restating the Buddha-word, as he openly expressed it .in severa! places

eaclier (see XV.6; XVII.6, 8, 11; XXIV.8-9). It is indeed surpri!ling to see how

most interpreters of Nagii;rjuna are loolcing for posidve statemeots of the doc·

370Ev.MINATION OF THE TwELVE CAUSAL FACTORS 37 1

trine primarily through negations {XXV.3 and Dedicatory Verses), while ignoring ałl the positive statements of Nigarjuna.

XXVI. l is a further cxplanation of the Buddh a's statement: "Depending

upon ignorance arc dispositions" (aviJJapaccaya sańkhafii). lts d aborarion is

also the Buddha's and is presented in the Kukkuravatika-rutla (M 1.390).

2. Vijffiinarp 1arpni11isa1e sarpsliiirapratyayarp gatatJ,

1arrznivi!fe 'tha vi/ fiiine niimafilparp nt! icyate.

Consciousncss, with disposition as i~ conditioo, cnters [the new] life.

Whcn coosciousnc:ss has cotercd, the psychophysical pcrsonality is i.nfuscd.

MKV(P) p.543; MKV(V) p.238.

This represents the cxplanacion of the relationships described in the statement,

"Depcoding upon dispositions is consciousness" (sańkharapaccaya vińffiif!arrz)

and "Depcnding upon consciousness is the psychophysical personality"

(vifllłaf!apaccaya namafilparp). The explication of the first of rhese is found at

S 3.87 ( Tsa 2. 14 [Taisho 2. llc)) where it is said: "Disposition is so called

bccause it proccsses . .. consciousness that has alteady beeo dispositionally

conditioned, into ics present state." The dispositions arc thus responsible for

providing an individualicy to consciousness, and it is this individuated consciousncss chat comes to be established in a psychophysicaJ personalicy. This łatcer event is explaincd at D 2.63 (Chang 10.2 ITairho l.6l b]), where it is scated

that the psychophysical personalicy formed in the mother's womb will not grow

into marurity (na vuddhi'?l viru(hirp 'iiP111/at1) if consciousness were not to enter

it and get established therein. In fact, the Chinese translatioo of Kuma rajl va

refers to such attainment of marurity of the psychophysical pcrsonaJity.

Those who aJ"e unwilling to atcribure a doctrine of survival to Nigarjuoa may

interprer the relation becween consciousoess and the psychophysicaJ pcrsonałity

as oo more chan the explanation of the act of being conscious during ordinary

day to day experienccs. lfso, ir would have been possibJe for Naga rjuna to say

so at this point. Instead , he ·ptefers to sp eak of a life (.gah) , generally

understood as a fururc life or desdny, and proceeds to explain the process of

perception only after outlinjng the emergence of the six sensory faculties

associatcd with the psychophysicaJ personalicy.372 THE PHILOSOPl-IY OFTHE MIDDLE WĄY

3. Nifikte niirnafiipe tu 1at!iiyatana-sa?!Jbha11a~.

1arfayatanam agamya saf!JSparfal/ sar(Jpravartate.

When the psychophysical personality has bee.n infused, the occurrence of

the six spheres (of sense) takcs place. Depencling upon the six spheres

proceech cont.act.

MKV(P) p.552-553; MKV(V) p.242 .

The Buddha's statemenr, "Dependiog upon the psychophysical personality are

che six spheres of sense" (niimarupapaccay'ii sa{'iiyatanaf!'), explains an import.ant pre-requisite for the emergence of human knowledge. If the

psychophysical personałity is not properly formed or if the sensory faculties

were to be.defective, the sensory spheres such as materia! form, sound , smell,

taste, touch, and concepts would not provide a foundation for contact. Thus,

the visual organ, whicb Is part of the psychophysical personality should be

unirnpeded (aparibhinna) and should function properly. The external object

should come into focus (bahir'li ca Nipa ipathaf!J agacchatt) and attention

(samannahara). which is a function of consciousness, shou.ld be avaiJable (M

1..190; Chung 7,2[Taisho1.467a]). Theo only there will cmerge consciousncss

which is a necessary condition for contact. This.idea is theo elabotaced by

Nagarjuna io the next verse.

4. Cakfuh. pralitya rupa'!' ca sa1nan11aharam, eva ca,

n'iimarupt1f'?J p rafftyaivaf!J vijńiinaf!J JIJ1(Jpravartatc.

5. Sa?!Jipatas tray'ii1{ii1(J yo ropa-vijflanu·Ca~tt!'li'f(t,

sparśal/ sah. tas1niit sparfac ca vedanii Jat!Jpravartate.

Thus, depeoding upon the eye and mateńal form, and attention too, and

depencling upon the psychophysical personality pcoceeds consciousness.

'Whatever is the harmonious coocurrence of the three factors: material

form, consciousness, and eye, is contact. .Feeling proceeds from such

contaet.

MKV(P) p,553·554; MKV(V) p.242.Ex.AMINATION OFTHE TWELVE WUSAL FACTORS

The i:welvefold formula presents feeling as being conditioned by contact

(phassapaccaya vedanii). However, Nagarjuna feds the need to explain what

contact is all about. He, therefore, inserts the cxplanation of cootact provided

by the Buddha in the Madhupif!fika-sutta (M 1.111-112; Chttng 28.3 [Tairho

1.604b]). Contact is che harmonious concurrence (sańgatt) of three factors:

materiał form , (visual) consciousness, and eye. lt is tłUs harmonious concurrencc chat provides a foundation for feeling (vedanii).

6. Vedanapratyaya trf'f!a vedanarthaf!I hi trf'yate,

trf~amlina upadiinam upad11tte catut'tlidha'(Z.

Conditioned by feeling is craving. lndeed, craving is feeling-directed.

The one who craves, gtaSpS on to the foutfold spheres of grasplng.

MKV(P) p..554-555 ; MKV(fl?p.243.

Hece Nagarjuna has an interesting explanacion of craving (tr1n.?i) when he says:

11edan4rtharp hi t(!yate, i. e, "it i~ for feeling that one craves ." Ie is a reference to

the pleasant feelings (śubha1 maniipa, or sukha). The fourfold spheres ofgrasping are: grasping for desires (kama), for views (dil(h1). for rules and rights

(i1/abba1a), and for theories of self (attaviida)(M 1. 51).

7. Upadiine sati bhava upadii11,f; pravartqte,

JYtidd hi yady anup1idiino mucyeta na bhaved bhaval;.

When grasping exis(S, bccoming on the part of che grasper proceeds. lfhe

were to be !l non-grasper, be would be released, and there would be no

further becoming.

MKV(P) p . 5~6; MKV(V} p.243.

lt is inceresting ro noce that at this point i"n the explaoarioo of the twelvefold

formula Nagarjuna speaks of freedom or release (mak.fa). It is a point at which

,374 TuE PH!LOSOPl-IY OF THE M IDDLE WAY

the process of bondage can be interrupted. Nagarjuna is problably emphasizing this because he witnessed how his fellow Buddhists, in spite of their enormous intellectual capacities, constantly adhered to metaphysicaJ views and wece

caught in "Brahma's Net" (brahma-jii/11). Some of these intellecrual giants, who

wece able to write commentary after commentary, even though they had abandoned househoJd lives wece cnamoced with their views and invoJved jo ceaseJc~

diatribes. Realiziog the emphasis placed by the Buddha upon "non-grasping"

(anupadiina), Nagarjuna interrupts his exposition of the process of bondage co

explain freedom.

8. Panca skandh'iil/ sa ca bha11afl bhav'iijj'iitil/ pravartate,

jar'ii-maraf!a-duf?khadi sokiil/ saparidevan'iif?.

9. Daurmana.syam upay'iis'ii1ater etat pravartate,

kevalasyaivam eta.sya dul/kha-skandhasya sa1tJbhaval;.

The fivc aggrcgatcs constitutc this bccoming. From becoming proceeds

birth. Suffering rclaring to decay and death, etc., grief, Iamcntation, dejcction, and ruspair- all tbese proce~ from birth. Such is the occurrence

of this e.nti.re mass of suffering.

MKV(P) p.556-557; MKV(V) p.243-244

The elimination of craving for becoming (bhava-Jaf!h'ii), as mentioned

cadier (sec XXV.10), was encouragcd by the Buddha. The rcason for this

is not merely because craving causes suffcring in this life, but aJso because

it could lead to birth in another Jifc (jatt), whicb would also involve the

repetition of all the unfortunate experiences of the present life. Tht<

phrase duf?kha-skandha is used in the sense of heap or mass of suffering

rathcr than "suffering attached to the skandhas," (lnada, p . 162).

10. Sa?!Jsar11rmu!an sao/skiiran avidvan sar!l.skaroty atal/,

a·11idvan kiirakaf; tasrniin na vidva??Zs tattva-darśaniit.

Thus, che ignorant forms disposjtions that constirute the source of thefx.AMJNt\.110 N OP THE TwELVE CAUSAL FACI'ORS

life process. Therefore, it is the ignorant who is the agent, not the wise

one, because of his [the łatter's] perception of truth.

MKV(P) p .558; MKV(V) p.244.

375

The enlightened one who had attained che appeasement of dispositions

(S4'f!Uk'iiropaśama) does not conttibute to the perpetuation of the life-process

(.ratrJsara). Hence, he is not an agent (kart.1kt.1f!) respoosible for such perpetuation. This seems to indicate Nagarjuna's awareness of the Buddha's famous

statement chat upon attainiog enligbtenment he perccived the builder of the

house (gaha-karaka, Dh 154). ·

Reading too much metaphysics into the phrase tattv11-darlt.1nt.1 can destroy all

that Nagarjuna attempted to do in the preceding cwenty-five chapters. Instead

of explaining it as "the perception of an absołute reality," it could be more appropriate1y understood as the perception of the empirical truth that "all this is

empty" (slZT'llam t'daf!J śUnydf!J) of a substance (svabhavt.1tal/).

11. Avidyay1i1fl niruddhafiif!J saf!Jskiiraf!am asa1{Jbht.1vaft,

avidjiiya nirodhas tu jniinenasyt.1t'va bhavanat.

When ignorance has ceased, there is no occurre.nce of dispositions.

However, the cessation of that igoorance takes płace as a result of the

practice of that [non-occurrencc of dispositions] through widsom.

MKV(P) pp.558-559r MKV(P) p .244.

The murual relacionship betWeen cessation of ignorance and the aon-arising of

disposicions is emphasized by Nagatjuna, keeping in mind the distinction between the appeasement of dispositions (sa1{Jskaropaśama) in the pcesent life

and their waning (saf!JSk1ira-k1ay11) at the time of death, theccby not pcovidi:ng

another opportuniry for rebirth.

12. Tasya ttZSya nirodhena lal tat1 nabhipra1111rttite,

du/;Jkha-skandht.14 kevalo 'yam evaf!J samyag nirudhyate.376 T HE PHILOSOPHY Of THE M.JDDLE W AY

With the cessation of these, these othere factors [of the twelvefold formula] would not proceed. ln this way, this entire mass ofsuffering ceases

comt>łetely.

MKV(P) p. 559; MKV(V) p .244.

The emphasis is probably on the cessation of ignorance and the non-arising of

dispositions. These two factors are taken to predominace the entire łife-process.

The attainmeot of e~ghtenment and the appeasemeńt of dispositioos through

non-graspiog (anupadiina) account for "freedom with substrate'' (saupadiśefa·

nirv'iif!a), whi.le the elimtnation of dispositions provides for non-re-becoming

(a-punar-bhava)(cf. XXVL l) and the waning of birth (iiiti-kfaya), which is

freedom "without substrate" (nirupadi1efa-11irvii11a).CHAPTER

'fwENTY SEVEN

Examination of Views

(Drffi-parz k~a)

1. Dr1fayo 'bhuvaf?Z nabhuvaf?Z ki?!/> nv alite 'dhvanlti ca,

jiis tal? śaśvatalokady7if? puniiintat?Z samupaśritaf?.

Whatcver views asserting an eternal world, etc. based upon [the perceptio.nJ: ''Did I exist or not exist in the past?" are associated with the prioc

end [of existence].

MKV(P) p.571; MKV{V) p.249.

The first line of the verse has been reconstructed by Poussin on the basis of the

Tibetan ttanslation.

In che Pari(eyyaka-sutta (S 3.94-99; Tsa 2,.,25 [Tatiho 2.13c-14a]}, the Buddha maintained chat views such as "The self and che world are etetnal" (sassato

afta ca loko ca) are metaphysical because they are dispositional answers

(sankharo so) to querries about the past such as: "Did I exist in the past or

not?" As such, chey are not based entirely upon empirical facts. lndeed, they

are attempts to go back to the prior end of existence (pubbanta). While the

Buddha recognized them as futile attempts, mostly because of the limitarions

of human knowledge and understanding (see Chaptet XI), he was not uowill·

ing to accept wbatever evidence available through veridical memories (sadi,

pubbenivasanussati). On the basis of such evidence, he characterized the past

existences as impecmanent (anicca), clispositionalły decermined (sankhata), and

dependently arisen (pa;iccasamuppanna), and not as permaoent (nicca) , immutable (dhuva) , and eternal (sassata).

Nagarjuna's explanatioo of the metaphysical views of eternalism (śaś-vata),

etc. is, therefore, a vivid representacion ofthe Buddha's attitude regatding such

v1ews.

2. Dpfayo na bhavi!yami kim anyo 'nagate 'dhvani,

bhavzjyatniti cantadya apf.1ńintam. sa1nupt1śritaf?.

377378 THE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE wAY

Whatever views asserti.ng the finite, etc. based upon [the perceptioo]:

"Would I not exist U1 the futu.re or would I become sorńeQne else?" arc

associ.ated with the posterior end [of existence].

MKV(P} p.573; MKV(Vj p.249.

The assumptions that the self and the world arc finite or iefinite ate similarly

based upon one's dispositions (sańkhara). Those who arc enamored with life as

it is would insist upon the world being infinite. Those who are averse to life

would advocate finiteness, insisting that there will be no way in which life

could continue. This is tantamount to annihilation (uccheda-ditthi, S 3.99;

Tsa 2.25 [Tairho 2.14bJ) .

3. Abhum atitam adhvanam ity api etan nopapadyate,

yo hijanmasu purve!u sa eva ,na bhavaty ayaf!Z.

The view that I existed in thepast is not appropriate, for whosoevet was in the

prcvious birth, he, indeed, is not identicał with his person.

MKV(P) p.573>MKV(V) p.250.

This sratemenr may appear, at first sight, to mean a denial of rebirth or survival; that is, it would be inapproptiate to say: "1 existed in the past." Howevet:,

if one "is careful in observing the emphasis in the second line, nan1ely, sa eva

("he himself"), it will become apparent that what is denied is not ally relatiooship between two lives, but the identity of the two persons in different existences. Therefore, the statement, "I existed i11 the past," becomes

metaphysical only if an absolute identity is posited, which indeed was the prod ivity of the metaphysician.

4. Sa evalmett' tu bhaved upadiina'f!l viśi1yate,

rtpadiina-vinirmukta atmii te katamal? puna/;.EXAM1NATIC5N OF Vtl!WS

Ifit were to occur [tosomeone): "He, indeed, is theself/' thcn graspingis

identified. Scparated f.rom grasping, what coostitutc your selt?

MKV(P) pp.574-575; MKV(V) p.250.

379

The Buddha explained self-consciousness expressed in such statemenrs as "I

am ... "(asmltt) as dependent upon (upiidiiy11) the five aggregates. lt is like

seeing one's own reflection on a clean mirror or a pan of elear water. In this

case, ooe cannot perceive one's refleccion unless there is a personality that is

rcflccted, and these constitute the five aggregates (S 3.105). However, convert~

ing cllls sdf-consciousoess to a cogito, a "self' that is permanent and eternal, is

also the work of upiidiina, meaoing "grasping or clinging.'' lt is sometimes

described as thirsting or craving (ta„ha) and this could be for becoming (bhav11)

or other.-becoming (vibh1111a)(S 3.26; Tsa 3.23 [Taisho 2.19a].

Tbus, neither self-consdousness nor a "self' would be fouod independently

(upiidiina-vinirmukta). Howcver, the attaino;ient of freedom, described as

anupadii vimukti, does not imply the ncgation of self-consciousness, but only

of the "thirsting for becoming/' (bhava-t1J'!h7i), which otherwise could lead to

the belief in a permaneot and eternal self that is independent of the aggregates, and idea already rejected by Nagaijuoa .in Chapter XXV.

5. Upadiina-vinirmukto nasty atmetikrte sati,

syad upadinam evat-rna tzasti catm.eti 11a!, puna}/.

When it is assumed that there is no selfseparated from grasping, g~g

itself would be the self. Yet, this is tantamount to saying that there is no

self.

MKV(P} p.575; MKV(V) p.251.

