Trung Luan(3)

dhariyamiina.sabhav'ii ańfio dham1no n'iima atthi, DhsTp.21; see aJso my aniele, "Schools of Buddhism in Eatly Ceyłon," in The Ceylon journ11/ of the142 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

Humanities, Peradeniya 1 (i970):78], a view that resembles the one presented

by George Berkeley during modern times.

Nagarjuna seems to be unwilling to accept such a solution. Considering the

philosophical issues a phiłosopher like Berkeley had to face, one can understand Nagarjuna's unwillingoess to subscribe to such a view. Without ałłowing

the experienced elements (dharma) to hang loose, Nagarjuna was interested in

providing a causa! exp łanation. Therefore, following the Buddha's explanation

of "dependent arising", Niigarjuna boldly asserts: "Nowhere is.there any effect

without a cause," (see also XXIV.19, aprafityasamutpanno dhaN!Ull/ kaŚcin na

vid!Jate).

3. RuPe11a tu vininnuktaf(l yadi sjiid rupa-kiirat/a?(i,

akiiryaka'l(i k'iiraf!41(l sy4t nasti ak-Pryaf(l ca kara11a'f!1.

H there were to be a cause of materiał form distinct from materiał form,

there would then bC a cause without an effect. There certainly is no ineffect-ive cause.

MKV(P) p. 124; MKV(V) p.48.

The staternent in the previous verse: "Nowhere is thete an effect without a

cause," (na c'iisti arthaf? kaicidahetukal/ kvacil) could lead ro the belief in an

invisible ultimate cause (like ~ubstance , or even God) that is ecernal. White th~

characteristics, perceived quałities , etc. could be looked upon as the experienced, yet variabłc, effects, their ultimate grouod would be the substance, eternalły existing even when it is not producing the effects. Rcałizing that such a

view could emerge frorn his previous assertion. Niigarjuna immediately pto·

ceeds to nip·it in the bud when he insists: "There is no in-effect-ive cause."

Thus, IV.2 and 3, in combinacion should provide the interpreters of Nagarjuna wich the cłearest evidence that he was upholding the theory of"dependent

atising" (prafityasamutpada) in the form in whjch it was fotmulated by the

Buddha in the early discourses.

4. Rupe Jaty eva iiipasya kiiraf!af(l nopapadyate,

riipe 'saty eva ropasya kiirat}at?Z nopapadyate.EXAMINATJON Of ACGREGATES

When a materiał form exists, a cause of rnaterial form is not appropriare.

When a materiał form docs not exist, a cause of materia! form is also not

appropnate.

MKV(P) p. 124; M.KV(V) p.AS

143

Herc Nigirjuna is reverting back to che criticisms he made of the Sarvastivada

and Sautrantika views in Chapter I. The first is the ideotity theory ofcausation

and the second, che non-ideocity theory, and these criricisms are here appłied

to the causality of materiał form (ropa).

5. Nifkaraf!af?J- puna rupa1p. naiva naivopapadyale,

lasmiit ropa-gatan klhrilcin na vikalpan vikalpayet.

Furthermore, a materia ł form without a cause is absolutely inappropriate.

Therefore, one should n_ot cliscriminarively think ofanything confined to

materia! form.

MKV(P) p. 125: JlfKV(V) p.29.

A theory of an uncaused event, as reiterated, was cleady unacceptable co

Nagarjuna. Indeed, it is emphasized by the repctition of the oegarion, naiva.

Not accepcing the epistemology chat is gencrally and indiscriminarely at·

tributed to Nagarjuna, we have avoided transła ting the term vika/pa either as

"conceptualization" or "conceptual construction" or ·even "discriminacion," (see

Introduction). The importance of the term rupagafiin cannot ge overemphasizcd. The comments on the previous verses show to what extent

speculacion "confined" suictly to marerial form (ropa) led to all lcinds of weird

philosophical theories. The analysis of materiał form should be undercaken in

relacion to various other issues, especially language and epistemology. [n the

lasc few verses, Nagarjuna was engaged precisely in such an enterprise. Hcnce

his advice in the present verse. The suffix -gala is better understood in the

meaning in which ie occurs in phrases like kaya-gata ("confined to the body''),

ha11a-gata ("confined to che hand"), etc.144 Trm PHILOSOPHY OFTHE MIODU! \V/AY

6. Na k1iraf!•uya sad(ia??J karyanJ ity upapadyate,

na kara„asyasadrśam kiityam ity upapadyate.

The view that the effect is identical with the -cause is not appropriate. The

view that the effect is not identical with the cause is aJso not appropriate.

MKV(P) p. 125; MKV(V) p.49.

Unlike I\T.4 wruch sc.ates the lnappropriateness of identity and non-jdendty

theories of causation applicd specific;aUy co the subjecc matter under discussion,

narody, materiał form (ropa), the present verse emphasizes t he inappropriatencss of identity and noo-idencity theories in generaJ.

7. Vedan'?i-ciJta-Ja??J;mhiiim.- sarrutiiirar/ii'!t ca sarvaśaf?,

sarvefiim evtT bhtivtinlif?J riipef!at'va s11maf? kramaf;:

The method of creatrnent of all existents such as feeling, thought, perception and dispositioru is in every way similar to that of materiał form.

MKV(P) p . 126; MKV(V) p.49.

The previous comments on the contents of this chapcer would indicace that

Nagarjuna dld not dcny the reality ofroaterią.l form but only the method ofe:xplaining it. A similar treatment is requested of the othcr a~gregates tao, Note

the·use of the term bhava in the present context, which prompts lnada to

fender it a5 "existential actiOflSH (compared wirh its usage at 1.3 wruch !nada

translared as "entities").

8. Vigrahe ya4 pan'harartt krte Junyataya vadet,

sa1'1!1J.f?J ltnjtipanlJrta?p. samaf!1 sadhyana /iiyate.

When an analysis is made in terms ofempti.ness, whosoever wece co ad-EX.AMINATlON OF AGGREGATES

dress a refutation, all that is left unrefuted by him will beequal to what is

yet to be proved.

9. Vjiikhy'iine ya up'iilambhatp krte śunyatafii vadet,

sarvarri tasyan1tpalabdha1?1 sama11J stidhyena jliyate.

When an explanacion in terms of emptiness is given, whosoever were to

address a censure, all chat is left uncensured by him will be equal to what

is yet to be proved.

MKV(P) p.127; ti!KV(V) pp.49-50.

14 ~

These two rubtle and crypcic verses tan best be understood in the context jo

which chey appear. They are placed at the end of an extremdy important

anałysis of die metaphysics relacing co materiał form (ropa). As.such they

should be consjdered the conclusion of that analysis.

The basie theme of the chapter has becn the rejection of any metaphysical

substance (svabhava) as the cause of materia! fo® (rtipa-k'1ira,,.a). lndeed, there

was no rejection of the cause of materiał form, only the criticism of the view

that this cause is an invisible permanent enticy distinct from the perceived

materia! form. This criticism if referred to ac IV.8 as "an ana.lysis in te~ms' of

empciness" (Siinyataya vigrahe krte). lnteresti.ogly, the term "empti1:_1ess"

(funyata) never occurred in char ana.lysis. The ana.lysis was made on the basis of

mutual "dependeiice" of lnaterial form (rupa) and the cause of material form

(rupa-karaf!a). Thus, materia! form and the cause are empty of substance

because they arc mutually dependent. At this scage, ifsomeone wece to present

a refutation of Nigarjuna's view, chat refutatioo wou1d be. iotended as a

refucation of the "mutual depeodence" of the materia! form and its cause.

However, such a refurarion ·does not aucomatically p.rove the valiclity of the

metaphysical idea, namely, svabhava chat is being rejecced by Nagarjuna on

che basis of"dependence." The argume~t in favor of dependeoce is experlence,

Hence, che person presenting .a refucation of this idea should be in a position

not only to negace "mutual dcpendence" bur also provide evidence for the

establishment of a metaphysical substance (svabhava). This has oot yet been

achieved: Thus, according to Nigarjuna, what stili remains ro be proved

(iiidhya) is the chesis regarding "substance" rather than "mutual dependence."146 THE PHll.OSOPHY OFTHE MI ODU! WAY

These two verses are very significant in that they seem to admit that the

Madhyamikas have a positive thesis, namely, "dependent arising" which is accepced on the basis of cxperience. The "emptiness" (fiinyalii) they advocate is

simply a challenge for the mctaphysician ro prove his own mctaphysics.

The tWo verses are idenricaJ except for the use of the rwo pairs of terms,

vigraha andpan"haru in the former, and vyakhyana and upala1nbha in the latter. As is welł known, Nagarjuna is also the author of a creatise called Vigrahavyavartańi. The term 11igraha means "analysis." On the basis of this work,

modern interpreters of Nagarjuna have assumed that he was merely an

an:ilytical philosopher whose enterprise was confined solely to "analysis"

(vigraha) of opposing views utiłiziog the conception of "emptiness" (f'iinyata).

However, IV.9, cast in the same mould as IV.8, raises doubts about the validity

of sucb an interpretation of rhe cbaracter of Nagarjuna's philosophical method.

The use of the term vyakhyana meaning "explanatioo" seems to indicate that,

in addition co "analysis io terms of emptiness," Nagarjuna was aJso providing

an "expłanatioo ." That expłanacion is once again said to be based upon emptincss (funyatay'ii vyiikhy'ii?Je krte). But as mentioned above, the term "emptiness" did not occur at all in the chapter. lnstead the explanation was provided

on the basis of "dependent arising" (pralityasamutpada). "Emptiness" being

che counterpart of "dependent arising," "explanation in terms of dependent

arising'' would, therefote, be the same as "explanation in terms of emptiness."

Thus, Nagarjuna, even when presenting his posirive theory of "dependent

arising," need not worry about someone censuring bim, for the theoi:y of

"dependence", likc "emptiness," was intended to reject the mecaphysicr of

subsrance, and the responsibilicy once again falls on his opponcnt co prove his

own substance-mecaphysics.CHAPTER

FIVE

The Examination of Elements

(Dhatu-parz ksd)

l . Niikafar?Z vidyate ki'f!Zcit purvam 'iikaśa- lak!a'f!'iil,

alak!a'f!a'f!J prasajyeta syat purva?!l yadi lak1a11at.

No space is evident prior to the spaml cbatacteristics. lf it eicists prior to the

cbaracteristics, then it would follow that it is without characterisrics.

MKV(P) p. 129; MKV(V) p.~l.

As pointed out earlier, the caregories of aggregates, spheres, and elements constituted an important pace of the Buddha's ceachings as well as of the

Abhidharma analysis (UL l ). This early classification was incended to accounc

for che human personality (skandha), its experience (12 ayatanas = 6 indn'yas

and 6 111/ayas.) and finally the dements to which this whole experience can be

analysed (18 elemcnts = 6 ayatanas, 6 v1jayas and 6 forms of consciousness).

Howevcr, Nagarjuna does nor cake them in that particular order. This is

because of the problems creaced by the ioterprcters of the Abhidharma. They

were more concerned with defining each one of che elements in eacb of the

catcgories without considcring them in the light of other elements within the

category to which ie belongs or in terms of ocher cacegories oucside of

themselves. This led to a wide range of mctaphysical speculations. For example,

one of the elemeots (dh'iit11) chat caused much misunderscanding and led to

many metaphysicaJ ideas is the conception of "space" (iik'iifa). Although

"space" is not an item included among either che aggregatcs, spheres or

elements (in rhe earlier classificacion), ii indeed was pan of an analysis of che

human personality comparable co the analysis into five aggregates (skandha).

The counrerpart of the skandha-classificarion is the explanation of the human

personality io terms of six elcments (cha-dhatu or !afidhii,tu), one of which was

"space" (akafa) (M 3. 239). At S 2.150, the Buddha specifically recognized che

inrerdependence of material form and "the sphere of space"

(Yaya'f!Z .. . akaJaiJcayatanadhatu ayar!l dhatu rupa"!J pa{icca pailwyat1).

However, the Buddhist metaphysicians, creating cach one of the carcgońes and

147148 lHE PHLLOSOl'HY Ol! THE MLODLE WAY

items independendy. assumed that "space" is "uncond.icioned" (asa1pskrta1?J,

Akb p.3). the Jactet being unde1stood as "independence" (see Sakv p.174;

DhsA p .193). Thus, space came to possess the unique narute of "nonobstruction,,- (aniivarana-svabhavam akiiśa'f!J) where mate~ial form finds its

locale (yatra ropasya gati/?, Akb p. 3).

This, indeed, was a very absolucistic conception of space , a conception chat

muddled up the entire Buddhisc epistemology. Ie posed the most significant

challenge for Nagarjuna. In order to eliminate such metaphysics, Nagarjuna

adopted the ingenious mechod of analysing the source of knowledge (i,e., seeing, darśana, Chapter lll), t he object of knowledge (i.e„ materia) form, rupa,

Chaprer IV) and its locale (i.e, space, ?ikafa, Chapter V) aod this he did on the

pretext of examining the Buddha's own categories of aggregaces, spheres and

elements (skandha-ayatana-dhatu). Thus, the presenr chapter on the examina·

tion of ele·ments comes to be devoted not to the traditional category of

elements, but rather to the conceprion of space, higbJ~ghting its relativity,

especially co material form, discussed in the previous chap rer. With these three

chapters. Nagarjuna was thus able to give a rather com prehensive account of

the problem of knowledge.

Here there is no denial of space, but only the rejection ofa particular way of

u nders tan~iing or conceiving it. If space were tó be undersrood as the ult.imately

real pure enrity, a substance to which various characteristlcs ate attributed, in

wbich case space precedes tbe c:haracceristics, then Nagarjuna finds no

epistemologicaJ justificatioh for it. This is a c:riticism of the first aspect of the

metap hysical explanation of sp ace referred to above, namely, thac space has the

cbaracter of non-obstructon (anavaraf!a-svabhiiva) . The obsrruccion, in this

case, tefers to mare.rial form (i.e., pratigha).

2. A/akf<1f!O na ka:icic ca bhavalJ Ja1rividyate kvacit,

asaty alak.rflf!e bha11e kramafiif!I kuha lak.raf!a'/'!J.

An existent tbat is without cbaracteristics is nowhere evident. When an

existent without characteristics does not exist, where can cbaracteristic:s

appear?

MKV(P) pp.129-130; MKV(V) p.51.

The denial of pure "space" at V. I is here extended to all ttlemeots or entities

(bh'iiva). The question chat follows next is: lf there wece to be no pure entity orTHE EXAMINATION OF El.EMl!NTS 149

a tabula rasa, then one also cannot account for adventitious elemeots through

which something comes to be koown. ihis tćpresents the second aspect of the

metaphysical definition mentioned earlier-, namely, the "unobstructed space"

serving as the locale for the appearance of materiaJ form (yq.tm iiiptJJya gatif? =

iiipasya kramata7(J).

3. Niifak!af!e fak!af!tJJYa pravrtttr ha Jalak.faT!e,

sa/aktaniilak.fanabhyif!l niipy anyatr(I pnwartate.

The occurrence of a chacacteristic does not take place either in something

without chacactedstic or in something with charactecistic. Nor does itproceed from something other than those1 with or without characteristic.

trlKV(P) p.130; MKV(V) p .5 L

Here again, it seems inappropriate ro assume thac Nagarjuna was denying

either space or materiał form, but only the mannet in which they were explained by the metaphysicians. It is the sharp dichotomy berween a thing and its

properties chat cannot account for either of them. The subscantiaJist mode of

speakir.g about entities (bhava) leads tó two extremist views. oameły , identity

or difference. The second scatemeot rejects the view that the ptobłem ofidentity and di.ffereoce can be solved by transcending both. The reasoning seems to

be that, rather than attempting co salve the problem of identity and dilfereoce

by follow-iag the method of traosceodence, it is mare appropriatge not to create

such a sharp distinction in the first place.

4. lak}"a1'faJa?!Jpravrttau ca na lakfyam upapadyate,

la~ya.syanupapattau ca lak!af!asyapy asa?!Jbhavai{,

When the characreristic does not occur, the characterized is not appropciate. In the absence of the characcerized, there is. no occurrence of

the characteristic.

1\ifKV(P) p.U I : MKV(V) p.52.L50 TuE PHILOSOPHY OFTllE MIDDLE WAY

The relativiry of concepts, or more spedfically the contextual meaning of concepts, is herc underscored. Definitions may be useful in clarifying the meaning

of terms. Yet these meani ngs are not derived independencly; they occur in conrexts and, as such, any reference to subsrance and attribute shouJd not be taken

co imply distinct or pure referents. What are denied here are not the concepts

of the characterized or of the characteristics, but merely their independent ex-

1stence.

5. Tasman na 11idyate lak.fyaf!l lak1at/af!l nai11a 11idyate,

lak,ya-la/qana-nim1ukto 11aiva bhavo'pi 11idyate.

Therefore, the characterized is not evidenct. Neither is the characteriscic

evident. Distinct from the characterized and the characteristic, an existent is certainly not evident.

A!KV(P) pp.131-132; MKV(V) p ..52

This is not a blanket denial of the cha.racterized and the characteristic. Rather it

is a denial of these two clements as expłajned at V.4, namely, as substance and

attribure conscirucing independent entitics. Therefore, one cannot find any

event, any encity, any existence tbac is separated from the characterized and the

characteristic. An existent separated from the characterized as wełl as the

charactcristic could turo out to be a "pure entity," an idea clearly unacceptable

to Nigarjuna.

6. A11tdya1niine bhave ca ka.syabhavo bhavqya11:

bhihiiibliiiva-vidharmii ca bhiivabh"iivam avaiti kaf?.

When an existent is not evident, whose non-existence can thcre be? Who

could comprehend the cli~tincr things: ex.istent and non-ex:iste.11t as well as

existence and non-existence?

MKV(P) p.132; MKV(V) pp.52- 53.TH!! EXAM1NATION OF ELBMENTS 15 1

Herc again, ifwe arc to understand "cxistent" (bh7i11fl) wichout takjng inco consideracion the son of "existent" referred to at V. 5, we would be left wich a

universal statement regarcling all "existeots" (bh7i11a). Yet, it is not meant to

be taken that way. The "existent'' referced to herc is alreadydefined at V.5. It is

an "existent" chat is separated from either the characterised or the characteristic

or both. lt is a "pure existent." Such a pure existent could then be contrasted

with a pure non-existent, and i~ is this sharp distinction or dichotomy chat is

being questioned by Nagarjuna. Indeed, it is significant to note the use of the

term 11i-dharma (whose occurrence in any other text is not knowa to the present

author) in the sense of ''distinct things."

7. Tasmiin na bh7ivo nabh7i110 na lak,ya?'!J -niipi lakfa!Ja'f?Z,

aliiiśaf!t ak.aśa-samli dhatavalf pańca ye pare.

Therefore; there is neither an existent nor a non-existent, neither the

characterized nor the characteristic, neither space nor the other five

elements similar to space.

MKV(P) p.1 34; MKV(V) p.53.

Thus, neither eXJStence nor non-existence, the characcerized nor the

characcerjstic as envisaged by the metaphysicians exisc. The five

elernents= earth, water, fire, air and consciousness, which together with space

constitute .the personality (cha-dhaturoya?'!J punso)-do not exist if these

elements are conceived ofin the same way as space. This does oot mean that the

way in which the metaphysicians conceive of the six elements is the only way in

wbich tbey can be understood and explained.

8. Astiva'fP ye tu ptlŚyanti nastif1Jt1f!J calpabuddhayal;,

bh7ivanii?'!J te na pa.fyanti drfJ/{avyopa.fama?'!J fiva?'!J.

lhose who arc of little intelligence, who percdve the existence as weU as152 THE PHilOSOPHY Of THE MIODLE W AY

che non-existence of existents, do not perceivc the appeasement of the

object, the auspicious.

MKV(P) p. 135; MKV(V) p. 54.

The "appeasement of the object" (dra1fa11yopaśa1na) is, no doubt, a synonym

for the ''appeasement of dispositions" (1a1!JSkaropaJama) or the "appeasement

of obsessions" (prapancopaśama) . lt is indeed not the elimination of the object

(drfl!{avya-k1aya), implying the abandoning of both subject and objecc. lt is

mcrcly che appeasement of the object. What is implied by the appeasement of

the object is its non-reification. The concepdon of the non-existence of the object will emecge only if its existencc is understood in a substantial way. Existcncc (a1titva) and non-existence (ni1Jitva) arc correlaóve. Asscrtion or denial

of one involves the assercion or clenia! of the ocher respectivcly. Asseróng cxistcnce in a mctaphysical way one is !cd to the denial of existencc. Denying cxistence in the same wa.y one is led to the assertion of non-existence. Instead of

eliminating both existence and non-existcncc and looking for a transcendent

reality, a reality that is beyond both exiscence and non-existence, it is possible

co appease. calm, or pacify one's cłispositions (1af!1.Jkara) or obsessions

(prapaflca). Dispositions or obsessions, when foilowed to their positive extreme, lead to che belief in a permaneot exiscence (aititva); when completel)'

negated they rontribute toward the belief in non-existencc (na1tit11a). Hence

the emphasis on rhcir appeasement rather chan cheir promotion ot elimioation.CHAPTER

SIX

The Examination of Lust and the Lustful

(Raga-rakta-pari k.ra)

1. Ragadyadi bhavet purva?(l rakto raga-tira1krtaf?,

fa?IJ pratiya bhaved rago rakte riige rago bhavet sati.

lf a lustful one, separated ftom lust, were to exist prior to Just, then

depending upon bim there will be Just. Lust exists when thete is a Justful

one.

MKV(P) p.138; MKV(V) p.55.

. .

So far Nagarjuna was considecing the basie elemencs (dharma) lnvolved in an

explanation of the problem of perception, nąmely . the "faculties" (indriya),

rhe ''aggregates" (sk1t11dha), and "elemeots" (dhatu). However, the analysis of

perceptuał experience, and rherefore of the elements (dharma) invołved in such

experience, is not confined to these. ln the Buddhist view, lusc (raga) is an im.

pottant constituent of perception, primarily because in Buddhism the analysis

of perception was not undertaken for its own sake, but for the sake of discovering the cause of bondage and freedom.

We have already referred to the confusioos created by Candraklrti, especially

in i:egard to the interptetation of the most crucial Chaptec I where he fails to

recognłze the significaoce even of the ordec in-which Nagarjuna takes up the

variety of ideas for examinacioo, let alone the ideas themselves.

Another unfQrtunate misinterpretacioo emerges when Candrakrrti' assumes

that every ioicial verse in every chapter represc.nts a sratement of the opponcnt's

view which is to be repudiated. While this may be true in some chapters, thete

is no necd to universalize it. There is oo reason why Nagarjuna could not cake

up his or the Buddha's views first and then go on to repudiate what are considered co be inappropriate ideas.

In the Buddha's owo analysis of perception, opsessions (prapańca) appears in

a personality th~c isalready smeared with !ust. The Buddha consistendy avoided any speculatioo tegarding absołute origins. As such, he was not willing to

assurne either a pure personality, a tabula rasa which comes to be defiled by

1531~4 TuE PHILOSOPHY OF THE M IODLE WAY

adventitious elemenrs (see A 1.254) or the existence of an element całłed Just

(raga) in the external world independent of a conscious person who generates

lust on the basis of external objects (see S 1.22). For him. objects can be

classified as pleasurabJe (śubha) , loathsomc (aJubha). or neuuał only in rełation to a perceiving iodividual who isprone to make such distinctions. A person

who is prone to make such distinctions is one who is either dominated by Just

(raga) or aversion (dósa) or indifference.

Thus, Nagarjuna is able to assert tbat if any object were to cause any lusc

(raga). chen there must be a lustful one (rakla), noc simp ly a "pure person" who

is uotained by lust. For him, tbere is no difficulty in speaking of !ust, so long as

that lust is not distioguished as an entity which is then supposcd co infect a person who is pure and undefiled by !ust. lt is the same sort of relation that is exeropłified by a compassionate one (maitra) and the recipient of comp assion

(upagr'iihaka), a very apt example given by Candrakfrci ro illusuace the conception of "otheroess' • (parat11a). but whicb has been misunderstood by many a

translator [MKV(P)p.78; Sprung , Lucid &position, p.66, who was probably

following Stcherbacsky's earlier translation]. There is oo sense in speaking of a

compassionate one or even compassion in a vacuum. A compassiooate one or

compassion bccomes meaningfuł only in the concext of people who are recipiencs of such compassion. The same sort of celarionship exists among the

łustful (rakta), !ust (raga). and the objeccs chat generate !ust in the individuals.

The present verse, cherefore, is a elear scacement of Nagarjuna's own position, noc the statemeot of an opponent that is to be rejected.

2. Rakte 'sati puna r'iigaf? kuta eva bhavifyati,

sati vasati v'ii r'iige rakte 'py e!a sama/; kramal/.

When a lustful one does not cxist, whence can tbere be lust? Wbether

lust exists or not, the method (of analysis) even of the lustful one would

be comparable.

MKV(P) pp.138-1:39; MKV(V} p. 5~

Thus. Nagarjuna raises the question as to how there could be !ust in che

absence of a luscful one . This avoids the theoty of a tabula rasa and the adventitious impressions. Lec alooe the exisrence or the non-exiscence of lusc. even

the lustfuJ one has to be analysed in terms of dcpendeoce , not in terms of pure

entities having tbeir own sdf-narure (svabha11a) .THE BxAMINATION OF LUST AND THE LUST~Ut

3. Sahawa puna udbhutir na yuklii r'iiga-raktayo/?,

bhavet'iir(l iiiga-raktau hi .nirapc/qau parmpara?('.

Again, the simultaneous occurrences of lust and the lustful one is not

proper. Lust and the lustful one would thcn bemutually non-contingent.

MKV(P) p.139; MKV(V} p.56.

155

To conceive of lust ot the lustful one in vacuity and then proceeding to explain

their simultaoeous arising (sahaiva udbhUtir) is not the purpose of "dependent

arising." In such a case, what is found is independent existence of lusc as well as

the lustful one, each having itS own nature. This, once agaio , represents Nagarjuna's rejeccion of the substance/attribute relationship. "Cow-ness" implies the

fact of having "four legs;'' the latter is not an independent attribute of the

former. The dangers inherent in catrying out the analytical process initiared by

the Buddha to its extre.me iś here indicated . Analysis is usefuJ in eliminating

metaphysiES, but useless when its leads to further metaphysics.

4. Naikatve sahabhavo 'sti na lenaiva hi lat saha,

Prthaktve sahabhavo 'tha kuta cva bhavifyati.

In identity, tbere is no co-existence. That which is associated does not

arise together. In discreteness, ·how can ther:e be co-existence?

MKV(PJ pp.139-140: MKV(V) p.56.

The philosophicalprobleros created by an over-extended analycicaJ process cannot be resolved by either a cooception of ideotity or of discreteness, The rela-

• I

tionship of co-existeoce (1ahabha11a) cannot be established ·once the analysis

leads to a sharp <;łichotomy becwee~ substance and arujbute.

5. Ekatve sahabhii11a1 cet sy'iil sahayatr1 11inapi sah.,

Prthaktvc sahabhavaJ cet syat .rahayar?f. viniipi salt.156 THE PH!LOSOPHY 01' 'THE MIDDLE WA Y.

lf, in identity, there were to be co-existence, it coułd oc.cur even without

association. If, in discreteness, there were to be co-existence, it could occur even without association.