The assertion that thc:re is no .self apan from grasping (upadiina-vinirmukta)

provides the identity tbeorists with the opportunity of ideotifying the selfwith

grasping. Thus, when the Bllddha,.having denied a self, maintained that consdousness (vifl;;a'!a) prov,ides a link. between two łives (D 3.105; Chang 12.2380 TifE PHILOSOPHY .OF THE Mrooi.E WAY

[Taisho 1. 767aJ), one of his disciplies, Sari, immediately assumed that "tbls

consciousness icself t.ransmigrates, and ńot anotber" (zdam eva vifiiiiif!a'f(l sandhavati sa'f(lHtrati ananfla'f(l, M 1.256; Chung 54.2 [Tairho l .767a]), chereby

atrributing ao identity theory to the Buddha. The Buddha's immediate

response was to. deny such identity by asserting that consciousness is depeodentły arisen (paficcasdmuppanna). Theo the Buddha proceeded ro show how

consciousness, when explained in terms of causa! dependence, leads to a denial

of such identity. This, indeed, is what Nagarju na eodeavors to do in the

present cootext.

6. Na copiidiinam evatmii vyeti tcrt samudeti ca,

katha'f(l hi namop'iidiinam upiidiiiii bhavi.fyati.

Grasping is not identical with the self, for that ~i.e„ grasping] ceases and

arises. Furthermore, how can grasping be the gta$per?

MKV(P) p.576; MKV(V) p.251.

As was dooe by the Buddha, (see comments above XXVlI.5), Nagarjuna is rejecting the notion of self (iitman) on two grounds. First, it is assumed to be

permanent and eternaJ, whereas grasping that is identified with the self is sub-

- ject to ac:isiog ·and ceasiog. Secondly, the self is also assumed to be the ageo t

behind all human action and, rherefore, of grasping. lfso, how can tt be both

action and agent at the same time?

7. Anyaf? punar upadiinad atrna 11t1ivopapad'yafe,

grhyeta hy anupadiino yady anyo na ca grhyate.

Furthermore, a self thar is different from grasping is oor~ppropriate. A

pecson who is without grasping can be observed. However, if he were to

be differeht [from grasping], he could not be observed.

MKV(P) p.577; MKV(V) p.251.EXAMINATION OF VIEWS 381

For che Buddha as wełl as for Nagarjuna, the denial of a substancial encity is

based upoo empirical evidem::e, namdy, the perception of an individualiry consisting of the five aggregates. The five aggregates do not appear individually as

insulated discrete elementS. They appear as·a lump (puflja) wh.ich retains its individuality (based upon dispos.hions) and cootinuicy (founded tipoo consciousness). In such a conte.xt he is caUed a person (hoti satto ti sammuti, S

1.135; Tsa 45.5 [Taisho 2.327a]). In the context of a society, he becomes a

social being with relarionships to others (as son, facher, or daughter , mother.

etc.) In the context of morał behavior, he becomes good or bad (see the explanation of empirical self by William James, The Pn·nciples of Psychology ,

vol.1,291-293). However, if the self wete to be considered different from che

perceivcd individuałity, it woułd turo out to be a rather mysterious encity and

bence unknowable through the availabJe means of knowledge.

CandcakTrti, who pcefers a transcendentalist interpretation of Nagarjuna, .

gives .a negative explanacioo of what is very clearły a positive statement of

Nagarjuna.

8. Evarp, nanya upadiinan na cop'iidiinam eva sa~

11tma nasty anupadiinal; n'iipi' niisty e!a niścayaf?.

Thus, he is neitber clifferent from grasping nor identical with it. A self

does not exist. Yet, it is not the case that a person who does not grasp

does not ex;ist. This much is certain.

M.KV(P) pp.577-578; MKV(V) p.252.

CandrakTrti, who favored a uailScendentaJist interpretation of Nagarjuna,

makes this a negative statement. The positive reading given above is justified

on ~o grounds. First, ,iQ the previous ·instances; Nagarjuna was clearJy asserting an empirically known ( = grhyeta) anupadiinaf? (that is, a person f.reed from

grasping), white at the same time rejecting an atman different from both grasp·

ing and non-graspiog. Secondly, che posicive readiog is clearly justified by

KumarajTva's Chinese rendering of this verse. .

As such, what Nagarjuna is denying is both jdentity (upadiinatn eva sal;)

and difference (anya upadiina'f!J). A rejection of metaphysicał identity and difference does not necessarily tnean that Nagarjuna was abandoning an empiricaJ

personality. For Nagarjuoa, Janguage need not be necessarily metaphysical in

character.382 TuE PHILOSOPHY OP THE M IODlf W/\ Y

9. Nlibhum afftam adhvanam ity etan nopapadyelte,

yo hijanmaru purve1u tato 'nyo na bhavaty aya?!J.

The statement, "I did not exist in che past," is not appropriate, for this

person is not different from whosoever existed in the previous lives.

M.KV(P) p.578: MKV(fl?p.252 .

This. theo is a elear deoial of absolute difference. Just as much as rhe statement, "I existed łn the past," is noc appropciate so long as it is interpreted to

meao absolute identity, even so the statement, ''I did not exist in the past," is

not appropriate as long as it is cakcn to mean absolute differeoce.

10. Yadi hy ayatrJ bhfl'vedanyal? pratyakhyayapi tafl'.J bhavel,

tathaiva Ca Ia Iaf!Zti;fhet Jatra jiiyeta 11amrtaf?.

If this person wece to be different [from that person in the previous existence], then he wouJd come to be even forsaking tbat person. In that

case he would remain the same and, in such a context, an immortal

wouJd emcrge.

MKV(P) p. 579: MKV(fl? p.252.

Absolute difference impłies absolute ideocity. Nagarjuna has alJ:eady shown

that "other-nature" (para-bhava) means the sclf-nature (svabhiiva) of aoother

(XV.3. s11ahha11af? parabhavasya parabhavo hi kathyate). Absolute identiry as

wel1 as absolute diffetence, trus involves complece iodependence, and as such ie

woułd constitute immortality. Notbing is to be achieved. Kumarajlva rende.rs

the phrase tatra /iiyeta v'iimrtaf? as "The atman will be self-cau~ed."

11. Ucchedaf? karma„af!' naślJ! Jatha 'nyena krta-karmatJaf!J,

anyena paribhogaf? sjiid evam adiprasajyale.

(1f that were the case,] there would be annihilation and destruction of ac-EXAMINAT!ON OP VIEWS

tions. This implies that the fruic of action performed by one will be experiencecl by another.

M.KV(P) p.580; M.KV(V) p.253.

383

The verse has been reconstructed by Poussin on the basis of the Tibctan uanslauon.

How a metaphysicaJ coocepcion ofdifference would lead not only to a denial

of survival but also a repudiation of moral cespoosibility has bcen aJready

discussed by Nagarjuna (Chapter XII). There it was shown that he depcnded

upon a discourse of the Budclha co explain this problem. The presenc is simply a

rcstatement of chat argument.

12. Napy abhutva samudbhu10 rlofo hy atra prasajyate,

krtako vii bhaved atmii sa1?J-bhu~o 'Vapy ahetukaJ?,

Yet, in that context, the error of assuming an emergent without prior existence docs not follow. Eithcr the self would be caused or, ifit has occurred, it woułd be without a c:ause.

1HKV(P) p.580; MKV(V) p.253 .

The concept of self (atman) was posiced in order to account for the concinuity

in the human personalicy which could also explain morał responsibility.

However, the denial of an eternal self led to the opposite view that there is no

continuity, but annihilation (uccheda). The denial of an eteraal self and the

consequeot assenion of ąnnihilarion do not imply (na prasajyate) che further

metaphysical view.;chat- stu:ticthing chat did nor exist before comes to be

(abhutva sqmhhotz), which carne co be interpreted as the abhutva bhava utpada in the Sautrantika school (sec Kalupahana, Causality , p.p. 152·254). In

other words, rhere is no implication hece chat existence is completely independent, withouc any prior connections. As such, if there wece to be any self

(atman), ir would be "made" (krtaka, see karaka ar XXVT. 10). lf it is not, and

if it were assumed co arise, the·self would be causeless.

13. Evaf!J dufir a.lite y'ii nabhum aham abhu1n aha'f!J,

ubhayaf!J- nobhayaf!J ceti 11a1!a sa1nupapadyate.584 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MlDOLE WAY

Thus, whatever view there is such as, "I existed in the past; I did not exist;

both or neither," is not really appropriate.

MKV(PJ p.581 ; MJ(V(V) p.253.

The views (dr!ft) referred to here a.re the metaphysical views relating to idencity.

difference , both or neithe.r. lt should be ooced chat the reasons for rejecting

these views are empirical. Empiricism, in the Buddha as well as in Nagarjuoa,

allows for the recognition of concinuity without having to posit absplute identity or absolute difference.

14. Adh11any anagate ki~ nu bhavzłyiimzti darśana~,

na bhav#yami cety etad afitenadhvana sa1na/?.

A view such as "Will I exist in the future?" or "Will I not exist in the

futu1e?'1 is comparable to those associated with the past.

MKV(P) p .5.82; MKV(V) p.254.

Here again, the views that rue inappropriate are those involving identity and

difference, not aoy explaoation of what the future could be based upon one's

experience of the process of dependent arising.

15. Sa de11af? sa manu1yaf ced eva??J bhavati fiifvata??J,

anutpannaś ca devaf? syajjiiyate na hi faśvatam..

If it is tJtought truit a human is the same as a divine being, then there

woułd be .the eternal. H the divine being were to be non-arisen, th61l he

would not be born and that would consritute the eternal.

16. Devadanyo ma11u1yaś ced afiiśvatam .ato bha'llei,

devad anyo tn4nu1yaś ced S4??Jlatir nopapadyate.EXAMINAT!ON OF V1ew s

lf ił is thought that a human is the same as a divine being, then there

wouJd be the non-eternal. lfit is thought that a human is different from

a divine being, chen continuicy is not appropriate.

MKV(P) p.583; AfKV(V,) p.254.

385

ln addjcion to the attainment of the uJtimate goaJ of life (para1nartha) which is

freedom (nirvaf!a), the Buddha allowed for the possibiJity of a human being

reachiog up to the status of a deicy or a divine being (deva). assumed to be one

who is macerially as well as morally superior to ordinary human beings, yet not

coming anywhere close to the ultimate goal (see S 1.228; Tsa 40.l [Taitho

2.290b]). H owever, the Buddha refused co recognize these divinc beings as

eternal and permanent enticies (D I.20, sec Chang 14.l (Taisho l.90b-c]).

The recognition of che above possibility could prompt the subsrantialiscs co

discover ''some-thiog" (ki?(lcit) in the human being that is identical with the

divine. Nagatjuna is herc rejecting any such idenciry, as well as aoy alternace

theory that coułd make diviniry uncaused.

Funhermore, the emphasis on absolute difference would not only lead to the

belief in non-eteroalicy (aśafvata), which woułd imply a denial of continui ry in

or the process of becoming (Jtt'!11afl), the.lacter being distinguished from the

meraphysical process referred to carlier (see XVI!. 7-10).

17. Divyo yady ekade.fa~ sjiid ekadesai ca 1nanu!a4,

aiaf!flta'!1 fa:fvata'T(I ca bhavet tac ca na yujyate.

If a part wece to be divine and the otber part to be human, then there

wouJd be both the eternal and the non-eter.na!, and this tod would not be

propcr.

MKV(P) p.584; MKV(V,) p.255

The combination of two metaphysical views do~s not prov1de for a noometaphysical one. The Buddha's rejection of SJJch views is clearly srated in the

Brah11iajala-1uJlanta (D 1.21) . Nagarjuoa is simply reiteratiog that posiLion

herc .386 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W'AY

18. A:fii1vala1!J 1af.vata1!J ca prasiddham ubhayar(J yadi,

siddhe na fiiivala'f!l kama??J nai11afiiJ11ata11i ity api.

Supposing both the eternal and the non-eteroał arc established, then it is

not possibłe to cithcr assert the etcrnal or the non-etetnał.

MKV(P) p.585; MKV(V) p.255.

Nigarjuna is hece refusicg to accept a conclusioo which is only a pan of a conjunctive proposition.

19. Kul41cid agataJ? kafcit ki'f!lcid gt1eche1puna!/ ku(Uit,

yadi ta.smad anadis tu sa'f!J.fiiral/ syan na casti sal/.

Ifanyonc has come from somewherc and apin werc to go somewherc,

tben the lifc~process would be beginningless. Such a situation does not

cxist.

MKV(P) p.585; MKV(V) p.255.

The m.ctaphysics rejected in Chaptcr II is refccred to in the first line. The second line cmphasizes che ideas cxprcsscd in Chapter XI.

20. Niisti cec chaivatal/ kafcit ko bha11i/yaty ai7iśvataf?,

fiifutTIO 'fiiśvataf capi dvabhyam abhfii'f!l tiraskrtaJ?.

Ifit is thought that thcrc is oothing ctemal, what is it that will be noncrernal, both ctecoal and non-eteroal, and also what is separated from

tbese two?

MKV(P) p .586; MKV(V) p.256.

Hcre again, we havc Nagarjuna's analysis of "something" (kaicit), an entityWMINATION OF VIEWS 387

that he was determioed to get dd of oo previous occasions (XXV. 19,20,24),

The theories of identity, differeoce, both or neither, are associated with such

metaphysical eotiti:es. Hence Nagarju.na's refusaJ to accept such theori~ing.

21. Anlariiin yadi /ok.al; sjiit paralokarp. katht1rp. bh1111e1,

athapy anantavarp.f lok.alf para/ok.alf ka1haf?Z bhavet.

H rhe world were to have a Jimjt, how could there be another wo.rJd?

Furthermore, if the world were to have no limit, how cou1d thcre be

another wodd?

MKV(P) p.587; MKV(V) p.;?56

Having discussed the rnetaphysical views relating to dw:ation, i.e„ eternality.

etc., of the world and the self, Nagarjuna moves on to a discussion of. the

theories.relating to the extent of the world.

The rejection of the metaphysicaJ notions of the finite and the infinite are

bascd upon a recognicion of the possibilicy of a future world (para-lokt/). According t0 Nagarjuna's analysis, a fioite (anta) implies abseoce of continuity (uccherla), and as such militates against any conception of a future world explained in terms of dependent arising (pralttyasamutpiida). The infioite (ananta)

implies permanence or eternalicy (fiif11ata) aod, as such, it woułd be meaningless to speak of a future world as an "other world" (pf/f(l-/oka), for it would be

identical with the previo.us world.

22. Skandhaniim efa sartzfiino yasmad dipiitci1am iva,

pravartate tasman tiiintiinanta11att1111~ ca yujyate.

As this scries of aggregatcs proceeds along like a flame of a Ja.mp,

[spcculation about] its finitude or its infinitude is not proper.

MKV(P) p.587.; MKV(V) p.256.

The simile of the lamp (patlipa) was popu]ar a.moog the Buddha and his

disciplcs, especiałly in their expłanation offreedom (nibban11). As the flame of388 THE PHILOSOPHY OFTHE M IODLI! W AY

a lamp is extinguished, because of che absence of the condicions necessary for

ics concinuous burning, so is a person's miod freed when the fuel chat feeds ics

continuous burning with anxiecy is cxhausted. Explaining this process in rerms

of dependencc, it would be most inap_propriate to speak of ics finfrude or infinicude, independent of any condicions that arc involved in its conrinuicy or

lack ofcontinuity. This is a elear indicacioo chat an absolutiscicconception is iocompatible with an explanation based upon conditionalicy.

23. PUrvc yadi ca bhajyerann utpadyeran na capy ami,

skandhaf? skandhan prafityeman atha loko 'ntaiiiin bha11e1.

Iftheprior aggregates were to pe destroyed and rhese aggregates were also

not to arise depending upon these other [aggregates], then the wodd

woułd be finice.

24. Purve yadi na bhajyerann utpadyeran na capy amT,

skandhaf? skandhan prafityemiin loko 'nanto bhaved atha,

Ifthe prioraggregates were not to be destroyed and these aggregates were

ałso not to ańsc dcpcnding upon these other [aggregates], then the world

would be infinite.

MKV(P) p.588; MKV(V) p.256.

The above is a criticism of an explanation of the conrinuity in the aggregaces

which does not takc into consideracion thcir causa! depeodence. l f the aggregaces were looked upon as things that appcar and disappear with no causa!

relations, then only can one speak ofa finite world. In other words, the cooception of a finite world involves one of the exueme views discussed earlier, namely, aonihilation (uccherla) .

The non-arising of the aggregates dependent upon other aggregates would

thcn imply permanencc, and this is what is involved when one speaks ofan infinite world.EXAMJNATION OF VJE\'(/S

25. Antavan ekadeśaśced ekadeśas tv anantavan,

syadantavan anantaś ca lokas tac ca na yujyate.

lf the world we.re to be pa~dy finice and also pardy infinite, it would be

both finite and infinite, and this too is also not proper.