MKV(P) p.140; MJ(V(V) p.55

The Sarvastivada conception of identity in terms of substantial existence

(s11abha11a), each substance being a part of a larger and mote pervading

substance (like Plato's "forms") did not need a concepcion of association. Coexistence comes to be overshadowed by idencity (just as much as the threc

Platonie forms ~ truth, beauty, and goodness-eould be found in amore eomprehensive form, i.e„ Good). The Sautrandka anaJysis of reality into diserete

momentary entiries (compaiable to the Humean impressions) led to an explanation of co-existence in terms of "associaiton." Io faet, such c;o-existence

cl.id not need any "association." Things could co-exist even wichouc association.

Thus, association i.s not a via.ble solution to problems either of ideotity or of

discrereness.

6. Prthaktve sahabhavaf ca yadi ki'f{Z f1iga-raktąyoł/,

st'ddhaf? Prthak-prth<Jg-bhaval/ sahabhavo yatas tayo/J.

If there were to be co-existence indiscreteness, is it the case that lust and

the lustful one arc completely separaced, as a result of which their coex:istence is also established.

M.KV(P) p.140; MKV(V) p.56.

The problem of"associacion" arises more with the eoneeption of"discreteness,"

than with the nocion of identity. "Association" was not much of a concern for

the Sarvastivadins. However, it was indeed a r:najo.r problem fot the

Sautraoti.kas. Hence their emphasis on the coneeption of"immediate contiguity" (1amananlara). Por Hume, with a similar atomie analysis of experience,

"association" was the- glue that bound togethet the discrete impressions. The

present question of Nagarjuna was a challenge co that Sautrantika (/Humean)

cheory of the ''ideas of association. ''THE EXAMINATION OF LUST ANO THE LUSTFUL

7. Siddhaf? Prthak-prthag-bhavo yadi va raga-raktayof?,

sahabhavaf?Z kirn arthaf!J tu pari/uz/payase tayof?.

Ifcomplete separation between łust and the lustful one is escablishcd, for

what pucpose do you conceive of their co-cxistence?

MKV(P) p.141 ; MKV(V) p.56.

157

The uscfulness of appeałing to co-existence after analysing evenrs inco discrete

entitics is here questioned. Nagarjuna's approach here is to resołve the very

idea that gave rise to the problem racher chan solving ir, namely, co avoid

creating sharp distinctions instead of trying to find solutions to problems

generatcd by such distinctions.

8. Pr1hag na siddhyaffty eva'f!l sahabhatlat!J vikank,asi,

sahabhava--prasiddhy artha??i Prthaktva'f!J bhuya icchasi.

You fancy co-existence assuming that the cliscrete is not establishcd. You ,

again, look for cliscreteness for the purpose of establishing co-existence.

MKV(P) p. 141; MKV(V) p.57.

No better explanation of the dilemma of an analytical philosopher who

recognizes discreteness can be found than in the present scaceroent of Nagarjuna. The vicious ciecie in which one gees invołved when, after anałysing things

into discrete entiries, one tries to put things together is dearly explained here.

9. Prthag-bhiivaprasiddhef ca sahabhavo na siddhyali,

katarnas1nin Prthag·bh'iive sahabhava'?"J salicchasi.

When discreteness is not cstablishcd, co-existence is not establishcd. In158 T HE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

the presence of what kind of discteteness would you expect co-existeilce.

MKV(P}l p .142 Mk'V(VJ p.57.

Nagarjuna's question herc is specifically oo the nature of discreteness. If

discreteness is absolucc, then association of co-existent entities is not acceptable. If there is no such discreceuess, then there is oo need for co-existence, for

the lack of complete discreteness implies "dependence" (prafityasa111utpada).

Hence, the quescion pertains tq the kina of discreteness envisaged.

10. Evaf!Z raktena raga.rya siddhtr na saha niisaha,

1liga11at saf'tlatlhamUif'!af!Z siddhir na saha nasaba.

Thus, with or without the; lustful one, there is no establishment of !ust.

Lilce lust, there is no establishment of anything with or without [accompaniments].

MKV{P) p. 142; MKV(V) p .57.

On the basis of the kind of discreteness referred to above, one caonot explain

either the association or the non-association of lust and che lustful one. Avoid

the sha.cp distinccioo, the problems are not there to solve. The same can be said

in regard to all phenomena (d}Jarma). Fot this teason, neither absolute identity

nor absolute di.screceness can establish the nature of phenomena.CHAPTER

SEVEN

The Examination of the Conditioned

(Sa'f!lskrta-parz kfa)

I . Ylll"ii JtZf!Zskrta utpidas tatra yukta tri-lakfaf!t,

ath1is1Z1?1.skr:ta utpada~ katharp. sarp..slą·ta-lalt;a11arp..

lfarising is co.oditioned, therein three chatacteristicsare proper. lfarising

is unconditioned, how can there be charactcristics of the conditioned?

MKV(P) pp.145-146; MKV(V) p.59

The examinaiton of·the "conditioned" (1arp..skrta) coming immediateły after

the analysis oflust (raga) and the luStful one (rmeta} brings out another important aspect of the B~ddha's conception of the pragmatic meaning of truth, a

conception that Nagarjuoa seems to be de:u:ly aware of.

Lust, as pointed out earlier, is one of the most important ełements in the

Buddha's analysis of experience. Lust is operative in the perceprual process

espedalły in the formation of idcas derived from experience. Having rejected

"omniscience" (sarvajnat11a) as a source of. knowledge, the Buddha depcndcd

primarily on sense expcrience. However, fot him, sense experience was a "big,

bloomiog. buzzing confusion." One way ofdealing with this confusing mass of

sense data is by concenuating upon nems that arc of interest to the indiv.idual

and then forming ideas. Such ·sełection is generally based upon one's interest.

This is the signific.ance of"dispositions" (I(Z'tJSkira "'° compounding of ideas).

For the Buddha, one's conception of truth is invariably·bound up with such

dispositions: Therefore, all ideas are "dispositionally condicioned" (1af!Zskrl4).

The Buddha's finał statemcnt:before his death: "Dispośitions are subjcct to

change" (11ayadhamma sańkhara, D 2.156), thetcfore, is an assection that,

since ideas are impermanent, there can be no absolutc truth.

However, the above conccption of the "dispositiooally cond.icioocd''

(Jaf?Ukrta) was to undergo a cadical change at the hands of the Buddhist

metaphysicians: Na°garjuna's examination of saf!JSkrta becomes meanirigful onJy in the background of chat change ofperspeccive. His was. indeed, an auempt

to reject the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika intcrpretations ofsarp..skria (and this160 THE PH!LOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

would apply ro the ideas that carne co be acceprcd by che later Theravadins)

and to reven back to the original teachings of the Buddha.

Once again, the Sarvastivada school was responsiblc for initiating this change

of perspeccive. In the eady discourses, the term Ja'T!Jskrta is used along with the

term pralilyasamutpanna, bur oot as synonyros (S 3.96, 103). While the

former implied "the disposicionally conditioned," the latter was used in the

moce comprehensive meaning of "the dependent." Thus, all dispositionalły

conditioned pheoomena are dependent, but not all dependent phenomena are

dispositionally conditioned. The equatioo ofsa'f'(Mkrta and pralitya1am111panna

occurs for the first time in the interpretation of the Abhidharma. 1t was this latter traditioo that Vasubandhu was recording when he said: "Those chat arc made

by the conditions having come cogethcr arc caJled the samsk[tas" (sametya sambhuya pratyayail? krtii iti sa11J1krliill, Akb p.4; see also AA 2.252, paccayehi

samiigantva kataua). The Sarvastivadins secm to have understood the concept

of sa'T!1Skr1a as a mere refutation of the bdief in the production ofan event by a

single cause (eka-pratyaya-janilaf!#, ibid.). Yaśomitra, commenting upon this

statement, goes on to say that Ja'f'(Mk('ta and pralityasamutpanna are, therefore,

synonyms (Sakv pp.171-172), thereby Óbliterating the semantie difference between "made" (krta) and "arisen" (utpanna).

This erroncous simplc equation was to lead to further complicatioos,

espccially in uoderstandiog the Buddha's characterizatioo of niniiit!a as

tl1t1"!1Jkrta. Eveo though the early discourscs prcsenred ni1'71af!a as an aJaT!JSkrta,

ir was nevcr coosidercd to be an apralityasamutpanna ("independent"). For

early Buddhism. borh sa'T!IJkrta and asaf!'skrta are pralityaJamutpanna.

· However. the Sarvastivada equatioo led to the equation of their oegations as

wełl . Asa'T!IJkrta secms ro have becn understood i.n the sense of t1prafitya1amutpt1nna, To what extent their perspcctive was dominated by an adherence to the

notion of self-nature (wabha11a), for which they gave no causal explanation at

all ocher thao merely maintaining chat it is permaneot, remains a surmise,

Ie is this Sarvastivada conception of sa'T!1Jkr1t1 as beiog identical wich

pralityaJamutpanna thac is beiog criticized at Vll.1. Nagarjuoa, as indicated in

the first line of this verse, had oo difficułty in assunilog that che Jflf!'Jkrta is

cbaracterized by arising, change, and cwing. This iodeed was a statemeot atttibuted to the Buddha in the early discowses, where it is said: "Monks, there

are these three characteristics of the disposiciooally conditioned. The arising of

that which is dispositionaJly conditioned is evident. l ts cessation is also evideoc.

Change of what has come to eodure is also evident," (A 1.152). Yct if, as explaioed by the Sarvastivadins. sarpskrta is ideotical with pralityaJamutpanna

(the latter also accouoting for arisiog, change and ceasing), then one cannot

Śpeak of thcse tłltee characteristics in the contcxt of the asa'T!IJkrta.

It may be of interest co noce that it is not only nirv'ii'!a that came to be included in the cacegony of asa11J1krta by these mecaphysiciaos. Thcy also admit-THE EXAMINATION OF THE CONDITIONED 161

red "space" (akaśa) as an asaf!Jskrta. The implications of that view was examined by Nagarj1,1oa in Chapte( V.

2 . Utpadiidyas trayo vyasfa nala1!1 lak1a?Ja-kamzaf!i,

saf!lJkrtasya samastaf? syur 'ekatra ka1ham ekadii.

When the triad consisting of arising, etc. are.discrete, they are not adequate to function as chara~ecistics of the conditioned. lf they were to be

combined, how can they be in the"same place at the same time?

MKV(P) p.146; MKV(V) p.59.

Further objections co the Saivastivada and Saurra ntika rheories relaring to the

characteriscics ofthe conditioned are raised here. The d(screteness of the thtee

characteristics, as envisaged by these two schools, would not allow them to

function as che characteristics of the conditioned. The Sarvastivida theory ofan

unqedying substance, which comes to be superficially characterized by rhe

three (or four) moments, as well as the Sautrantika theory that each moment is

inherent in the previous one in the form of pocentiality or seed (śakti, bija),

were the direct rcsults of such a pcrspectivc. Furthermore, if rhcse

characcerisrics were disrinct in ćelation ro both time and space, thcy could not

occur in any one saf!Jskrta at che same time.

3. Utpada-sthtti-bhańganam anya1 saf!Jskrta-lakfarJfl'f!J,

asti ced (lnavasthaivaf!J nasti cet te na Ja'l'(lskrtalr

If there wece to.be a characteristic of the conditioned other than arising,

duration., and destruction 1 tbere would be infinite regress. lf there were

to be no such [charact~ristics], t~ese would not be conditioned.

MKV(P) p. t47; MKV(V) p .60.

lf arising, stasis, and ceasing are three distinc;t evcnts, chen each one of thcse

wiU require further characterisrics of arjsing, stasis, and ceasing to a.ccou~t for162 THE PHllOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WAY

themselves. Thus, the moment of arising will need three f\uther characteristics

of arising, stasis, and ceasing bcfore it could give rise to the next moment,

narncly, stasis. The same applics to stasis and ceasing. This wiJI lead to infinite

regress (ana11asJhi). On the contrary, if cach of these moments do not possess

further characteristics, then they cannot be defined as the conditioned.

4. Utpadotpada utpado mulotpadasya ke11ala'f(J,

utpadotpadam utpado maula janayate panaf?.

The ańsing of arising is exdusively the arising of pńmary ańsing. Again,

the primary arising produccs the arising of arising.

MKV(P) p.149; MKV(V) p.60.

In order to avoid infinite regress, one may assume that the arising of arising is

che primary arisiog (mula-utpada) , and that this latter again causcs the arisiog

ofarising. Such mutuaJ action on the part ofprimary atising and arising of arisiog coul~ climinate infinite regress.

5. Utpadotp'iida utpado mulotpad~ya te yad1;

maulenajanit~ la'f!l te sa katha'f!l janayifyati.

lf ańsing of arising is the prim2ry arising, not being produced by the

pei.mary, how can it [the.former) produce that [the laner)?

MKV(P) p. l)O; MKV(V) p.61.

The questioo raised herc by Nigarjuna pena.ins to active causation . The

substantialist (Sarvastivada) view of causacion, which assumes the essence of

the effect to be already lateot in the cause,.does not permit mutual dependence

ofcause and effect. In sucha case, the cause-effect relatiooship would be a oneway relatiooship. Nigarjuna perceives that the ioterdependence utilized in

VU.4 in order to avoid infinite regress would not be appropriate in the context

of a substantiaJist theory of causation. ·THE EXAWNATION OF THl! CONDl'IJO~ED

6. Sa te maulena janito 1111JUla'f!J janayate yadi,

·maulr!I? sa tenajanitas lam utjiiidtJyate katha'f!J.

lf, produced by the primary, it produces the primary, how can thar

primary, ·not produccd by it, produce h?

MJ..."V(P) p. 150; MKV(V? p.61.

163

Here again, Nagarjuna rcfuses to rccognize the mutuaJ dependence of causc

and effect in the contoct of an active or substantialist theory of causarion.

7. Ayam utpadyamanas te kamam utpiidayeń tfna'f!J,

yadimam uipadayitum aj'iital? śaknuyiidayt1'1!J.

This, while arising, ifit may so dcsire, producc tbat, so that it, bcing not

yet bom, will be able to ptoducc tbat.

MKV(P) p.150; MKV(VJ p.61.

At this point Nagarjuna proceeds to state the Sautrantika theocy ofcausation,

whkh is described vcry succinctly by Vasubandhu (Akb pp.76-77). The

Sautrantikas believed that the Buddha's discourse on the three characte.riscics of

existence-arising (utpiit:fr!), change of what has endured (sthitasyanyathiitva),

and ceasing (11yayt1)-was intended for the foólish people who arc blinded by

ignorance (avidyandhabaliif?). According to them, the rccognition of ~uch

charactcrisdcs iovolves the belief in the subs~ntial e.xistence (a1JittJa) of the

"conditioned'' (Jaf!lskrta) (sec ibid., p. 77). Howcvcr, thesc three charactcristics

arc not part of reality which consists of momentary (kfaf!ika) cvents. Such

momentacy events or imprcssions coming one after another in rapid succcssion

(PUrvasya purvasyottarakfa?Jasyiinubandhaf?) produce~ the appearancc of

"change of what has endu.red" (Jthityanyathatva), -vvbereas it is merely a serics

of cveots (pra11aha) resembling one anothcr (a11isadrśa). In sucha contcxt, arising is merely the immedidatc arising from ·a state of non-existence

(pratt'k!4'!am abhii.tva hhiiva utparlal(). A moment thus comes to be from

oowhere and ceases immediately. (Here one is naturally remindcd of the Humcan version of causal rdacioos.)164 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

In the presenc verse, Nagarjuna is providing his own description of the

Sauttanrika theory of change. As chis cheory is based upon the recognition of

momentarioess (k!aT!ikatva), Nagarjuoa insiscs that the preceding event has to

produce the succeeding event (in the series of similar events) even before the

former is born, for the former does not endure in order co produce the laner. In

other words, if there were to beany causal connection between two momencary

eventS, the moment chat serves as che cause should be·ready to generare the cffect before it passes away, that is, eveo beforc it is boro.

8. Pradipal/ sva-par'iitmanau Ja??Jprakafayita yatha,

utpiidaf? svapaiiitmiinav r·bh'iiv u1padayet tathii.

As a light illuminates itself as well as others, so does arising produce both

itself and others.

M.KV(P) p. 15 1; MKV(V} p.62.

Here, a meraphor is utili:zed to exp\a.\n che Sautrancika version of the causal

theory. The·thrust of the argument i~ ~hac ie is noc necessary for an event to en-

.duce before it can produce some other cffect. A lamp or light does not have to

remaio for a while beforc it could illuminate itself as welł as others. This is che

same argument ~cd by the Sautrantikas and óther idealistic schools to ju'stify

the existence ofa c'tigito discussed above (see also Masaaki Hatrori, Dignaga On

Perception , Cambridge: Harvard Uoiversity Press, 1968, p. 101). The

Sautrancikas feared chat any conception ofduration or scatis (sthitt) will lead co

the unacceptable view of subscance (111abhiiva).

9. Pardipe niindhakaro 'sti yatra ciisau prafi!fhitaf?,

kif!1 prakiiśayati dipaf? prak'iiśo hi tamo- vadhaf?.

There ex.ists no ~rkness ei.ther in the light or in whatever place it is

siruatcd. What does light illuminate? For, illumination is indeed the

dcstruction of darkness.

MKV(P) p.151 ; .MKV(v,J ·p.62.lHE EXAMINATION OPTHE CONDITIONED 165

Nagarjuna's criticism of the Sautrantika theory begins here. In order to get rid

of the metaphysics associaced with the Saucriinika cheory of change and

causation, Nligarjuoa begios by quescioning the meaning of the term "illumination" (prakiifa). For bim, light (a/oka) and darkoess (andhaliiira) are

relative ideas. This same idea is expressed by the Buddha at S 2. lSO, wherc it i.s

said: ''This so-called element of light is known through its dependence upon

darkness'' (yayaf(J . , , abhadhiitu ayaf(J dhatu andhakiiraf(J paficcapaflfiiiyati;

see also Nagarjuna's discussion in his R.atniiva/i [Ratnava/i ofNiigarjuna, ed.

G , Tucci,joumal ofthe Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1934, 1936, l.48]). The

relatonship herc is by way ofconrrast; the absence ofone means che presence of

che othcr. Thus, "i łłumination" is synonymous with the "destruction of

darkness" (lamo-vadhaf?). one is nor produced by the ocher in any substantiaJ

way.

10. Katham utpadyamanena pradipena tamo hataf(l-,

notpadyamiino hi·tama!? pradipaą piiipn11te yadii..

How can darkness be desrroyed by the emergent light, when the emerging Light, indeed , does not teach darkness?

MKV(P} p. 152: AfA.'V(V) p.62,

The example of light and darkness used to i lłus trate che causal relationship berween two momenrary evencs is here showo to be inappropriatc, as

ie cvenrually leads to a rarher substancialist nocion of light reaching up to

d:ukness in order to destroy ie.

11. Aprapyaiva pradipena yadi va nihatarrt tama!?,

iha-Slahal, sarva-loka-sthaf(J sa tamo nihani!yati.

On the contrary, if darkńess is destroyed by light witbout reaching ic.

then chat [light) rcmaining here will destroy the darkness present in all

the woclds.

MKV(P) p . 15 :\ ~ MKV(J.? p.62166 TuĘ PHlLOSOPHY oF THE Mmoµ WAy ·

The cootrary of the substantialist view referred to at VII.10 is here shown to

lead to furthcr confusion. Iflight can destroy darkness without reaching it, the

implication would be that any spack oflight anywhere can destroy the darkness

present in the entire universe.

12. Pradipal/ sva-paratmiin11u Saf!Zprllkaśayate yal/1;

tamo 'pi svap11ratmii1111u cliiidayi/yaty a.raf!JŚayaf'!'.

If light were to illminate both itselfand otherS, then certain.ly darkness

too will .conceal itself and ot~ers.

MKV(P) p.154; MKV(V) p.63.

Taking the acgument ofthe subsrantialist at VII.8 that light illurninates itselfas

well as others, Nagarjuna is herc showing that the same could be said of

darkness too, which would invalidate the meaningfułness of the very example

ilsed by the substantialist.

13. Anutpanno 'yam utpadaf? svatm'iinaf!Z janayet kathaf!Z,

athotpanno janayate jiite kif!Z jany4te p11naf?.

How can this non-arisen arising ptoduce itself? Hitis the ariseo that pr<>-

duces, theo being boro, what is it that is produced again?

MKV(P) p.157; MKV(V) p.64.

·The principle adopted at I.6 in criticizing the identity and non-identity

theorics of causation is herc applied to reject the notion of a self-creating arisIng. The metapliysical assumptions associated with the Sautrantika theory of

momentary arising is laid bare by an cxamination of the so-called "deep struc·

tures.''THE EXAMINATION OF THE CONDITIONED 167

s

Arising produces itself.

NP VP

i. (non-arisen) arising

ii. (arisen) arising

produces itself

produces ltself

The first alternative is impossible. The second is meaningless.

14. N olp11dyaman11f?Z notpannaf?Z nanutpanna'f?Z kath(N!1cana,

utpadjate tathakhyata'f?Z gamyamiina-galiigataif?.

Neither the present arising, nor the arisen. nor the non-arisen, is being

arisen in any way. This has alteady been explained by mea!15 of [the concepts of] present moving, the moved and the not yet moved.

MKV(Pj p. 157~ MKV(V) p.64.

The anałysis of present arising (utpadyamana), ·the atiscn (utpanna), and the

noo-arisen (111'1Utpanna) conceived ofin metaphysical terms compares wełl with

the analysis.of motion in Chaptcr Il.

15. Utp11dyamanam utpattav idaf?Z na kramate yadii,

katham utpizdyamanaf!' tu parlf.tyotpatti1!J ucyate.

When this present arising does not proceed from wichin arising, indeed,

how can the present arising be spoken of as dependent arising?

MKV(P) p.158; Mk'V(V) p.6j.168 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WAY

The first line utllizes the concepcual apparacus of rhe subscantiałists in speaking

of the effect (i.e.. che present arising. utpadya1nana) as issuing out of the c:ause

(i.e., the arising, utpattt). This is a theory of self-production. As indicated in

1.7, Nagarjuna rejecrs this causa! explaoacion as meaningless, for there is acrually no production of anything new in such a cootext. lt is mere self-re·

production.

If the substancialist were to adopt the cerminology ofthe Buddha(utilized so

oftcn by Nagarjuna), theo he could say that the "presenc arising is dependent

(prafitya) upon arising. '' Even though this souods like the Buddha's (and,

therefore, Nagarjuna's) formulation of the causa! principle, yet Nigarjuna is

not willing to recognize it. This is because dependent arising does oot simply

mean the·reproduction of the same thing. In che present case, it is an explanation of the present arising (utpadya1niina) on the basis of arising (utpallt),

which is simply tautological with no new informatioo provided. "Dependent

arising" accounts for the arising of something new or differenr, even though

such newness or difference is not emphasized to the complcte neglect of the

cela cionship of dependence.

The present verse is indicacive of che manner in which the Saurrancikas,

while trying to explain causation in terms of "associacioo" of discrere momeotary cntities, wece evencually led co a substantialist concepcion causacioo. Eirher

they had co accept self-causation or remain satisfled with rnere self-re·

production, the latter providing no explanation of creacivicy at all. "Dependent

arising,„ on che conrcary. accounts for creacivity without falling into the

substancialist trap.

16. Parfitya yadyad bha11ati tat tac chiinla'f!l svabhiivataf?,

tasmad uJpadyamiinaf!l ca fiinJam utpattir eva ca.

Whatever that comes to be dependently, thac is inherently peaceful.

Therefore, that which is presenrly arisiog as well as arising icself are

peaceful.

!lf.KV(P) p. l ~9- 1 60 : ,W.Kll(V) p. 6~ .

This singularly imporcanc statemcnt in the prcsent chaptet comes after Vll.-15

where Nagarjuna refused co recognize a form of „dependent arising" chat alsoTHE EX11MINA110 N Ot THE CONDIT10NBD 169

carries the implication of self-tausation (svata-utpattt). The nocion of depen·

dent arising (prafitya bhavati = prafityasamutpada) is simply free from any

idea of sdf-causation involving substance or self nature (s11abliii11ata4 ś'iita'?!-)

and. in tbat sense, is "inhereotly peaceful." 1t does not contribute to the notion

of "self1 (atman, svabhava) or "other" (para) and , as a result, does not generate

lusc (riiga) or hacred (dvefa), anachment or aversion. It is the more appropriate

view regarding the present arising (utpadya1nana) as well as arising (utpatt1)

and constitutes an understanding (jnana) or wisdom (prajifii) thac brings abouc

freedom (vimuk11: nirvaf!a). It is indeed not a negation of arising (utpada, utpattt), but simply a non-substantialist way of percciving such phenomena.

17. Yadi kaścid anutpanno bhava!J sa'f!J.vidyate kvacit,

utpadyeta sa kirtt ta1mirJ bhava utpadyate 'sati.

If a cectain non-arisen existent js evidcnt somewhere, theo that would

arise. When sucb a thing does not exist, how can.an exist.ent anse?

M.KV(P) p.160; M.KV(V) p.66.

Here Naga(juna, seems to be sctting up the Sarvascivada theory ef identity

against the Sautrintika view of non-idencicy. The identity theory of causation

recognizes an ~nticy (bhava), permaoent and cternal, lying concealed

somewhere (kvacit), and therefore not yet arisen (anutpanna). If sucha thing

wece to exist, theo it could be said to arise. However, ifsucha thing were to be

non-existent (lasmin asat1). how can one say chat a ching or eotity arises? This

is, once again, a criticism of the Sauttantika tbeory of the arising of a nonexisting enrity (abhutv?i bh?i11a utp?ida, Akb p. 77; sec also Kalupahana ,

Causa/ity , p. 151). Hete, Nigarjuna is maintaining that the Sarvastivada

cheory of causacion, though excessively metaphysical, may be intelłigiblc in

some w.ą.. but that the Sautrancika theory of the arisiog of a non-existent entity

makes no sense ac all. ·

18. Utpadyam4nam utpiido yadi cotpadayaty ayaf?l,

utpadayet tam u.tpadam utp'iida/f katamal; puna~.170 J).rn PHILOSOPHY OF Tf!E MIDDLE W /\Y

lfarising we(C to produce this prcsent arising, which arising would again

produce tbat arising of that arising?

MKV(P) p.161; MKV(P) p.66.

lnfinite Iegress becomes a n~essary corollary of the Saumntika theory of

momentary events. As mencioned eaclier, the Sauttantikas were compelJed. to

assume the notion of potentiality (fa/dz; hi/a) in order to avoid such infinite

regrcss. Nagarjuna was not ready to accept tbat solution.

19. Anya utpadayaty enaf!t yady utpido 'navasthitif?,

athanutpacla utpannaf? sarvam uJpadyate tr;th'ii,

If this arising were to produce another, arising would turn out to be in- ·

finite regression. H the non-airising IS arisen, then i.t will produce

everything in tbis manner.

MKV(P) p.162; MKv(fl? p.67.

Not only does the Sautrantika theocy lead to infinite regress (anavastha), it also

contributes to the chaotic view that anything can come ~ut of anything, whicb

is the opposite of the Sa..cvastivada v.iew that notłUng comes out of nothing._

Causa! unifocmity bas no place whacsoever in che Saucta.ntika scheme of

things. This is another point of comparisoa between the .Sauttaatika and Humean views of causatioa. ·

20. Sataś ca tavad utpattir asataf ca nri yujyate,

na sataś c'iisataś cetipurvam evopapadita?JJ.

As such, neither the arisi.ng ofan existcnt noc the arising ofa non-existent

is pcopec. .Even se is the arising of that whlch is both existent and nonexistcnt, and this has been pteviously explained.