' + • '

MKV(P) p .589; MKV(V) p.256.

389

The rejection of both the finite and the infinite, the etetnal as well as the noneternal, as constitucing the reality, was prompted by the Buddha's refusal to

recognize two djfferent levels of reality: a changing and finite world contrasted

with an eternal and infinite ultimate reality or an Absollłte. As such, neither it:i

the Buddha's philosophy, nor in Nagarjuna's thinking is thete any room for an

Absolute of any sort.

26. Katha1(l tavad upadiitur ekadeśo vinank,yate,

na nańkfyate caikadefaf? eva~ caitan na yujyate.

How can it be possible that one part of a gr:asper is dest!oyed and the

othetpart is not destroyed. This too is not proper. ·

27. Uptidiinaikadeśaś ca katha1(l n'iima vinank1yate,

na nańkfyate caikadeśo naitad apy upapadyate.

How can it be possible that one part of grasping is destroyed and another

part js not destroyed, This too is not appropri.ate.

MKV{P) pp.589 -~90 ; MKV(V) p.257.

Nagacjuna leaves no room for the recognitioo of an ecernal and absolute entity

either in the person grasping (up'iidiitr) or in grasping (upadiina).390 THE PHILOSOPHY 01' TH..E MIDDLE WAY·

28. Antavac capy anantaf?'l ca prasiddham ubhayaf?'l yadi,

siddhe naivantavat kctmanJ naivanantavad ity apz:

Supposing both the finite and the infinite are e5tabiished, then it is not

possible to assert either the finite or the infinite.

MKV(P) p.590; MKV(Ji? p.257.

This rejeccion of the finitc and the infinite is comparabJe to the rejection ofthe

eternal and the non-cternal (XXVIl.18).

29. Athava sarva-bhavananJ śunyatvac chaśvatadayaf?,

kva kasya ~atamal? ka.rmat sambhavi,yanti t/ufayaf?.

Thus, because of the emptiness of all existenr.s, wbere, to whom, which

and for what reason vtews sucb as the etetnal could ever occur?

MKV(P) p. 591; MKV(V) p.258.

The recognition of depeodencly arisen phenomeoa (prafityasamutpanna dharma) meaos the acccpdnce of the non-substantiality or emptioess of all these

things. If things are non-substantial, how can thcrc be views about the eternal

and the non-ete,rnal, the finite and the infinite? The answer to this question

has been provided by the Buddh.a and clearly .rcstated by Nigarjuna. Tt is the

resułt of an urge on the part of human beings to find absolute answers to ques.

tioos such as "Where did 1 come from?'' or ''Wherc do I go fcom herc?" These

qucstioos wouJd be raised and attempts to answer them be made so Jong as

human beings arc propeUed by a "craving for becoming" (bhava-tr1'!ti) o~

"craving for other-becoming" (vibhava-tu'!ii) . This was the riddle of human

existence faced by the Buddha. Understanding that riddJe of existence, the

Buddha attained freedotn (nirva11a) by spewing out craving (tr11iii)~ and

abandooing any grasping (upadiina).

30. Sarva-drtfi-pr11ha1faya yaf? saddharmam adeśayat,

anukampa"' upadiiya ta1{'J naffl4Syami gautama~.EXAMTNATION OF VtBWS

I revcrcntly bow to Gautama who, out ofcompassion, bas taught the truc

doctńne in order to rclinquish all vicws.

MKV(P) p.592; MKV(V) p.258.

391

Th.is finał statemen't of Nagarjuna referring to the Buddha's.preachiog of the

doctrine (sad-dharma) is to be contrasted with his statement at the end of the

chaptcr on freedom (ntrviifła)(XXV.24) , whcre he says that the Buddha did not

"preach anything as .. ." (na ... kalcid dharmo buddhena deiital/). and

should open the cyes of those who stick to a completdy ncgative'interprctation

of Nagatjuna. Nagarjuna's rernarks clearly show that he was aware thar the

Buddha did not spcak "metaphysically'' but only "empiricalJy."INDEX TO THE KARIKA

NOMlNAL FORMS

agni (firc) X. I, 6-9. 12- 1); nirogniAa X .9

ag111 (beginning) Xl.1. 2

11;1kura (sproul) XVIL7

alłj11ni (proposi tion) XXV. l 5

alita (pasc) XlX.1-3; XX.12; XXVll. l, 3, 9,

13- 14

adhama (low) XDC.4

adh1ga1t1 (attaincd, realized) XXJV.28

adh1la-ya (obscssion) XXIV. 13

11dhya1ma (imcrnaJ) :XVlll.4

adh111111 (time, pcńod) XXVll.1-3, 9. 14

fl'!(ll!aragrtJ (without prior end) Xl. l

anagata (future) XJX. 1- 3; XXVll 2, 14

anukampa (compusion. sympathy) X:XVJl.30

anu.van.11/a (excolkd) XVll.13

anta (end, limit, finite) XXll.12; X:XV.21, 22;

imania XXJJ.12; XXV.22; X:XVJl.24

anantaval XXV.22; XXVll.21, 22, 25 .

28

amaval XXV.22; XXVIJ. 21- 23, 25, 28

11paran111XXV.21; XXVIl .2

purvanta XXV.21 : xxv11.1

antanJ (becwccn, mcdiatc) XXV.20

atJantara (immediate) 1.2, 9

1mdhakara (darknc$S) Vll.9

a,11ya (orbc1, anothc1, differcnc) 11.8. 15. 18 ,

20. 23; VII .19, 28; IX.6, 9: X. l, 5-7;

XJl.3: XIV.3. 5-8; XVLl.4, 28, 31. 32:

XVlll. l, IO: XXII.I: XXV.23:

XXVll .7-1 1, 16

QflJOfQ X. 13

a11onya (mutU:il, togctbcr) X.7: XIV. I;

•

XXl.6

a11y11111a (differtncc) XlV. 3-4. 7: X.X, t9;

XXIl.8

a11yathiit11a (change) .XV.9

anyathiibhiiva (change) Xlll.;}- 6; XV.5. 8

apalu1rfant; (climinacion) XVL. 10

apara (postcrjor) XJ.2, 6

apekfii (cootingcnt, comingencc) XX. I I

nir- (non-) Vl.3; X.3; XV.2

apekfita11ya X.1O

abhidh"iilavya (ro be de$ignated) :XVIJI. 7

abhin11J1a (mountcd) XXIV 15

abhutva (without prior exlsrencc) XXVU. t2

abhfiigama (bcing con!rontcd) :XVll.2')

abhyupapanna (cngr<>Mccł) XXl.14

amrt11 (immonal) Xl.3: xxvn_.10

11rcifilf1.1 (fl:unc) xxvn.22

artha (fruit, cffcct, purposc, mc:injng) 1.6;

IV.2; Vl.7-8; VUl.6; X .16: Xl.7

ekarJha (one meaning, identity)

Dedi~tory Vcrscs; XVIJl.11

'1a11ar1h11 (vllicry of mc:anings,

difference) Ocdicatory Vccses;

XVJU. l t

nairarthakyfl (futility) Vlll.6

paramiirtha (ultimnte fruit) X:XlV.8, 10

prajfJaptyartha (purposc of dcslgnatibn)

XXII. 11

11aryar1hya (meaningless) X.2-3

alarrz (adcquarc) Vll.2

a11agiihalif!1, dur- (difficulty of undcrscanding) XXIV.17. /

a11ara (end) Xl.1. 2

a11as1ha (state) Vll.28; XXIV.38;

avaslho XVJ.6

at1ava11hi, ana11a11hiti (infinite regress)

Vll.3. 19

aJva (horse) X:XfV. 15

a.uan;gala (rc:ichcd it's end) X:X.10

as/iii ("cxists'') XV. IO

303

flOJfiti ("docs nm cKist") XV.], 10-1 l

asti ni11fili lX. 12

a11i1va (existcnce) V.8: XV 8, 10

XXlll.3: XXV.14

11ii11i111a (non-existcntc) V.8; 10: XXll.3

nau11'ii XV.8394 TuE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

aham iii ("l am") XVlll.4

nirahaf!'Kartz (free from cgoism)

XVUl.2, 3

iiuJa (space) V.l, 7

iiRhyiila (explaincd) Vll.14

iig11111 (come) XXVll. 19

71gl1fl'J4, an-(noo-appcarancc) DcdiC3co.iy Vcrscs

aJ11t11»!1/tMbliiiva (oanuc of coming and going)

XXV.9

iltma (self, form) IX.9; X.15, 16; XVlll.l-2, 6;

XX.5; XXlll. 3. 21- 22; XXVIl.4- 8, 12

llniltma (oc>sclf) XVIll.6; XX23: XXIJ.3;

XXlll.22

111malł.r:111 (self..caused) Xll.8

i1ma-111f{Jy111'fl!lka (sclf-n:sttaint) XVll.1

ilmanly11 XXJV. I5

iilm1J11 xvm.2

p4iiil1TNI (anothcr self) vn.25. 32

svilma (iaelf) m .2; Vll.13, 25. 32; :XX.24

$V11-pri1ma VIJ.8, 12

iitli(bcginning) Xl.l. 4

tmiitli (bcginn.inglcs.s) XXVII.19

iidhip111eyy11 (dominancc) I.2

iytilli1111 (sphercs of scruc) XIV.2; XVl.2

!4ff (six) XXVl.3

ifmhdha (initilued)

1111· (non·) XXIV.37

4111mbh4 (commencemcnt) ll.13-14: X.2-3

iilmnbtm4 (objcctivc ruppon) 1.2, 8

iiloh (light) XXV.14

i.fr111111 (inllux)

1111· XVIl.19

14- XVll.19

mdriya (faculty)

!Ilf/ (sile) m.1

Urtifuna (fucl) X.I. 4, ~9. U-15

idhµm;ina (buming) X.4

uuheda (annihibtioo) :>W.11; XVll.20;

XXI.14-17; XXVll.11

an- (non) Dcdicatory Vcr.scs; XVlll. I I

ucchee/a.rillTfana XV.10; XXJ.14

ucchinna (annilulatcd) XVIl.8, 10:

XVIll.10

t111- (non-) XXV.3

1111i1ma (highest) XIX.4

11//(lm (follc>winu\ XI.3

„

.utpitla(arising) VIJ.1- 5, 8, 13, 18-19, 25. 29,

32-34; XXJV.17

t111· (non-) Ded.IC3tory Vc.iscs; XVUI.12

mulotpiitla (primary arising) VIJ.4, 5

.utpalli(arising) VD.15-16, 20-2 I

o-p11nar-11tpt111i (abscncc of rcpcatrd

arising) XXI.16

u1ptllly11mii174 (prescndy arising) VU.7, 10,

14-16, 18

11/jxmfltl (arisco) I. I; Vll.14; XX.10

tm- (non-) l.9; Vll.IJ..: 14, 17, 22; XVU.21;

XVlll.7; XX.17- 18; XXlll.9: XXY.3

im-.uj>Qpatti(ab.sense of arising)) V.4;

XX.22

11p11J)iltli1t1 VU..20

uihy11 (uprising) XVJ.5; XVIll. l: XXL 15-16;

XXN.l, 20; XXV. l, 2

uihyo-~111f!114na XXI. 1~16

udiihrto (cxamplified) Vll.34

utibhuti(occuuencc) Vl.3

1uibht11111 (uprising) XVU. to; XXl .2

upfllllmbha (objcct) XXV.24

uplli4"111 (appeasement)

uplllllmbhopaiama (appcasemcm of

objcct) XXV.24

tl171!{1111yop11ftlma (appeasement of

objcct) V.8

pr11paflcopaJam4 (appeasement of

obse.ssions) Dedicarory Verses; XXV.24

11ptlf11111a (appcased) XXIIJ. 15

.upiidiino (grasping) 111.8; Vlll.13; X. U ;

XVl.3, 6; XVllJ.4; XXII.7-10; X.XVl.~7 ;

XXVll.4- 8, 27

""" (non) XVl.3, 6, 9; XXVI.7

nir-(witho11~) XXII.7

upadaua (sphcrc of grasping) XXVl.6

:t1'·(spherc of non·) XXJJ.7

11pidii1r: (graspcr) XXlf.10; X:XVL7;

XXVll.6, 26

upiyt1 (mcans) XVI!. I I

upiiyisa (dispair) XXVI.9

upiiltlmbha (ccnsurc) JV.9

up4/abtiha (ccnsurcd), a1'111pilabdh11

(unccnsurcd) IV .~.

urdhva (abovc) IX. 12

r'!a (dcbt) XVCL 14

rli! (without) 11.41 20; X.1; XIV.5, 6: XV.4;

XVI!.7, 9; XIX.6; XXU.4lNDEX 395

fdrfhi·Iamp11tliJ (psycho-kioetic power)

XVll.31

r1i (3.Scciic)

parama- (supremc-) XVll.2

eka (one)

ek.al11a (idcntiry) VI.4, 5; Vll.30; X . I ;

XIX.4; X:X.20

ek"tirtha (one meaning), an·ekanha

XVlll.11

eklbh1i11P (ideociry) 11. 19, 21

aika (identical) XXI. JO

aika111f? (co-exis1) Vlll.7

aikahla (identity) XX.19

aikya (identity) XX.20

karma (action) 11.19: Vlll.l-3; 9-13; X.l ;

XVll.2-3, 5-6. 10, 14-18, 20-23, 25-27,

29-30, 32-30; XVlll.5; XXVI.1 ; XXVII.11

-ja (bom of action) XVIl.30

-patha (path of-) XVI!. I I

-11aa'ha (destruccion of-) XVll.16

a-karmaka (withouc action) Vlll.2; X .2

kamtJa (performance of action) XXN. 17

k.

arta11ya (to be donc) XXJV.33. 37

kattr (agent) II. 19; VUJ.2-4, 8, 13; X. I;

XVIl.28-30. 32-33; XXIV.17

kartrka, li· (withoUl agem) VUl.2

karaka (agent) Vlll.l, 3. 7, 9- 12;

XXIV.37; X.XVI. IO

ak11r111if!a (noo-accing) XXIV.37

kfira'!a (causc, sufficiem condicioo)

IV.1-4, 6: Xl.7: XXIV.17

ni[- (withOUI·) lV.5

karya (effecr) łV .6; Vlll.4; Xl. 7; Xll. l;

XXIV. 17

a-kiiryaka (in-effcn-ivc) IV. 3

kr1a (donc, causcd) Xll. 1-4. 7-9:

XVll.24, 32; XXVIl.5, Il

a- (not·) XVIJ ,22, 23

krta.k.a (made) XV 1-2; XVIL23;

XXVll.12

J.ririma, 11- (un·made) XV,2

kriyfi (activity) 1.4; Vlll.2, 4-6;

XXIV. 17, 37

kalpa (fabricarion) XXll.9

kalpan?i (thoughr) IX,12, XVU.12, 13

11i-k.alpa (discrimination) IV.5

11U11;/pa1af? (one who disc.riminates)

XVlll.5

11lr-11ikalpa (without discrimination)

XVlll.9

11ikalpaya~ (discrimioatjng) XXII. H

!ll"J?l·kalpa {thought) xxm:1

Kiityfiyanilvavada (Admonition 10

Katyliyana) XV.7

klima (plcasuce, dcsirc)

·KUf!ll (strands of-) XVU.11

kfiyika (bodily) XVI13

ki/a(timc)XVll.6; XIX. I, 3, 5-6; XXl.21

ella- (comcmporaneous) XX.7

111/ya- (nmc·) XXJ.3

nirv1ir/a· (-offrccdom) XXI. t7

kfl(.:utha (remaioing immutabłe) XXJV. 38

ke11ala (cxclusivcly, cntirely. otll) VU.4; X.l.8;

Xll.10; XlV.4: XXlll.8: XXVI.9, 12

koti (cxtrcmiry, end) XI. I, 8; XXV.20

krania (mcthod, mode) fV.7; VI.2; X .n ;

XVI. I; XIX.4

puniaparasaha-krama XI.2. 6

klei (defilemcor, impurity) XVIl.26-27, 33;

XVU.5: XVlll.5; XXJll.2-6, 24-25

k/11fii1maka (defiling natwe) XVll.26, 27

-praha'!a (diminatioo, relinquishing)

XXIV.39

klifta (ddiled) XXJll.5

R,t:ya (waning) XVIU .4-), 12; XXI.7

a- (not·) XXl. 7

k[lr111 (waned) XVIJl.4

ki'ira (milk) XIIl,6

gamana (movemcm) 11.3-7, 9-11, 13-14 ,

16-20, 24-25

a- (non-) 11.3

gamyam1ina (presenr moving) 11. 1- 5,

12- 14, 17; llł.3; Vll.14; X.13: XVI.7

gala (mo~·ed) Jl. I- . 12-14, 17; lll .3:

Vll. 14: X.13; XVl.7

fi· (un·) 11.1-2, 12-14, 17; 111.3; Vll. 14:

X. 13; XVl.7

gati (morion) 11.2, 4, 17-18, 20, 22-23,

25; XXVI.J-2

gat11411Jll (space to be: movcd) li.n

gani(' (movec) 11.6-12, 15-16, 18- 20,

22- 25

a- (non-) 11.8. 15 , 20

gandha (smell) XXJJI.7-8

gandharva11agara (city of the gandha.rva)

•396 THE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

Vll.34: XVlt33: XXIU.8

gambhlra (profound) XX.IV.9

grhita (grasped) XXll tl3: XXlll.1.5

a- (non-) XIX..5

d11r- (wrongly-) XXIV+li

gocara (sphcre) IfJ, l

c1iia- (-of rhought) XVIII.7

Gautama XXVIl.30

graha (grasping, hold) XVI.9

a- (non-) XVI.9

griiha (grasping) XXJJ. l3 ; XX.ID.13-16

ghatan (conrcnd) XXJV.32

ghana (substandał) XXII 13

ghfii11a (smdling) 111.1, 9

ca,t!u·(cye) 111.7; X..XVJ.4-3

ttJrama (łase) XXI.18-19

ca1tirt1tdhya (fourfold mcthod) Xll. IO

ciita (thought) IV.7: XVll.9-10: XXIV.12

-gocara {spherc of-) XVIII.7

-IDf?11'iina (-scrics) XVU.9

cettna/; (from thought) XVIJ.9

c1#ta (rhough1) XXli, 14

cet11na (vołitioo) XVll.2,3,5

ce1fii (efforc) li.2

chedana (cuning) Vll.31

/agat (univcrsc) XX0. 16; XXJV.38

janma (birth) XVfil.4; XXl.2-3. 5

punar· (re-) XX.9

purva- (prcvious-) XXVIL3, 9

janaka (producer) XX.7, 20

a-jamia (not produccd) Vll.5

janya (co~ produced) XX.10

janyamona, a- {not produdng) XX.22

jiit11 (bom) Vll.13; XX .6, 12- 14

a· (un-, fururc) VU.26; Xl.4; XX.12- 14;

X:Xlll.19; XXJV.38

Jtili (blrch) Xl.3-6; X.XVl.8-9

jifyamana (being boro) XI.~; XXI.19-20

Jana (peopfe) XV.5

jrmt11 (scmient being) XVJI. 28

jara (dccay. -age) Vll.24: Xl.3-6; X.XV 4;

XXVJ.8

jit1a (vocwrlous one) XIII.8

J1rf!a (aged) XIll,5

jfliina (wisdom) XVlll.12; XXVl.11

la1J1111 (icsclf. 1ruth, idemi1y) XV.6; XV!lf.9;

XXII.8; XXIY.9

ta1111ala~ ("in icself") XVI! .26; XXlll . 2

/llttva-tlariana (perccpcioo of truth)

X.XVI.IO

lathya (sucb) xvnts

a-(not-) XVl!I.8

1111hiiga1aXX.Jl.1 , 3-8, IO, 13, 15-16

lama (darkness) Vll.9-12~ XXV.14

t1roJkr1a (scparaced) VJ.1; X .7; XXVJJ.20

ti!fhrJn (enduring) XX. LO

l1[!hamona Vll.22; XXV.18

111/ya (cqual. same) XX.20; XXl.3

trfT{ii (craving) XVll.28; XXVl.6

f(!Jamana XXVI.6

darfan11 (secing. pcrccption) 111.1-6, 8-9;

l.X.1-4, 6-7, 1~12; XIV.l

11- (not-) 111.5

darśana (view, mctaphysica l view)

XXI.14; XXVH; 14

du!a, dur- (wrongly perceived) XXJV.l l

dr!!i (view) XIH.8; XXVIL l-2, 13.

29- 30; s11akaya· XXllf.5

drfyamiina, a- (nor being perccived)

11.14

dra.ff( (scer) IJf.5-6; JX.8-9; XIV. l

41-a,rtavya (objcct of seefng) 111.l, 6, 8;

XJV.l, 3-4

drał(avyopt11ama (sec upalam.a)

tlahana (burning), '1'" X .5

dipa (lamp) VJl.9; XXV!l.22

duqkha (suffedng. unsacisfacrorin~) Xll. J.

3-10; XXlll.22; XXIV.21 , 23, 25, 39-40:

XXVI.8- 9, 12

dofanta (example) 111.3

dew (divine being) XXVII.15-16

divya (clivioc) XXVIl. l7

defrma (1caching) XXIV.8

defita (caughc) XVll.20; XVJU.6;

x:xv. 24

deóa (body) XVI!. 27. H

do1a (error, faulr) VJil.8; XVU. 12. 16.

23; XXJV.1.5; XXVll.12

do!a-prasai1ga XXlV, U

daurmanasya (dejccilon) XXVI.9

dviialJ (pairs) XIV. L

d11c1a (hacred) XXOI. l, 7. 12INDEX 397

dharma (ching, nature) I.7-9; XVll.5;

XXlV.19; X.XV.24

/ariimara'!a· (nacurc of dccay and dca,th)

Vll.24

drffa- ( • druaJanman, prcscm life)

XVll.18

fłi· ( distinct chings) V,6

1arva- (all·) Vl.10: Vll.29: X:XV.22

dharma (good) Vlll.5: XVU .l , il ; XXIV.6,

33-;5

a· (bad) Vlll.5; XXIV.6, 33-35

dharma (doctrinc) XVll.20; XXJV.5, 12

sad- (true-) XXlV.4, 30; XXVU.30

-deiana XXJV.8

dharma!? (conccpts) XXUI.7-8

dharma/ii. (nature of things) XVUl.7

dharmin, udaya-vyaya- (nature of arising

and ccasiog) XVI.5

dhatu (element) XVl.2

panca· (fivc-) V.7

far! XVll.17

naya (mcthod, modc), a/mam- XVlll.2

rfi1nli (differcnt) XXl. 10

-bhli11a (differcncc) li.21

nanlirtha, a· (without a varicty of

mcaoings) XVlll.9

nimariipa (psychophysicaJ pcisooaliry)

XXVl 2-4

nilia (dcstrutcion) XX.VII. I I

''Offa (dcnroycd " past) X:X.14

riii1t1ifi (non-cicistcncc) XV.8

na1ffti ("does not exiJt'') XV.10-11 ;

X:Xll 13

flitya (pcrmancm. etcmal) X.2-3; XVI. I;

XXl.14; XXIU.13- 14, 22

a- X:Vl .1; XXl. 14; XXlll.13- 14, 22:

XXJV.21

nityalii (pcrmancncc) XVll.6

a- (impcrmancncc) )QQ.4

nimitta, dharmiidharma· (occasiohccl by good

and bad XXJV.34-n

mroa'ha (cessation, ccasing) 1.9; Vll.27,

29-32; XXJV. 17, 23. 25. 40; XXV. 1- 2;

XXVJ.11- 12

a- (non·) Dcdicatory Vcrscs

parr11~ nirodhad (aftcr death) XXll.14;

XXV. l7, 21

nirodhana (ccssacion) XXIII .23

m·ruddha (ceascd) VlJ.26: XVll.6;

XX.5-6; 10; XXl.18; XXUl.23;

X.XV!. I I

a- (not·, oon-) Vll.26; >.'VIIJ.7;

XX.17-18; XXJ . 18; XXIV.38; XXV.3

nirudhyamiina (ccasing) Vll.21.2},26;

XXl.19-20

a- (oon-) Vll .21, 23

'!irgama, 11 (non-disappcar'lnct) Dcdic-.uory

Vcrscs

nirmila (crcared) XVI!. 31, 32

m'rmitaka XVJl.31

nirmuakakiira (crcatcd form) XVll.32

nirmimita XVU.31

nirmukta (distinct from) IV. I, 2; V.5; X.X.8

11i- IV.3

'

m"rllartaka (producing) I.7

niffla'!a (frecdom, cessation) XVl.4, 9-10;

XVlll. 7; XXl.17; XXIV. 10, XXV. l- l6;

19-21

a- (that wbich docs noi ccase) X.5

nmtrkl (cc:asc:d) XX1I. n

fli11rta (cnvclopcd) XX.VI. l

11ir1Jr1ta (rcnounccd) rx.12

11ivr11a (cc:asc:d) XVIII.7

niJcaya (cercain) XXVll.8

nl!panna (accomplishcd) X.8

flil/1arana (1clinquishing) Xlll.8

pa)ąa (view, position) li. 10

pa~ (cloth) X .15

patlrrl (promissory notc) xvn.14

para (ocher) 111.2; V.7; Xll.3, 7-8

pańin11grii/xJka (bcncfittiog ochcis)

XVll.l

-kara (ca.using by-) Xll.9

-krta (Cllused by-) X.Il. I , 3, 7- 8

-pudgala (-person) Xll. )-6

pamta~ (from anothcr) I.I ; XXl.1 3

paratra (dscwhcrc) X.3; XV.2

parabhava (othcr-oacurc) I.3: XV.3-4 , 6:

XXll.2- 4, 9

paraspara (mucually) Vl.3

paramartha (ultimate ftuit) XXIV.8, 10

pankTr1i1a (cxpounded) XVIl.2

parig(h'!ata4 (one who upholds) XXIV.28

parljilii (undcrst~nding) XXIV.2. 27

panjfl'iia (under$tanding) XXIV.26

11· XXJV. 26398 THE PH!WSO!'HY OF THE MIDOLB WAY

paniliptda (1lluminating) Xlll.1

paride11ana, sa· (Jamcncation) XXVl.8

pan·/iiitaytm (attributing) XX'JV.15

paribhoga (experience, enjoymcnt) XVll.5;

X.XVU.ll

padvartal:a (1clacc:d) XIX,4

pan·hilra (rcfut:u.ion) TV.8

parihrta, a- (unrefutcd) IV.8

parya11os1hina (adhering) XXIV.23

paryi1pta (adequa1c) lll.3

pa!ciiJ (posterior} XI.4

pafcima (cod) XI.l

ptiiya"1iina, 11- (noc pecceiving) 111.4

pika (m11.turing) XVIl.6

putJya (merle) XVJL5, 24

a· XVII.5

putra (son) lU.7

pudgala (pct!lon) XII.4-6; XVl. 2

puru1a· XXTV.4, 29

purufa (man) X6

-pudgala XXJV.4. 29

purra (prior) Jl.13; V.1; Vl. t ; l'X.6-8; X.8;

XJ.1-3, 6, 8; XV.Il ; XVl.7; .XX.8-9;

XXVU .2)-24

PrthaJ: (discrctc. scparacc:) Vl.8; X. l6

·lllfJ (discrcrcnC3s) Vl.4-7; XX.20

, -bhiiva (discretcness) VJ.6-7, 9

prakaia (illuminacion) Vll.9

prakrti (pramal narure) XV.8- 9; XVll.14

pr.1j1JajJl i (eommunicatiofl, &on 11en1ion)

XXJ/.l/

upiidiiya (dcpcndcn~) XXlV.18

pmtipa,, madhy@iii (mi6dłe path) XXlV.18

pra1ipanflaka (rcachcd the way) XXlV. 3, 29

pmtibiidhatal, (one who concmdicts)

XXIV.22, 37

pralibimba (mirror image) XXIU.9

prat1u1thitP (sicuatcd) Vll.9

prPtisandhi (moment of conccp1ion) XVll. 17

prati!iddhP (rcfu1ed) V.7

prafi1yosamulpiida (depcndcnt u ising)

Dedica1ory Vcrscs; X.XIV. 18, 36, 40

pmlJllJfJ (condi1ion) l.3, 5- 6. !>. 11- 14;

XV. I; XVJJ,27 . 29; XX, 1- 4. 8, 23;

X:XVl.2, 6

a- (0011-) 1.5, 12, 14; XVll.29

t1/JPrt1· (indcpendcmly reaJized) XVJJI.9

· nhZJll (made of-) 1.1 3-14

-siimagn (harmony of-) XX.24

-11.zff (constinucd of-) 1.4

&alfliiml? (four) I. 2

pratyikhyiiya (fot!lak.ing) XXVll.10

pralyulua (ccfuted) lll.3

pratyulpanna (prcscnt) XlX. 1- 3

prPtyudiivrtta (cccoilcd) XXJV.12

pradipa (lighr) Vll.8-12

pradipta (aflamc) X.2- 3

propaflca (obscssion) XVIU.) , 9

-alila (gone beyond-) XXIl.15

-hata (impaired by-) XXll. 15

-opaśama (appe:tScment of·) XXV .24

pmpancita, a- (unobsesscd) XV!ll.9

prt1brti (bcgins wich) XV!l . 7

prabóaVtJ (sourtc} XXI!l. I

pmyojana (purpose) xxrv.7

pravrlli (occuucoce) V.3

pnzfalua (implied) li. 5-6

pmsPnga (accompanying, following) XXIV.13

praiadhi1a, tiul· (wrongly cultiva1cd)

XXIV .1I

prasiddha (cstablished) XXVl!.18, 28

pra1iddhi (cscablishmcnt) IJl.3; Vl.8-9

a· (non·) VTI.33; XJl.7; XV. ~

prahli'!a (relinqu.ishiog) XVLl.15-16; XXlV.2,

21, 39; xxv.1- 2, 10; xxvu .~o

prah1'1a, P· (unrclinquishcd) XXV.3

pr/Jh11ya (10 bt rdinquisncd) XVll.15-16

piiik (pl'ior) IX.1- 3. 12

praptP, a- (nor rc:ichcd) X.5

prip1; (ceaching) X.XIV.39

baddba (bound) XVl.8

bandhP (bondagc)_ XVl.8

bandbana XVl.6-7

bahirrihli (cxternal) XVlll .4

bahu (many) xvn.12

·lllP (pluraliry) IX.9

bahya (cxccrnal, Olhcr) XJJ .10

b/jP (sccd) XVIl.l, 7-8

b11ddh1Z XVll.I;, 20, XVlll.6, 8. 11; XXIJ.2.

L4- 15; XXlV.5, 8, 30-31 ; XXV.24

·fiisana (Buddha's mcssagc) XV.6;

XXlV,9

a- (unenllghtcncd) XXJV32

pmtyeliP· (self-enlighic.-ned) XVll. 13;

XVlll.12

sarn· (pcńoctly cnligh1enc.-d), Dc:dica1ory

Vcrscs-; XVIII. 12INDEX 399

b1uldhi, alpa- (meager imdligcncc) V.8

bodhi (cnlightenment) XXIV.31- 32

bodhilatllla, -caryo (c21ccr of a bodhisanva)

XXIV.32

broh111acarya1 a- (ignoble life) XVll .23

bruv'iiTfa (speaking} xxrv»

bhagaviin (blcsscd one) Xlll.1- 2; XV. 7;

XXV.17-18

bhanga (dcstruction) Vll.3. 33- 34

bha11a (becoming) XXI.18; XXV.10;

XXVl.7- 8

·SllfJJlllli (sueam of-) XXl.17, 21

vi- (other-, dissolution) XVl.3; XXI.1-5,

7- ll; XXV.10

punar- (re-) XXVl. l

bhava (cxistcnt, existence) l. l , 3, JO; IV.7;

V.2. S-8; VIL ,17, 21, 23-24. 27, 30-31;

Vlll. B; IX.2-3; X .10-11, 16; XJ.8;

XJl.lO; Xlll.3; XV.4-7; XJX,6: XXl.4, 8,

12- 16; XXJll.20; XXIV.16; X:XV.4-7,

10-16; XXVII.29

a· (non·, abscncc) V. 6-7. 30; Vlil.4:

XV.3, 5-7; XXl.12; XXIV.l-4, 20,

29-30; XXV.8. 10-16

bhavaniJ (cultivation) XVll. l~ ; XXIV.2, 24.