MKV(P) p .162; MKV(V) p.67.THE EXAMlNATION OF TI-IE CONDITIONED 171

Neither the identity thcocy of causation nor the oon-identity theocy nor cven a

cornbinacioo of these two will appropriatcly account for all the issucs rclating to

causation. This idea continucs to be emphasizcd by Nagarjuna.

21. Nirudhyamiinasyo1p111Jir na bhavasyopapadyate,

yaś c'iinir11dhyamiinas tu sa bh'ii110 nopopadyate.

The ańsing ofan existent tbat is ceasing is not appropriate. Whatever cxistcnt that is non-arising, that cxistent too is not appropriate.

MKV(P) p.163; MKV('1 p.67.

The theory discussed at VU.20 was the arising of a non-existent entity. The

discussion oow moves oo to the question rcgarding the arisiog ofan event that

is ccasing. The Abhidharma interpreters recognized two typcs of causes (helu)

that provide a foundation for the causal efficacy of an cvent that is ceasing

(nirudhyamane k'iirilraf!!- dvau hefii kuruta4, AK ii.63; AKB p.100; also see

definition of k'iiritra at AD 321; Adv p.281). Nagarjuna is reluctant to acccpt

even the fact that an existebt that is on ics way to ceasing can arise. In other

words, cessation and arising cannot be describcd as evcnts taking place in relacion to the same entity. Or moce specifically, a changing substance is unacceptablc to Nagarjuna. Similarly, one cannot speak ofan cntity that is not ceasing

(11nirudhy11miina).

22. Na sthita-bh1i11a.J li/thaty as1hi1a.bha110 na tifthatz~

na tifthati tirthamiina4 ko 'nutpannaś ca f#thati.

An existent that has endured is not stationary, nor is an existent t.hat has

not endurcd. The presently cnduring is not stationary. What non-arisen

can stay?

A1KV(P) p.164; MKV(V) p.68.172 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIDDLE WAY

Tbc Sarvasdivadins (especiaJJy the Vaibha~ikas) argued thac u nless "stasis"

(sthit1) of an encity (dharma) is not recognized , ie causał efficacy also cannot be

admirred (Adv p.109). This is conrrary co the view (referred co in VTI.21) expressed by the Sautrantikas, namely, chat an entity, wheo it is ceasiog, can

generace causaJ efficiency. Thus, while the Sautraocikas rcfused to recognize a

moment of scasis fearing chat ie would lead co a belief in substance, the Sarvastivadiris insisted upon admittiog such a static momenc.

As such, the Sarvastivadins can maintain that a static moment cndures

(11hita-bhavaf? tiffhatt) , primariły because they assumed that scasis has its own

oacure (111abha11a). lf there was no such narure, chen phenomena could not eodure. Herc again, we have the discinccion between a phenomenon and its static

narure. Whac Nagarjuna is denying hece is not chat a phenomenon can endure,

but chat a static nature can endure (asthita-bhavaf? tiffhatt)? This woułd appear

to be seł f-concradictory to Nagarjuna. To say chat "presently enduring is enduring" {tt/(hamanaf? tt/ fhall) woułd be taucologicaJ.

All the above mencioned views would pertain to something chat has ąlieady

arisen. Finally, Nagarjuna insists chat we cannot speak of a non-arisen entity as

having scasis.

23. Sthitir nirudhyamiinasya na bhavaJyopapadyate,

yaf canirudhyamiinas tu sa bhavo nopapadyate.

Duration of an ~tent that is ceasing is noc appropriate. Whatever existenc chat is non-ceasing is also not.appropriate.

MKV(P) p.164; MKV(V} p.68.

While the Sautrancikas (a.S mentioned earlier) recogoized causaJ efficiency in a

phcnomcnon at the moment of its arising (utpada). and as such they did not

have co accept a static moment, che Sarvascivadins argued chat without a static

moment a phenomenon caaaot generate any causal efficiency (yadi hi dharmasya sthitir na sya11 tasyatmanya11a1thria1ya hetvakhjiif? faktiprabha11a11iśefO

na.Jyat, Ad11 p.105). A moment of stasis is ro be foJlowed by decay (jara) and

destruction (11yaya). If the Sarvascivadins were noc happy abour cecognizing

causa! efficieocy of a pheaomeaon at che moment of its ar-ising, che moment

being such a minute instant of time. they will be compelled to admic such

causaJ efficiency in a scacie moment as ie begins to disappear (ntrudhyamana).

Nagarjuna's argument, here is, thereforc, direcced agains che SarvascjvadinsT HE EXAMfNAilON OF THE ( ONDITIONED 173

wheo he says: "The duration of an existent that is presently ceasing is not ap·

propriate." However, someone may assume that Na~rjuna's C(idcism of the

Sarvaśtivada theory of scasis would mean that he is compelled co accept che contrary view, oamely, that therc is a phcnomenon chat is not ceasmg

(anirudhyamana). This lattet view he rejects in che second lioe.

24. jarii-mara11a-dharrrtef,u rarva-bha11e1u sarvadii,

t;,,thanti katame bhava ye jafii-1nara1Jan,z vina.

When all existents are always of the nature ofdecay and death, which existents that are without decay and death can stay?

MKV(P) p"l65; MKV(V) p.68.

This is a simple Iejection of any metaphysical idea pettain.ing to the real stasis

(sthitt) of phenomena. This rejection is based upon the empirical notions of

decay and death (jara-maraf!4) emphasized by the Buddha himself.

The interpretets of the Abhidharma seem to have experienced difficulty in

reconciling the Buddha's description of the "dispositionally cooditioned"

(san,iskrta) as having three characceristics (tn11i lak1a11am) (A 1.152; TsenB

12. 5 [Taisho 2.607c)) with chei.r owo theories ofmomeotarioess. While the Sarvastivadins recognized a fourth moment (caturtham atra vaktavya'f(l syat, Akb

p .75), splitting up "change of what has Iemained'' (thitassa aflfJathatta) into

ewo moments as sc.asis (sthiti) and decay (anyathiitva, jara), the Saucriinrikas admitced ooly two moments rejectiog both stasis and decay. The Theraviidins accepted a thcocy of three moments , once again omitting decay.

The need for recóg.nizing stasis o.n the part of the Sarvastivadins and its

denial by the Sautrantikas is discussed at length by Vasubandhu (Akb

pp.75·76). Both schooJs assumed (and this is the case wich the later

Theravadins coo) chat the Buddha's definition of the "dispositiooally conditioned'' in tenns of three Gharacceristics (as arising, decay or change of what has

remained, and ~easing) is for the sake'of the unenlightened (11ineyajan'iirthaf?').

They argued chat it is for this reasoo chat the Buddba utilized the rerm ''appeats" (pannayati, prajnayate) when speaking of these three charą.cceristics.

However, chis is not the case with the Abhidharma theory of moments (na tu

kfa1'!1JJya).

The incerpreters of the Abhidha.rrna (hardly realizing chat the Abhidharma

did not have a theory of momencs) wece making a distinccioo between the174 D-ffi Pl-ifLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

"discourses" (1utra) and Abhidharma, comparabłe to the distinction made in

the Saddharmapu11 f1Jnka between the Agama and Mahayana discourses. They

assumed that the Abhidharma aoałysis (i.e. , in terms of moments) is for those

who reałly understand the "meaning" (arthajiia), not for those who merely go

after the "texts" (granthajfla). Thus carne to be established the definition of

Abhidharma as concaining "taintless wisdom" (prafl'ii 'ma/ii J'iinucara 'bhidharmaf?, AK i.21).

Nigarjuoa soems to have remained undaunted by such claims on the part of

the Buddłiist metaphysicians. He was probably aware that all three

metaphysical views presented by the Sarvasrivadans, the Sautrantikas and the

!acer Theravadins (the last was pcobably not knowa to bim) were incompatible

with the Buddba's own conception of change explaioed in terms'of decay and

death (jafii-maraf!a). Thcrefore, he perceives no existents (bh1iva) that arc free

from decay and death.

25. Sthityanyay1i Jthitef? sthanaf?l tayaiva ca na yujyate,

utpadasya yathotpado natmanii na paratmana.

The endurance ofan cnduring tbing bascd. on the eodurance of jrself or

ofanother is not pcopet. lt is likc the absencc ofarising ofarising, cither

from itself or from anothe.r.

MKV(P) p. 165; MKV(V? p.68.

lfstasis (sthit1) we.re to be a distinct event, theo the metaphysicians who needed

to explaio such an eveot in terms ofcausality will have to maintain that it could

occur either depending upon itself( =self-causation, svatotpatti) or based upon

another (externaJ causation, para/a JJtpattt). Both are not appropriate. This is

simiłar to the criricism made of arising ac VII .18- 19.

26. Nirudhyate naniruddhaf?l na niruddhaf?l nirudhyate,

lathapi nirudhyamana11J kim aj1ita1J'} nirudhyate.

T~t which has not ccased does not cease. That which has ceased also doesTHE ExAMINATION OF THE CONDITIONED 175

not cease. Even so is that which is ceasing. Is it the urtborn that ceases?

MKV(P} p.i67; M.KV(V) p.69.

After analysing the metaphysical concepts ofarising (utp'iida) and stasis (1thitt),

Nagarjuna settles down to an examination of the problem of cessacion or

destruction (nirodha, vyaya). 1his criticism follows the method adopted at II. l, ex·

cepting the finał question: "Is it the unborn.that ceases?" lfcessation were to be

understood in the sense of momentary cessation, it cannot be explained.

However, if one wece to accept a permanent and eternal substance (111tJbha11a)

which would, at the same time, be unborn (a1izta), as the Sarvastivadins did ,

then that cenainly cancot cease to exist.

27, Sthita.rya tavad bha11asya nirodho nopapadyate,

nasthita.ryapi bhava.rya nirodha upapadyate.

The cessation of an existent that has endured is not appropciate. The

cessation of an existent that has not endured is also not appropriate.

MKV(P) p. 168; MKV(V) p.70.

As mentioned earlier, the Buddha's discourse pertains to "change of what has

remaioed'' (!hitassa afJńathatta), where ''what has remained" (!hita) would not

imply something that has remained static without any change, but rather "what

has become" (bhUta, bhutva). What has become can then cease to exist. Tuus,

"change of what has remained'' (namely. something that has undergone a process ofchange or uansfocmation-vzParif!ama) can come.to an end. Hence, itis

meaningful to speak of cessation (vaya) after "change of what has remained"

(fhilassa afJfJathatta),

However, this is not the case with stasis (sthitt) as explained by the

metaphysicians, primae.iły because. such stasis was disringuished from change

(anyathatva). As such, stasis implied that sornething remains static, without

change, for a while and then without any cause or reason it would suddeoly

start changing or would cease to exist. This is the implicatłon of the rheory

refe.rred to in the first line which is not acceptabłe co Nagarjuna. ,

The second line implics the equally metaphysical and unacceptable view of

the Sautrantikas who argued that an eveot ceases immediately upon arising176 Tur! PHILOSOPHY OF THBMIDDLE WAY

without remaining cven for one moment (k/a11ikasya hi dharmasya 11ina sthitya

11yayo bhavet, Akb p.77).

28. Tayai11a11aslhayii11aJtha na hi sai11a nirudhyate,

anyajii11aJ/haya11aJtha na canyai11a nirudhyate.

lndecd, a certain state [of cxistence] does not cease Crom a state identical

with its owo. Nor docs a state [ofexistence] cease from another state dif.

ferent &om its own.

MKV(P) p.169; MKV(V) p.70.

The principles of self-causation (siJata-uljJatli) and external causation (paratautpattt), rejected in Chapter I, may have to be adopted in order co explain cessacion itself (nirodha), if the latter were to be uoderstood in the way the Sar·

vascivadins and the Saucrancikas conceived of it. Eithcr ccssacion will havc to

occur on its owo, or on .the basis ·ofanother. Such discussions were rampant

ducing the scholastic period in~n philosophy (especially with the domination of the doctrine of mome,N;_armess) whcn it was argued as to whether

dcstruction is inherent in birth or whether,~ is brought about by extcrnal causcs

or conditions (sec Ad11 pp.106-108). Nigarjuna's rejection applies to both

VICWS.

29. Yadaiva sarva-dharniii111im utpado nopapadyate,

tadai11a rarva-dharm7h!i'f' nirodho nopapadyate..

Indccd, when the arising ofall things is not appropriatc, then the ccssation of all things is also not appropriate.

MKV(P) p.169; MKV(V) p.70.

Note chat the term sart1a (all) is uscd as an adjective ofdharma, but not utpida

(arising). This means thac Nagarjuna is not rejecting all forms of arising (sariiautpada) as being unsatisfactory. Ratber, he·is critical of utilizing the concepcionTHE EXhMINhTION OF IBE CONDITIONED 177

ofacising-(111pada), discussed previously, to any or all pbenomena (dharma). If

arising in a metaphysical se:ise cannot be applied to all phenome~a , then

cessaton (nt'rodha) too, similarly conceived, is inapplicablc. ·

30. Sataf ca tavad bha11asya nirodho nopapadyate,

ekatve na hi bliiivaf ca nabhavaf copapadyafe.

Furthermoret the ccssation ofa real existent is not appropriate. lndecd, in

the context of identity, neither existence nor non-existence is appropriate.

31. Asato 'pi na bhavasya nirodha upapadyate,

na d11iliyasya firasaf? chedanaf?' vidyaJe yatha.

The cessation of an unreal existent is also not appropriate, just as a second

beheading [of a person] is not evident.

MKV(P) pp.169-170; MKV(V) pp.70- 71.

Nagarjuoa's criticism so far has been confined to arising, stasis and ceasing

metaphysically conceived as events in themselvcs. In the present contexts, he

retums to the criticism ofthe ccssacion of real existcnts (satal; bha11asya), similar

to the criticism of the real cxistents in Chaptcr I. Neither existence or noncxistence,- nor a combination of both. arc acceptablc to him.

32. Na svatmana nirodho 'sli nirodho na pariitmana,

utpadasya yathotpado na~mana na para1mani.

There is no cessarion by i_tself or by anothcr entity, just as the arising of

arising is neither by itsclf nor by another.

MKV(P) p.lvl ; MKV(V) p.71.178 THE PH TLOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE \Y/AY

This is the fioaJ criticism of che identity and non-idencity cheories as applied to

the idea of cessation (nirodha). lt is comparable to the criticism of arising (utp'iida) presenced at vn.l 2.

33. U1p'iida-1thiti-bhańganiim asUlher n'iisti Jaf!llkrtaf!J,

Sa'f!Jskrtasyaprasiddhau ca kathaf!J setsyaty asa1'(lskrtaf!J.

With the non-establishment of arising, duration and destruction, the

conditioncd docs not ex.ist. With the non-establishmentof the conditioncd, how could thece be the uoconditioned?

MKV(P) p.1 76; MKV(V) p.73.

Arising (utpiida), stasis (s1hiti), and destrucdoo (bhanga), as explained by the

metaphysicians, would not establish their conception of che "conditioned"

(Jaf!llkrta). If the "conditioned", so conceived, is not cstablished, indeed chere

caooot be a similarly formulated conception of the "unconditioned"

(asaf!llkrta).

One very significant fact chat caonot escape a careful scrutiny of the contents

of this entire chapter is that, while Nagarjuna has spccifically criticizcd che

tłuee kinds of even ts (arising, stasis, and ceasing), he has made oo criticism

whatsoever of decay (jara). In fact, at VII.24 , decay and death (jari-mararta)

were used as arguments for the rejection of stasis (1thit1). In short, the Buddha's

owo conceptions of arising (uppada), ceasiog (vaya, nirodha), change of what

has remained ([hita11a afifialhatta), decay (jar'ii), impermanence (anicattii) have

been Jeft intact. These have no room for a substantial entity (an atman, a

svabh'liva) and arc indeed compatible with the Buddha's famous doctrine of

noo-substantiaJity (anatta). There could be no reason why a philosopher of

Nagarjuna's caJibre could not distinguish the empiricaJ nature of the Buddha's

anaJysis of the "characteristics of the disposicionaUy conditioned" (sal!khatassa

sankhata-lakkha1{iint) from the metaphysical character of the ideas expressed

by the intcrpreters of the Abhidharma.

34. Yatha mayii yatha 111apno gandharva-nagaraf!J yatha,

tathotp'iidas tath'ii 11hanaf(J tathi bhańga udiihrtaf(J.T HE EXAMINAT!ON OF THE COND!'rIONED

As an illusion, a dream, a city of the gandharvas, so have arising, endurance and destruction l:>een exemplified.

M.KV(P) p.1'77; M.KV(V) p.73.

179

If the analys.is of the conteots of the present chapter is correct, then there

could be no question that the ilłusory character as exemplified by "dream" and

"the city of the gandharoas'' is appplicabJe only to the metaphysical ideas of

arising, stasis and ceasing as presented by the interpreters of the Abhidharma,

and nÓt to any one of the conceprs of arising, ceasing, decay. change, and impetmanence formulated by the Buddha and accepted by Nagarjuna hirnself.

The Buddha utilized the similies of foam (phef!a), bubble (bubbula) ,

mirage (manc1), trunk of a plantain tree (kadalt), and illusion (maya) in order

w illustrate the non-substaotiality of the five aggregates (S 3.142). Nagarjuna

is here using comparable simi!ies for the same purpose. A careless applicatoo of

these similies to explain all forms of ideas, whether substantialist or nonsubstantialist, has given rise to enormous misunderstanclings relating to the

Buddhist doctrine.CHAPTER

EIGHT

Examination of Action and the Agent

(Karma-karaka--partk.[a)

1. Sadbhuta4 kiirakal? karma sadbhutarp na karoty ayaf!J,

k'iirtfko napy a.radbhutaJ? karmasadbhutam thate.

'

This really existent agent does not perform a reałly existent action.

Neither is it intended that a really non-existent agent performs a really

' ,

non-existent action.

MKV(PJ p.180; ·MKV(V) p.75.

The examination of the "dispositiona)Jy conditioned" (sa'f!Mktta) naturally led

Nigarjuna to another major philosophical problem that has been the subject of

much misunderstanding among the Buddhisrs as well as the non-Buddhists,

namcly, the _doctrine of karma.

ln the early discourses, karma and saf!Jskara (and, therefore, sa?!Jskrta) are

mutually related. Wbile karmas arc said to form saf!Jsk'iiras (see M 2.'121),

saf!Js/iara.r themselves ·arc decerminants of karma. The Buddha who denied an

eteroal soul or self (atman) was often confrooted by skeptics who raised the

qucstion as to how karrńas performed by a "no-self" can affect a person (anafla-

·katiini kammani ka'!' (Aatarp) atfina?!J phusirsanti, M 3.119;·S 3.103). This is

not, howcver, the problem of morał responsibiłity (karma--phala), which

Nigarjuoa takes up later in Chapcer XVII. The present problem relates mostly

to the oature ofan action and an agent (karma-karaka). When this lattec question was raised in the discourses, very often it is said that there is no substantial

agent who is the author of actions. What is generally understood as a substantial being (satta) or person (puggala) is nothi.og moce than a "lump of disposicions" (sańkhiira-pułija, S 1.134), which is another name for the five aggregates

(khandha), cach recciving irs form conditioned by the sańkhiita.r (S 3.87; Tsa

2 .14 (Tairho 2.llc]). Neither the "lump of dispositions" nor the aggregates

were considered to be substantial, that is, having a reality of their own. The

"clispositions" (sańkhara) , which arc acquired by the person and, therefore, im·

perinanent, are also responsible for condiciooing that personality. Thus,

1ROTHE Ex.AMINATION Of AcnoN AND TiiE AGENT 181

according to early Buddhism, neither the person nor die aggregate~ (one of

whicb is disposition, sankh'iira) have any substaotial reality. Io the fitst place,

the dispositions chemselves arc impermancnt (11ayadhamm4 sank~iira, D

2.156) and, secondly, all phenomena, includińg all persons or aggregates, arc

non-substantial (sabbe dhammii anrJttii, M 2.228; S 3.133; 4.401; A 1.286;

Tsa 10.7 [Tairho 2.668)).

Yet, when the canonical Abhidharma tex:ts rejected a real self or soul (atta)

and listed the various physical and psychological factors that go to constitute

the human personality, the intcrpreters of these physical and psychological factors ttansgressed the limits of speculatioo and admitted the real existcnce of

these various factors. Thus carne to be the theory of the substantialiiy of

elemenrs propounded by the Sarvastivadins.

Thcreforc, in his attempt to establish the non-substantiałity of all elements

(dharma-nairatmya) , Nagarjuna was compelled to examine the concepts of action (karma) as well as the agent of such action (karaka) in the prescnt section

of his treatise (leaving the question regarding morał responsiblity for a. detailed

discussion at a later and more appropriate time). As ·explained previously,

Nagarjuna tealized chat the concepts of substantial existence (sat, astitva) as

well as a.bsolute noo-existcnce (asat, na1tit11a) werc two cxuemcs to be avoided

in any discussioo of action and agent.

2. Sadbhutasya kn'yii nasli karma ca syad akartrkam,

sadbhula.rya krijii nasti karta ca syiid akarmakaf?.

A rcally existent cntity bas no' activity. Therefore, acton would be without

an agent. A really existent entity has no acriviry. Thcreforc, cvcn an agent

would be without action.

MKV(P) p.181 ; MKV(V) p. 75.

This is an cxtremely interesring analysis of the implicatioru as welJ as the conscqueoces ofadmfrring a rcally existing entity (sadbhuJa). a soul or a self(atman,

pudgala) or evcn a substance (!vabha11a). The concept of a self (atman) as envisaged in the substantialist traditions, like the Upanifads, is one of pure cnti·

ty, permancot and eternal, unaffcctcd by the changes taking place in the

phenomenal world. lt is beyond all forms of duality and multiplicity. The con·

cept ofsubstance, even though rarely dcfined as a "pure encity," yet pactakes of

all othcr characteristics, namely , permanence, eternalicy, noo-duility, and182 THE PHJLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

non-multiplicity. This means tha.t any activity, any change in quality, in quancity, in character, or in fórm would bćmerely supe.rficial. The real or the essential is eternal. Such implications of the Sarvastivada theory of substance

(svabhliva) wece noted ear1ier (sec Chapter I). If the cause and effect were to be

idc:ncical in essence, then their diffe.reoce becomes superficial. A cause becomes

un-productive and wouJd be like a tree stump that .temains moti'onless (vanjha

ku{a!fha, D 1.14, 56; S 3.211 ; M 1.517; 11vicalit11-nity11tv11, sec Ka1upahana,

Causality , p. 28).

Hence Nagarjuna's statement: "A really existing encity is without·activity."

This assercion leads to two rather disastrous conseql.lences, especially for the

doctrine of karma; either an action (lu;muz) will be rendered agent-less

(a-kartru) or an agent (kartr) would be action-less (t1-karmakiz).

'3. K11roti yady asadbhuto 'sadbhuta'f!J karma karakal/,

t1hetuka'f!J bhavet karota karfii ciihetuko bhavet.

lfą non-existent age.nt w~e to perfor.m a non•existent action, the action

would be without a cause, and the agent too would be without a cause.

. '

MKV(P) p. 182; MKV(V) pp.75-76.

.

Ifone wece to accept the view which is contrary to the one mentioned at VIU. 2,

that is, a non-existeot entity performing a non-existent action, then both agent

(kartr) and action (ka"na) would be rendered cause-less (a-hetuka).

VIII.2-3 thus turo out to be a elear warning against the universal and indiscriminate application of the examples of "illusion'' (maya) , "dream'' (sv(Zpna) and the "city of the gandbarvas" (gąndharva-nagara) , espedally in the mattet of explaining "emptiness" (funyatli) at VIi.34 and elsewhere.

4. Hetiiv asati liiirya'f!J. ca kliraf1af!l ca na vidyale,

tad abhlitie knyli karta karaf!a'f!J ca na vidyate.

' . .

When a cause does not ćxis(, both the effect and the sufficient conditionT HE EXAMlNATION OF ACTION AND THE AGBNT

arc not evident. When thcse are ooo-existent, activity, agent and

performance of accion are also not cvideot.

MKV(P) p.182; MKV(V) p. 76.

18}

Furtbcr impłications of the deniał ofa cause at Vlll.3 are highlighted herc. Not

only would it negate an effecr (karya) or a sufficient condition (k7ira1Ja), it

wouJd also lead to the abandoning of activity, agent as well as action, nooe of

which is accepcable to Nagarjuna.

5. Dhamiiidharmau na vidyele knyadiniim aJaf(lbhave,

dharme ciisaty adharme ca phalf(l tajjam na vidyale.

With the non-occurrence of activity, etc., good and bad arc also not evident. Wben both good and bad do not exist, a fruit arising from these

would also not be evidcnt.

MKV(P) p .183; MKV(V) pp.76-77 .

Inada's rendering of this verse clcarly indicates his faitbful adhereoce to the

transcendentalist interpretation of Nagarjuna offered by previous interpreters

like Stcherbatsky, Murti, Conze, and most of theJapancse scholars. In spite of

KumarajTva's very elear rendering into Chinese, lnada ttanslates dharma and

adharma as factors and non-facrors respecrively (p.73). While ie is crue that the

term dharma is used in the Buddhist texts, both in an ontołogicał sense (referring to "pheoomcna") and in amore ethical sense (meaning "good"), cbere is no

evideoce at aU that the negacive term ,a.dharma was ever used in the former

sense. A careful examinatioo of the contexts in which it occurs provides sufficient evidence that the term meant "bad" and, hence synonymous wich

akusala. Furthermore, ofall che terms used co refer to an effecc, the term phala

occurring in this verse is invariably used in the sense of "fruit," baviog a morał

connotatton.

The preseot verse. therefore, provides unmiscakable evidcnce that Nagarjuna was upholding che morał philosophy advocated by the Buddha in his first

discourse-the Dhammacappa111111an1rs11tla-wbich lays down a middle pach184 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

bctwccn the two cxtremcs, which in ics rurn is based upon the philosophicał

middle position prcsented in the "DiscoMrse Io Kiityayana."

The belief in substancial cxistence or eternalisrn (a11hita, sassata) leads to

self-denial (at111-kilamathanuyoga) and the idea of nihilistic non-existence or

annihilationism (n'atthita, uccheda) coQtributes to self-indulgencc (kiimasukhallikiinuyoga) (sec Iotroduction). Verses VIIl.3-4 refer to che substantialist

and annihilationist views of karma, both of which lead to the abandoning ofa

morał life (iocluding morał responsibility) as understood by the Buddha. Having spokcn of artha (effect, fruit, consequencc) in relacion to pratyaya (cause,

condition) in Chapter I, Nagarjuna is herc addressing·rumself to the question

regarding the •:fruit ofaction" (karma-phala), a detailcd treatment of this problem being reserved for a lacer occasion (Chapter XVII). In the prescnt chapcer,

Nagarjuna's iotcncion is to cxplaio the non-substanciałity of the "agent'' and

the ''action," rather chan settlc the qucstion of mora] responsiblity. However,

he could not help rcferring to the "fruics of action," primarily bccause the

mctaphysical nocions of "agent" and "action" contributed to thcir vcry denial.

6. Phale 'sati na mokfiiya na s11argayopapadyale,

marga!? sarva-knya11am. ca nairarthak.yam, prasajyate.

When the fruit docs not cxist, the path of rcleasc or of hcavcn is not ap--

propńatc. This would imply the futility of all activity.

MKV(P) pp.183-184; MKV(V) p .77 .

Not only is Nagarjuna interested in the ·:ultimate fruit" (paramartha), i.e.,

freedom ·from sufferiog (mo/qa), he is also concerned with the fruits (artha,

phala) chat actions can generate as human beings proceed ałong the morał patb

(marga) gradualJy lcading to thac "ultimate fruit." Hence his interest in

"heaven" (s11arga), so often discussed in the "discourses" as the "fruics" enjoyed

by the "wayfa.rer." As far as Nagarjuna is concerne<l, human actions arc

rendered "fruitless" or "meaningless" (nir·artha), ifone were co adhere ro either

a theory of eternalism or of annihiłacionisn1 .