27: XXVl.11

bhuta (clc:mc:nrs) lX.10

bhuta (come to be) XXlll. 24

a- XX!ll.25

bheda (distinct v:uicties) XVIJ.2

bhoktr (cxpericnccr) XVIJ.28, 30

rnadhya (middle) XJ.2

marlhyama XJX.4; XXIV. 18

'11111111 {mind) m.1, 9

mar1ufy11 (human) XXVU. l}- 16

mil#Ufa XXVll.17

mam/a (me:igcr incc:Wgcncc) XXIV. 12

-medhasa XXJV.11

mama

mamefi ("mine") XVlll.4

nlr- (free from sdf1Shne.ss) XVUl,2-3

ma!'tlf!11 (death) Vll.24; Xl.3- 6: XVl1:19;

XXl.2- 3, 5; XXV.4; XXVl.8

maffci (miragc) XVll.33: XX!Jl.8

mahan111 (grcat) XVII.12

miiliipi1arau {mothcr and father) 111.7

miinaJll (mcnal) XVll.3

marga (path) VID.6; XXJV.24-25; 40

miiy'ii (ilłusion) Vll.34; XXlll.9

milhyl (wrong) xxrn.16

mucyamiin11 (frccing) XVl.8

muni (sagc) XXIV.12

maha- (great-) Xl.1

mu/4 (sourcc) XXVl.10

mrgyamilf!11 (sought for) XVl.2; XXU.8

mrfil (ddusion) Xlll.1-2

medha1 (inrcUigcncc) XXJV.I I

maitro (fricndly) XVll. l '

rno/qa (rtlca.$c) Vlll.6; XVlll.); XXV.11

mo1f11'!a XVl.8

mofa-dh11rma (dcccptivc nacurc) Xlll. l- 2

moha (confwfoo) XXI.Il; XXXIJl.l. 7

11111u/11 (prima.cy) VII.4-6

yukta (propcr) l.9; Vl.;; VII. I~ XV, I ; XXl.21

yugapad (sirnulcaneous) XVl.8

yu11a (young) Xlll.5

rakla (lustful) Vl .1-3. 6-7, 10; XIV.2

ra1Jj11n1ya (objcct of Lust) XIV. 2

flllna (jcw(ll) XXJV.5

rasa (tascc) XXJll.7-8

flUl11711 Ili. l , 9

rahita (dcvoid) XXIV.38

r.iga(lusc) Vl.1-3, 6-7, 10; XIV.2; XXJII.l,

7. 12

riipa (m11ccria.I fonn) !11.7; N .l- 5, 7; XXIIL7;

:XXVl.4-5

liil:sana (characccristic/ V.1- ). 7; VII. I; Xl.7;

XVlll.9; xxv.4

a· (without·) V.1-3

11Jkandha- (-of non-aggrcgatc) XVlll.2

sarpskrta· (of the conditioocd) Vll.1, 3

-karrnanl (function as-) VII.2

/11kf11'!1, tri- (having duce charactcristirs)

VII. I .

lakfya (ch:uutcriz.cd) V.5, 7; XI.7

liriga, SI/O· (owo matk) X.5

loka (world) X:XVll.21, 23-2)

para· (other-) XXVU .21

-ni1tha (pattoo of the-) xvm .11

-sarrivrti (worldJy coovcntion) XXIV.8

/auAika (worldly) XXIV.6, 36

vak111vya (to be dcdatcd) X:Xll. 11

11a1111 (foundation) XXUI.7

viik {word, speech) XVll .4400 THE PHILOSOPHY OP nm MIDDLE wAy

v'iicika (vetb21) XVII.3

'var/41i1(1 (spcak.cc), Dcdkatory Vcrscs.

Vtmlf!J (best), Dedicatory Vccscs

11iuk.f111!a (discerning person) XV.10

vigraha (analysis) N .8

11id1ra (vc:riegatcd) XXIV.38

11i}llllp1i, a- (n.on-mtimation) XVIJ.4

flijlliinfl (consciousncss) fil.7-8:

XXVI.2, 4-)

vitijflrni11111 (cvidcnt) XXIV.22

fi· (not·) 1.3; V.6; IX.2; XI\1.7;

XXIIL 12, 16

11itlyii (knowledgc) XXIV.11

11- (ignonncc) XVU.28; XXIII.23;

XXVI.1 , 11

J1itl11il# (wise ooc:) XXVI.10

a· (ignorant one) XXVL.10

11inii (without) Vl.5; IX.4-5 ; Xll.5-6;

XX.24; XXI.1-2, 4, 6, 8; XXlll>-4.;

XXV.4

11initmtd111 (separatcd) ll.1; XXVIL4-5

11ip111114 (sub)ect to perversfon) XXIU.17

a- (not·) XXIIl.17

11i.łparyflya (pcrversiOJJ) XXIlI.6, 1}-14.

16-2 1, 23

a- (non-) XXIJL 16

flipary'iisa (pc:rversion) XXIII.1- 2

11ip1Jry4Sjaf!iiina (being subject to

pervcrsion) XXII!. 18

flipiilł:a (maturiry) XVII. 25

l'iptmvfl (marurcd) XVII.18, 2~

11ijm1'!iiifl, 11- (impcrlshable) XVll.14- 15 , 20

vibha1111 (sec bh1111a)

11ibl/ilgt1 (distinction) XVIl.19; XXIV.9

prtwi· (XVll.24

·vibhaviil (adept) X,V.7

111roli (non-dclight) X:VU.4

11- (delight) XVII.4

vbuadha, par'1Jp11r11- (sclf-conrradictory)

VIU.7

11iie!"1!" (distinguishing) XXV. 19

tiiglhatui11 (dced) XVll.4

11rl4 (separatc<l) XX.10

fi· (DOt·)XX.U

vedako (feclcr) IX.8-9; XI.7

vet/ana (feeling) JV.7; IX.I, 3, 10-11; XI.7;

XXVI.5-6 •

vdiyt1rlhya (see 11rlha)

tlyatiArat114 (incerruption) XVll. 19

11yaya (ceasing) XVI.); XVlil. l ; XXl.15-16;

XXJV. l , 20

a·(comtant) XXII.15

vya1111Jthi'4 (dctermined) IX. 2-4; XVU.25

vyflflahiinr(convencion) XVI1.24; XXlV.10

IO'!J XX1V.6, 36

vyasth4 (scparaced) l.11; VII.2

11jiillr1a. a· (indcccrmlnate) XVll.14'

11jiillhya111 (explained) Ill.:>, 9; X.15

11jiillhyiin11 (cxplanation) IV.9

'JUtsarga (rejeccion) Vlll. H

i11bda (sound) XXlll.7

ft1ma (appea.scmcnr) XVIlf.2

Pl'fl· XXl.17

iinltl (pcaccful) Vll.16; XVlll.9;XXII.12

1"iJiwll4 (ctcmii!, etemalism) XY.11; XVD.8, 10,

20, 23; XVlll.10; XXI.14-15; XXII.12;

XXV.21, 23; XXVIl.15, 17-18, 20, 29

fi· (not-, non-) Dedkatory Verses)

XVIIl.11; XXIL12; XXV.3, 23;

xxvu. 16-18, 20

-lou (-"Vo.rld) xxvn.1

~gr11h11 (grasping after-) XV. IO

Jiisl11'a (mcssage) X.16; XVlll.11

· b11ddh11- (Buddha's-)XV.6; XXIV.9

anu· (admonition) XVIll.8

I 'iisJr (teacher) XVll.31~ :XXV.10

Jir11Ja~ (head) Vll.31

fiw (auspicfous), Dcd.icatory Vc:rscs; V.8;

XXV.24

ftll/11 (pure) XVIJ.11

i11r;i (pleasant) XXlll.21- 22

11- (unpleasant) XXIII.22

finy11 (cmpty) XIII.7; XVU.27; XX.16, 18;

XXl.9; XXll.10, 14; XXlll. 13-14;

XXIV.l, 13-14; XXV. 11 22

il· (non·) XIII.7; XX. 16'-17; XXl.9;

XXIV.19-20, 33. 35, 39; X:XV.1

fiiny11m iri ("empty") XXIL11

·fil (cmptincss) IV.8-9; Xlll.2-3, 8;

XVIl.20; XVlll.5; XXIV.6-7, u,

B-14, 18, 22, 36-37

-14rtha (mcaning of>-) XXJV,7

-wa (cmptiness) XXVU..29

i ubha(pleasant) XXIII.l- 2, 6, 9-12

a- (un·) XXIll.l-2, 6, 9-12

iou (grld) XXVI.s

Jm111111 (hearing) lll.l, 9: IX.1. ·3. 10-11INDEX 401

iiilv11k.il (disciplc) XVD.13; XVlll.12

iro111t1111 (sound) 111.9

irotr (hcarc.r) IX.8-9

s1111,1yd (rightly, completcly) XXIJl.16;

XXVI. 12

s1111,11111'111U (rcsuainc) XVU.l

11111,1yoj11n11 (fctter) XVll.28

s1111,111rti (convemion) XXJV.8

111'!J111Jt1 (doubt, uoccru.inty)

11- (undoubtcdly, c.cnainly Vll.12; IX.4;

XVIl.22

"" (wlchout doubt} XVU.24

Sllf!Ullrlln (moviog) XVl.3

Sllf!ISllfill (a5.50Ciacioo) XIV.I, 3, 8

a· (w1iho11J.) XVlll.2

saff.11int (łifc-proccss) XI.1. 8; XVI. IO;

XVll.20; XXV.19-20; XXVl.10; XXVU.19

11111,ll.Ura (dispositioo) IV.7; X.Jl!.I; XVJ. l,

4-); XXJil.23: XXVl.1-, 10--11

Stlff.'14{111 (conditioncd) Vll.l- 3, B;

XXV.), 13

li· (un-) Vll.l . 33; X:XV.) , 13

saf!Jf/"llł{ll (agem of2SS0Ciation) XIV .8

St1ff.1Jr.iJt1m4n11 (2.SWCiatlng) XIV.8

I"f!ISr/{il (associ11tcd) XIV.8

Ja~l'Omll (wuuformacion) XVU.16

st1f(lkntmą11 XX.9

s11f?1g11ti (assemblage) XX.12- 14

s11rriJlli1 (pcrccption) IV. 7

J'"!f/llit11 (dcslgmm~d) XVIJ.4

Sllf!1141i (sucam, contlnuity) XXVll. 16

bha1111· (-of bccoming) XXJ.17, 21

I11f!Jli1111 (serics) XVU.7-10; XXVJl.22

'"/6Jl1·VJllJl1· (·ofacising and ccasing)

XXJ.15-16

•1at(cxis1cnc1) l.6-8: Il.li; VU.20; 30: VlIJ.7,

XVll.6

11· (non·) 1.6-7, 12: Vll.20 , 31;

Vlll.7-8, Il

-111111~11'!1 (substantiality) X. 16

.Ja (existcoce) 1.10

-111'1 (scmiem bcing) XVI. I , 4-~

-bho11a (existcncc) XXJ.17; XXlV.6, 16

4··bliii11a (non·existencc) XXJ.17:

XXJll.n

-bhu111 (come to be , real) Jl . 24-2~;

Vlll. 1-2, 7. 9-1 I

1P-bhu111 Il.24-2): VUJ. I, 3, 7, 9- ll

IRii (locarivc case of 11111111, pr.p. of 1111)

I.IO; IV.4: Vl.1- 2, 9: IX.9; X.2, 9;

XV.4, 9; XX . 1~ ; XXJV.16, 24;

XXV. 15; XXVl.7: XXVJI.~

fi· 11.7; 111.6: V.2; Vl.2; Vll.17;

Vtll.4-6: XV.9; XVll.30; XX.15;

XXJV. ~

Jfl/J'1, iry11- (ooblc troth) XXJV. l-2, 4.

20, 30

ti11e (rwo) XXIV.8-9

lou·sllf!l•rli· (-rclating to wocldly

convention) XXIV.8

p11ramiirthal'11j (-in terms of ultimacc

fruit) XXIV.8

s11tir!11 (idcnc.ical) JV.6

fi· (not·) JV.6

Jll"!nipii111 (occurrrcnce) XXVJ .5

Illf!tnibha (rcscmble) XXJIJ.8

Jllf!1Prakiii11Yilii (illuminatc) VIJ.8

lllf!IP'""rlli (commeoccmcnt, occurrcncc)

u.17

• '1· (non-) V.4 .

lflf!'Priip1111 fi· (noc rcacbed) XXJV.39: XXV.3

Jt1f!Jbh111111 (birth, occurrcnce) 111.7; V.4:

XV.I; XXJ. 1-~; 7-11: XXVl.3. 9

111".'bhim (occurrcd) XV.1; XXVll.12

111bhaga (simila.r) XVJI. 17

11i· (dissimiłar) XVlI.17

s1m111 (comparablc, cqual) 11. 17; lV.8-9;

VJ.2: XVl.2; XX.4: XXIJl.9; XXVJJ.14

saman11ihiil'l1 (attcntion) XXV1.4

sam'1Jl'1 (combined) l.11 ; Vll.2

1am1111111thita (ftxcd) XXJV.26

sam4ropa (atuibutioo) XVJ.10

JRmain'lll (associaterl} XXV.21

sam1111hi111, Rpratyay11· (issuing fonh from a

OOO·COndition) XVJl.29

11Jm111p11111111 (uisen)

prafftJ1J· (depc:ndently-) XXIV.19. 21

praty11y11- (-from a condition) XVll.29.

tihllrm4tihimna· (-from good and bad)

XXIV.3 ~

samutpatia (arising)

pr11fity'1 (dcpc:ndcot-)(sec prRl1/ya)

samutiaya (arising) XXJV.22. 25, 40

samudilhrt11 (sptcificd) XVU.27

Jflm11tibh'iita (cmcrgcnt) XXVll.12

111m11pi n'111 (a530Ciatcd) XXVll.1- 2

a· (non-) VJU.5; XXVI.11402 THE PHllOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE WAY

Jlll'Pll (snalcc) XXIV.11

s-iJ (all, cvciything) IV.7-9; VTI.19, 29;

VIIl.8; IX.6-7; X.U; Xlll.l; XIV.l;

XVll.17-18, ~4; XVlll.8; XXll.15;

XXIl!.15; XXIV. l, 6, 14, 20, 36, 39;

XXVl-2, 24

·Ariji (·acrivlcy) Vlll.6

-Rufi (·view$) Xlll.8; XXVlI.30

-dh11fl'J'UI (·things) Vll.29; XXV.22

-bhi1111 (-cxisrcncc) VU. 24; Xl.8,

XXVU.29

-Iw (-in the wodds) VII'. 11

s~111hi (everyway) ll. 14

111ha (with, togcthcr, simułtancous,

coocomitant) Vl.3, JO; XI.5; XXI.I, 3,

5-6

11· (without) VI.10

J11habl:la1111 (co-existence) VI.4-9

iiiltrirb/t111111 (rcalizatioo) XXJV.'27

. iiill[ilt11rm11 XXIV.2

rjitlhaflll (proof, achicving) X .9; XVll.11

iiitlhyll (10 be provcd) IV.8

a- (iocorrigiblc) Xlll.8

iii11J11gfi (harmo.ny) XX.l-4, 7-8, 23-:Z4

proty11ya- (-of conditions) XX.24

·ltrttJ (made by-) XX.24

sif!tpru'°~ (slmultancous) IX. 12

iiirdhaf?J, (togct:hcr, jointly) X.lS; XIV.4;

XXl.20

1it/</h4 (cstablislied, PtOvcd) VI.6-7; X.9. 11;

XXV.U; XXVll.18, 28

11- (not·) X.11

si<ldhi (csrablishmcm).II.21; VI.10; VIIf.12;

XlX.3; XXJ.6

a- (non-) Vll.33

pra- Vl.8

1u@T~(head) VIJ.31

rulthll (happy) XXI11. 21-.22

111suAfm11 (subtlcst) XXV.20

slmdha (aggregaccs) Xll.2; XVI.2; XXI.20;

XXll.l-2, 5-6; XXVU.22-24

11- (non-) XVIII.1

d11f?ltń11- (ma.u of suffccing) XXVI.9. 12

p11flca· (fivc-) XXVl.8

·viin (posses.«:d of-)"X:xU.l

slfi (woman) f'.6

slhlina (enduraiicc) vu.2~. 34

J1hit11 (codurcd, static) VlI.27

t1· VII.27; XIX.5

-bhiva vn.22

slhifi (duratlon, stasis) Vll.3, 23, 2), 33

spańll (roucb, roocact) XXIIl. 7-8; XXVl.5

Sllf!I• XXVl,3

sparś11'!a (toucb.ing) 111.1, 9

1mr1a (reminisccd) XVIl.3-5; XVUI. l l

vi- (co.ofused) XXlV.U

1v11 (own)

-/a(from irsclf) 1.1; XXl.13; xxm.20

-pudgtlla (-person) XIl.4

sv11pn11 (dream) VJI.34; XVll.33; XXIll.8

w11/:/Jii11a (sdf-nature) 1.3; XIIl.4; XV. 1- 4; 6,

11; XVll.22; XX.21; XXl.17; XXll.2 , 4,

9. 14, 16; XXlil.2, 6, 24-25; XXIV.16,

2Z-24, 26, 28, 32-33, 38

wrJbhii11111ilf? (inhctcntly) Vll.16

s11iibh'ii11ilt11 (posst'S$ing sclf-narure)

XVU.25

li· (wichout·) Xlll.3

11il?- (devold of•) 1.10; XVll.21; XXll.16

11if?11111bh'ii1111tva (abscasc of sclf-narurc)

Xlll.3

svay~ (self, oncself, own) X:Xlll.18

-ltiira (-causing) Xll.9

·krt11 (·Ca\ISed) Xll,1-2, 4, 7-8

-maya (made of.) I.13

11111rg11 (hcavcn) Vlll.6

hetu (cawc, ca11$al, rcason) 1.2, 7; VUl.4,

9-11; XV.1; ~1-6, 8- 16. 19-23

d· (non-) I.I ; XX.20; XXJV.16

helultil X.2.-3; XX.5

a· VIU.:3; XI.4-5; XII. l, 9; XX.6, 8;

XXVII.12

11he1111t11 IV.2

·tvll(causal efficacy) XX.22

heya {to be rcliaquished) XVII.15

VERBAL FOR.MS

ajyate (mll,dc knowa) IX.5-6; XXV.16

ade1ayal (taught) XXVII.30

adhigamifjyaJi (will anaia) XXIV.32

lldhigamyale (is act:aincd) XXJV.10

anupaiy111i (perccive) XXIV.16

apekfya (bcing eontingcnt} X.8- 12; XIX.1-2

llfl· X.12; XIX.3; XXIIl.10-11

11bhiifala (has said) XID .1

abhipravarlale (procced) 1.12; xvn,7' 9;

XXVl,12

TJbhitaf!JJkurule (forms) XXVl.1INDEX

abhi~11m, 11hhum (I cxisccd) XXVU. I , 3,

9. 13

1111aiJi (comprchcnd) V.6

aga&&hati (comes) x.n

ag11rnj11 (dcpcncling upon) XXVl.3

iipnuyill (shoułd reach) X.7

arabhyate, ar11bhye111 (begun, initiated)

11.12- B

lłfn'ty11, 1111· (not rcłying) XXJV . IO

afffyeta (should 1cly) XV.10

1cch.ui (inclinc, cxpcct) Vl.8-9

idhyat'iifl,I (being burnt) X.4

lhate (Is intcndcd) Vill. 1

ucyate (is spolcc of) U.11, 22- 23: Vll.15

111p11dyatt1 (u isc) 1.5; Vłl. 14

111p11riyt1111 VII.17

111p1111ya1e XX:.17-18

111pariyer1111 XXVll.23- 24

111padayate (producc) Vll.6; XVll.17-18

u1padayati Vll.18-19

u1pada:ye1VII.7-8, 18

111padayi111m VII.7

up11g11my11111m (shouJd adm ie) 111.5

upaliisyale (shown) 1.8; XXV.9

upapaliyatt (is appropda1e) Jl.3. 6-7, 9, 16;,

IV.4-6; V.4; VII.21, 23. 27, 29-31; Vllł.6;

I.2; XIV.5: XV.8; XVI.4; XVll.12; XX.19,

22; XXl.9-IO; XXll.), 14; XXlll .10;

XXJV.2, 13, 24, XXVll.3 . 7, 9. 16, 27

upapatJyate U.3, 9, Hi

11papaliye1e 11.23

_ 111m- XXVIJ.1j

11plllabhy11te (is obtaincd) JV.1

upadadyad (should be dependent) XXIJ.5

11p11riasyate (wlll be graspcd) XXlI.6

up11day11 (dependent) XXl1.2, ); XXV.9. 12;

XXVJI.30

1111- (not grasping. indcpendcm)

XXlJ.5-6: XXV.6. 8-9. 12

uhyate (is assumcd) XXV.17- Ja

ltathy111t1 (is callcd, is cxpressed, is said)

XV.3; XXII.li; XXlll.t

karoti (performs, doc:s) Vili .I, 3, 9-11

/lurute VIII,7

ltnyale VIJ.8; XVll.22; X:XIV.33

urifyate XXIV.33

.łuryat XJI.7

ll11rute XXIV. 13

ulpay11 (woułd thiaJc) XXIJ.13

llramate (proc~ds) VJI.l}

g11&&ha1i (gOC$, movcs) 11.8-11. 22-25;

XXVl.1

pra· 11.23

g11&&he1 X:XVll.19

gamyate li.1, 4

grhyalt' (is observcd, is graspcd) XIX.5;

XXJll.15

grh~ati XXlll .15

grhyeta XlX.5; X:X.3: XXVJJ. 7

ce1ayi11111 (vołitio112ł) XVU.2-3

chadayifyali (will conttal) Vll.12

1i1r1ayate' (produccs) Vll.4, 6. 13;

XX. U- 16

ja1111ye1 VII. U ; XX.10-11, 23

janayifyati VIL5; XVU.6; XX.21

ja11yaJe XX.7

j1111iy111 (should be known) Ili.9

jay111e (be, arisc, be boro) IV.8-9:

XVll. 15;

XX.1- 2; XXlll.20; XXVU.I5

j11ye1a Xl.3; XXVl1. IO

jiry11111 (age) XJll.5

1lr111łlrtya (having separated 11.6-7; lll .6

li[{hati (stays, is statiooary) 11.15- 17;

Vll.22, 24; XVll.6, 18

riattva (having passcd on) XXV.5

11· XX.6

drsyate (is sceo) IV,I ; XXI. U

dr1ya1am XJV.2

drff11a, adrstva, XX. I I

riesyate (is taugbt, is prnched) XXJV.10

de1ay11mt1Ja, Dcdicacory Verses

de111yi111m XXJV. 12

droA,y11ti (sec) lll.1

dha/qyati (bums) X .)

nan„yate (is des1roycd) XXVU .26-27

yj. XXVll.26-27

1111m111yami (I bow reverently) XXVll. 30

nllJti (docs not cxis1) 1.2; ll.22, llł . 6 , 8;

403404 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

lV. ~; Vl.4: Vll.9. 32-33; VIII.2: XID.3,

7; XlV.6-7; XVI.2, 7; XVll.29; XIX.6;

XXJ .1, 7. 21; XXIl.2, 4, 6, 8- 9;

XXlll.10-11; XXJV.1, 20, 22:

XXV.1-2, 8, 19: XXVU.8, 19

111111111/i XXIV.3

ninl.tlh,11111 (ccascs} Vff.26, 18: XVll.19;

XVll.>; X:X.)-6; XXJII.23: XXVl.12

nirudhyllllii XVllJ.4

11iro11µ111 XX.17-18

n1r.:lir11nti (posit) X .16

11itW1r111111 (produces) 1. 7

nirvll!Jllli (cease) X.5

ni,-,#{y11111i (J will be free) XVI.9

"i!i&yote (is infuscd) XXVl.2

lllhof'!i!Joti (will destroy) vn. 11

pori.łlllp11y11Se (umcclvc) Vl .8

PlllJl11i (perccives) 111.2, 4--5 ; V.8; XVIll.3;

XXIV. 16, 40

posyimti XV.6; XXII. U

. ptt.syomllh VUI.12

Prdip11J11ti (illuminaccs) VIl.9

Pńl&M,mllhe (souc) XXlV:tB

Pfllfa11pyau (makcs known) IX.3; XIX. 5;

XXll.5. 10

prt1fa11P11Jemahi XXlll.10-ll

pra}noydle (is known) Xl. l

pra1i/J11dh11re (conmdicc) XXJV. 5- 6, 17, 23,

36

Pf1111°tyll (depending, dcpendcm, dcpendcocly)

1.5; UJ.7; Vl. l ; Yll.15- 16; Vlll.12; XII.2;

XIV.5; XVIII. IO; XJX.6; XXll.J;

XXlll.l-2, 6, 10--11: x:xv.9: XXVJ.4;

XXVll,2.3--24

11· XXIV. 19. 21, 31: X:XV.9

prlllliy11te (givcs over co) Xll.5

pr11p11„c11Janti (obscss) XJ.6; XXIl.15

pfllbh11V1111ti (arisc) XI.6

pro11~omi {I will expound) XVU. 13

Pfl1Vllrl41e (proceeds} 1.12; V.J; Vlll.12;

XV!ll.12; XXVI.7-9; .JO..'Vll.22

pr.u11jyo1e (wiJI, follow, fimply) Il.4, 10; IV.2;

Vlll.6, 8; X. 3; XV.1j; XVll.23; XX.9. 18;

XXl.14, 16; XXN.f. 20, 31: XXV.4;

XXVll.11-12 I

ptrJ.J11jye1e ll.61 11, 19; V. I; XX.7

prasojyeran XVII.16

pr.rhif'!Oli (bcstows) XIJ.6

pf'flh11.1y111i ( rdlnąuish) XXJll.24- 2)

prahiyer11n XXllI.24-2S

pradurbho11e1 (would appcar) XX. 7- 8

pmp11yqya1i (will lead to) XX.IV. 25

propf!ule (rcach) Yll. 10

prapf!uy11dX.6-7

Pf"llPJll, O· Vll. IJ

prop!J11le X.5

prety11 (having gooc bcyond, in the nat life)

XVll.1. n

badhniyod(sbould be bound) XVl.7

ŃbÓll/lre (ha.s said) IU.8

blldhyale (is bound) XVI.5-ó

badhyonle XVl,5

bn1v111e (ca.Il, say) V.5

brumah XXJV.7

b/:Jajyerrm (wece to be dcstroyed)

XXVll.23-24

bha11111i (comcsr to be, eKists, i.i) l.10; lll.4ć

Vll. 16; IX.I, 10; X.4; X:Xll.14:

X.XV.1 7- 18; XXVll.3. 9. 15

bh11~11nti XXlll.4

Bho11i!Jati U-7: UJ.8; Vl.2, 4; IX.2. 4;

X.9; XllI.6; XV.2-3. !>: XVl.9;

XVtl.30: XVUI.2: XJX.t, 6; XX,17;

XXI.2-4; XXIl.3; XXlll.9. 12;

XXIV.5. 30, 38; X:XV.7: XXVJl.6

bh11vifyami xxvn.i' J4

óhl1llel l.11 : 11.1!>: VI. I; Vlll.3; JX.8-9;

X .1; Xl . 2~ ; Xll.3; Xlf!.6-7; XIV.6;

XV. I, 8; XVl.3. 7; XVJl.22: XVIII.I ;

xx.~6. B-9: XXI.u. 14, 19;

XX.ll.4-5, 11; XXlll.16; XXJV.37;

XXV.5. 11-14; XXVl.7; XXVU.4, IO,

12. 16, 23- 24

bhave1a1n Vl.3

bh11vy111e XXlV.24

m1111111 (having rcfl~ctcd) XXIV.12

manye (1considcr) X.16

1'11J&ya1e (is releascd) XVI.' , 8

m1"yan111xvr.5

m1Jcye111XXVl. 7

mn'yale (dies) XXl.20

mriy4l11 Xl.5

ytitiJ111e (proper. pcuincnt) J.6-7; ll.18; Ul.4:

Vll.20, 25; IX.8; X.li ; Xl.5; XID.5:XlV.8; XVII.24: XXlV.14: XXV.10-ll;

xxvn.22. 25-26

y11fj11nte XXXIV.27

:10Jy11te x.vn.13

"1k,11yet (should be indicatcd) XVIJ.19:

XJX.4

11°"'11'li (dcdaic) IX.1

1111ek1 IV.B-9

ł'111'tle (l salutc) Dedicatory Vcrscs

111u/p11ye1 (should think) IV. 5

v1blpy111e 11.14, 20; XVl. lO; XXII!.7

11ikil1'~11Ji (faocy) Vl.8

11ij'1111tl1'li (uodcm.and) XXIV.9

11ijaniy111 VIII. 11

INDEX

11rr1j11nli (function) XIV.1, 3

sakyam (possiblc;, :1blc) XXIV.28

.std1111y11d VII.7

saf!lfi/fhtt (would remain) XXVll.10

Jllf!Jnilli1a1e (cntcrs) XXV1.2

saf!11tilli!!e XXVI.2

santi (arc, ClCist) 1.4; Xl.7

It1f!1PraR11Jt1JaU (illuminatcs) Yll.12

Jt1f1JPN1111rtate (procttds) XXVl.~5

Sllf!1Pr11pf!oli (rcach) X.6

405

saff!bhilllanli (occur) Xll.2; XXIll, 1-2, 17-18

Jll'f?1b"411i!Jllli XXVll.29

s1111UU1hig11nl11f!J (to rcalizc) XXIV.28

J11m11<kti (uiscs) XXVU.6

11itly111t(iscvidcm)l.l, IO; 11.21, 25; V.1, 5: s11m11tle!Jllle XXlV.22

111m11p111rity11 (bascd upon) XXJV.8

I11f!111irlyate (is cvidcot) 1.14; VIl.17

1ao/-111r111i (t1'11nsmigratc.s) XVI.2

VU.31: Vlll.4-5: IX.6-7, 10-13: Xl.8;

Xll.10; Xlll.4: XlV.~4 . 7-8: XVlll.3;

XIX.3, 5: XX.12- 14; XXl.3-6, 8;

XXUl.11, 13. 15, 21-22; )Q(IV.4, 19, 21,

23- 25, 30, .34-35. 39; xxv.~-8. t G, 20

111rn- V.2

llirlyPntll lX.ll

11itly11nte XXlll.2, 6: XXJV.3

11itlya1 Vlll.13

vinasay1m1i (ruin) )Q{IV,11

11ip11~y11ti (matures) XVU.25

111pr11f!ll!Jl1ti (pcrishes) XVll.21

vióhavayet (should be critically cxamincd)

VJil. 13

11~/PSlltl (rdlcct) XXlU.18

virutihyante (arc c.ontradictcd) XVU.24

11iJ011te (is idcntified) XXVIl.4

vihanyase (arc tormcntcd) XXJV.7

11et1i (comprchend) XX.IV.7

vy11t1' (ccases) XXVll.6

St1f!Ullrt1trli XVI.l

JITf?11t1rify111i XVI.2

saf?Uuroti (forms) XXVl. 10

sitlhy111i (is csrablishcd) Vl.B-9; XV.4-~ ;

XXJll.4; XXV.15

stilhyate X. l 0--11

sitlhy111ah XXIJl.3

1itftihyaum X .lO

Jel!)ati (could be) VII.33

1lh11SJ11le (rcmaias) X.~

sy111 (would be, wece ro be) U.20; JV.3: V.l ;

Vl. 5: VJH.2: lX.9; X.l : XJ.4- 5; Xll.7-9~

XIU.4, 7; XV.8; XVII.16. 23, 26, 30;

XX.20; XXl.19; XXIV.1&: XXVI.7:

XXVU.11, 15 , 19, 21, 25

Jy11111m X.7; XVl.8; XlX.2

sy11r Vll.2; XIl.3; XVJl.12: XX.4406 TuE PHILOSOPHY OF THE Mroou; wAy

GENERAL INDEX

Abhidharrna, srarus of 3, 6, 174; period of

20; ca.dy Buddhisrn and canonical 22- 26,

29, 3H; theory of conditions 28, 38, 106,

107. U0-114: catcgories of the 37, 132,

147 , 193. 244 , 245 , 275; interprctation of

the 6, 125, 140, 141 , 160, 171-173. 178.

179, 252, 278, 280, 284, 323. 331.

Abhidharma litcrature a.nd ccxts, 6, 20, 25 ,

26. 38, 181. 323.

Abhidharrnika 32, 107.

Absolucc 2), 47. 116 , 272. 389, For adjectival

usc, sec undcr cxisccnce. diffcrcnce,

ldcntity, truth, reality. etc.

absolut.ism 86, 128, 340.

absoludstic (vicws, sy5tems, traditions, etc.)

1, 16. 20. n. 69. 85, 90, 148. 2s5 , 326,

328, 336, 337. 342, 3H . 388.

Acela-lcou11pa-s11111J 45

urion (.łorma. ltn]"ii, etc.) 29, 30, 33, 42-44,

46, 51, 53, 54. 55, 56, 59. 61, 64, ~8. 69,

74. 90. 91. 128, 133. 162, 180-187' 195.

197, 205, 218, 219, 236. 243-2)1 ,

253-258, 260, 261, 263, 266, 261, 2n,

276, 332. 3}9. 3H- 353. 380, 383;

impcrisbability of 30, 55, 251 , 254, 255.

agem (ulf, karaka, etc.) 29, 42-44, 46, 55,

69. 83,.90. 105. 128. 180-187. 195- 197.

205, 214, 221, 259-261. 302, 339, n2,

37), 380. 195.

aggrcgatcs (1.ł11„Jh11) 18, 21, 29, 36-40, 46,

)2, 56. 64, 132, 140, 144. 147, 148,

179-181, 193. 196. 211, 212, 222, 236,

237. 263, 264, 301-307. 315. 374, 379.

381, 387. 388.

altrui.~m (absolutc) 4, 91: altruistic 91.

analysis 21 . 22, 40, 49-50, 61, 125 , l28m

129. 143-147, 1')3- 156. 159. 167, 174,

224-226, 228. 277. 285. 293. 297. 30.8',

322, 349, 368, 386.

anoihilacion (ucr:heda, etc.) 9. 13. 14, 19, 29,

33. 4), 46. 51. 54. 55. 59, 67. 75. 79, 81 .