7. Kiirakaf? sad-asad-bhutal; sadasat kurute na tat,

par1Upara-viruddha~ hi saccasacc-aikatal? kutaf?.THE EXAMINATION Of A cnoN AND THE AGENT

An agent who is both existent and qón-exiscent does not perform an action that is both existent and non-existcnt, for they arc self-contndictory.

Wherc can cxistence and oon-cxistencc co-exist?

MKV(P) p. 185; MKV(V) p. 77 .

185

After criticizing the subscancfa)jst as well as the annihilationist views rclating

to agent and action, Nigarjuna examines the theory that atcempcs. to combine

them. This follows the criticism at I.13. For Nigarjuna, contradictory

predicates such as existence (sat) and non-cxistence (a.rat) cannot be applied to

the same thing.

8. Sala ca knyate niisan niisata kriyate ca sat,

kartra sarve prasajyante dofiis tatra ta eva ht'.

A non-existent action is not performed by a presently existing agent. Nor

is an cxistcnt action performed by a prescndy non-existent agent. Indeed,

if that wece to be the c.ue, all errots relating to the ageots [mentioned

earlier] would follow.

MKV(P) p .185; MKV(V) p .78.

Existence (sat) and non-ex.istence (asat} applied to the agent and action will

producc some other alternacive rheories than those mentioned earlier, e.g. :

i. A presently exiscenr agent (santa) performs a non-existent

(asat) action, and

u. a presencly ·non-existent agent (a.ranta) performs an existent

(sat) action.

Herc, the agent is described by means of a present patticiple (santa}.

9. Niisadbhutaf!J na stJdbhi1af/ sad-a.rad-bhuta1n eva va,

karoti k.iirakal? karma puN1ok11lir eva hetubhil/.186 TuE PHllOSOPHY OF THE M IDDLE W AY

For rcasoos stated above, an agent who has come co be existent does not

pcrform an action thac is non-existent or botb existcnt and non-existent.

10. Niisadbhuto 'pi sadbhulaf?' sad-asad-bhutam eva va,

karoli k'iiraka4 karma.purvoktair e11a hetubhil,J.

For reasons -stated above, an agent who has come to·be non-existcnt does

not pcrform an action chat is exisrcnt or both cxistent and non-existent.

11. Karoti 1ad-a1ad-bhuto na san nasac ca kiirakal,,

karma tal tu 11ifiinty'iit purvoktair eva hetubhif?.

An agent that has come to be botb existcnt and non-existent does not

pctform an action that exists and docs not exisc. This coo should be

undcmood in terms of the rcasons adduced above.

MKV(P) pp. 186-1.87; MKV(V) p.78-79.

WhHe VIII.8 utiłized the present paniciple to refer to the agent, the preseoc

verses ernploy the past participle: (i) an agent who has come ro be existent(1adbhuta); (ii) an agent who has come co be non-existenc(a.radbhula), and (iii) an

agent who has come to be bo~h existent and non-existent (sadtUadbhuta).

VIII.10 is not found in the Ch inese version.

12. Prafitya karakal? karma taf(t pralitya ca karakaf{l,

karma p Mvarfale nanyal paiy'iimal/ siddhi-k'lżrat!a'f!I>:

An agent proceeds depending upon action and action proceeds depcncJing upon the agent. We do not pccceive any other way of establishing

(them].

MKV(P) p.189; MKV(TI) p.79THf EXMvUNATION OF ACTION AND 1HE AGENT 187

After criticizing the metaphysical ioterpretations of agent (karaka) and action

(karma), Nagarjuna gives a positivc description of both in terms of the principle of "dependent arisint' (prafityasamutpada). Indeed, a mote posirive assertion sućh as, "We do oot perceive any other way of establishing [them]"

(ninyat siddhi-karaf!af!' paśyamal/), is rardy met with in the Kiirikiis.

13. Evaf!t vidyad upadiinaf?Z vyutsargad iti karmaf!.al/,

k.arttJś ca k4rma-k.artrbhya1~ fe1a11 bh'iiv'iin vibhavayet.

Following this method of the rejection of agent and action, one should

understand grasping. The remaining existentS should be c.ritically examined in terms of the concepts of action and agent.

MKV(P) pp.189-190: MKV(V) p.BO.

Nagarjuna began the chaptcr with the problem of grasping (upadiin'ii). lf he

wece to accept the substantialisr notions of agent and action, he could not explain grasping. During the course of this chapter, he was able to anaJyse the

metaphysical (and, therefore, unacceptablc) implications of the substaatialist

views such as the deniaJ of morał tesponsibility and freedom. The abandoning

(vyulsarga) refers to the giving up ofsuch metaphysical views. After giving up

such metaphysical views, he presented an aJccrnacive view, oamely, dependent

arisiog of both agent and action (VIIl.12). Such a view allows for a satisfactory

explanacions of"grasping" (11pidiina). A life with reduced grasping contributes

to worldly fruics such as the attainment of "heavenly" bliss. The complete

elimination of grasping culmioates in perfect freedom (mok1a) or the ultima.te

fruic.

This does not mean tbat Nagarjuna has no conception of an agent or an action or morał responsibility or freedom. It is mcreJy the renunciatioo of wroog

vicws and che adopcion of more appropriate explanations of these phenomena.

Such explanations, Nagarjuna concludes, should be extended to all

phcnomena.CHAPTER

NINE

Examination of the Pri.or Entity

(Piirva-pank1a)

l . Darśana-śr11vt11{iidini vedanadini Clipy atha,

bha11anli yasyt1 prag ebhyaf? IO 'sflly elee 11adanly utll.

"For whomsoever there eicists seeing, heacing, etc., and feeling, etc., he

exists prior to these." So do some declare. -

2. Katharti hy avidyamiinasya dllr:ianidi bhavi.!yati,

óbi11<1Iya tasmat prag ebhyaf? IO 'sti blfiivo t1yavmthitaf?.

How can there be sceing, etc. of an existent who is not cvident?

Thcrcforc, it is detetrnined that, prior t(l.these things, such an existent is.

MKV(P) p.192: MKV(V) p .81.

While the previous chapter is devoted to the refutation of the Canesian enterprise adopted lacer on by some of the Buddhist metaphysicians, the present

chapcer seems to be ca.king up specifically the Kantian project, namely, the

assumption of a primordial condition for all forms of koowledge , induding the

cogito. Heoce the questioo regardiog prior existcnce (purva).

He could not have beeo unaware of the Buddha's attitude toward the problem of the past (pubbanta). For a r~dicaJ cmpiricist like the Buddha,

knowJedgc of the past (afilllf!J.IC n'iif!a) is as important as any other knowledgc

(D 3.275). Indeed, knowledge of ''dependent arising" (pa;kcaiamuppada) is

invariably based upon such knowledge. Yet, when the pursuit of that

knowledge is attemptcd beyond its limi~. that is, when one tries to achieve absolute certainty w.ith regard to such knowledge, one ends up ·in specułations

regarding the past (pubbanfiinudittht) rathcr than knowledge (n'ii'!a). The

Brahmajiila-suttllnta refers to a whole hoot of mctaphysicaJ views presented by

188EXAMINATION OF THE PR10R ENTITY 189

thosc who wece involved in such specułations (D 1.13 ff.,pubbanta-kappik4 =

purriiinta-kalpikii).

Nagarjuna was thus convinced that the concepts of the cogito, the atman oc

s1111bh?i11a wcte fotmulated by the metaphysicians who wece actempc~ng to know

the past with ccrtainty. No ocher expl~ation would satisfy their yearning for

certainty regarding the past. Pec.tnancnt self, cternal substance, pcc-existing

cogito, a transcendental unity of appercepcion-tbese could account for wy

breaks or intcrruptions in.human experience as well as their continuity. The ~mbolism of the chariotecr (Katha Upani1ad 3.3-6) as wcU as the example .of the

two birds, one enjoying .the fruit, the other watching (Mu11fhka Upanifad

3.1.1), adoptcd SO cnthusiasticalły by the Brahmanical thinkers, were g1adually

making inroads into Buddhist philosóphicaJ thinking. The SammitTyas (if not

identical with, at least relatcd to the Sau~antika school) we.re accused of permitting such a bclief into the Buddhist fołd. So says Cand~rkTrci. Yet, Sarvastivada, witb its svabhava-metaphysics is no less culpable of this deviation

tban the Sammitfyas with their pudgala-mctaphysics or even the later

Theravadins with the bhavanga·metaphysics. "Nagarjuna begins the present.

chapter with a statement, not only of this theory, but also of the rationalizations of thosc who formulatcd such a theory.

3. Dar:fana-fravat}adibhyo 11edanadibhya eva ca,

ya}/ priig 11yavasthito bhaval/ kena prajnapyate 'tha sal{.

Whatever existent is detennined as existing prior to seeing, hcaring, et~.•

and also feeling, etc., by what means is he [it] made known?

MKV(P) p.193; .MKV(f1 p.81.

As usual, Nagarjuna's first objectioo against positing such an entity that exists

pdor to the experiences such as seeing. hearing, etc. as wdl as feeling, etc., is

epistemologicaJ. This objection should serve as warning against those who

believe chat Nagarjuna recognizes a special intuitive non-sensuous experience

through which_the so-called "ulcirńarc reality" (paramiirtha?) is known. In fact,

this question on the pait of Nagarjuna is a elear incJi§ation of che fact that he

was quite aware of the sort of empiricism advocated by the Buddha, especiałly

in his "DiscoUISe on Evetything (Sabba-sutta, S 4.15; sec also Kalupahana, "A

Buddhist tract on empiricism," in PEJP' 19 (1969):65-67).190 THE PHlLOSOPHYOFTHE MIDDLE WAY

4. Vinlipi darlaniidini yadi casau 11ya11asthita4,

amuny api bha111jyan1i 11ina tena na sa1'!1faya4.

If he is determined as existing even without seeing, etc., undoubtedly

even these [i.e. , seeing, etc.] will exist without bim.

MKV(P) p.193; MKV(V) p.81.

After questioning the empirical validity of such an assumption, Nagarjuna is

herc raising a logicaJ objection. lf a prior existing entity can be determined

witbout depending upon its experiences such as seeing, theo ie shouJd also be

logically possible that such experiences as seeing can be determined without a

prior entity. Indeed, this logical conclusion seems to be so suqng that Nagarjuna is willing to use the term asa~aya ("without doubt") co describe it.

5. Ajyate kenacit kalcit ktfrJcit kenacirl ajyate,

kuta!; ki'l'(lcid vina kafcit ki'l'(lcit kaf!lcid 11ina kutaf?.

Someone is made known by something. Something is m.ade known by

someone. How coul.d there be someone without something and

something without someone?

MKV(P) p.194: MKV(V) p.81

Herc chen is Nagarjuna's method of explaining (vyakhyana) the relationship

bctween substance and attribute. lt is a rdation of dependence and neither che

~·óbstance nor che atuibute can be understood properly if thcy were to be conceived of as .independent entities, cach having its owo narure.

6. Sarvebhyo rlarianadibhyaf? kalciJ purvo na vidyate,

ajyaJe darśanadinam anyena punar anyadii.EXAMINATION OF THE PRle>R ENTl'IY

Sorneone is not evident prior to all ofseeing, etc. Again, on different occasions, one could bemade k.nown by things different from _seeing, etc.

' •

MKV(P) p. 194; MKV(V) p .82.

191

While rejecting the view that there is an entity prior to all fortns of experiences

such as seeing, Nigarjun.a is, at the same time, uying to avoid the other extrt!me of assuming two different encities when the experiences are di.fferent.

Avoidińg.a metaphysical nocion ofideocity does not mean that one is invaciably

coinmitted to an equally metaphysicał notion of difference. Just as much as

identity can be explained on the basis of an empiricał notion of dependence,

Nagarjuaa seems to assen that differttnce can and need to be accounted for oo

an empiricał basis. · /

7. Sf)rvebhyo darśanac/ibhyo yadi purvo na 11i4yale,

ekaikasmiit katha'!l pur110 darśaniidef? sa vidyate.

lf someone existing prior to all of seeing, etc. is not evident, how can

someone existing prior to cach of seeing, etc. be evident.

MKV(P) p.195; MKV(V) p.82.

It seems that hece Nigarjuna is referring to an interestiog-assumption underlying·an identity theory. The not1on of self (atman) or substance (s11abhii11a)

would geoerally be presented in order to account for the continuity in a large

number of dissimilar experiences. Taking that premise, Nagarjuna is arguing

that ifit is not possible to discover someoó.e or entity chat pre-exists all forms of

different experienc.es, then such a person or eotity would not be available even

in the case of individual experiential situations. A momentary cogito would be

as impossible as a permanent and eternal self (atman).

8. Df'a.ftfi sa e11a sa frota sa eva yadi vedakaf?,

ekaikasmiid bhavetputva?!J e11afr.t cailan na yujyate.192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

Ifa seer is, at the same time, a hearcrand fecler, then so1neone would exist prior to cach one [of the functions]. But this is not proper.

MK.V(P) p.195 ; MKV(V) pp.82·83.

Only if the seer, hearer, and experiencer ace absolutely identical. chen he will

prc-exist cach individual experiential situation. Nigarjuna rightły denics any

ruch absolutc identity. He was probably assuming that even in the act ofsceing

the same object at differcnt times, there cannot be absolute identity, lee alone

in the acts ofsecing di.ffLrcnr objccts. The reason is not chat human experiences

or even the objccts of expcricnce change every moment, but that the circumstances under which such cxperiences take place could vary. (For a discussion of the perccprual flux, sce WilliamJames, Some Prohlems ofPhilosophy,

Cambridge , Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979, pp.31-32.)

9. Drtl!!finya eva frofjjnyo vedako 'nya!, punaryadi,

sari .ryad dnlffan· frota bahutvaf!l citmanif!l bhavel.

lf seer and hearer and fceler arc different, then, when there is a seer,

there also would be a bearer, and as such there woułd be a plurality of

selves.

MKV(P) pp.196·197; MJ.. 'V(V) p.83.

If absolute identiry is not a possibility, absolute difference also would be im·

possible, for in that case within cach stream of experience chere would be

plurality of distinct sdves or entities corresponding to the different experiences.

10. D(lrfana-frava„adini vedanadini cipy atha,

bhavanti yebhyas te/V e1a bhutepv api na 11idyate.

lt [i.e., the scH] is not evident in the elements from włtich seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc. come to be.

MKV(P) p.179; MKV(V) p.83.ExAMINATION OF 11-1E PRJoR ENnrr 193

In the Chąpter V on the "elemeocs" (dhatu), Nigarjuna examioed the theorics

presented by the metaphysiciaos relating to the phy$ical foundations of human

experiences such as seeing, hearing. etc. Even though the Abhidharma

classified the fi~t five sensory organs as well as theiI objects under the category

of derived matter (upadii rupa), there was no indicacioa that this involved the

assertion of any self or subscance in the individual elemencs that go to con·

stitute these sensory organs and objects. The interpreters of the Abhidharma, as

reitcrated earlier, were responsible for sucb metaphysics. Nigarjuna is herc going back to the analysis in the discourses as well as ia the Abhidharma where,

not ooly in the combination of aggregates or elements, but aJso in each in·

dividual element, there is oo recognition of such a meraphysicaJ self or

subscance (see ałso Chapter IV).

11. Dar1ana-fravaf!fid'ini vedanad'inicapy atha,

na vidyate cedyasya sa na 111dyanta iminy api.

lfhe, co whom bclongs sceing, hcaring, etc. and feeling, etc., is not evidcnt, thcn even thcse would not be cvidcnt.

MKV(P) p .198; MKV(V) p.84.

Nagarjuna starts with the negatioo of an opponent's view chat there is a prior

cntit:y to which the expcrienccs such as sedng and hearing belongs. The implication of the opponent's view is that the experiences of seeing, etc. arc independent elemenrs appropriaced by an equally independent prior entity. As

such, for Nigarjuoa, it is not merely the prior enricy that is unacceptabJe, but

also the experieoccs themselves as concdved of by the opponent. This,

tbcreforc, is not a simple denial of any and all forms of description of experience. Rather, it is a parcicular type of disccimination resortcd to by the

metaphysician chat is rejectcd.

12. Prak ~ayo darianadibhyaf? iii1!1-pralaf?1 cordhvam eva ca,

na vidyate 'sti nasffti nz11r:tt'iis tatra ka/pana.

Whcrcin someonc prior to, simultaneous with or posterior to, seeing, etc.

i.s not cvidcnt, thcrcin thoughts of existencc and non-existeoce are a1so renounccd,

MKV(P) p .199; MKV(V) p.84,194 THE PMILOSOPHY OF TI-IE MIDDLE WAY

The cxistence of an independent enciry in the cxperientlaJ_prqcess, whe·ther it

be prior to experience, simultaneous with it, or posterior to it, is rejected by

Nigarjuna. This does not mean that he was willing to accept the independent

occurrence of impressions co~ing one afrer another in rapid succession with oo

causaJ connectoins, as the Sautrantikas believed. In these particuJar contexts

(t111ra), Nigarjuna is ready t.o abandon the thoughts (kalpanii) of cxistence and

non-e.xistence (11Jli nasffh) in the way they were understood by the metaphysi~

c1ans.CHAPTER

TEN

Examination of Fire and Fuel

(Agmndhana-pank.ra)

1. Yad indhanaf!l sa cedagnir ekat11af!Z kartr·karma11of?,

anyaf ced indhanadagnir indhanad apy rJe bhaveJ.

Iffire wcrc to be fucl, thcn thcrc would be idcntity ofagent and action. If

firc wcre to be d.iffcrcnt from fucl, thcn 1t would cxist evcn without the

fucl.

MKV(P) p .202; MKV(V) p .86..

Chapter Jl(, as pointed out, was devoted to an examination of the cause or

foundation of the speculations that eveotually led to the belief in me'taphysicał

notions such as "self' (atman) or "substance''. (wabha11a). Such specu1ations perta.ined to the "past" (piirva). Why should that anałysis be followed by an examination of che metaphor of "fire and fuel" (agncndhana)? What is its

relevance?

Only a glance at the controvcrsies goiog on during Nagarjuna's day can provi~e justification for this chapter. Once again, Vasubandhu comes to our

assistance. In his Abhidharmakofa-bh'ii.[ya, he was recording a conrroversy

among the Buddbists that was continued for centuries before rum. And that

conuoversy could not have escaped the attcntion of Nagirjuna.

The ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakofa is an appendix (Akb

pp.461-479; translated inro English by T. I. Stcherbatsky, The Soul Theory of

the Buddhists, in the Bul/eling de l'AC11demie des Sciences de Russie,

Petrograd, 1920, repriored 1970, Bharariya Vidya Pra.kasan, Varanasi). lt deals

with the concroversial views of the YatsTputriyas (considered to be the same as

the Arya-Samm~tTyas , sec Sakv p.699) who propounded the view that there is a

"real person" (1anlaf!l pudgalar('). In the discussion that foll9ws, the

Yatslputriyas arc made to admit tha~. this "person" is neither a substance

(dravya), łike materiał form (ritpa), etc., nor a mac designation (.prajnapti), a

merc name like "milk" (kfir11), this lacter being norhing more than an aggregate ofsubsrances (dravya). Whcn the Sautrancika V25ubandhu pressed his

195196 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

questioos as to whether the person is real or nominal. the Yatslputriyas fell back

upon the metaphor of "fire and fuel" (agnindhana) in order to illustrate their

point of aview (Akb p.461). This metaphor is then discussed at length and

seems to have been the most important means by whic:h the Yatslpuuiyas attempted to justify their concepcion of a "person."

Therefore, it is understandable why Nagarjuna. after dealing with the quescion regarding a substantiał agent (karaka, Cbapter VTII) and ałso the motiva·

tion for such a theory (nameły , the desire to rrac:e one's identity to the past,

purva, Chapter IX), would settłe down to an examinacion of a singularly imponant metaphor used by the substantiałists to justify their conception of an

agent.

lt may be necessary to keep in mind that Vasubandhu, who wrote the

Abhidharmakofa, was a Saucrantika who believed that a "person" (pudgala) is

a merc designation (prajńapt1) without any realiry. Hence his agreement with

the nominalist position (Akb p .461, a/ha prajńaptif?, vayam apy evaf!J

brumaf?). The substancialist position (dravya-vada) was therefore identified

with the Sarvastivada view. Even though the Sarvascivadins did not actuałly

propound a substantialist theory of a person. their conception of substance

(wabhavfl) could not escape such implications (sec Sakv p.362, svabhavala iły

almalal/).

However, even if by implication, the Sarvasrivada theory were to be iden-

1 tified with che substantialist view of a person (pudgala), what sort of conception were the Yatslpucriyas upholding? They wece looking for a middle position between substantialism (dravya) and nominalism (prajfJaptt). The discussion in terms of the metaphor of "fue and fucł" was, therefore, intended to

overcome soch dualiry.

The argument follows thus: "Without fuel . there would be no designation of

fire. Yet, fire cannot be designated a.S sometbing different from fuel, nor as

·something identical," (Akb p.462, Na hi vinendhanenagnif? prajńapyale, na

canya indhanadagnif? iakyaleprajflapayifuf?J niipy ananyal/). Similarly, a person is neirher identical nor different from the aggregates. (lf we a.re to accept

the oegacive interpretation of the Nigarjunian dialectic, as is ofren presented

by most modern scholars, tbe Madhyamika position would be no different

from that of the Yatslputriyas as described above.)

Whc.n the question was raiscd as co which of the six sense organs provide

knowledge of the "person," the Yatsłputriyas answered: "By means of all six,"

(1aąbhir api, Akb p.463). They argued: "A 'person' is rccognized depending

upon visualły cognized materiał form (ca./qur-vijńeyani filPil'!t.). As sucha personshould be declared as being visualły cognizable and visually not cognizable;

it is ,neither matecial form nor not materiał form ."

Tbese and ocher arguments seem to indicate thac the YatsTputriyas were

following a dialectical method at arriving at a higher synthesis by avoiding theEXAMINATION OF f IRE AND Full 197

dicbotomies of thesis and antitbesis. This, unfortunately, is the view attributed

to Nigarjuna. The conteots of the present chaptet needs co be carefully

evaJuated in the light of the Yatsipuuiya conception of a person.

When the Yatsłputriyas maiotained that firc and fuel arc neitber identicaJ

nor different, thcy were acruaJly admitting both. Por them , both firc and fuel

arc cach constitutcd of four substanccs (ubhayam 11.f{a-dharmakarp), the only

difference is that in the case of firc the heac element (Uff!t1m) predominates,

whereas in the fuel it is latent. In this way , they arć both idcncical or noodiffercnt. Yet they arc different in terms of the difference in time (bhinnaktilatziiit). Thus, the negacivc description of the Yatsfputriyas is not meant as·

a ncgation of metaphysical views, as it was in the case ofNigarjuoa (see above,

commentary on the dedicatory verses), but an assertion of both identity and

difference in order to arrive at a bigher synthesis. No such move is found in

Nigarjuna when be criticizes the idenciry of fire and fuel in che above verse.

For hisn identity of fire and fuel rneans identity of agent and action. If they werc

diffcrent, chen cach could be independent.

2. Nitya-pradipla e1111 sjiidapradipana-helukaf?,

punar arambha-vaiyarthyam evarp ciikarmakafl sati.

A buming without a ause would be eteroally aflame. Furthecmore, its

commcnccment will be rendercd meani.ogless (usdcss]. Whcn that happcns, it will be without a function.

MKV(P) p .203: MKV(V) p.86.

The idcntity of fue and fuel recognized by the VitsTputriyas (as cxplaincd in

terms of the eight elements, alta-dharmaka, sec abovc) would lead to the view

that both firc: and fucl arc buroing all the time (nilya-pradipta), for the caloric

element (uma) is found in both, the difference being quantitativc rather chan

qualicativc. This fucthec lcads to the dcnial of the e.mpirical fact of starcing a

fire. lf fire and fuel arc always burning, thcn fire would be deprivcd of any

spcdfic function. Indeed, the Buddha's ust" of the metaphor of the fi.re at M

l.487 is non-substantiaJist in implication He wantcd to show rhat just as fire ~

not stoccd up anywhece when it is extinguished, even so a "frced one"

(talhiigata) does noc e.ióst in ercrnal bliss afrer dcach (param maraf!"ii). Nagarjuna's criticism of the mctaphor of "firc and fuel" secms to follow doscly the

Buddha's own cxplanation of the phcnomenon of fuc.198 THE P~nLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE W AY

3. pt1ratrt1 nirt1pek;at11adapradipana-hetuktll/,

p 1111t1r arambha-11aiyqrthyaf!l nitya-pradiptal/ prasajyate.

A burning without a c:ause, bec:ause it is not contingent on anothcr and,

therefore, etemally aflame, would imply the meaninglcssness of itS commencemeot.

MKV(P) p.203; MKV(V) p.86.

A substantialist v.iew of fire makes it iodepcndcnt of other clemcnts or things.

Hcncc, all the ,iinplications mcotioncd at X .2 will follow from such a view.

· 4. Tatrt1ilt1smad idhyamanam indhanaf!l bha11afiti tet,

k.enedhyat'lim indhanarp, lat tavan matra1n idarrt yadfi.

Hercin, if it is assumed that fuel is the present buroiog and, therefore,

that [i.e., buring] is mercly this [.i.e„ fuclJ, by what is fucl bcing

burnt?

MKV(P) p .204; MKV(V) p.87.

The substancialist point of view cxpressed at X.2 is further analysed herc. Iffuel

already has the caloric element (umt1) and, thcrefore, is alrcady burning

(idhyam'lint1), one could not only raise the question as to when it started buroing but also joquite as to whac it is that brings about that burning.

5. Anyo naprapsyale 'priiplo na dha.ł!yaty adahan punal/,

na nirv'iisyaty anirva„a!, sthasyate 11a svalińgavan.

[Fuel] that is <liffertnt is not reached; the urueached is not ignited. Furthermore, that wh.ich is n6t ignited does not cease. That which does not

cease remains, li.kc one that has its owo mark.

MKV(P) p.205; MKV(V) p.87.EXAMJNATION OF FtRE AND FUEL. 199

lf it is assumed that firc and fuel arc different, a futther serics of questions

arise. Difference in the prescnt case implies absolutc distinction or in·

dependcnce. As such, one entity cannot reach up to another. Fice canoot rcach

che fuel. Whcn firc cannot reach the fucl , it cannot burn. lhat which does not

burn reroains for ever and does not cease. This expla.ins the vicious circle the

metaphysical speculacions can lead to.

6. Anya evendhanad agnir indhanarrt prapnujiid yadJ~

stn sarrtpriipnoti puru1arrt j;urup1Ś ca striyar{Z yatha.

lf firc is diffcrcnt from fueł it would reach the fueł, just as a woman

would rcach for a man and a man for a woman.

MKV(P) p.206; MKV(V) p.88.

lffire and fuel wece considered to be different yet complemcowy, theoNagar·

juna is willing to allow somc son of mutual relationship. He perceives such a

relationship bewteen a man and a woman.

Unfortunately, herc again 'we have a negacive interpretation from Can·

dra.krrti. Without ta.king much trouble to cxamine the import of the metaphor

of "man and woman" uscd by Nagarjuna, Candraklrti assumcs that the rela·

tiooship exemplified by it is mcaninglcss (dr1(iinta-t1aiy11rthyattz). On the con·

uary, Nagarjuna is throwing the gauntlcc at his opponent asking him to show

that the sort of relationship chat cxists bctweeo a man and a woman can a..lso be

obtaincd between firc and fuel as the opponenl has conceit1ed ofthem.