88, 101 , 21 9, 220, 234. 238. 254, 264,

267. 269. 273, 274, 287, 292. 298-300,

362. 378, 382, 383. 357

aonihilationism (iaclJet/41iiid11, etc.) 16, 92.

131. 184. 212. 218, 232. 236, 246. 259.

267. 292 . 298. 299.

annihil:uionist (uccheri11vitli. etc.) 184. 185.

219. 247, 56.

ar/Mnl 24 , 25, 72.

1triyap11nyuona-111J1a 17 , 240, 336, 240, 332.

Aryadcva 102.

Asoka 2, 2).

asscrtion, Abhidbarrna 193; absolute 365,

Buddha's 159. 379; Nigicjuna's 42, 43, 55 .

56. 92. 114, 122, 123. 136. 142, 205, 210.

2}6. 265. 291. 340, 341, 347; racion:i.list

81 ; Sarvisrivida 109; subscantialist 71, 120,

123. 182, 383; Vicslpurriya 197, 230.

attainment, nou-amunrncnt (pr#pli/

11priipl1) 127 . 241. 242. 251 , 318. 349.

amibutc 17. 43, 47, B. 62, 122. 124, 127-

129. 150, 155, 190, 222, 2H, 239, 258,

371.

bc:coming (bh111111) 10, ll. 15, 26, 32. H,

62-64. 72. 74, 78. 88, 218, 237. 241, 294.

298-301, 337, 361, 362. 370, 373. 374.

H6. 379. 385. 390: sucwn of 62, 218,

241 . 299. 301.

bcginning (absolutc) 44, 61, 79. 2o6. 207.

259. 271, 292, 293. 368.

Berkeley, George 112, 142.

Bhogavadglfii \9, 20, .238.

Bh:lvavivckll 26, 101, 105. ·

borihua111111 24, 25, 53. 91. 348.

bondage (b1mdhana. etc.) 9, n, 18, 20.

2.9-H. 40, 51-53. 56, 57 , 72, 76, 77, 80.

85, 88, 92. 133. 235. 238-243, 304-307,

3412, 356. 359. 368-370, 374.

Brahmajii/11-111/trmf.t li , 79. 80. 188. 385.

Candrakrrci 17, 26, 28. 29. 40, 86. 96. 101.

102, 105-107, 112, 114. 134, 138, 153.

154. 189. 199. 201, 203, 207, 234. 350,

251, 255. 381.

causallty 31 . 34-36, 68. 73. 77, 94, 95, 97.

137. 143. 169. 174, 182 , 191 , 244, 347.

356; mctaphysical thco.cies 36. 77.

causation 22, 34, )0, 61, 78, 94, 97, 108,

114. 116, 134. 143. 144. 162, 163, 165,

166. 170, 171, 2ll. 215. 216, 273, 276,

282, 283, 286. 327, 369; ~ternal causation

14, 27. 28. 32. 46, 1o6. 107, 115. 174.

176. 204. 259. 260. 298; sclf-causatlon 14,

27. 28, 32', 39. 46, 106. 107. 115, 168,

169. 174, 176, 204. 212. 214, 258-260.

280, 281 , 298.INDEX 407

cercaincy (absolute, etc.) n. 79, 84, 188,

256.

change 8, 27, 28; 31, 34-36, 41, 32, 54,

102, 125 , 131, 134, 159, 160, 163-165,

173-175, 178, 179. 182, 192. 204, 220-

222, 23()-233. 263, 273. 274, 286, 295,

346', 369.

clairaudience 8}.

dalrvoyance 83.

cogito, sec under Dcsca([Cs.

co-existeli.ce 155-H8.

commitmeot (pralijn'ii) 92, 93.

conccptuafuatoo 49, 56, 57, 66, 129, 143,

209, 249, 263.

conditionalicy 18, 30, 271, 388.

Confucianisrn 8.

confusion (tnrfii, 11UJha, etc.) 46-48, 59, 66,

67, 72. 82, 90, 217, 219. 297, 312. 313,

323, 332; big bloomiog buzzfog 92, 159;

cognitive 316, 318.

consciousness (11ijffiin11, viftifii1!11) 10, 11, 18,

38, 49. 72, 81, 84, 111, 1H. 136-138,

140, 147, !)I, 225, 261 , 264, 280, 386,

371-373, 381; self· 379; self·pt"tcc:iving 37;

tiansmigr.uing 235, 236, 252, 380.

contiogcnce (apek.fii) 198-204, 276,

convcntion (satr111rtil sammuti1 ryavahiiral

11oh'iiN, prajiiapti/paflfłatti, nif'gtti, etc.)

14, 55, 69, 241, 256; absolute reality 17;

dependent 86; idea! 330-~32, 334. 340;

linguistic 18, 19, 35; morał 88, 89; woildly

68, 330-332, 334. 340, 352. 355. 366.

dcath(matll'fll) 9-ll, 16. 45. 47, 51,

57-59. 63, 64, 66, 73, 76, 78, 159, 173.

174, 178, 197. 207-209. 218, 219. 238,

253, 254, 270, 292-295, 301, 303, 309,

358, 365, 366, 368, 374, 374.

dcfilcmem (Ń./efa) 55, 56, 112, 224, 225, 256,

258, 259. 262, 266. 278. 313-315, 324,

325, 335, 353. 356.

depeodence. principle of 12, 13. 15, 22, :B.

37, 38, 43, 45, 46, 51, 33, 61, 64, 65, 68,

69. 77. 82, 88, 93. 108, 109, 124, 126,

137, 145. 146, 154, 158, 162, 163: 165,

168, 190, 191. 200, 212, 213, 227, 231.

236. 252, 254, 273. 279. 306. 316, 342,

361, 380. 388.

dependent uising (pr(l/fty11111mNJpiJfŃI,

pa(iccasarnuppida) 1, 2, 15, 16, 21, 22,

27, 31, 32. 34. 42 , 49-51, 66, 68-70, 72,

78, 80, 82, 85- 87, 93, 101-103, 114, 131 ,

139, 142. 146. 155, 167-169, 187' 188,

216, 221, 226, 228-231, 255. 267, 269,

272-274, 290. 295. 320, 331-333. 336,

339-341. 343, 352-354, 362, 384, 357.

dependendy arisen (prali1ya1amu1panna,

p11ficc4s11mupp11nnd) 15, 21, 34, 42, 48-SO,

55, 59, 69, 70, 82, 84, 85, 93. 114, 212,

220, 235, 236, 267. 273, 274. 313, 331,

332. 340, 341, 343. 368, 377, 380, 390.

Ocscancs, Renc (Cartesian) 37. 43. 119;

cogito ergo sum or Ćogiio 37, 43, 81-84,

92, ll:l. l33, 134, )37, 164, 188, 189,

191. 264, 266, 379.

dcterminism 16, 30; detcuninistic 235, 347,

}48,

Dhammac11kkappa11alta1111-1111111 l-2.

Dham11iap4d.rJ 20, 54, 91.

dharma (dham._1714), Abh[dhanna concepcioo

of. 20-21, dharnt4.(ihatu 8; docuioe,

discourse 25, 329. 331. 392; foUI different

uscs 15-16; ethical 43 , 68, 88, U3, 1°83,

243. 257. 330, 335, 336, 340, 349, 366;

metaphysical 18, 19, 22-24, 32, 39. 77.

84. 141. 172, 176. 177, 369; life

( ~janman) 2)3, 275 ; nacurc ( = dh11rrnali)

55, 58, 268, 269; ontological 4', 8, 12, 19.

21, 22, 24, ~4. '!>7. 40, 51. 55, 56, 67, 70,

71, 83-85, 90·~ llO, 11, 132, 140-142. Ul,

153. 181, 217-220, 224, 234, 235. 273,

286, 288, .Hl, 336, 354, 390, (See also

unde( demcnrs.)

diffcrence (absolute, real, etc.) 12, 16, 23,

33, 40, 50, H. 29, 64, 76, 81, 92, 101 ,

106, 108, 111 , 116, 128, 129. 136. 137.

149. 160, 168, 182, 191, 192, 197. 199.

202, 211, 221. 225-228, 230, 231, 23~ ,

244. 2ts . _259. 262, 261, 273. 274, 276,

281, 284. 288, 289, 296, 304, 306-308,

310, 312, 360, 362. 365, 366, 381-385 ,

387.

disdples (Śrii11aka, ecc.) 2-4, 17, 19, n , 26,

31, 32. 79, 80, 90, 133. 23~. 236, 240,

243. 249. 250, 274, 292, 380, 387.

discrimination H, 56, 59, 88, 92, 126, U9,

143. 193. 266.

dispositions (sarrz.skiira, sllńkhar11) io-12, 14,

18, 40, 46, 49. 65. 66, 72, 73, 82, 84, 1·38 ,408 THE PHILOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE WAY

144, 159, 181, 217-220, 224, 225, 324,

352, 353, ~70, 371, 374-376, 378, 381 ;

appeasement of (-fllffUlth(J, ·t1Pfli11ma) 4,

47, 48, 92, 152, 335-238, .264, 308, 320,

336, ;15, 376; ccssation or waning of

(-k,rdyd) 218, 219, 238, 375; lump of

(-p11 łlj4) 180; uansmigrątc 52, 235, 236;

unconditioncd by 6,, 73.

discinccion (11i1e!llf!ll, etc.) 7~76, 114, 121,

127, 129, 130, 14(), 141, 149, 151, 158,

172, 173, 199. 233, 239.. 258, 280, 281,

283, 285 , 349, 359, 366, 367, 369;

Humcan cxplllnacion 72.

Dogcn 257.

dogmatism 18, 80, 86, 92, 219, 223.

dream (svapna) 179. 182, 316.

clcmcots, adveoticious 241; discrctc 22, 381;

of Cllpcdcncc 15, 21, 29, 37:-40, 52, 83,

132, 140, 142, 147-l H, 153, 154, 235-

237, 261; non-subscanciality of(-nt1iriitmy11)

24, 29, 37. 40, 5l. 84, 181, 235, 235;

subjcctivc 313; subsrantiałist thcory of 4,

7, 24, 84, 140-142, 147-151. 192, 193.

197, 198, 216, 332. (See ~lso dharma.)

cmpiricist 8, 33, 39. 81, 83-85, 113, 115,

ll9, 132, 188. 258. 271, 278, 282, 285,

286, 293. 341, 342, 357, 368.

cmptiness (h1.0yat1.) 5, 6, 29, ,48, 49, 53. 55,

56, 67-7 1, 77, 80, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 93.

144- 132, 182, 22(}-223, 231•. 254, 266,

268, 288, 319. 320, 326-328, 330, 331,

335. 337-341, 343, 347, 350, 352, 355,

368, 390.

empty (sun~) 14, 49, 64, 67, 70, 71, 85, 86,

89, 93. 103, 145 , 220, 222, 223. 258, 259.

261, 262, 267, 287, 288, 296, 307-309.

318, 319. 326-328, 330, 331, H5.

337-342, 350, 3H, 3B, 355, 356, 368,

375.

cnłightened one 12, 47 , 58, 63, 65, n. 87,

30.2, 321, 330, 347' 348, 356. 249. 274,

313.

cnłightnmcnt 1, 9, Il, 14, 17, 18, 63, 92,

138, 240, 327, 335, 336, 323, 375, 376.

cternal, life 63, 74; sdf 12, 20, 30, 37. 43,

H, 56, 57, 64, 67, 78, 79, 106, 191, 219,

222, 236, 238, 262, 263, 269, 298. 379.

383.

ctc:rnalism 16, 92. 109, 131. 184, 212, 218,

228, 234. 236, 246, 259, 267, 292, 298,

299. 353. 377.

cternalist 247, 79.

exiSrencc (absolutc, etc. bh'ii11111 11JfŹti111, etc.)

1, 3, 7-11, 13. 14, 17 , 21, 24, 27, 29, 30.

'2- 34, 36, 39, 40, 42-46, 50, 51, 54, 56,

57' 61-65, 67-69. 71-76. 78. 79. 82, 85 ,

88, 103, 108, 113-115, 125, 131, 132,

1)(}-152. l.5~158 , 163, 164, 176, 177,

181, 184, 185, 188, 193, 194, 201, 202,

205. 220. 221 . 228, 231-234, 235, 236,

241. 246, 261, 264, 269, 272. 272. 276,

239.. 294, 296, 298, 299, 301, 303, 309,

310, 314, 322-324, 326, 329, 330, 332,

339. 342, 344, 347, 350. 356-365, 369,

377, .378, 382, 383, 390~ non-existcnce

(artrl, 11bha1111, etc,) l, 7, 9- 11, 14', 29, 32,

39. 40, 42, 44, 50, 62, 67- 69, 73, 74, 78,

82, 88, 103, 108, 131, 15(}-152 , 154, 163,

177, 181, 184, 185, l93, 194. 220, 221,

228, 231-234. 269. 272, 298, 299, 303,

309, 314, 324, 326, 329, 342, 347, 357,

358, 360-365, 355.

cxpericocc: l, 12-15, 19, 21, 37, 47~9. 51,

56. 60, 69, 78, 82- 85, 89. 92, 93, 108,

ll l. 130, 139, 145-147. 153, 156, 159.

189. 192-194. 216, 219, 220, 234, 261 ,

262, 264, 271. 278, 282, 308, 313, 316,

319, 320, 323, 331, 335. 337, 34'<>-342,

350, 384, suc:un of 192, 349.

finite (11n111) 292, 368, 378, 387-390.

fue (11gnt) 39, 140, 151, and fueld (i11dh11t111)

44, 134, 135 , 29$-205, 222, 227, 230.

freedom (11irvii~11, nibb'iin11) l, 4, 15. 16, 18,

21, 29-31, 40, 41, 43, 47, 49. 52, 53, 56.

n. 59. 63. 6~77. 80; 85 . 88, 89. 90, 92,

97. 102, 103, 138, 153, 160, 169. 184,

187, 218, 23S, 238, 24<>-243, 251, 266,

268, 269, 299. 300; 307, 321, 328, 329.

332-336, 346-349. 353, 354, 355-370,

373. 374. 376, 379, 385, 387, 390, 391.

Fruit (cffc"Ct, consequence, etc. 11r1h11/ 11tth11„

pńa/11, vipak11) 14, 15, 16, 19. 29, 33. 43 ,

5:3. 55 , 61. 68. 69. 73. 77. 80, 85 , 88,

89, 108-110, 183, ł84, 187, 189. 243, 288,

290, 291, 35<>-335. 339, 347, 348, 3H,

352, 356, 357, 366, 383: ultimatc orINDEX 409

highcst (p11rrzmiirtha, p11rrzm1111ha) 16, 19.

68, 69, 73, 77, 80, 88, 89, 184, 187, 331-

33), 352, 356, 3.57. 366.

grasping (upiidii1111) 10-13, 38, 40, 42. 48,

56, 63, 79. 80, 92, 102, 138. 187 ' 204.

205, 218. 219, 234, 236. 237, 239, 240.

263. 266, 304-309, HB-321, 329. 363.

373, 374, 376, 379-381, 389. 390,

Gudmunsen, Chris 98.

harmony (silmll~n. _ctc.) 30. 59. 61 , 226, no.

280-283 . 286, 290, 29 1.

human personaliry 68, 70.ja2. 85. 369;

Abhldharnu analysis 21 , 181; analyscd into

aggrcpccs 38. 39, 263, 264: annihilatlon of

9; bondagc and &ccdom 29. 30, H-59.

dispositions and 47; mctaphysiw view 19;

non-subscanóaliry 51, 52, 61, 62, 67 .

292; Sarvistivada and Sauuincika vicws 25,

84; sclf-consciousocss and 1.H; six clcmcms

147; survival of 62, 77. 78. 90, 92, 236,

in, 369, 3n, 378. 383; cwclvc faccors 1.

7, IO, 11 . 13. Z5, 77;

Hume, David 81, lH. 156, 224 , 338.

ideał 3. 4. 15, 24, 25 , 63, 88, 89, 91, 332,

334, 335. 341 , 353, 355, 36~

idcncity 16, 22, 33, 34. 36. 50, 51 , 56. 59.

64, 75-77, 81 , 101, 105. LOB, 111. 116.

128. 129, 136, 143. 144. 149, 1S5, 156,

))8, 166, 169. 171 . 177. 178, 191. 192,

195-197. 202, 204, 213, 221 , 226-228,

230, 23'1, 239. 245 . 254. 259, 262, 273,

274, 276, 277, 281. 284, 288-290, 296.

298, 306, 307, 310, 312, 3)1, 360, 365-

367, 378--382, 348, 384. 387.

igno~ncc (a11iriya) 10, 11 . 14, 82, 163, 259 .

324, 370, 371, Jn. 376.

illwion (nriyii) 179, 182, 316, H 7.

illusory 42, 179.

immortality (amr14) 45, 63. 208. 218, 382.

!nada 3. 20, 38, 53, 55, 64, 70, 94~97 . 120,

144, 160, 216, 217' 230. 232, 191 , 237'

243, 248. 250. 268, 270, 271, 294, 296.

310, 323, 327. 329. 330. 337, 340, 344.

345. no. 358, 367, 369. 370, 374.

infinitc 161, 162, 170, 308, 368, 378, 387-

390; rcgrcss 161 , 162. 170.

inhcrcnce 33, 109, 276.

lti11utlllkll 313.

Jaina 14, 244.

Jaini, P. S. 350.

James, William 35, 47, 60, 88, 97. 192. 219,

308. 334, 337' 381.

jayawidacma, N. A. 94. 95.

Kaa:iyana (Kiryayana) 7. 8, 10, li, 50, 78,

82, 103, 108, 184, 212, 220, 221, 228,

232. 271, 272, 294, 314, 320, 342, 356,

569. 370.

K4cliiya11agollil-1uffa (.Kiityiyanivavida) 1, 5,

1. 1~14 , 25 , 26, 29, :n. 63. 1s. 79, 81.

232.

Kant, Immanuel 33, 322.

karma (sec undcr action).

Karmmiridhiprwral!a 29, 55, 250.

Kii1yap11-p11n1'11rta 4, 6, 7, 24, 25.

K11(h11 Up1111i{llri 189.

K111h'iJ111111h11 2, 21. 23, 24.

Kityiyan (sec undcc Kaccayana),

Kil'jiiy11nii111111iria (sec undcr Kacc#y1111agotlll·

SU/Ili).

lmowlcdgc, of the beginning 61; of

dependent arisiog 21, H 11 339; iodc·

pendent or nor ocher depcndcoc (11p11r11-

pra1yay11) 10-11 , 59, 271, 272; empicical

knowlcdgc 381 ; going beyond expcricncc

320; foundation of 82, 264. 372: Jcading to

frccdom 92; of the future 159; of the past

206; hlghcr (abhińflii) 261 , 262; Jamcsean.

cxplanacioo 47; limications of 377; mctaphysical 285, 332; of objcct, etc. 133. 148;

not omniscicncc 159. 358: pragmatic

dcfinition 219: as prajflil or y11thiibhu111°

jflina 2, 11 , 12, 67, 80, 274. 285, 294,

331. 342; sourcc of84; transccnding che

&cnscs 269; of ulcimatc fruit 335:

Upani.~11dic view 63; ViiuTpuuiya dcfini.t.ioo

196.

KumirajTva 3, 8, 39. 50, 120. 18)„243, 322,

371. 38 l , 382,

1."11i11111ir1111r1 366.

lifc-proccss (1111JJiira) 44, 45, 52, B , 55, 61,

74-76, 9 1. 206-208, 210, 211, 241 , 243.

246, 252, 254, 256, 263. 292. 293. 366,410 THE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE V/!AV

367 . 37). 376, 386.

M.1ulh11pi'! r!'4-f11/t11 3 7 3.

Mah'i111tJSt11 24.

Mahiylina 1-8, 20, 24. 25. 59, 69- 71. 75,

77. 82 , 90, 9l, 94. 174, 257. 329. 348,

350. 366, 370; Mahaylinist 7. 53.

Matc:riaJisu l, 9. l4, 19, 39. 40.

maucr, Abhid\larma concepcion 193; early

Buddhist view 39, 40, 14()-145; meta·

pbysical view 9, t9, 39. 40; primordial 44;

Sarvlistiviid:l view 49, 111- 1}2, 140-145.

meraphysician(s), Buddhist 5. l5, 28, 41,

43- 46, 49. 51, H. 55. 60-62, 68, 74. 76, 88,

114. 127. 128, 133, 137. 146. 147. 149,

151 , 159. 160, 174, 175. 178. 189. 193.

194, 202, 207, 208, 213, 224-227 , 231 .

232, 236, 241, 260, 265. 267. 269, 273,

216. 218, 292, 313, 321, 328, 330, :n2,

H5, 337-339. 341, 343. 345, .349, 355,

357-359. 361-363, 366; r.caditional Ind.iw

62, 68, 189, 22~227 .

middle pach l , 2, 4, 7, 16. 18, 25 , 69, 78,

86, 9()-92, 183. 267 , 320, 339·323.

Mitchell, Dorutld 97.

Mogga!Tpurca-tissa 2, 5.

momc:nrs (theory of) 22, 23, 28, 35. 49, 54.

6()-62, 82, 112. 113. 125, 127 , 128, 131 ,

134, n6. 161-164, i66, t6s, 110. 112-

116. 191 , 192, 206, 213 , 222 . 236, 246,

2)2, 253. 278, 279. 282, 284. 288, 298.

300, 301, 319. 349.

monl, pc:rfcction U , 59, 90, 366; puri~ry 256,

257: rcsponsibility 9. 14, 27, 30. 46, 62,

64, 70, 85, 90. 180, 181. 184, 187, 235,

243, 352, 369, 383; truth 13, 59. 334.

motion 36, 38, 68, 82, 119, 121, 126-Bl,

167, 203, 204; movcmc:ot 3. 19, 24,

34-36. 118-131

multiplicicy 181, 182. 364.

Mu„tjlu UpflJ'lf!ad 189.

Muni, T. R. V. 4, 7, 28, 33, 86. 94. 183.

Nabmura, Hajime 95, 340.

ncgatioo 45, 102, 143, 169. l!H. 197, 252,

269, 295. 345. 365, 379; fourfold 58, 270.

OOO·COOtCptuaJ 32, 66, 87, 88, 203, 268,

269.

objcct (cin!(1111y11, 11Ź!f1J4. c:tc.) 50, 59, 76. 84,

88, 112, 131, 133. 136-138. 140, 148. 154,

192. 224. 266, 271, 320, ;B2, 372;

appeasement of 40, 87, 264, 308.

obscssioo (prt1jJ11iica). 18, 48, 56, .59, 86. 153.

266, 267, 270, 272, 308, .BG. 337:

appeasement of 40. 84, 101- 103. 152, 264,

369; illoof from 310; c:Jimination of 18,

freedom from 31: root of 43.

omnisciencc: 47, 63. 92, 1.59. 219, 227, 358.

ontology 81 , 83. 323.

ot.hc:c-narure (p:ln-bhiva) 23, 28, 33, 37, .50,

H , .57, 64, 67, 74. 76, 77, 81, 83, 88, 107.

114, 212, 21.5, 229-232, 272, 302-304,

3o6. 307. 382.

Pirileyyau·n#lll 377.

pc:rtn:lOCOCe 19, 29, 45, 51, }4, 5), 59, 81,

88, 101. 160, 236, 237, 24), 253, 256,

267 . 272- 274, 287, 292. 294. 295. 319,

320. 387. 388.

pecson (pudgala) 23. 24, 26, 29, 36, 44 , 4.5,

51 , 52„ 62, 83-85, 105, 126, 130, 180,

181, 189. 195-197. 200, 202, 21}-215.

221, 222 , 235-239. 299. 311. 312, c~cc

also under humllfl personalicy).

personilliru 23, 36. 37.

pc:rvcrsion (11ip11ry'ii.J11) 312- 31.5, 318-32 1,

322, 543, 312, 313. 3 15, 316, 319,

321, 322- 324, 326, 327.

po1eotialj1y 108, 161, 170, 246, 349.

Powsin, L de: la Vałlc:e 97, 101, 127, 213,

377. 356.

power (ś11h1) 81. 108, 133. 261 , 262.

pngmatic conccption, of conditions (pratya)'11)

109, 110; of emptincss 330; of language

308; of moraliry 89. 2n, 334. 366; of

philosopby 8; of truth 16. 19, 67, 80,

85, 159. 219. 224, 225. 227„. 229. 272,

332.

Pmj11'i1pirami'J7i-1iilr11J 3. 7. 367.

prii1angika 26. 101, 102.

Rath1111inlla-1111111 240.

reality 9. U. 27, 44 , 49. 57- 59, 76. 82, 84,

85. 144, 152. 156. 163. 180, 181, 196.

213. 218, 220, 23()-232. 249, 2.59, 271,

n9. 310, 319, 330-334, 340, 352,

355. 37.5, 389; ultimatc: or absolutc

rcaJicy (p11TrJmii.r1ha) 16, 17. 19, 20, 66.

87. 189. 203, 268, 331. 3.H . 356. 361 ,

364. 366.realization 59, 63. 267, 286. 328, 346.

rebirth 56, 206, 235. 237, 252, 255, ;266,

284, 294, 299, 375. :n8, cigl'n view 10-12,

31, 78, 80, 87. 103. 249. 271 , 272.

Robinson, Richard 8.

RusseU, Bertrand 225.

S11hb4-Iflll4 189, 231' 270, 358.

Sarlrlht1rmt1fł1'f!tjliilla·sufrtl 3, 4, 6, 24 , 25 ,

174, 366.

Sarvasrivada i . 6, :H-25, 32, 36, 39, 41. 50.

52, 58, 62, 64. 67, 76, 77, 84, 85,

107. 109. 119, 127, 135. 141, 143. 156.

159-162, 169, 170, 173, 182, 189. 196.

206, 225. 236, 256. 280, 288, 290, 296,

299. H 3, 349, 359. 367; Sarvinivadins

22, 25-28, 32, 34, 35, 38-40,

44, 50, H, 60, 62, 69, 77, 81, 84, 105,

106, n;, 119, 125, 120, 129. 134. 137.

U6, 160, 1n-116. 181, 196, 201. 213,

270, 276, 288, 298. 327, 338, 349. 366.

Sauuaocika 6, 22-28, 34-36, 41 , 44, 52, 54,

57. ·Go, 62, 67, 16, n. 81. 84, 05 , 106,

IB, 119, 125, 128, 129, 134, 141, 143.

U6, 159. 161, 163-166, 168-170. 172-

176, 189, 194-196, 206, 207, 213, 236,

246-248 , 255, 256. 286, 286, 288, 290,

293 , 296. 299. 300. 301 , 332, 333. 338.

349, 355, 367, 383.

'self (almafł) 9. 14, 19. 20, 27, JO, 32, 39.

40. 44. 48, 51, 55, 56, 63-65. 67, 68, 74.

78, 105, 180, 181, 191, 218, 262-264,

269, 303. 318, 380, 383 .

sclf-indulgencc l, 4, 90, 184.

sclf-mortification i, 18, 90. 91.

self-l)atOIC (J1JiJbliiifJa) 1, n ,23, 28, 32- 36,

38-40, 48-52, 55-57, 64, 67, 69. 71, 74,

76.• 77, 80, 81-83, 88, 102, 107-110,

113, 114, 140,, 141 , 154, 160, 169. 212,

215, 220, 221, 225, 228-282. 191, 240,

255 . i57. 258, 272. 280, 288, 298. 299.

302~304, 306-311, 313, Jl), 322, 324.

325, 339, 343- 351, 355. 357. 382.

sclf-tcsuainc 53, 90, 91 , 243.

sense expcricncc 12. 82, 83. 159, 219, 264,

316, (sec also undcr expcricnce)

space (ii.łiiia) 36, 39. 68, 89, 131, 147-149,

Ul, 161.

Spnmg, Maivin 96, 154.

Stchcrcabsky, T.l. 23. 70,' ?5, 154. 183. 19~.

INDEX. 411

Strawson, P. F. 98, 131.

substancc (s11abha1111, etc.) l, 7, 12, 13, 15;

21. 28, 29, 32 , 35, 40, 41, 50, 54. 55, 58.

64., 65 , 67. 68, 76. 77, 81, 82 . 84, 85, 88,

93. 103, 105- 108, 111, 112, 122, 127-102,

133. 137, 141, 142, 145, 146, 148, 1.50.

155: Vi6. 161. 164, 169. 171, 172, 175,

181. 1S2, 189-191, 193. 195. 196, 206,

212. 213, 219-222, 225, 226, 228, 229,

233. 235, 236. 239. 241, 255. 262, 267,

269, 270, 288, 298, 308, 318, 320, 327 ,

332. 338, 339. 341-34„, 345, 346, 351,

3.53. 355-347, 375; non-subscantial 49, 65,

84, 85, 103. 131 , 181 , 218, 220, 255. 258,

312, 314. 317, 325, 341 , 390; AOO·

subsuwtialiry 25. 35, 43, 49. 65, 67, 80, ·

178, 217. 220-223. 231, 320. 350, 390; of

agent/action 184; of rhc :&ggrcg:ucs 179;

human petsonality (purlga/a- „11ir'ii1my11) 24,

26, 29, 51, 62, 63, 84-87. 181, 292, 3ll;

of phcnomcna (rlharma·nairiitmya) 24, 26.

29, 40, H, 84-87, 181, 234, 264, .311; of

vicws 103.

sµffcring (rl11~.łh11) 10-12, 14, 30, 31, 40,

42, 43, 45. 46, 48, 51, 63, 65, 70, 74, 78,

80. 91, 184, 211-218, 237. 241, 259. 304,

319, 323, 32~328 , 343- 346, 3B, 354,

355 . 356, 362, 363, 374, 376.

S111ta-11tpila 17, 43, 331.

tabula r11111149, 153, 154.

T11.thigiita 10, 13, 16, 30, 47, 58, 65-65, 72,

197. 218, 238. 269. 270. 302-312, 319,

324-326, 355, 365. 366.

Thef'llgithi 2.

Thcravada l-3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 25, 62, 69. 70,

91. 141, 333, 366.

Theifgat/111 2, 335.

time (ka/a)·30, 35. 36, 59-61, 68, 82, 125,

161, 172. 197. 275-279, 286, 301.

transcendence 24, 25 , 90, 102, 149, 332, 334;

transcc:odeot 16, 24, 25, 152, 249. 303,

365; transcendeoral 363.

ttansmigntionists 23, 35 .

truih(s), absolute or ulcimate 47, 49, 82, 86,

103, 159. 218, 219, 270, 271, 272, 288,

342 , 364; a priori 12; and cóofus1on 46;

Buddha's conccption of l7, 231. 232;

cha.tactecistks of 271; 2 dependent :uising

230, 273; dispositions and 218; cmpirical412 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TiiE MrDOLE WAY

375; four noble 67, 326, 352; linguistically

transcendent i49; meaningful language 19;

metaphysic:al 88, motał 334; percepcion of

92; Platonie n9; pragmatic: dcfinicion 16,

85, 219, 225, 229, 272, 308. 334;

provisional 220; self-conuadictory 272:

statemcnt 3l9; two 68, 69, 330, 331, 333:

unspcalcable :HO; Upan~.rdic 11ohow1 J3.

Ueda, Y 230.

ullimtlte retJllty (see umler re4'/1y).

undet/11reti questtons (1111yiilr1a-1111Jlu) 31.

2.51, 309, 368.

uniformiry U, 1)9.

unity 2ÓO, 230.

univcrse 13. 16, 65, 80, 89, 125, 166, 188,

310, 311, 353.

Up1mi.f11dr l , 37. 43, 63, 105. 18l , 237 . 199.

200.

Valbh~1:ł111JJ ,

Vajr111;chetJi,ł;i.pr11jfliipir11milii 24, 240.

VitsTpuuiya 197, 195-197, 200, 202, 222,

230. 299.

Vigr11/J111ifiiw1r111irl 92.

Vinaya-pi/f1Ńll 4. .

volition 53. 244, 245, 248: volitional 53, 244,

·252.

Warder, A. K. 7, 95.

Wittgenstein, Lud'l(ig 93, 217.

wrong view 12, 13, 78.

Yogacira 7, 9, 37.Exr.erptsfrom reviews:

"The book represents a bold, new and independent

approach to the problem of Nagarjuna's philosophical

stance and provides a readable and stimulating addition

to the already existent literature on the subject.

The index to the Karika and the generał index

appended to the work increase its research value for the

serious investigators and students ofBuddhist thought."

Journal ofthe Oriental Institute, Vadodara,

"In this book, which is a new translation ofNagarjuna's

work Mulamadhyamakakarika. Prof. Kalupahana has

given a new interpretation of Sunyavada of Nagarjuna

who is the reputed scholar of Buddhism... Sanskrit text

and its translation have precision in presenting the exact

nature of Nagarjuna as a truest interpreter of Buddha's

teachings. The author begins with a brilliant exposition

of middle path Madhyama Marga, for about hundred

pages, and then presents the Sanskrit text of

Madhyamakakarika, translating all the 448 verses of the

text, covering 200 pages; and the last 20 pages are devoted

to index. The introduction is a discussion of all

metaphysical problems raised in 27 chapters ofthe text."

Pathway to God, Vol. xxvi, No. 4, 1992

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