Indccd, there could not be much difficulty in understanding the empirical

rclationship betweeo a man and a woman. Because of their complcmcntarity,

they arc attracted to cach other. Such a relationship is dearly expresscd by the

Buddha in the first two discourscs in thc Ańguttara-.nikaya (1.1-2). Yct the

Buddha ncver attemptcd to go beyond chat cmpirical relacionship-to inquire as

to how it all happened. Such an inquiry was undoubtedly the foundatioo of the

speculations recorded in the Upanz'!ads. Describing the origin of the uaiverse

from a single unitary "self' (atman), the Brhadiira1}yaka Upanifad (I.4.3-4)

says:

He, verily, had no delight. Therefore he who is alonc has no

dclight. He desir~d a second. He became as large as a woman and a

man in dose cmbracc. He caused that self to fali into two parts.

'200 T HE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MIODLE WAY

From that arose husband and wife. .. . He became united with

her. From chat human bejngs wece produced.

She thought, "How can he unite with me after having produced

me from himself?" Well, !et me hide mysdf. She became a cow,

the ocher became a bull and was united with her and from thac

cows werc boro.... Thus, indeed, he produccd everything

whatever exists in pairs. down to the antS.

This is the son of answer char emerges from an inquiry chat is noc only

directed at understańding the absolute origin of things, but also their substancialicy. The metapho,r of the fire and fuel wece utili.zed by che VitsTputriyas,

not merely co undersr:and the relacionship between two empirical evencs, but

also to justify the conception of a prior exiscent "person" (pudgala), no differeot from the pre-cxisccnc "self" ('iitman) assumed in the Upani/ads, which is

clearly exprcscd in the metaphor of "man and woman."

Percepcive Nagarjuna was chus aware of the motivations of those who

presented the metaphor. In the presenc verse he was therefore allowing the

possibiłity of fire and fuel having a complcmcntary relationship . Howcver, if

any ocher implication is drawo from such a reJationship, Nagarjuna was ready

to expose its untenabiliry. This he docs in che verscs chat foUow.

7.. Anya evendhanad agnir irzdhanam. kaman apnuyat,

agnlndhane yadi .rjiit'iim anyonyena tiriukrta.

The fue that is different from fueJ may rcach the fud only iffue and fud

wece co exist mutually separated.

MKV(P) p.206; MKV(fi? p.88.

Here agaio, Nagarjuna is qualifying the sort of relatiooship chat may obtaio

between fire and fuel ifthey arc atuacced to one another. One of the first conditioos would be that they arc separate. Without such separation it would be

meaningless to speak of one reachiog for the ocher. It is an attempt to destroy

the belief in a myscerious underłying unity , any substantial connection. Nagarjuna is wiUing to allow for the empirical differences and the relationship of

dependence among such cvents. However, he is not prepared to leave any room

for any speculation about underlying substances (.r11abhava).EXAMINl.TION OF flRB AND FUEL

8. Yadindhanam apek,yiignir apek,yignif!J yadindhanaf!I,

katara/ purva-nqpannaf!I yad apek,yagnir indhanaf!I,

Iffire is contingent upon fuel and fuel upon fire, which of them is p~

accomplished so that fire could be contingent upon fuel?

MKV(P) p.207; MKV(V) p .88.

201

The motivation of the substantfalists who were ucilizing the metapbors of "fue

and fuel" (agnlnrlhana) as well as "woman and man" (stff-puru1a), as exlained

at X.6, arc brought to the forcfront hece. Let fire and fuel be related by way of

cootingence (apek,"ii). Nagarjuna has no objection to it and this is clearly indicatcd by the manner in which Candrilirti himself ucilizcs this particularcon;

ceptioo of cootingence on numerous oa:asionions (sec MKV(P) pp.67, 189,

200, 202.. 345, 492, 527). Io the presenc case, Nagarjuna is oot rejcccing the

mutual contiogence (paraspar?ipek,'ii) of pheoomena, but ooly the inquiry

relating to the prc-accomplishmcnt or prior existence (purva--ni,panna) of any

one of them. Chaptcr IX made it abundantly elear that speculations regarding

the prior entity led to most metaphysical speculations. Having raised the ques--

tion as to which one of thcse two thiogs-fue and fuel-is prior, a questioo

that a substantialist cannot resist asking, Nagacjuna procceds to analyse the

poss.ible answers and cxplain thei.r unsatisfactory implication.~ .

9. Yadindhanam apek,fiignir agntl/ n'ddhasya sadhana1!J,

evaf!Z saffndhanaf!I capi bhavi,syati niragnika'f!'.

Ifftre were to be contingcnt upon fuel, there would be proof of fire th.at

is already proved [to e:xist] . When that is the case, evcn fucl would exist

without ftr:e.

MKV(P) p.207; MKV(V) pp.88-89.

Frustrating any attcmpt on the part of the substantialist, Nagarjuna insists that

iffuel wece to be the prior entity (purva-nifpanna), and that firc is contingent

upon it, then what is to be established is alrcady cstablishcd. In other words,202 TFłE PHILOSOPHY OF nłE M IODLE W AY

the substantialist interpretations of contingence (paraspar7ipekfi) would me2.0

that fire is aJready existenr in the fuel , which is itself the prior entity. If it is

already existent in the fuel, tben the implication is that it wiJI need no fuel for

its reaJ cxistence. Ifso, fue and fuel could not be murually contingenc and one

can conceive of fuel without fire (nir-agnikaftl).

10. Yo 'peh,ya Jidhyate bhavas tam etiiipeiqya Jidhyatt~

yadi yo 'pek1ita11yaf? Ja Jidhyaliif(J kam apekfya kal/.

MKV(P) p.208; MKV(V) p.89.

Ifevents are to be truły concingent, then they should be muruallycontingent or

dependent. If any one of two murually contingent entities is to be fou o,d in a

substantiał or essential way in the other, then the notion pf conringe11ce is

nullified. One becomes the essential and the orher the superficial. The problem chen would be: which depends upon what? The Wtsfpuą-iyas . as mentioned earlier, werc not looking fot means ofdissolving idcntity and difference.

They arc struggling to cetain both identity and difference. and then-move on to

a higher synthesis. Nigatjuna's attempt herc is not to allow the metaphysici_an

the very concepts of identity and difference, which they were going to ucilize as

a springboard for leaping coward the notion of a mctaphyskaJ "person"

(pudgala).

1l . Yo 'pek.tya Jidhyate bhaval, JO 1Jiddho 'pek.tate kathaf(J,

athapy 4pekfate Jiddhal? tv apek.tazya na yujyate.

Whatevct cxistent that is cstablished through cootingence, how Cln tha_t,

ifit is not yet established, be conringent? Even so [how can,] that whi~ is

already establishcd be contingent? F~r, _i~.coot:ingence is not propec.

MKV(P) p.2ó9: MKV(V) p.89.EXAMJNATION OF flRE AND FuEt 203

X.10 refers to the fire that is already established (.riddha), chat is, something

that is really existent (sad-bhuta). lfone were to move to the other extreme and

speak about events that are not established (a.ui:/dha), that is, those that are

really oon-existent (asad-bhuta), how can such events be contingcnt (apekfya

sidhyate)?

Thus, neithcr the already established (siddha) nor the unestablished (asiddha) can be relatcd by way of mutual contingeoce. Contingence (apek{a) is not

established in thls substantialist way.

12. Apek,yendhanam agntr na nanapek!yagnir indhana1lJ,

apek,ycndhanam agni1lJ na n?inapek;y?ig~im indhana'f?t.

.Fire is .not conti.ngent upon fuel; fire is not non-contingent upon fuel.

Fuel is not contingent upon 6re; fueł is not non-contingent upon fire.

MKV(P) p.209; MKV(V) pp.88·90.

1fthe ideas expressed in tl)e present verse were to be examioed independent of

wha.t went before, it would be. easy to łeap to the conclusion that Nagarjuna is

here expressing the "inexpreśsible''; that the negations such as "oon-ceasing''

(anirodhaf!I.) ind "non-arising" (anutp?idaf(l) wece supposed to elear the way

for the ''non-cohceptual," l•non-dual" ultimate reality (paramiirtha?). On the

conttary, if these thoughts are placed in their proper cootext, namely, the

metaphysical explanations of "muial contingence" (parasparapek!a), -then

'these oegative statements can be understood as outright rejections of such

metaphysical explanations. As is evident from several quocatioos from Candra.klrti hiroself (see X.7), "contiogence" (ttpek!a) can be explained in a nonmetaphysicał or empiricał way, just as much as the not.ion of cause or condition

(pratyaya) or the idea of motion (gatt) can be elucidated without falling into

the quagmire of metaphysics (see Cbapters l,Il).

13. Agacchaty anyato nagnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate,

atrendhane śefam ukta11'f gamyamina-gafiigatail;.204 THE PHJLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

Fi.te does not come out of something different nor is fire secn to be in the

fuel. Herein, with regatd to fuel, the rest is m.tcd.as i.n the case ofpresent

moving, the moved and the not movcd.

MVK(P) pp.210-211 ; MKV(V,l p.90,

Mter dealiÓg with che metaphysicaJ interpretations of "contingence" (apekf1i)

assumed betwecn fue and fueJ, Nagarjuna retu.ens co the more familiar

substancialist theories of self-causation (svata utpattt) and external causation

(para/a utpatti). Fi(e is not inherent in the fucl nor does it issue out of

something external. If any furcher explanations are to be provided which arc

themselves founded upo·a sucb substantialist ideas, all such expla9ations can be

analysed in terms of the mechods adopced in Chapter II dealing with motion

(g_atz).

14. Indhanaf?J punar agnir na ri1ignir'anyatra cendhanat1

nagnir indhanavan riiignav indhaniini na teru sal{.

Furthermorc, fuel is not fire. Apart from fucl therc is no fire. .Fire is not

possessed of fuel. Fucł is not in the fue, noc is it [i.c., fire] in them.

MKV(P) p.211; MKV(V) p .91.

The refutation of all metaphysical formulations of the nocion of identity as applied to fire and fuel is presented here. This is done in terms of the analyticaJ

methods followed in Chapter I.

15 . Agnzndhanabhyiif?I vyakhyata atmopadiinayoh. kramal;.

s4rvo niravaśefena sardhaf!J ghata-pa{iidibhil;.

Through the examples of fire and fuel, together with the examples of

pot, cloth, etc. evcry method of analysis of the self and grasping have

bcen cxplaincd without exccption.

MKV(P} pp.212-213; MKV(V,l pp.91-92.EXAMINAT!ON Of fl RE ANO fUEL 20~

The metaphysicaJ ioterprecations of "self' (aJman) and "grasping" (uparliina)

arc exposed here , especially in relacion to the metaphor of fiie and fuel'

(agn'i'ndhana). Does thls mean thac there could be ooo-metaphysicaJ expłanacions of both "self' and "grasping?" The answer would be in the posicive,

especially in vew of whar Nagarjuna has said in reference to "graspiog" and the

"one who grasps" (uparliitr) or the action and che agent (ka"na-karaka).

Tbis analysis is not confined to the metaphor of "fue and fueł" alone. lt applies to all other metaphors used during thls period ofspeculatioo, such as"cłay

and the pót," and "thread and the doth."

16. Almamif ca satattvaf!Z ye bha11'iin'ii1?1- ca PrJhak Prthak,

nirdiśanti na fiin manye fiisanasyiirtha-kovidiin.

Those who posit the substantialicy of the self as well as of disaete existents- these I do not coosidcr to be experts in the meaning of the (Buddha's] m~ge.

MKV(P) p.214; MKV(V) p.92.

Here then is a elear and unequivocal assercion oo che pan of Nagarjuna. Those

who assert the substantial exi.Jtence (satat111am), whether that be of a monistic

"self' (atman) or of distinct enticies (prthak PrJhak bha11ant1'f!') are not conversant with the teachings of the Buddha. When Nagaijuna makes that assertion

with the statement: "[I) do not consider" ([aha'!'] na manye), what sorr of self

was he recognizing? It certainly could not be anything like what he was

refutiog. The answer to this question will be provided łater.CHAPTER

ELEVEN

Examination of the Prior and Posterior Extremities

(PUrvriparakoti-pank.ra)

1. P"Urva prajfiiiyate kofir nety u11iica mahiimunil/,

J(lf!'J'iiro 'na11ariigro hi nasty adir napi paścimal/.

The Great Sage has stated that the prior end is not known. The lifeprocess is without beginning and end. There is neither a beginning nor

an end.

MKV(P) p.219; MKV{V) p.95 .

The criticism of the "self" (atman) as a substantial entity continued in the last

few chapters brings up more related issues for discussion. If there is no such entity, how can the life process consisting of tepeated births and deaths be explained?

Rebitth or rebecoming (ptfn(lbbhava) was an important element in the Buddhist doctrine,, even though the Buddha was concetned more with the problems of the present life than of the past. As mentioned earlier (see commentary on IX.1-2), for the Buddha, the knowledge of the past (afitat?Jse fJaf!a) was

an important means of understanding the present. Yet he did not encourage

speculation regarding the past as he feared that this would eventually lead to all

sorts ofmecaphysical views. For this reason, he remained aloof from specułacing

on the absołute origin of things. That aloofness is clearły implied in his statement: "lnconceivable is the beginning of this life-process. The prior end is not

evident," (Anamataggo 1yat?J ... 1af{lJiiro pubbakofi na pannayati, S 2.178,

193; 3.144.151). There is here no denial of the prior end or the first beginning

of things, but ooly of its cooceivability or perceptibility. However, with the

problems that emerged duting the scholastic period In the matter of expłaining

any form of origin (utpada), not merely of the first beginning (puN1a kop),

some Buddhists wece compelled to deny outrigbt any form of beginning.

Whilc the Sarvastivada conception of substance left no room for origin and

cessation, the Sautrantikas had difficulties explaining the origin and cessation

of momentary events. The difficulcies invołved in providing an explanatioo

206ExAMlNATJON OF'fHE PRJO,R AND PoSIB.RJOR Ex~REMfflEĘ 207

seems co have led the metaphysicians to assume the absence·ofa prior end,

rather thao of its iocooceivability. Henc;e the term ana'l!J4tagga ("inconceivable

is the begioning'') came to be replaced by anavqragra ("without end and beginning"). As such, Nagarjuna proceeds with the exa.mination of the view current

during his day, only to revert back to the Buddha's own approach to this problem in the cod. Cancłraklr6. confining himself to .the literary tradition of his

day and influenced by a transcendentalist approach in his interpretation of

Nagarjuna, does not seem to recognize the above mentioned change taking·

place in the Buddhist conception of the life-process (.raf!liiira).

2. Naivfigtaf'!I navara?!' y11Sya tasya madhya1?Z kuto bhavet,

tasmfin natropapadyante purvapara-.raha-kramaf!,

How could there be the middle of that which has neither a beginning nor

a_

n end? Therefore, the methock of (distinguishing) the prior, the

posterior or both together (i.e., the middle) are not appropriate.

MKV(P) pp.220-221; MKV(V) p.96.

Startiog with the cunent assumption that there is neither a prior nor a posterior

end, Nigarjuna raises the quescioo as to how , in the absence of these two extremities, one can speak of a "middle'' (madhya). He then proceeds to apply

this cciticism to the conception of the life-process (.raf!J-.riira) as- understood and

interpreted by the metaphysicians.

3. Piiroa'l(I /iitir yadi bhavejjarf,i..maraTJam utt(JrM(l,

nir-jarii-marar{ii1atir bhavej;ayeta camrtafl.

lf birtł:t·were to come fiist and decay and death were to follow, then birth

wouid be withoutdecay and death, and an immortalwouJd thus emergc.

MKV(P) p .221; MKV(V) p.96.

The difficułties cre~ted by the Sa.cvastivadios and the Sautrantikas in the mat-208 THE PHILOSOPHY OF tHE MIDDLE WAY

ter of explaining causa) continuity have beeo discussed at length. The linelU'

view of the causal process broken up into discrete events, one fołlowing the

ocher, left these evencs without any possible relations . lf the same model were

to be used in explaining evencs such as birth (jalt) decay-death (jafii-mara„a),

then the implication woułd be that birth has nothing to do with decay-death.

There is no necessary connection between them. If this argument were co be

carried to its condusioń, then it could be maintained thac there is immoctałicy

(amrta), for there coll.łd be sornething chat continues without decay.death.

Here, Nagarjuna is not insiscing that decay-death should be inherent in birth.

Rather, he is exposing the difficulties confrooted by the metaphysicians who

upheld a linear view of the causa) process.

4. Pa1cajJalir yadi bhavejjara-mara1Jam adita/?,

ahetukam aj'iitasya syiij jarfi-mtlraf!a'l'(Z katha'l'(Z.

lf birth were to be posterio.r and decay-death anterior, chen the łacter

would be without a cause. ·How couJd there be decay-death of one who is

not bom?

MKV(P) p.222; MKV(V) p.97.

Pla:cing birth after decay-death in this lineat view of the lite-process, the logical

conclusion is inevitabłe that birth cannot relace itself to anythiag prior and,

therefore, is uncaused. lf birth cannot be explained, .just as much as decaydeath could not be accounted foJ (as stated at X.1.3), then we -are left with the

tJOborn (ajiita). Nagarjuna considers it inappropriate to s_ peak of decay-aeath of

>,'

something/someone who is not born.

5. Na jarli-mara'f!enai11a1a1iś ca saha yujyate~

mtiyeta /aJamanaś ca sfiic cahetukatobhayol(.

Indeed, decay-death as concomitant ofbirth is not proper. [In chat case,]

what is in the process of being boro will a1so be dying and both would be

rendered causeless.

MKV(P) p.223; MKV(V) p.97.EXAMlNA'TlON Of THE PfllOR AND POSTBRJOR EXTREMITIE5 209

As mentioned in commentary on Xl.4, one way of expłainłng the problems

raised at XI.4-5 would be to assume that decay-death (jar'?icmaraf!a) is ioherent

in birth (/iitz). This celationship of inherence would mean chat decay-death

begios at the same time as bin:h, and as sueh ie would be appropriate to say that

one who is being boro is at the same time dying. If s0; neither one of them

could be the cause of the other. Being uncaused, their occurrence wou!d be

rather spontaneous.

6. Yatra na prabhavanty ettl purvapara-saha-krarnal;,

pra:pancayanti fii?'(l jiili?'!l taj jara-rnarfJ'!4f!i ca kif!i.

Wherever such methods of (discriminating) the pńor, the posterior and

the $Unultaneous do not arise, why be obsessed by such birth -and such

decay-death.

MKV(P) p.224; MKV(V) p.97.

The speculation that is questioned herc is specifically related to the sort of succession discussed previously. lt is not every form of reflection that is rejected.

Even if the verb prapańcayanti wece to mean "conceptualizing", as

understood by a majority of modern uanslators of Buddhist texts, in chis context, it does not mean the emptying of the miod of all concepts of birth and

decay-death. lt is the particular form of conceptualization mentioned in the

previous statements as well as the earłier verses that is co be avoided.

7. Kiirya?'!l ca kartzf!a'!(Z caiva lak!Ya?'!l lak!af!am eva ca,

vedana vedtzkai caiva santy artha ye ca kecana.

Effett and cause as well as chara~terized and characteristic, together with

feeling and fe.eter or whatever fruits there are.

8. Pfirva na vidyate kofif? sa?'(ZSaraJya nil keva/af!J,

sarvefiim api bh'Qvari'ii'l'{J. purvli kofi na vidyate.210 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIDDLE .W AY

the prior end of thcscis notevidcnt. Of the cntire life-process as well as of

all existcnts, the prior end is not cvidcnt.

MKV(P) p.224; MKV(V) p.98.

It is not suprizing to sec Nagarjuni concluding his analysis ofextremities (kop)

of events, whether they be of cause and effect, or the charactcrized and the

char~cteristic, of experiences, of the life-process, and even of all existents

(bhava), with the assercion that thcy arc not cvident (na vidyate). He does not

mainwn chat these events arc without extremities.CHAPTER

TWELVE

Examination of Suffering

(Du~kha-pan-k~a)

1. S11ayaf{' krtaf{'para·krtaf'?ldv'iibhyiif!I- krtam ahetukaf{',

duf?kham ity eka icchanti tac ca liiiryaf!t- na yujyate.

Some assume that suffering is sclf-c:aused, c:aused by anothcr, c:aused by

both or without a c:ause. [Suffering as] such an dfect is indeed not appropriate.

MKV(P) p.227; MKV(V} p .100.

The discussion of the life-ptoccss (saf!t-fiira) leads Nagarjuna to an cxamination

of the problem of suffering (dul/kha). lt sccms that when compiling this

chapter Nagarjuna bad a copy of the Buddha's discoutse to Acda-Kassapa (S

2.18-22; T1a 12.20 [Tairho 2.86a]) in front of him.

The Buddha's discourse co Accla-Kassapa begins witb the fout cheories of the

causacion of suffering referred to by Nagarjuna in almost identical terms. The

onł y difference is with regard to the explanation of the fourth. Where Nagarjuna has ahetukatrz, the Buddha's discourse refers to adhiccasamuppannaf{' (sec

Xll.9 below). Anotber difference is tha't while the Buddha's advises Kassapa

not to get involvcd in such speculacions. insisting, "Do not [say] so," (mah'

evaf!t-), Nagarjuna maincains chat thesc cheories arc not appropriace.

2. Svayarp krtaf'?I yadi bha11et prafiya na tato bhavet,

skandh'iin iman ami skandhal/ sat?Jbhavanti prafiya bi:

.

lf[suffering were to be] self-caused, thcn ie could not occur dependentły .

lndced, depending upon these aggccgates, these otber aggregates occur.

MKV(P) p.228; MKV(V) p. 100.

2 11212 THE PHILOS0PHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

The nocion ofself-causation of,suffering is funher elaboraced by the Buddha as

the view expressed in the statement, "He acts and he [himself] reaps the consequences," (so karoti sopafisaf!l-vediy4tt). The Buddha's reason for not accepting

such a view is that.it leads to the belief in ecernalism (sassataf!I- eltl'f!I paretz).

Nagarjuna certainly koew that the Buddha was utiliziog the cooceptioa of

dependence (paficcasamuppada) co avoid aay mecaphysical theory of eternalism. This was the basie theme, not oo1y in the cliscourse to Kaccayana, but

also in the diścourśe to Aceła-Kassapa , where it is ooce again presented as the

middle position berween the excremes of eternalism and annihilatiooism (S

2.20}. Ic is, therefore, noc surprising to see Nagarjunarejectingthe conception

ofself-causation ofsuffcring on the grounds thai in sucha case suffering would

not be dependently arisen (na prafftya bht111et).

Furthermore, the eternalism that comes to be embodied in a theory'of selfcausation ofsuffering pertains moce to the individual selfor soul (atman), and

not the substance (wabliiiv4). Thcrcfore, Nagarjuna insists that what is being

asserted as a self or soul is nothing other than the arising ofa set of aggregates

dcpending upon (praffy4) another set of aggregates.

3. Yr1dy amtbhya ime 'nye syur ebhyo vam'i pare yadi,

bhavet para-krtan;. duf?khaf!I- parair ebhir ami krtal;.

lffrom these those that arc differeot were to come to be, oriffrom those

these different [things] wece to come to be, then suffering would be caused by another, for these are caused by those that are different.

MKV(P) p. 229; MKV(V) p.100.

Here we find a definition of "external causation" (para-krta) . Nagarjuna has

already explained the relationship between setf-nature or substance (svabliiiva)

and other-nature (parabhiiva)(see f.3). There he maintained that without selfnarure there cannot be other.narure (avidyamiine svabhave parabha110 na

vidyate). In the prcsent verse, Nigarjuna applies the same principle to explain

"causation by another. '' Thus, we find him utilizing the ablative case

(amTbhyal;, ebhyal;), exprcssive of"source" or "origin," 'in order to explain the

arising of somcthiog different from within something chat preceded. In ocher

.words, even though the effcct is different frorn the .cause, it acises from the

cause; that is, exteroal causation is invariably related to self-causation.EX/.MINATION OF SUFFERJNG 213

It is important to distinguish this statemeot from that found at XJI. 2 which ,

instead of ~ing the ablative case, empl0.ys the accusative (iman skandhan

pmliya) in order co highlight the principle of dependence. Indeed, the very term

idapp11Ccayafii (idaf!Z·PraJyayaJ'ii} utilizcd by the Buddha to cxprcss the principle of dependence is couchcd in the accusacive case (idaf!Z). instead of the

ablative of soucce.

4. Sva-pudgala-krJa1{l dul;khaf!Z yadi dul;kllaf!Z punQr 11inii,

wa-pudgalal; sa katamo yena dul/kha?!f- svaya1{l krtaf!Z.

lfsuffering is oused by ones owo person, thcn that own person can exist

without suffcring. Who is he by whom suffering is self-ouscd?

MKV(P) p.230; MKV(V) p. 101 .

As shown before, the Buddhjst mecaphysicians who adopted a thcory of

moments had difficuJty explaining personal continuity or identity in a more

empirical way. They were confronted with the problem of expłaining good and

bad. suffering and happiness as pan of the personał continuity. Thus, the Sarvastivadins would maintain that suffcring. etc. arc mere qualities (lak,a„a) thac

characterize the substance (dravya}, or they would, along with the Sautrantikas,

maincain rhat qualities are appropriated or become pan of the stream

(.rvasaf!Jfiina-patila, A.K 2.36; Akb p.62; Poussin, L'Abhidharmakofa, vol. 1.

p. 179). Such a perspeccive inevicably leads to a di.stinction between the person

or the stream of personał identity, on the one hand, and qualities like suffering

on the other. What Nagarjuna is atcempting to do in the present verse is to bring out the metaphysical implications of this cheory. According to this theory,

suffering is something cxternaJ to the individual. It is an enciry having its own

reality. lt is something caused by a person, as a carpenter woułd produce a piece

of furniture. As such, Nagarjuna questions the very nature of chat person who,

being independent of sufferińg, causes suffering on its owo.

5. Para-pudga/11/af!l duf?khaf!Z yadiyasmaipradiyate,

pare71a kr111a lad duf?khaf!Z sa duf?khena vinii ku1af?.214. THE PHILOSOPHY 0F THE MIDPlB WĄY

lfsuffering were to be produced by one personand given over to anothet,

that suffering is caused by the former. How can the latter be ide~tified

without suffering?

MKV(P) p.231; MKV(V) p .lOL

Ifone were to accept the·separation ofsUfferiog from the person who produces

ie (i.e. , the theory cticicized at XII.4), then it will lead to d.ifficulties not only

for one who adopts self-causation of sufferiog (svayaf!t Artaf!t du//khaf!t), but

ałso for one who upholds the opposire view , namely, suffering is caused by

another (para-krtaf!t t:/uf?khaf!t). The latter will have to maintain that suffe.ting

is caused by one person and passed on to another. But that other wouJd himself

be independen~ofsuffering, in the same way as the person who caused it. The

question stili remains ·as to how that person can be identified.

6. Para-pudgalafaf!t dul;kha1'{1 yadi kal? para-pudgala/?.

11ina dul;khena yaf? krt1iii parasmai prahit1oti tat.

If suffering is caused by anothec person, who is that other person who,

himsclf without ruffecing, causes ie and bestows it on another?

MKV(P) p.231; MKV(V} p .101.

This is similar to the arguments presented before. The sharp dichotomy between the agent of suffering and su:ffecing itsełf proinpts ~agarjuna to question the nature of that othet person (para-pudga/4) who is supposed to be the

author of suffering and who passes it oo to an.other.

7. S11aya1!J. krtasyiipra.riddher du//kht111J para;krta??J kuta!/,

przro hi duftkha??J yat kuryat tat ta.rya syat svayarri krta??J.

With the non-establishment of self-causation, how can there be suffering caósed'by another? For, indeed, ifanother wcre to cause that sufferiog, 'in rclaclon to bim it would be self-ca~. ·ExAM1NATION OF SUPr'ER1NG

8. Na l'iival wakrtaf!l dul/khaf!I na hi lenai11a lat krtaf!l,

paro nii1makr1af cet sy'iid dul/kha'(l para,.krtaf!l kathaf!l.

So long as suffering 1s not self-caused, it is, indecd, not caused by oncself.

lf the ocher were not to do it by himself, how could suffcring be causcd

by anotbcr?

MKV(PJ p.232; MKV(V) pp. 101- 102.

21S

The i.mplications ofXII.3 discusscd carlicr arc stated oncc moce cłcarly and explicitly in thcsc two vcrses. If some othcr pctson wece co causc suffcring, theo

that suffering, in relation to that particular person, would be sclf-caused. Tuus,

if one pcrspcctvic is not valid then the other too would be invalidaccd. This, as

pointcd out earlicr, is the method adopted at 1.3 to reject both self-nature

(svabh'iiva) and othcr-narure (parabh'iiva).

9. Syiid ubh'iibhy'iif!l krkl?P dul;khaf!l sjiid ekaika-krtaf!l yadi,

pafiik'iir'iiwayaf!lk'iiraf!l dul/kham ahetukaf?I kutaf!.

If suffeńng wece to be caused by both, it would be caused by cach individually. Whcnce can thece be suffering that is causcd neither by

another nor by oneself aild is without a cause?

MKV(P) p.233; MKV(V) p.102,

The tbird chcory of the causation of suffecing refcued to in the discoursc co

Acela-l<2Ssapa is a combination of causation by oncself and causatioo by

anochcr (sayaf!l katan ca paraf?j katafJ ca). This is understood by Nagirjuna as

caus;1.tion by cach individual (ekaika-krtał'!J) . Howevet, he has already rejected

both typcs of causation.

lf suffcting were not caused ·by onesclf or another, chen accordiug to the

Buddha ie would "arise one top of another" (adhiccasamuppanna). Such arising

is contrary to "arising by moviog towards or depending upon another" (pa#cca.samuppanna). This implies arising wichout any causa! connection. Hcocc ,

atihiccasamuppanna becomcs a synonym for ahe111ka (cause-less). For Nagarjuna, chcre is no such uocaused suffcring.216 THE PHtLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDl.l! WAY

lO. Na kevala?(t hi dul?khasya c~rvidya'f?J· na vidyate,

bahyiiriiim api bhavana'f?J caturvidya'f!Z 11a vidyate.

lt is not that thefoutfold theory applied exdusively to suffering is not cvident. Tbe fouńold theo.ry pertaining to other existents too is not evident.

MKV(P) p.233; M.KV(V) p.102.

Iha-<ła's explanation that these are the "four-fold pombie views" (caturvidhyanj)

(p,88) seems to leave no toom for.a fifth view which both the Buddha (in his

discourse to Kassapa) and Nagarjuoa (at XII.2) wece very clearly and unequivocaUy upholding, namely. "dependent arising of suffering." Hence his

condusion that these four possible views can.equally be applied to demonstrate

the impossibility ofas.serting ele1nents of the external world. On the concrary,

Nagarjuna (as well as the Buddha) were mercly criticizing the futility of

adoptlog these f91J! .particular views io explaining suffering as weU as other

elements in the woi'td of experience. Indeed, Nagarjuna was dearly aware of

the facr that these four are not the ooJy views explicating the causation of suffering. Hence his statement in the very fust verse in this chapter, "Some assert"

(eke icchanti), wruch meaos that it is not evecyone that assects such theories.CHAPTER

THIRTEEN

Examination of Action and the Agent

(Sa1'!Jskara-pctrt°k!a)

l. Tan mr1a mo1a-dharma yad bhagavin ity a'bhi1ata,

sart1e C11 mofa-dharmaf!al? sa'f!'Skiirif? lena le mrfi.

The Ble$ed One has said that whatever is of deccptive naturc, that is

delusion. All things that arc of deccptive nature involve dispositions.

Therefore, they are delusions.

MKV(P) p.237; MKV(V) p.104 .

A chapter dealing with disposicions (saf!Jskiira) immediately following an

anaJysis of suffering (duf?kha) need not create any confusion. Nor should the

fact the the title of this chapter is prescntcd in the Tibetan translation as lattva,

instead of sa'f!'Jkra (sec Inada, p .91), lead to difficultics in undcrstanding it.

There cannot beany doubt that the original chapter was named "Examinatioo of the Dispositions." Even the most cursory glance at the statcments of the

Buddha in the discourses would reveal the naked fad: that he never looked

upon all phenomena (sabbe dhammi) as "suffering" or "unsatisfactory" (dukkha). However, the classicaJ Hindu philosophers who misquoted the Buddhist

textS, and some of the modern intccprerers who wece guided by such philosophm,

have been cesponsible for ponraying Buddhism as a pessim.istic religion by

misintecpreting the Buddha-word, especially the doctrine of "suffering" {sec

Kałupahana , "The nocion ofsuffering in early Budclliism, compared with som.e

reflectioos of early Wittgenstein," PEW 27 [1977]:423-431.)

The three prominent characteristics, impermanence (iznicca), sufie.dog (dukkha), and oon-substantiaHty (tJnątta) have·bcen recklessJy lumped together by

these interpreters and appłied to all phenoffi:ena when the Bµddha in innumbcrablc instances (M 1.228; S 3.133; 4.401; A 1.286; Dhp 277-279; T1a

10.7 [Tat'sho2.66b-67aj; Tseng 23.4 [Tairho2.668c) Ch'ang 1.1[Tairho1.9b))

and in every statement he made in regard to these three ch~racteriscics, always

'l.1„218 TH!l PHILOSOPHY Ol' THE MIDDLE WAY

distinguisbed between Jankhara and dhamma. These duce characteristics a.re

always mentioned as follows:

1. "AU dispositions are impermaneot" (sabbe sankliiira aniccii).

u. "All dispositions ase suffering" (sabbe sankh'iira dukkh"ii) .

iii. "AU phenomena a.re oon-substantial" (sabbe dhammii anat/ii).

ln the first place, the elear distinction made by the Buddha becween

"dispositions" (sar.mkiira) and "phenomena" (dharma) and, secondly, the fact

tbat he specifically referred to the former being subject to suffering, could not

have escaped the penetracing and careful eye of Nagarjuna, a philosopher

whose wcitings have .influenced some of the best brains in the East throughout

the cenrur.ies. Ifall disposit.ions were coosideced by the Buddha to be subject to

suffecing, then there is no reason to doubt as to w4y Nagarjuoa sbouJd not concencrate bis attention on these "dispositions" aftcr his examination of the prob·

Iem of suffering. Hence che reason for the present chapter.

Why the Tibet.an translators should considet this to be an examination of

truth (tat111a) is also nor a myscery. They were simply loolcing at the conclusion

of the chapter. Is there any connection between "disposit:ions" and "truth"?

As pointed out easlier (V.8), the "appeasement of dispositions"

(Ia'f!lskiiropafama) .is the ultimatc goal of Buddhism. Excessive lust (raga) is

supposed to lead to the strengthening or solidificacion of one's dispositions,

which in ruro conuibutes to grasping, no~ only for the objects ofsense pleasure,

but also for ideas. The result would be the dogmacie grasping on to absolute

truth or truths. The elimination oflust wouJd then mean the elimination of the

dispositions too (Ia?!J.rkiira-R,aya) which would imply virtual death and oo

motivatioo for any action or even to continue with one's preseot life. Thus, the

Buddha hlmsclf was willing to characterize the death of a "freed one"

(tathagata) as the "cessation of dispositions" (sańkharakkaya) (Dhp 383)

leading to the cessation of the stream of bccoming (bha11a-sota).

Howcver, while recognizing the waning of lust (rag4k.khaya) as the way to

freedom , the Buddha did noc encomage the complcte elimination of dispositions which would mean suicide. Ie seems that che Buddha. did not recognize a

one-to-one relationship betweeo the waning of' lust and the cessation of

dispositions. Hence his emphasis on the appeasement of dispositioos while living and the cessacion of dispositions at the .time of death.

The sucngtheoing of dispositions, as meotiooed earlier, leads to dogmacie

bclicfs. These would pert:Un to personal immort.ality, conceived io the form of

a belief in an eternal soul or self (atman) or of a universal reality (loka,

brahf!14n). Any form of eternalism (fiiśvata) would be che consequence ofsuch

strong dispositional tendendes. The opposice of ie would be annihilacionismEXA.WNĄTION Ol' ACTION AND THE AGENT 219

(uccheda), and it is not difficult to understand why the critics of the Buddha

would refer to him as an annihilationist(ucchedatiiidi) upholding the annihila·

tion ofreą.llyttisdng sentient being (M 1.140). They were p.robably referring to

the Buddha's advocacy of the "cessation of dispositions" (sankhtirakkhaya) at

death.

Yet, for th~ living human being the Buddha was nor prescribing the elimination of dispositions. Rather he adyocated their appeasement. This view has

significant epistemoidgkal implications. A living human beiog needs to act.

Action involves ·understanding. Conduct (caraf!a) is preceded by knowledge

(vidya). 'One needsJcnowJedge ofoneself as well of the external world. "Omniscience" or knowledge of ever:ything :was not available to the Buddha. Hence,

neither the absolute· oripn of things nor the absolute end of things were

discussed in Buddhism (see Cł)apter XI). Any theoty that attempts to explain

su<ih origins and ends, whether it._pertains to an eternal selfoi: soul (atman) or a

substance (sva!Jliiiva), was unacceptable to the Buddha.

Dispositions are invariably assodated with the knowledge derived from the

senses. The innumerable data provided by the senses cannot easily be handled

by the human being. As William James characterized sense experience, it is a

"big, b!ooming, buzzing confusion" (Some Problems ofPhilosophy p .32). Being unable to deal with such con.fusion, human beings are compelled to be

selective. They pick out the things that interest them, leaving out others. In

tbat process, they devełop dispositions and these disposfrions in turn conttibutes their share in gainiog knowledge of the world. As such, the world of

ordered experience is one that is construćted , made, put together (sam

+vkr. "to do, to make"), by the human being. This is the ptagmatic conception of truth (latt11a) that is prominent in the Buddha's teaching. The appeasement ofdispositions thus contributcs to the e!imination ofdogmatism, of

grasping after absolute truth or tru~hs. when all the time human beings are

creating truths. If a person is not aware of the process by which he construcrs

the truths about the world, be wiU not only be confused but also disappointed.

Dispositioos can thus rum out to be a great source ofconfounding and delusion

(mr!a), unless one understands their function in the formiJlation of uuths (lattva). The tram,łators of Nagarjuna's text into Tibetan probably pcrceived the

direction of the argument in this chaptet and na.med it accordingły.

Note that the dduslon (mrrii) is produced, not by all the phenomena (saf'tla-·

dharma) but ooly by the way in which these phenomena are put togecher

(sa'J'!Mkarott) for purposes of understanding (see Websters' Seventh Collegiate

Dictionary, 1965, p. 219 where delusion is defined as "self-deception concerning facts or situations"). That putting together is the function of dispositions

~S<l'f?tskara) . Hence, for Nilgarjuna, as it was fór the Buddha, if anything is to

contribute toward delusion that would noc be all phenomena (H1rve dhr1mi1iJ,),

ratbei: it would be all dispositions (sarve sa'J'!Mliii.ra'1).220 THE Pl flLOSOPl-IY OF TifE MIODLE \'(/AY

2. Tan rnriii mO!a-dharma yad yadi ki1?J tatra mufytlte,

etat tukta?(l bhagavat'ii IUnyata-paridipaka'f!'J.

II, whatever that is ofdeceptive nature is delusion, what is it about which

thece is dełusion ? That too, namely, that which illuminates emptiness,

has been spoken of by the Blesscd One.

MKV(P) pp.238-239; MKV(V} p.104.

Ifdispositions cause delusjons, what is 1t about which there arc delusions? The

answer would be: ''The world of e.xperience." The Buddha bas spoken of thac

world coo. lt is the world that is non-substantial, is empty of any permanent

and eternal entity. All delusioos arise rega.rding that world which is

dependently arisen and non-substantial, but which is being uoderstood as being either eternal or absolutely unreal.

3. Bhav'iin'iif!l nil/svabha11at11a1(l anyatha-bhava-darśan'iif,

asvabh'iivo bhavo ,,,;Jsti bh'ii11'ii1iii'f!'l śiinyat'ii yataf?.

Because of the perception of change, the absence of self-nature of existents is [recognized]. Because of the emptiness of existencs, there is no

existent without self-nature.

MKV(P) p.240; hfKV(V} p .105

Tbis is a elear statement that truth or reaJ.ity (lattva) (there being no provisional

truth and ultim<tte reality) is neither substantial exisrence nor nihjlistic nonexistence. The perception of change or variacion (anya1habha11a) confirms the.

non-substantiaJity of phenomena (nzl1svabha11a). This is anothcr way of expressing the idea embodied in the discourse to Kaccayana that "ro hi.in who

percdvcs through right wisdom che cessation of the world as it has come co be,

the notion of existence (atthit'ii) in the world does not occur," (S 2. 17).

Cessacion (nirodha) or change (anyathabhava) does not imply complete anruhilation. Hence Nagarjuna's view that there is no existent that is without

substance (a-svabhava), thac is, soroething that goes into complete oblivion

after Cl(tsting for a white (bhiitva prativigacchatt) leaving no trace at aJI. TheEx.AMIN/\TJON OF ACTION AND 'Jlle. AGENT 22!

discourse to Kaccayana says that he who perceives arising (iamudaya) does not

hold on to the non-existence of the world . In other words, arising (Iamudaya or

.ramutpiida) contradicts nihjlistic non-existence (na.rtifii, a-.r11abha11a). Nagarjuna perccives this to be emptiness (!unyatfi).

This, then, is the way in which "dependent arisiag" of phcnomena

(prafitya.ramutpada) becomes a syoooym for "empciness'' (śunyata) or "nonsubstantialicy" (nairatmya) whkh will be further elaborated in Chapter X.XIV.

4. Ka.rya .ryiid anyatha-bhava/J .rvabhav/JŚ cen na vidyate,

ka.rya sy'iid anytha-bhavaf? .rvabhavo yadi vidyate.

Whose change would rhere be, if self-nature were not evident? Aga&n,

whose change would there be, if self-nature wete evident.?

MKV(P) p.241; MKV(V) p. 105.

Nigarjuna is here conuasting identity and difference. If tbiogs are compłetely

different from one another, then there is no reason to $peak of the change of

things (a»yathabhava). If, on the contrary, the.re were to be a substance

(.rvabhava) which is assumed to be permanent and eteroal, it could not change.

5. Ta.ryaiva nanyatha-bhavo napy anyasyaiva yujyate,

yuvii na j'iryate ya.rmiidya.rmiij/i"!O na jiryate.

Neither change of something in irself nor of someth.ing different is proper. The rea.son being that a youth does not age nor does an aged person

age.

MKV(P) µ. 241; 11r1KV(V) p.106.

Nigarjuna cootioues to emphasize the view thac change (anyathabhava) is inexplicable in the contexr of identity or diffecence. "Of itself" (ta.rya eva) means

"of somethffig chat has substantial exiscence;" "of anocher'' (anya.rya eva) implies "belonging co something completeły differenc.'' As mentioned previously222 TuE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

(VII.24), "decay" (jara) was not cejected by Nagarjuna. In the pcesent context,

what he intends to convey is that such decay makes no sense wheo applied to

explain a person who is metaphysically conceived eitheras possessing an eternal

self or as being dlfferent fcom moment to moment.

6. Tasya cedanyatha-bha11af? kfTram eva bh1J1Jed dadhz~

kftrad anyasya k.asyacid dadhi-bhavo bhavi[Jati.

Ifchange were to be ofsometbing in itself, then milk itselfwould be butter. Butter-ness would then be something other than milk.

MKV(P) p.242; MKV(V} p.106.

Ifchange were to be applied to somethingrecognized as exisiting in itself, i.e.,

asubstance, thcn the conception ofchange would be negated. Hece we find the

example of milk and butter (kflra-dadhi) utilized by the Vitsłputriyas, along

with the metaphor of "fi.re and fuel" (Akb pp.432-433), to illustrate the relationship becween the aggregates and the self. If butter is considered to be

substantialły the same as milk, chen butter-ness wiU have to belong to

something different from milk. Otherwise we will be left with two differeot

substances having the same substantial constitution.

7. Yady a:śunyatrJ bhavet kt7?zcit syiic chunyam iti ktf?tcana,

na kitrJCid asty a:śunyatrJ ca kutaft śunyatrJ bhavzjy(lti.

lf there were to be something non-empty, there wou1d chen be

something called empty. However, there .is nothing d~at is non-empty.

How could there be something empty?

MKV(P) p.245; MKV(V) p. 107.

The conception of "empciness" or "non-substantiality" is intended to eliminate

the belief in substance and attribute conceived in a me_raphysical sense.

However, if"emptiness" itself wece to be used in an attributive sense, that is as'

EXAMINATION OF ACTION AND THE AGENT 223

a characteristic of something substantial, theo "emptiness" itself becomes

"something" (ki'f!Jca114). A substaocial thing is a "non-empry-something''

(aśUnya'f!' ki'l?Zcit). Such a thing does not exist. lf so, there cannot be something

called "empty'' (śUnya1!l iti kitp.cana) .

This is the clearest warning from Nigarjuna against moving' towards the

mecaphysics of "empciness" (śUnyata du!i. sec below).

8. ŚUnyalii sarva-dr1fina'f!J prokfii nil;saratJa'f!t jinail;,

ye1af!Z tu śUnyafii-dr1fis tan asadhyan babha#re.

The Victorious Ones havc announced that entptiness is the relinquishio.g

ofall vicws. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to

be incorrigible.

MKV(P) p.247; MA"V(V) p.1084.

The inevitable conclusion to be derived from XIII.7 is that the conception of

"emptiness" (śunyata) or "non-substaotiality" (nairatmya), utilized by the

Buddha io order to free ooeself from all metaphysical views (dN!t), can turo out

to be. an equa lły unsatisfactory view. ifits application is to be carried beyood its

proper limits. lndeed, Nagarjuna perccives such activiry as leading to worse

forms of dogmatism. ·CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

Examination of Assoc1atiQJJ

(Sa1!Jsarga-jJartkła)

1. DraftavJa'lt darśana1,!t dra[{i.i Jiff!Y efiini dviśo dviiaf?,

sarvaśaś ca na sa1,!tSargam anyonyena vrajanty uta.

ihe object ofseeing, the seeing and the seer-these threc do not function

in mutual association either in pairs or all together.

2. Evaf?'l ragaś ca rakla! ca rafljaniya~ ca drfyafii~.

traidhena śefiil{ klefi.iś ca śefany ayatanani ca.

Lust, the Iustful as weU as the object of łust shoułd be scen in the same

way. The retrulining defilements as well ~s the remaining spheres ofsense

should be seen in the tńadic mocie.

MKV(P) pp.250·251; MKV(V) p.110.

The pragmatic theory i;if truth, that is, truth as somethiog put together according to human disp\lsitions (sa1,!tJkiira) depending upon something experienced

(dhamta), is not a very palatable one, especialły for some analytical philosopher

who wants to carry his analysis to the very extreme. In the present treatment of

Nagarjuna's philosophy, it has been repeatedly pointed out thar an extremist

analysis łeft the Buddhist metaphysician with absolutely distioct entities. For

hlm (and this was the position accepted even by a philosopher like Hume),

1'What is distinguishable ~ ałso separable." Of coutse, these metaphysiciaos

would theo proceed to explą.in events in terms of"composition," of putting different entities rogether (sa1,!tSkaraf!a) accotc!ing to ooe's dispositions (.ra1,!tSkiira)

or, as Hume iosisted, in teons of one's imaginatioo. However, they will have to

cairy the burderi of explaining how only cettain things can be so put·together

and not aoytfllog a.od everytbing. For example, one can insist thac it is possible

224ExAMtNATION oi: Assoc1ATION 225

to bring togecher events such as the eye, color, and visual consciousness

togecher to produce the impression called "perception of color." Yet, one can·

nor, either jo terms of dispositions or accordiog to any imaginarion, put

together the eye, sound, and guscatory consciousne~ and produce either a visual

im

pression or an auditory impression.

The onły way in which sucłi metaphysicians can explain any possible association is by assuming a substanciał reł acion, an iohereot nature a.moog chose

events thac are so associated . This is how che anaJysis of events into abso łu tely

different entities contributed co the recognition of mysterious subsrances. The

Sarvastivada notion of substance or self-nature (111abliii11a) was, therefore, an

inevitable answer to such extremist analysis, in the same way as Beruand

Russełl's theory of relations, defined as neither mental or physical, was the

answer to the Humean analysis.

For such philosopbers, a pragmatic theory ofi truth, where truth is defined as

something "made" (ItJf!likrta), becomes a problem bccause their analysis has

deprived them of any empirical relations in terms of. which ch ings can be

associaced . ft is, therefore, not surpózing to see Nagarjuna raking up the quescion of associadon (saf!lsarga), in order to show chat ie does not work in the

background of the metaphysicał assumpcions of certain ana łysts.

Thus 1t becomes necessary co keep in mind chat Nagarjuna's cricicism of

associacion is spcdfically rełarcd co che associacion of eveots chat wece so

distinguished chat each was assumed co have its own nature (111obha11a). He

begins this chapter with a reference to the various categories he has alrcady examined at the very oucset in this secdoo of the book, namely, seeing (darśana),

the objcct ofseciag (drQłfavya) and the seer (drflłtr) (Chapter III). XIV.2 refers

to another set of categories examined in Chapter Vl. This appłica tion is then

extended to aJJ occurreoces such as the defiłements and facu lcics.

3. Anyenanyasya sarruargai? tac canyatvaf!l na vi~yate,

drtl!{avya-probhrliniif!J yan na IIJT(Mflrgflf!l vrajanty ataJ?.

Association is of the mutually different [events). Such difference is not

evident in the ol:ijecrs of seeing, etc. Therefore, they do not function in

mutual association.

MKV(P) p.251; MKV(V) p.1 10,

Association, as mencioned above, becomes a philosophical p roblem only wheo

distinctions or differences are rendered absolute. Nagarjuna, basing himself on226 THE PHILOSOPHYOFTHE MIDDLE WAY

the principłe of "dependent arising," insisrs chat such distinccions arc not

avai labłe among objcccs of seeing, etc. lf these are discinguished or djffe1enciarcd in the way metaphysicians do, then they cannot enjoy mutual harmony

or associaaon.

4. Na ca ke11alam anya111a1{Z drQ!fa11yader na 11irlya1e,

kasyacil kenacit iiirrlha'(J nanyatvam upapadyate.

lt is not only that the difference with regard to objects of seeing, etc. is

not evident; the possibility of something possessing difference jointly

with another is also not appropriate.

MKV(P) p.2)2 ; MKV(V) p. 110.

This is an interesting analysis of idenciry and difference. The dilemma of

substance is broughc out clea.rly in this analysis. ln order co relace things, differences need to be recognized. Once the differences a.re retognized as being

absołute, each thing is assumed ro have ics owo nacure. Ir becomes a subscaoce

different from any ocher substance. If cach subscance is ,differenc, ie cannot

have a substance that is shared by another. If it does.. the difference breaks

down. Eithcr rhere is differcnce or therc is idencity.

5. Anyarlanyat prafityfinyan niinyadanyad rte 'nya1af?,

yat prafitya ca yal lasmiit Jad anyan nopaparlyate.

Diffcrcnt things are de~ndc.nt upon cliffcrent things. Different things

arc not witbout different things. Because something depends upon

someching, a different thing is not appropriate.

6. Yady anyad anyad anyasmat/ anyas11iiirl apy rte bha11et1

tad anyad anyad anyasmiirl rte nasti ca nasty ataf?.

If a thing is different from anothcr bccause it arises from a different

thing, then it would ex.ist cven without that other thing. Howevcr, thatEXAMINA110N OF A SSOCIATION

other thing does not exist without the other, and therefore, it does not

exist.

7. N1inyasmin 11idyate 'nyat11am anany1111nit1 na vidyate,

a11idyamane C'iif!yatve nasty anyad va tad eva Va.

A diffcrence is not evident in rełation to a diffcrent thing. Nor is it not

evident in a diffcrcnt thing. When diffcrence is not evident, rhcrc is

neither diHercnce nor ide.ntity.

MKV(P) pp.252-255; MKV(V) pp. I I 1-112.

227

These verses seem to higblight the face that one cannot speak ofdependence so

long as one .recognizes absolute difference among events. They arc a reminder

of the detaiłed treatment of the relacion of contingence (apek.fii) undenaken

previously in relation to the metaphor of "fire and fuel" (Chapter A.1.

8. Na tena ltJJya I(Jf!MaTKO nanyen'iinya.sya yujyale,

saf?Zsr/yamiinaf!t saf!IS!l!af?Z saf?ZSr(ll{a ca na 11idyate.

The association of identical things or of diffcrent things is not propcr.

Neithcr the associating nor the associated nor even the agent of association is evident.

MKV(P) pp.255-256; MKV(V) pp. I 12-13.

ldencity and difference -assumed by the Buddhist metaphysicians cannot solve

the problem of truth, especiaJly its pragmacic version. The only solution

avai łable to them is a recognicion of the Buddha's "omniscience" (saroajflatva),

which they unhesitatingly attributed to him, even without atcempting to

define what "omnis'' (saroaf?Z) stood for in the Buddhist context (see commentary on IX.3).CHAPTER

FlFTEEN

Examination of Self-narure

(Svabhava-parzk.ra)

l. Na Jt11!Jbhavaf? svabhavasya yuktal? pralyaya-hetubbif?,

hetu-pratyaya-sat!Jbhuta-1? .rvabhavaf? krtako bhavet.

The occurrence of self-oatnre through auscs and conditions is not proper. Sclf-narure that has occurrcd as a rcsułt of causcs and conditions

would be something that is made.

MKV(P) p.259; MKV(V) p.1 14.

Chaptcr XV is the condusioo to Part II of Nagarjuna's text. The maio thrust of

Pan 11, as cxplaincd in the Intioduction, is in the direccion of clarifyiag the

conccption of dharmas (in the plural), whcthcr they rcprescn tcd ideas, things,

events, or phenomena. As was evident from an examioacioo of the preceding

cwelve chapters, Nagarjuna's analysis ofdharmas was intended to eliminate·thc

metaphysical ideas relating to idenrity and d.iffereoce (ekiirtha-naniirlha). In

that proce~. he refuted the meraphysical notions of arisiog and ceasing

(utpada-nt'rodha) , of cternalism and annihilationism (Uiśvata-uccheda) and of

appearancc and dJsappearancc (agama-nirgama). These metaphysical ootions

werc the rc:sult of assuming a substancc or sclf-narure (svabhava) io

phcnomcna, an assumption that is muruaUy related by a conception of absolute

"otherncss" (parabliiiva).

Self-narurc or substance (111abhava) thus being the major ~ue , it is natura!

for Nigarjuna to concludc this scction with an cxamination of this particular

concepuon.

In rcfuting the conception of substance, Nigarjuoa relies heavily upon the

Buddha's own conception of a "middle position," nameJy, "dependent

arising." Because he was herc concecned maioly with refuting che mecaphysical

extremcs, Nigarjuna rcfers only to that section of his locus classicus (i.e„ the

discurse to Kityayana) that deals with the ewo extremes of exiscence (aslitva)

and non-existence (nastitva).

228EXAMINATION OP SEl.l'-NAlURE 229

In the very first verse, Nigarjuna statcs his owo pragmatic view of truth as

something made (krtaka) depcncling upon causes and conditions (he111-

pra1yaya-sarpbhutaf?). ·subscance or sclf-nature, if it wece to ocist, couJd not

escape the principle of dependent arising (pralilya.Iamutpada).

2. 'S11abha11af? krtako niima bhavi!Jalipunal/ kathaf!I,

akrtn'maf! svabhavo hi nirapelqaf? paratra ca.

Again, how could there be a self-natute th2t is made? Indeed, an unmade self-

. .

nature is ałso non;.contingent upon another.

MKV(P) pp.260-262; MKV(V) pp.114-11 ~ -

.A.n artificial substance (krtakal? svabhival/) is not possible, for by defio.ition a

subscance is etcrnal and therefore not subject to acising and ceasing. Anyching

that is subjcct to arising and ccasing cannot be a substance and, bence, concrary

to dependent arising. lt is simply non-contingent (nirapelqaf?).

3. Kutafl s11abha11t1.Iyabha11e para-bhavo bhav#yatt;

svabhaval? para-bha11asya para-bhavo hi kathyate.

In the absence ofself-nature, whence can there be other-nature? For, selfnaturc of othcr-nature is called other-nature.

MKV(P) pp.265-266; MKV(v,I p. 116.

This represeots a rcpetition of che argument used by Nigarjuna at I. 3 and

XIV.4 to indicate the rclativity ofself-nature lµld other-natu!C. lf one is not acceptable, the other too is not ~dmissible.

4. S1111bh'ii11a-para-bha11abhya1n rte bh'iivafl kutal? punaf?,

svabhave para-bhave vii sali bhii110 hisidhyati.230 THE PHtLOSOPHY OF Tl-lE MIDDLE WAY

Without sełf-nature and other-nature, whence can therc be an existent?

For, tbe existent is established only when there is self-nature or other·

nature.

MKf/(P) p.266; M.k'V(V) p.ll6.

This probably could serve as evidence against the belief that Nagatjuna

recognized an ultimate reality beyond bothself-nature and other-nature. In the

case of the Yatslputriyas, the "ultimatdy real" emerges on the basis of an assertion of both idencity and difference, (see commentary on X.1, "Fire cannot be

designated as something differenc from the fuel, nor as something idencical.")

. The Japanese Buddhist scholar Y. Ueda perceives a unique logical principle

adopted in Madhyamika logic detived from the metaphor of "fire and fuel."

According to rum, ''There are inherent conditions in each sucb tbat their

ultimate rdatonship into a whole or unity entails a mutual dcnial of cach

other,'' (see Ioada, p.80, emphasis added). However, Nagarjuna is here raising the question; "Distinct from self-nature and other-nature, whence can

there be an existent?"

Thus, the eight negations are not intended to prove or establish the nature of

reali.ty, as it is ońen and loudly asserted. They are primarily and solely intended

to eliminate metaphysical notions, not co characterize either an ultimate reali.ty

or dependent arising. Dependent arising is a totally differnt way of expressing

the truth or reality.

In the second statement above, Nagarjuna maintains that svtJbhav4 and

parabha11a are both dependen.t upon bhava. They represent a further bifurcation of bhava.

5. Bhavasya ced aprastddhir abhavo naiva sidhyatz;

bhavtJSya hy anyatha-bh411am abhavaf!l bruvate janiih.

When the existent is not established, the non-existent is also not

established. It is, indeed, the change of the existent that people generally

call the non-existent.

lef.KV(P) p.267; MKV(f1p. ll7 .

Whlle svabhava ' nd parabhiiva reprcsent a bifurcation of bhiiila, the łatter isEXAMINATION OP SELF-NATURE 231

itself dependent upon abha11a. Ordinarily peoplc speak of abliii11a as change in

bhava. The bha11a - abhava, chough moce comprehensive than che wabhava

-parabha11a dichotomy, carries the same implications as the lacter. Boch involve

the metaphysical nocions of idencity and di.fference.

Neither the Buddha's conceptioos of "dependent arising" (paf1cca.ramuppada) and "non-substantiality" (anatta) nor Nagarjuna's views on dependence

and emptiness (śunyatii) should be understood as involving or crearing the

metaphysical notions of identity and di.fference. In face, the intcrpretation of

fUnyafii by some scholars as an "ultimate reality'' has brought about an immediate respoose from others who characterize it as "oothingness." The

dichotomy thac ordinary people assume is immediately fuought into play herc.

It was chis incorrigibilicy (aiiidhya) that Nagarjuoa was referring to at Xlll.8.

Hence. Nagarjuna's declaration that follows.

6. S11abhava1(' para-bhava?[I ca bha11t11(' cabhiivam eva ca,

ye pafyanti na paśyanli te tattvarri Buddha-fasane.

Those who pcrceive self-natutt as well as other-nature, existence as well as

non-existence, they do not perceive the tmth embodied in the Buddha's

message.

MKV(P) p .267; MKV(V) p.117.

lt is not merely self-oature and other-nature that arc rejected, but also existence

and oon-existence. The former pair covers a limited range ofexplanation, compared to the moce comprehensive notioos of ex:istence and non-cxistence.

An empirical definition of existence, as presented by the Buddha, would

mean some thing, some event, some phenomenon available to the sbc senses (see

S 4.15, Sabba-sulla). Such a phenomenoo is assumed to have come to be oo

che basis of cooditioos (pa.f1ccast1muppanna), to remain for a while showing

signs, ac the same time, of decay (!hita.rsa afJflathatta), and then cease to exist

(nirodha, 11yaya)1once agaio depeodiog upon conditioos. So thal even ordioary

unenlighcened people would say: "Change of what is existent is non:exiscence"

(bhiivasya hy anyathabhavam abha11a1(' bruvate janiil/, XV.5).

However, che metaphysicians can take over from this ordinary man's

language, especially with its use of the geoecive or possessive case (bhavasya).

He will assume that change is something possessed by the existenc (bhiiva)

which is always the same. Y et he cannot say the same about non-existence232 THE PHLLOSOPHY OFTHEMIDDLE WAY

(abhava). The metaphysicians part company here. one dogmaticaUy holding oo

to a theory of eternal existence (śaśvatq), the other advocating absolute nonex.istence, which is annihilationism (uccheda).

Another metaphysician who is interested in explainiog the empirically fclt

"selfhood" and "others" wiłl attempt to bifurcate existence (bhava) as selfnature (svabhava) and otber-nanue (parabhava). Wheo applyiog this latter

dicbotomy to the explanation ofcausality, the metaphysician once again brl.ngs

the duality of existence and non-ex.istence into play.

Such metaphysics has no place whatsoever in the Buddha's explanation ofexistence and oon-existeoce. Hence Nigarjuna's statement that those who adhere

to these notions do not understand the truth or reality expressed in the

Buddha's message.

7. Katyayanavatiiide ca.stili n'iisliti cobhayaf?J.,

prati[iddhaf?J. bhagavat7i bliiiv'iibliiiva-vibhavina.

In the admonition to Katyayana, the two thcories Jimplying] 1exists' and

'does not exist' have been refuted by.the Blessed One who .is adept in existence as well as in non-existence.

MKV(P) p .269; MKV(V,) p. 117.

This, as mencioned in the Iouoduction, is the single most imporrant piece of

evidence avaiłable in the work of Nigarjuna, which ca!1 rdate him to the Buddha as presented in the Pali Nikayas and the Ch.inese Agamas. Inada's note on

th.is versi:: is too brief and vague: "The Saoskrit Katyayaoavavada, either refers

to the sutra or the iosttuctions given to Katyayama [sic.) by the Buddha,"

(p.99).:Tfiis statement of Nagarjuna deserves much moce attention than has

ever beeo accorded to it.

The main theme of the diścourse is to expose thć untenability of che two

metaphysical views .of existence (astitva) and oon-existence (ntistitva). This is

clone b.y appealing to the empiticaJ notions of arising (utpiida) and ceasing

(nirodha). With the fifteeo chapters (induding the present). Nigarjuna has

presented an outstanding explaoation of how the empirical conceptions ofarising and ceasing, of irnpermanence and change;, can proficably be used to expose the futility of metaphysics. Hence, he is satisfied with meręly referring to

that porrion of the "Discourse to Katyayana" whi~h deals wirh the rejection ofEJV.MlNATION OF SELP-NATIJRE 233

the two metaphysicaJ extremcs. A discussion of the remaining ideas expressed

by the Buddha in this discourse, especiałly the positive description of the

human personalicy as well as its experiences, is reserved for a later occasion,

8. Yady as1tt1111f!J pr11kr1ya syiin na bh1111ed asya nastilii,

prakrter anyatha-bha110 na hijatupapadyate.

Ifexistcnce wece to be in terms ofprimal natuce, then therewouJd not be

its non-existence. A change of peimal nature is certainly not appropriate.

MKV(P) p.271 ; JHKJ/(V) pp.118-1 19.

This and the oext three verses seem to constitute a digesr of the detailed and

meticulous analysis of the two extreme views presented by Nagarjuna so far.

lf existence is·understood in the sense of primal narure (pr11kr11), in the way

the Sańkhya school clid, for. in fut, the Sańkhya used the term 111abhii11a to refer

ro che primal oarure, then there cannot be its ooo-cxistcnce. The rea.son is that

change and primal nature or substance arc incompacible.

9. Pf'flkrtau kasya casatyam anjathat11a1'{1 bha11ifya1i,

prakrtau kasya ca salyam anyatha111a1!J bha11i;yati.

When pei.mal nature is non-existent, whose change would there be?

When prima! nature is existent, whose change would there be?

MKV(P) p.271·272; MKV(V) p.119.

Not only the existence of primal nature, but also its non-existence is iocompatible with change. Herc primal nature is understood as the substance and change

as the attribute. If the substance is nor available, the attributes cannot be applied to it. If the substance is present, the attributes become superficial. In

brief, the substantialist enterprise coosists of reconciling subscance and attribute aftcr creating a sharp and irreconciliable discinction between them (see

Chapter V).234 TuB PHILOSOPHY Ol' 1'HE MLDPLE WAY

The above explanatioi1 would eliminace the need for assuming that the first

line of the verse represents a question raised by an opponent to which Nagarjuna gives his own reply in the second (see Inada p.99, who follows

CandrakTrti's interpreracion of this verse.)

10. Asliti Saivata-graho n1islity uccheda-darfanat?J,

tasmiid astitva-nastitve naśiiyeta vicak!at!tll/.

"Exists' implics grasping after eternalism. "Docs not exist" implics the

philosophy ofannihilation. Therefore, a discerning person shouJd not rely upon either existence or non-existence.

11. Asti yadd hi s11abha11ena na tan niistftfiiśvatat?J,

nasfidiintm abhut purva11z ity ucchedal; prasajyate.

"Whatever that exists in terms of self-nature, chat is not non-existent''

implies eternalism. "lt does not ex:ist now, but existed before" implies annihilation.

MKV(P) pp.272·273; MKV(V) p.119.

These theories of existence and non-existence are not simple and harmless ones.

They contribuce to unforrunate consequeaces. The theory of existence kads to

the dogmacie grasping on to the belief in eternalism. The conception-of nonexistence leads to an equally dangerous view of annihilation, both o~which , as

will be pointed out later, are damaging to the moral life. Hence, a wise man

would not associate himself with such extreme views.

This seems to be a most appropriate condusion to an anaJysis chat was intended to establish che non-substantialicy of all phcnomcna (dharmanairatmya). Nagarjuna did not allow any toom for the reificarion of any one

single phenomenon that was refcrred to as being pan of human experience.CHAPTER

SIXTEEN

Examination of Bondage and Release

(Bandhana-mok.fa-partk~a)

1. Sa1p.skiiraf? sa'l!'saranti cen na nityal; sa1!'Jaranli te,

sa'l!'saranti ca ti4nityal/ sattve 'py e1a sam.aft kramaf?.

If it is assumed that dispositions transmigrate, they would not

transmigrate as permanent entities. Neither do they transmigrate as impermanent entities. This method (of analysis) is applicable even in the

case of a sentient being.

MKV(P) p.280; MKV(V) p .123.

Part Thrce, according to our analysis, consists ofChapter XVI-:XXVI; and is different from Part Two io its treatment of the subject matter, even though the

subject matter itself appears to be similar in them. While Part Two was concerned with the analysis of the elements of existence (dharma) showing how

they are lacking in any substance (dharma-11airalmya) and how tbey are

dependently arisen (parfitya.ram11tpanna), Part Three is concerned more with

the explanacion of the human personality (pudgala) without falling into

meraphysical uaps. The human persooality, both in bondage and in freedom ,

is analysed here. The problems of "self' (atman), questioos regarding morał

responsibility and its associated concepts of time and fruitioning, are discussed

fust. Movfr1g therefrom, Nagarjuna takes up the problem of the person who

has anained freedom, the question of rruths, of freedom itself, rrying to deal

ooce again with the metaphysicał iotetpretations, until be reaches Chapter XXVI when he presencs the most positive explanation of that human personal·ity.

The present chapter beings with one of the most popularly held misconceptions about the Buddha's teachlogs pertaioing to rebinh (punabbhava). Even

duriog the Buddha's day, when he spoke about rebirth being causally conditioned or ' 'depeodentły acisen" (patźci;asamuppanna), and enumerated several

conditions that would contribute co ie (M 1.265), one of his disciples picked out

one among these conditions, namely, consciousoess (11ifJffiif!a), maintaining

235236 T HE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MI DDLE WAY

that it is "This very same coosciousness that transmigcates, not aoother" (:dam

eva viflłfiifla?(I sandhavatt.' Ill1(1Saratt.' anaflfla?(I, M 1.256; Chung 54.2 [Tairho

1.766c)). There certainly were many others, including some of his disciples,

who cootinued to uphold such views throughout che centuries. The widespread

p.tevalence of this view seems to indicate the adamant way in which people

believed that for survival to ta.kc place there must be a permanent and eternal

subscance:

The Buddha's answer co rhese believers in a permanent and eternal selfor entity is that any factor that conrributes to human survival, whether ie is consciousoess (vififiafła) or disposition (sankhara), or action (kamma) or even

graspiog (upadiina), aJl these arc dcpendencly arisen. For the Buddha, contłnuity can be explained in a more empiricaJ way by following the principle of

dependence of impermanenc faccors of cxistence, where on leaves an impression on another, thus eliminating the need for assuming a permaoent entity.

Nigarjuna is herc referdng to rwo extremes, i.e., permanence (nitya) and

impermanence (anitya) , this latter being the momentary destruction (k!af!abhańga) advocated by the Buddhist metaphysicians. The. former cepresents the

Sarvastivada point of view; the lacter, the Sautrantika.

If the dispositions (Ia?(lskiira) arc presenred as being either pcrmanent or impermanent whcn thcy rransmigrate, and if there is no mention of causaJ conditioning of rhese dispositions as well as the ocher factocs, then the theories of

eternalism and annihilatiooism are inevitable. Furthermore, such excreme condusions arc especiaJly unavoidable when one factor or eotity is singled out and

shown to be the factor lnvolved in transmigratjon.

2. Pudgalaf? sa1(1Jaranti cel skandhayalanadhaltJ!U,

paflcadha mrgyama,,.o 'sau nasti kal? sa1(1Sari/yati.

lt may be assumcd tbat a person transmigrntes. Yet, such a person,

sought for i.o the fivefold way in the aggrcgates, spheres (of sense) and

elements, does not cx.ist. Who chen will transmigrate?

MKV(P) p.284; MKV(fl? p„124.

lt is interesting to note that in the previous statement Nigarjuna rejects only

the view that dispositions cransmigrate. He did noc deny the disposicions

them$elves. However, in the present verse Nagarjuna maintains chat if a

transmigrating "person" (pudgaia) is sought for (mrgya11tano) in the ag-EXAMINATION OF BoNDAGE ANO RELEASE 237

gregatcs, faculties, and elements (as Nagatjuoa tried to do in the last fifteen

chapters) one does not discovcr him. The "person" referrcd to bcre is no ordjnary person. This person shouJd possess the same characteristic which, according to the previous verse, made it impossible for the "dispositions" to

tranSmigcate, namcly, permanence.

!nada seems to miss the meaning of the term mrgyt1m'ii11a in his translacioo

of this verse.

3. Upadiinad up'iidiinaf!J sa'(lsaran 11ibha110 bha11et,

11ibha11aś c'iinupadiinal/ kal? sa ki'(l Itlf!Jiari;yali.

Moving from one form of grasping to anotber, t~ere would be othcrbecoming. Who is this person who bas ceased to be and is [therefore]

non-grasping? Wherein does he transmigrate?

MKV(P) p.284; M.KV(V) p. 124.

I

Uoderstanding the causa! process in a lioear way one runs into difficulties in expłaining "grasping" (upadiina) as a reason, not only foc transmigration but also

for conceptualizing a person. White grasping was considered a.o impoctant

cause for the unhappiness and suffering (dukkha), as aJso the rebirtb of a

human bcing, "non-grasping" (anupadiina) was. a conditioo for happiness

(sukha) in this life and for not bcing reborn in a future life. In adclition, eveo

the vcry notion o'f a substantial "self' (alta) is supposed to be the result of

grasping on to the five aggregates (upadiinakkhandha).

However, if graspiog is singled out and explained in a lioear way. then moviog from one moment of grasping to another, one will be faced with otherbecoming (11ibha11a). To explain this broken or inrerrupted series of graspings,

one. needs to assume that there is something to be grasped so that grasping can

continue. The: aggregates do not continuously provide a foundation for grasping. They arise and cease. With such arising and ceasing, grasping itself would

be ioter.rupted. This me.ans chat grasping that has come to be non-existent

(11ibha11a) would also be noo-grasping (anupadiina). If so, where is this socalłed permanent cnticy and where does he transmigrate?

4. Saf'!J.Ikaiiif{iirp na n_iro'ii'łarrt katha?!Jci'd upaparlyrrle,

sa1t11a.ryapi na niroar;a'!t katharp.cid upap11dyate.238 THE PH!LOSOPl-IY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

The cessation of dispositions is somehow not appropriate. The cessation

even of a scntient being is also not appropńate in any way.

MKV(P} p .288; MKV(V) p.126.

The Buddha left unanswered the quescion regarding the narure of a "freed person" (tath'iigata) aftec death (param1nara11a). Nagarjuna wiU return to this

question in his finał chapter, "The Examination of Views" (Dr1fi-pank1a). In

the present context, Nagarjuna is concecned mostly with the living person. The

previous verses referred to the mecaphysical views regarding a living person in

boodage. The present verse is, thercfore, devoted to an exarninatioo of the

mecaphysicaJ view percaining to a living person who has attained freedom.

Speakiog of chat fre.edom, Nagarjuna doc:s not wanc co assume chat it is the

cessacion of dispositions, QI of a "person." He was probably aware that che Buddha spoke of the pacification of disposicions (sańkhara-upasama) in relation to

a living person who has attained freedorn. He was also aware that the Buddha

did not advocate the annihilation of a sentient being (1att11a, see commentary

of Xlll. l ). Heoce his present st~tement.

S. Na badhyanle na mucyanta udaya-vyaya-dharmit!af?,

.Iaf!IJliiiral? purvavat satto badhyate na na 1nucyate.

Dispositions that are of the nature of upńsing and ceasing are neither

bound nor rcleased. A sentient being, like the foregoing, is neither

bound nor released.

MKV(P) p.290: MKV(V) p .127.

According co the substanciałisc way of thinking , an erernaJ selfor soul (at1na11)

is in bondage because it is bound co various ephimera1 factors such as che

psycho-physical personalicy (see. Bhaga11adgll'ii, Chapter Xlll). Such a self has to

break away from i-ts bondage in order to be free. Having rejected a pcrmancnr

cntity Jike the self, if the Buddhisrs were to consider the disposicions as the condition for bondage, such disposidons, being of the nature of arising and ceasing, could neither be bound nor freed . In ocher words. one canoot look at rhe

dispositions through the eyes of the substantialist. The same t.-an be said of a

sentient bcing (sanva).EXAMINATION Ol' BONDAGE AND RELEASF.

6. Bandhanaf?l cod uptirliinaf?l soptirliino na badhyate,

b11dhy11te n?inuparliinai/ kim avastho 'tha badhyate.

lfgrasping were to be considered a bo.ndage, one who is with gcasping is

not being bound. Neither is one without gcasping being bound. A person in which state is then bou.nd?

MKV(P) 290; MKV(!'? p.127 .

239

The substance/anribute distinccion that emergcs from the statement such as

"one who is with grasping" (sa-uptiaano) militatćs against saying that he is being bound (b11t/hy11te). In this sense, the attribute is ałre.ady implicit in the

substance and there is no point in piling,up another identical attribute on it. If

the substa0ce is without attribute (as in the case of an-upadiina), then there

.seems to be no way in which one can atuibute an attribute to it. They could

always remain independent. These difficulties relating to identi.ty and difference give rise to the questipn regarding the status of the person who is being

.. ~

bound. ·

7, Badhn'iylid bandhanaf?l kamaf?l bandhy'iit purvaf!J bhavedyadi,

na casti tal fe.fa'n uklaf!J g11v1yamana-gatiigalail/.

Ifit is assumed that bondage existsprior to the binding ofthat which is co

be bouod, that does not exist. The rest has been explained by [the

ąnalysis of] present moviog, the moved and the not moved.

MKV(P) pp.291-292; MKV(V) pp 127-1?8.

lf, in answer to the question raised in the previow verse, it is said that bondage

exists prior to someone being bound, such bondage, according to Nagarjuna,

does not exist. The analysis in Chapter·II as well as in Chapter X can be utilized

hete to refute the implications of a substantialist view. of bondage. ·

8. Baddho na tntJcyate fiivad abaddho 114i11a mucyate,

s:f?itii'!l badtilhe mucyam?ine yugapad-bandha-mok/ane.240 'fHE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MJDDl..E W AY

One who is bound is not rcleased. nor is one who is o~t bound freed.

When there is rcleasing of one who is bound, then thcrc would be

simultaneous occurrcnce of bond.age and release.

M.KV(P) p.29); MKV(V) p.128.

One who is substantially bound (baadha), i.e.. one who bas the sełf-nature

(s11abhiiJ1a) of bondagc, cannot be frced. Similarly, it is meaningless to spcak of

somconc who is absołutely free (a-baddha). i.c.• whose sełf-naturc is frccdom,

as one beiag frccd. Ifone wcrc to speak of someoae who is idready bound and is

beiag freed, thca bondage and freedom would be simułtancous.

9„ Nirvasy'iimy 11nupadiino nir:iii1!1Zf(I me bh1111i./yati,

itiyefiif(J grahar tefiim upadiina-11111ha-grahaf?.

"Noi;i-graspiag, I sball be free. Freedom will then be mine." For whomsocver tbere is grasping in tbis manner, that will be a gigantic grasping.

MKV(P) p.295; MKV(V) p.129.

Nagarjuna is herc prescnting a fundamcntal idea expressed in the early

dtscounes (sec M 1.145-151, Ratha11inl~sutta) as well as in the Praj1r\iparamita literaturc, espedally the Vajra&chediliii. It is the idea that one

Caruiot be frced and still eling to frecdom, let along braggiog about it.

Howcvcr, one nced not construe µie Buddha's statcment at M 1.171

1(Anyapariyesana-iutta) as an instance of such bragging. That statemcnt was

Jl)a°dc by the Buddha in responsc to a question raiscd by Upaka at a time whco

.the only frced one in the world was the Buddha hirruelf. He was simply dcscrib-

/ing to Upaka th~ abscnce ofany one who bad attained freedom , in the sense in

which the Buddha understood the conccption of freedom. Whether the Buddha would make such a statcment subsequcnt to the prcacbing of the first scrJ mon and the attainmcnr of colightcnment and freedom by his fll~t fivc

disciplcs is extremdy doubtful. ·ExAMINATION Of BONDAGE ANO.R!rLEASE

10. N11 niNii'!11-s11miiropo 1111 sllf!ISt1rtip/Jkq11111111f!I,

yatr11 kas tatra Sllf[ISiiro niwii1111f!1 kif?Z 11ikalpy11te.

Wheccin there is neither the attribution of frecdom nor the elimination

of the life..process, what is it that is being discriminated as life-process or

as frcedom?

MKV(P) p.299; MKV(V) p.130.

241

This concluding verse provides a beautiful summary of the metapbysical views

rełating to a life of bondage (st11[1Sir11) and frccdom (ninliif!t1) and can servc as a

key to unlocking the mystcries sucrounding the chaptcrs to.come. The constant

debates among modern scholars as to the implkacions ofNigatjuna's famous

chapter on Niroa11a (XXV,) tan easily be eliminatcd if we arc to keep in mind

the nature of the theories pertaining to bondage and freedom that Nagarjuna

h:od to deal with. ·

Presented in the substantialist moułd, freedom becomes an attcibution

(samiiropa). while the life-process with its suffering requires elimination

(apak4r!tJ'!ll)_, No such frcedo~ or life proccss is accepted by Nagarjuna. Such a

description was too metaphysical for bim.

Attribution and elimination imply the existence of a neutral substance to

which freedom can be attt:ibuted or suung on to, while bondage in the form of

łife-process can be wrestled away from . If no neutral substance is recognized,

there couJd be two ocher ways of explaining freedom and bondage. First, it is

possible to say tbat the substance is inherentły free and that it is held in bondage by adventitious elements. Tuus, the Upani~adic or the Brahmaoical notion

of "self' which is pure and luminous is understood as something kept in bondage to the ·psycbophysical personality, like a sword kept in its sheath. The

originally pure mind (prakrti-pra6hiiwfll'a-~itta) ofthe Buddhist metaphysician

(sec Lank.avatiira, ed. Nanjio, 1956, p.358) resembles the Upan4aclic and

Brahmanical vie.ws of the ''self." Secondly, if such an originaUy pure encity is

not acceptablt:, then it is possi,ble to argue that wbat is called the life-process

(sa?!Mara) is completely annihilated and a completely new process offreedom is

initiated. The former has nQthing to do with the latter. lndeed, one cannot ig·

nore the solutions offcred by the·Buddhist me.taphysidans when they carne to

analyse che personal stream of becoming (bhava-sota) into discrete entities. Thę

concepts of ''atcainment'' (praptt) and "non-attainment" (a-piiiptt) providcd·a242 THE PHJLOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE WAY

solution that is almost identical with those meotioned above. Niroa,,_a thus

becomes a prapti that fall into the stream (111a-Iaf!'t(ina-patita) and at that

point sa'!'Jara becomes at;i a-prap1i.

As pointed out in the lntroduction, the Buddha's conceptions of bondage

and freedom (and this woułd also appJy to Nagarjuoa's views) have nothing to

do with aoy one of the alternacive explanations mentioned above.CHAP'J'ER

SEVENTEEN

Examination of the Fruit of Action

(Karma-phala-partk!ti)

1. Atma-sflr(tyamakartt cetafl paranugrahakaf?l cayat,

maitrartt sa dht1rmaf! lad bl/af?l phalsya pretyt1 ceha ca.

Self-resti:aint as well as benefitting othets-this is the friendly way and it

constitutes the secd that bears fruit here as well as in the next life.

MKV(P) p.303; MKV(V) p.132.

The present chapter, unlike Chapter VIII , deals with the problem of morał

responsibility. It is an attempt to explain the "fruits" (phala) reaped as a result

of one's actions (karma). The docuine of the fruits of action or morał responsibilicy is pivotal to any explanation of human life, whether it is in bondage or

in freedom. However, in the present chapter, the idea of the accumulation of

merit and demerit (pu'!ya-papa) (for future benefit) is examined at length,

primarily because this parcicular idea is mostly associated with the Jife-process

(saf?Jsara) in .bondage. The Buddha insisted that such accumulatioo of merit

and demerit is abandoned (prahlf!a) by a person who is enjoying freedom (nirvaf!a), even though he does not transcend morals or is not unconcerned with

questions relating to mota! responsibility.

Inada assumes that verses 1-19 represent the popular explanation of karma.

This is questionable. Io fact, the popular, and therefore, a mistaken view of

karma is presented only in verses 6-12. Verse 13, as will be pointed out, refers

to a more sophisticated theocy of moral responsibility held by the Buddha and

his disciples.

The present verse deals with two importaot virtues-self-restraint and

benevolence-and these constitute the friendly way (maitraf?1 dharmafl) which

serves as the seed that fruitions herc as well as in the furure. !nada reads three

virtues-self-restraint, kindness towards others and benevolence. On the conuary, m(litrarrt seems co quality dharma, and Kumaraj1va undetstood it in this

latter sense.

243244 ThB PHILOSOPHY OFTHE MIDDLE WAY

2. Cekina celayi111ii ca karmoklaf{l p11rama-r11f!'ii,

1asy'iineka11idho bhethl/ RaN1lllf!l1Q parikrrtitaf?.

The Słłpteme Ascetic has said tbat action is volition as well as volitio.nal.

Many distinct varieties of that action have ałso been expounded.

MVK(P) pp.30~- 306 ; MKV(V) p.133.

At A 3.415 (Chung 27.5 (Tairho l.600a]), the Buddha idcntified karma witb

"volition" arid maintaincd I.bat karµ-ia, whcther it b_c bodily,·vcrbal, or mentaJ,

is to be ra:ognizcd as karmaifit is volitional (Cetana 'haf?l bhikkhave kammaf?Z

11adiimi. Cetayil11'ii kllmmaf{l karoti kayena t1acaya manasii ca). ihe emphasis

oo volitjon was intendcd to ełiminate the wrong beliefthat a person is responsible for any and every action be pcrforms, a view that was advocated by theJain.a

thinkers of pte-Buddhist India (sec Kalupahana, Causality, pp.125-126). The

distinct varieties of karma referred to herc arc ·the one's preseoted in the

canonical Adhidharma, and these arc based upon the discussions availabłe in

the early discowses.

3. Tait" yac cetanety uklaf{l karma miinasaf{l smrtaf{l,

cetayitva ca yat tuk.taf{l tat tu kayik<1-11acikaf{l.

Herein, what is called volition is J"eminisced as menralaction. Whaceveris

called volitiot1al consists of the bodily and verbal.

MKV(P) p. 306; MKV(V) p.133.

A difference is noticcable between the Buddha's owo explanarioo of karma in

the statement from Ańguttara quoced acXVII.2 and the present description of

Nigarjuna. While cetana or volition is dcfinicely meotal, che Buddha seems to

assume that not all mental actioos·are volitiooal. Hence his statement that all

,three forms of kar,na, bodily, verbal and mentał , can be determined by volition. However, in the presen.t statcment, volition seems to have been identified

with mentaJ action, the vołitional being confined strictly co bodily and vetbal.

This laner view may be a reflexion of the Buddba's own staccment at M 2.25

(Chung 47.2 [Tairho 1.720)), whcrcio both bodiły and verbal actioos ace con·

sidered co havc mind as a basis.Exi.MINATION OP THE FRUIT OF ACTION

4. Viig· fli/Pando 'viratayo yliś ca11ijntipti·saf!Z}lłilii'1,

avijlłaptaya e11'iinya'1 smrlii viratayt1.S taiha.

5. Paribhoganvayaf!Z p11„yam apu„yaf!Z ca trJthavidha.f!Z,

cetana ceti saptaite dharma!? karmiińjanal; smrtal;.

Whatever words and deeds that arc wociated with dclight and

dcsignated as non·intimation, and also tbosc others rctniniscod as nonintimation, but arc associated with non-delight; similady, merit as well as

demerit consequent upon enjoymcnt, and finally, voliti?n- these arc

reminisced as the scvcn things that arc productive of action.

MKV(P) p.307; MKV(V,} p.133.

245

Some of the ter~ used here to define the various forms ofkarma appcar for the

first time in the Abhidharma (sec Akb iv.1-2; Akb pp.162·164; Adv

pp.118-119). They arc absent in the eady discourses. However, takcn in

themsełves, they do not seem to crcate any philopsophical problems. The

philosophical problcms arose because of the manner in which these actions

wece interpreter/. These interpretations are then taken up for ex:aminacion by

Nigarjuna in the following verses.

6. Ti!thaty apaka-k'ii/iic cet kt11'm4 tan nityafiim iy'iit,

niruddhatp cen nirudrlhaf!l- sat ki'f!Z pha/af!Z jpnayqyati.

lfit is assumcd that action remains during the time it ismaturing, then it

will approach permanence. If it is assumed to have ccased, thcrt having

ceased, how can it produce a fruit?

MKV(P) p.311; MKV(V,} p .134.

This is actually the point at which Nagarjuna begins his analysis of the

metaphysital assumptioos. Hece he immediately turns on to the theories of

idencity and difference. The assumption taken up for criticism in the :first line

needs to be examined carefully. UodoubtedJy, it is the problem ofpotentilJIex-246 THE PH!LOSOPHY OF rnE MIDDLE WAY

istcncc. Such cxistencc may be undcrsrood in various ways. Potcntialiry may be

takco as the cxistence of conditions that would eventually givc rise co some particular cvcnt. Nagarjuoa, as may be scen in a moment, does not sccm to objcct

to such an explanacion. Oo the contrary, if potentiality is undcrstood in the

sense of substantial existcncc of the panicuJar.evcnt (in this case, karma), even

when it has not marurcd or come to fmitioo, thcn that assumption lcads to

ctemalism. This lattcr view is cenainly not acccptabłc to Nagarjuna. It also

leads to the contrary view, that is, if the evcoc is complcccly abscnt (and this

absence pertains to the very conditions that will cvenruaJJy give cise to the

cvent), chen thcre will be doubts about the occurrence of the cvcnt at all. This

is annihilationism. Thus, Nagarjuna is not dcoying the fruit of action but only

the manocr in whicb it is explaincd.

7. Yo 'nkura-prabhrtir bl1at sa?r)tano 'bhipra11artate,

tata!? pha/af?Z rte b'ijat sa ca nabhipra11artate.

Wbatcvcr serics that begins with a sprout p rocccds from a sccd, and thcn

produccs a fruit. Howcver, without a sccd, such [a sccics] would not procced.

MKV(P) p.312; MKV(V,J p .13).

The mecaphysical assumptions of the Sautraotik.a doctrine of karma are under

review herc. The atomistic view of the life-process acccpted by the Sautrantikas

compelled them to analyse an event into a series (saf(Jt'iina) of moments. Their

major difficułty lay in explaining how one series (e,g. , a sprout-series) comes to

be tied up with another preceding scries (e.g., a seed-series), since thcy are different. If they are radicałly different, theo the sprout-series CUl occur cven in the

absence of the seed-series. Nagarjuna maintains chat thls docs not happeo. Io

other words, he is insisting chat philosophers like the Sautrantikas will have to

acccpc the view tbat no evcnt can come inco being unless therc wcre condicions

tbat give rise co ie; in this case it is the see_d-series.

8. Bi/ac ca yasmiit saf{Jtanaf? rtZf?Zlaniic ca phalodbhavaf?,

brja-puroaf?Z phalaf?Z tasmiin nocchinnaf?Z napi f(iŚ'l/ataf(J.EXAbilNATION OF TI-IE FRUIT OF AcnoN

Since a series arises Crom a s«d and a fruit ariscs from a series, a fruit t.hat is

prcceded by a seed is, thereforc, neither inteuupted nor etcrnal.

MKV(P) p.313; M.k'V(V) p. 135.

247

Lo answer to the question raised by Ni\garjuna, a Sautrantika can i:espood tbus:

lnstead of conceiving of these as two differeot series, łet us say that a series is

produced from a seed. ·This series then gives rise to the effect (whk h is the

sprour). ln that sense, a fruit is preceded by a seed (btja-purvarp phalaftl).

Understood in this way, one does nor fall into either the eternałistic or the annibilationist view.

9. Yas tasmlic cittt1-Jt1ftlfiinflf cetaso 'bhipmvartate,

latał? phaltlftl rte citfiit sa ca n'iibhipravarlate.

1 berefore, wbatever thought-series therc is, that proceedsfrom a thought

and ftom that fruit. That thought series would not proceed without a

thought.

10, Citfiic ca yasmlit SflftJfiinaf? IflftJfiinac ca phalodbhaval?,

karma-purvaftl phalaftl tasmlin nocchinnaf!J napi śifvatrw.z.

Since a continuous series arises from thought and from the continuous

.series the uprising of\l fruit, the fruit that is preccded by action is neithcr

intcrrupted nor etemal.

MKV(P) p.313-314; MKV(V) p. 135.

The Sautrantika continues: Similarły, a though series (cilta-sam,fiina) cmerges

from a chought (cela.raf?). From that se.ries arises the fruit. Thus, without a

thought, the fruit does not come to be. The thought followed by a thoughtseries thus gives rise to the fruit. The fruit is thus preceded by a thought which

is its cause. & such, it is neither permaoent nor interrupted.

The causa! connection envisaged by the Sautriintikas abovc is simple

antecedence.248 THE P!ill.OSOPHY OPIBE MIDPLli w/.Y

11. DharmtHya iiidhanoplijiil/ ś11klii'1 karma-path'ii ritJSa,

phalt11?1 kiimagu'!il/ pańca dharmasya prety(I ceha ca.

The ten pure paths of action are the means of achieving good. The five

smnds ofsetlSC pleasutc represent the fruit ofgood, here as well as in the

next life.

MKV(P) p.314; MKV(V) p.136.

Following the causal pattern łaid down above, namely, antecedence, the

Sautrantika would explain the tenfold path of action (karma-patha) as beiog

initiated by volition (cetan'il) which puts it together (tatliiibhisa7?1skilra„al, A.kb

p.248). Volition WU$ becomes the karma, and the series ofaccions, bodily and

verbal (k'iiya-1iik), dctermined by that volition, becomes the vchicle of action"

(karma,,af ca pantliiinaf?, ibid.). The pure bodily and verłnl actioos would

then be the mcans by which good is achieved (dharmasy11 fiidhanop'iiyiif?). The

five strands ofpleasurc to be cnjoyed in a "heavenly" life (svarg11), cithcr herc or

in the next world, wouJd be the fruit ofthe goód voJition. This is the manncr in

which the Sauttantlkas otplained the Buddha1s notloo ofkarma and its effect.

12. Bahavai ca mahantaf ca daiiil; syur api ka/pana,

yady eia tena naiflai .fii kalpanatropapadyate.

If there were ro be such a thought, there would be many a gren error.

Therefore, sucha thought is not appropriate hece.

llf.](J/(P) p.316; llf.](J/(V) p.136

Nagarjuna is not impressed by such an explanatioo. He perceivcs many and

substantial errors in such conceprualizations. Hence he considers them to be inappcopriate.

Inada's translacion, once again, skips an cxtremdy important qualific.ation

made by Niigarjuna. "IfconcepruaJi.zations arc permittcd, there will arise many

as weU as great errors," (p.107). The implicarion woułd be that Nigarjuna rejccts all conc'Cptualizations. However, this is not the case. Niigatjuna is very specific

in bis reference when he says: e1a kalpa!Ui, "these concepcualizations," whereExAMINATION OF THE FRUIT OP ACI'ION 249

"these'' refers to the prcceding conceptualizations or explanations. Indeed, it is

for this rcason that Nagarjuna can turo.around and speak ofa more appropriate

thought or con~ptuaHzation in the next verse.

13. lmiif!' puna!?pravqk/yami kalpanaf!t yatra yojyate,

buddhail, pratyeka-buddhaiś ca fravakaiś canuvaf'T!ittlf!'.

Moreovcr, I shall expou.nd the following thougbt which is appropriate

a.nd which has bcen extolled by the Buddhas, the self-enlightened ones

' '

and the disciplcs.

MKV(P) p.317; MKV(V) p.13.

The preseot statement by Nagarjuna should.servc as an antidote to most of the

misunderstandings that have prevailed so far regarding his views about thought

and languagc. Nagarjuna is about to explain in no unclear terms a more appropriate thought or conceptualization (ka/pana}, a right thought (samyaksaf!'kalpa), a right view or perception (samyag-duft) relacing to karma and its

fruit (phala). It is one that is extolled not only by the Buddha, but also by his

disciples (fravaka) and the self-enlightened ones (pratyeka--buddha). IfNiigarjuna had recognized a linguistically transcendent ttuth or reality, he could not

have made the above statement.

14. Pattrat'(t yatha 'vlprar{iiśas tatha-r1111m iva karma ca,

ca1t1TT1idho dhatulai? sa prakrtya 'vyakt;taf ca sal,.

Li.kc an imperishable promissory note, so is debr as well as action. It is

fourfold in terms of rcalms and indeterminate in terms ofprimal nature.

Jrfl(V(P) p.317; jij}(l/(V) p.1)7

Herc, a.debt and karma are compared to an imperishable promissory note. The

metaphor is significant and needs to be carefully cicamined. It is used by

Nagarjuna to iłlustratc the doctrine of karma as described in one of the most250 THE PHII.OSOPHY OF THE MJDDLE WAY

popular and authoricative scacements in the Indian Buddhist craditioo. Two

centurics łater, Vasubandhu wrote a whole treatise - Karmasit/-

dhtprakara,_,a - attempting to explain this statement. Candrakirci quotes it

cwice in his commentary (pp.324,390). The fact that he does not quote iratthis

point, where it seems to be most relevant, indicates thac he was using it to

illuscrate a compłetely different point (sec bclow XVII.21). The staccment runs

thus: "Karmas do not pcrish cvcn after hundreds of millioos of aeons. Rcaching

the harmony of conditions and the appropriatc time, they producc conscqucnces for human beings."

The first statement, taken in isolation, will convey the impression that the

Buddhist theory of karma is detcrministic in an extreme sense. However, the second scatement provides sufficient qualificacions to take the dctcrminist sting

away. What seems co have compelled !nada to assume that herc, "With equal

force he condemns any idea of an indestructible continuing action (avipra„afakarma) which gives the sense of continuiry or transirion in man's cvcryday life

and.deeds" (Niigarjuna, p.104), is his failure to cvaluate thefirst statement in

the light of the qualifications provided in the second statement, In the prcsent

chapter Nagarjuna is simply expłaining the fust statement, i.e., "karmas do

not perish" (na pra,.,afyanfi karma'!t). His analysis, at this point, is confined to

it. He leavcs the second Statemeot to be exarruned in two ocher chaptcrs that

follow. After examiniog what an imperishable karma is, N:igarjuna wants to

keep any soul-theory out of the way, and this he docs with Chaptcr XVIIl. And

from thcrc, he immediately gets down to anałyse the conteots of the second

statemeot by compiłing two chapters: (i) Cbapter XIX on the "Examination of

Time" (Kii/a-pank.iii) and (ii) Chapter XX on the "Examination of Harmony"

(samagn-pankfii). As such, it would be inappropriate to come to any definite

concłusions regardiog the contents of this chapter uoril the three followiog

chapters arc carefully cxamined. However, Nagarjuna's statement at XVIIl.13

thar he "will state thi's moce appropriatc view" (imaf!l kalpanaf!J pravak.$yami

yatra yojyate), which he thcn attributes to the Buddhas, his disciples, and the

Pratyeka-buddhas would certainJy seem to indicatc chat he is presenring an acceptabJe view, tather than one that should be rejected.

Furthermore, having made such a strong statement indicacing chat he is

presentiog "this'' (imiitp) appropriate view, if Nagarjuna were to follow it up

with a theory that he is condemoing, one will need to think twice before considcring Nagarjuna to be a second Bucłdha.

To return to the metaphor of the prornissory notc (patra) that one signs when

borrowing money- this metaphor being Nagarjuna's owo - he is not speaking

of a permanent and eternal promissory note , but something that wilJ remain so

long as it is not redeemed. As long as a promissory noce is preserved, and u~css

one were to honor ooc's obligations, one will eveorualły, dcpeoding upon timeEXAMIN/\TION OF THli FRUIT OF ACTION 251

and cooditions, have to face the consequcnc;cs. The imperishability of the promissory note may aJso mean that even if th'c promissory note is descroyed there

is an obligation on onc's part to honor such an agreement.

If', in order to account for such an obligation, one wcre to assumc a substanda1 oature (prakrti = wabhava) in that act, Nagarjuna's reponse is chac sucb a

nacure is i.not determinate" or is "inexplicablc" (avyakr1a), an :11.nswer that the

Buddha himself gave when qucstioncd about metaphysical issues (sec Chapter

·XXVII).

Finally, in terms of the realms in which the consequences may be reaped.

such actions can be foutfold. Candarkini rcfers to the fourfold realms as (i) the

sphere of sensuality (kiimiivacara), (ii) the sphere of materiałity (rupivacara),

(iii) the sphere of the formless-{ariipavacara) , and (iv) the state of freedom or

absence of influxes (aniifrtWa).

15. Praha,,,10 na prr1heyo bhavana-heya eva va,

tauniid avipra11a1ena1ay111e kaf'lfJa1'ł1if!' phala'f!J.

That [i.e., the impcrisbablc karma] would not be relinquishcd by simplc

relinquishing. lt is to be relinquished on1y through cultivation. Thus,

through the imperishabłe ;arises the fruit of action.

16. Praha„ataf? praheyaf! ryat karmaf!af! sa1t1krame„a 11a,

yadi do1af! prasajyeraf!IJ tatra karma-1111dhiyal/.

If it is to be relinquisbed through simple relinquishing or througb the

transformation ofaction, thcn therc would follow a vańety oferrors soch

as the destructi0n of actions.

MKV(P) pp.319-320; MKV(V) p.137-138.

When spealcing ofimperishable karma, naturally the question can be raised as

to how it can be gottern rid of. Is it possible to nullify the effect, say. of a bad

karma by simply not doing it again (praha„aJo praheyo)? The theory ofprtipti

("attainment") and aprapti ("non-attairunent'') may impły such a sicuation.2)2 THE PHlLOSOPHY OFTHE MIODLE WAY

Preventing the momenwy sueam of life from appropriacing a bad karma

would mean the nulłification of the effects of aH previous karmas. Nigarjuna

perccivcs this to be a negatioo of the docuine of karma (leaf'fllll-11adha). He

therefore insists that the abandoning of the fruits of karma c.an be aclUeved , not

through simple abandonment, but through constant practice (bhiivanii), i.e.

constant performance or promotion of good accions and the constant avoidance

of cvil actións (cp. sabbapiipassa akargf!tlf'!Z kusfllassa upmampadii, D 2.49;

Dhp 183).

17. Saf'IJefiif'!Z vi/abhiiganiit?J sabhiginaf!Z ca kArma'fl'iif!Z,

pratUaf!ldhau sadhatiinii'?I ekA utpadyate tu saf?.

Of all thcse accions, whether dissimilar or similar, bclonging to certain

realms, only one would arise at the moment of birth [of a being].

MKV(P) p.321; MKV(V) p. 138.

Even though this statement of Nigacjuna is in perfect conformity with the

Buddha's owo explanation of the doctrine of karma, it may come as a surprise

to most Nigarjunian scholars, cspecially because it confliccs with most opinions

exp~d about Nigatjuna's philosophy. Herc is an cxplanation of rebirth (.punarbhavt1) cxamined in rełation to past karma. In the eyes ofmost scholars, Nagar·

juna could nevec make a statemeot Jike this. Herc, karma is presented a~ the

connecting link between two lives. lt is one of a myriad of karmas an individual may have petformed, whether they be similar or dissimilar. The face

chat only one (elea) among such actioos of a life-time may appear at the time of

the conception of a being (pratis'tl~ht) and which can influence the new lifeprocess is acknowledged by Nagarjuna. He could not have been unaware of the

statement. of the Buddha that consciousness (viflłfii11a which is inextricably

bound up with volitional karma) was a possible connecting link between two

lives (D.3.105; Chang 12.2 [Taitho L 77bJ) and also of the ernphasis placed by

his fellow Buddhists on the last thought of the dying person (culi-citta) as hav·

ing influence over a new life-process (pafisandhi-cilta, sec detailed discussion

at VbhA 155-160). Without falling back upon a mecaphysical theory of

moments, as some of the Abhidharma interpreters did, Nagacjuna is hece

recognizing the dependence of rebirth (pratisam,dht) oo at least one previous

karma. lt is a similar cecognition chat made the Buddh.a declare: "Beings have

karma as their own, karma as inheritance, karma as the source, karma as kin. IrExAMJNATION OP 'fHE FRuJT OF AcnoN 253

is karma that distinguishes human beings, for example, as inferior and

superior," (kammassa~a . .. satt'ii 'kammadiiy'iidii kammayonikammabandhu,

kammaf!' salte 11abhaj<1ti yatlidatrt hln.appańilllfiiya, M 3.203; Chung 44.1

[Tairho 1.704c]). Unfortunately, Buddhaghosa's explanation, though retaining

the i.deas expre~scd by the Buddha as well as Nigarjuna, is marreci by a thcory

of moments (see VbhA 156). Just as much as mcmory is bcing described by

most psychologistsas being "owned" .withouthavin~toassume its permanence,

bere we find a person's karma bcing perceived as something "owned'' by bim.

18. Karma~111? karman.o drrte dharma utpadyate tu .rab.,

d11i-prak'iirasya sarvasya 11ipakve pi ca tif/hati.

That [imperishable] arises in the present life, corresponcłing to all the actlons having dual natures [similat and dissimilar, good and bad, etc.] and

stays so even when matured.

MKV(P) p . 321.; MKV(V) p.138.

A further explo.-atioo ofthe Buddha's docuine ofkarma is continued bere. The

phrase Jute dharme is a sanskritizatio.n ofPali dt{tha dhamma, which itselfcan

be traced back co drrta-Janman, meaning "the present life." The fruitioning of

kanna .into good and bad consequences is admitted hece.

19. Phalll~11jalikrafft4d 11a sa marrJ'!ad va nirudhyate,

anafravatrt I tilra11aftt ca vibhagaf!' tatra lakrayet.

Tbat [imperishable} ceases as result of theintetruption ofthe fruit or as~

result of death. lierein, a clistinction betwcen one with influxes and the

one without inflm:es is to be signified.

MKV(P) p.322; MKV(V) p . L38.

The so-caJled imperishable action (avipraf!afa-karma) cao terminate as a result

oftwo 'evcnts: (i) the interruption of the fruit(phala-vyatikrama) , or ((ii) death254 TuE PHlLOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE 'iY/AY

of the individual. ln the case of the latter, it is necessary to remtmber what was

said at XVII.17, i.e., that all accioos performed during a lifetime are not continued. Only one of the myriads of actions performed can domioate the last

thought: moment ofa person. This wouJd mean that many other karmas, even

though all of them have not matured, may become nułlified at the time of

deat~.

20. ŚUnyata ca na cocched4// sa'!l-s'iiraf ca na śiiśvata'!I-,

karma'ło 'vipraTJaśaf ca dharmo buddhena defitaf?.

Emptiness, however, .is not annihilarion; life-pcocess is.also not eternal;

the imperisbability is of acrion-such is the doctrine taught by .he Buddha.

MKV(P) p ,322; MKV(V} 138.

Ifwhat is said before is an approptiate explaoation of karma, then Nagatjuna

can maintain that "emptiness!' (JUnyalii) does not mean "annihilatioo" (uccheda). At the same time he can maintain that the life-process (saf'!JJara) is not

a permaoent and etemal (fafvata) process. In such a context, an irnpcrishabłe

action (avipraf!aśa-karma) simply means the continuity of that life-process conditioned by kanna until some ofthese karmas bear ftu.it or ~e lost on the way,

while others łike the threads of a web can contioue to iilfluence the future lifeprocess. In any case, the eotire process is one of depeodence- dependence

upon a whole composfre of factors.

Nagatjuna has no hesitacion in attributing such a doctrine of karma and personal idenity to the Buddha himself artd praising it as the Buddha-wotd, even

though the atuibution ofsuch a doctrine co Nagarjuoa would be unacceptable

to some of the dassicaJ and modern foUowers of N""agarjuna himself.

21. Ki11'f!la notpadyate kasmiit nil{svabhavaf?t yai(lI tata!?,

yasmac ca tadanutpannaf!Z na tasmiid vipra„aśyati.EXAMIN.<\TION 01' THE FRUIT OF ACTION

Why does action not a.rise? Because it is without self-bature. Since it is

non-arisen, it docs not perish.

MKV(P) pp .323-324; MKV(Jl) p.139.

255

Havjng <:oncluded the- explanatioo of the more appropriate view.of karma as

advocated by the Buddha, Nigarjuna does not leave the discussioo without

taldng a look at the possible metaphysical interptetacions or any m.i.sunderstanding of th.is doctrine. He has already spoken of the arising (utpaa'a)·ofkar.nia at

the moment of rebirth (pratisaf!U/hi). That arising is understood iii ręlacion to

the principle of dependent arising (prafityasamutpada). ·The i.mperishability

(avipra'łfifa) is introduced in order to explain the continuity in the fruitioning

ofaction. It is not intended as a justification for the beliefin a permanent and

eternal substance (svabhava). However, some of the Buddhists did utilize a notion ofsubstance to account for the functioning of karma. It is this particular

notioa of substaace that is taken up for analysis.

If karma is "non-substantial" (nil/svabhava) in the way the Sautrantikas

understood it, i.e., without any perceivable cootinuity, but ooly as something

that is continually inter.rupted, then the arising of such karma cannot be explained. If arising cannot be accounted for in such a metaphysical way , neither

can cessation be admitted. Imperishability (avi'prar;afa), as explained by

Nigarjuna, becomes the only othet alternative.

UnfortunatĆly, Candrakrni, who favored a rather absolutistic interpretation

of Nigarjuna (sec comments on the Dedicatory Verses), utilizes the conception

ofinlpecishability in order to denyany form ofarising. It is because he had such

..an interpretation in mi'nd that he quotes the famous ve.rse elucidaciog karma at

this .point rather thao utilizing itwhen the i.mpecishabiliry was first meotioaed

by Nigatjuna at XVII.14. As has been shown alieady, Nagarjuna was n~t

critical ofany and every form of arising or ceasing. He was only rejecting the>

metaphysical ideas.

22. Karma svabhavataś cet sy?i« chaftlata'f(l syad a.ra'J'!Zśaya'f(l,

tJktttJT(l ca bhavet k.armt1 knyate nrz hi śiifvafaf?t.

lfit·is aSSwned that actio.o comes to be from self-nature, i-t certainly will256 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

be etccnal, and action would a1so be uncaused, for that which is crernal

is, indeed, not caused.

MKV(P) p.324; MKV(V) p.139.

If the arising of karma cannot be accounted for by following tbe Sautrantika

mcthod, can it be explained in terms of the Sarvastivada conception? Nagarjuna's answer is negative. He seems to know with great cenainty (asaf!Zfayao/,)

that the Sarvastivada solution docs not work. It implies permanence and as a

result karma would appear to be "un-done" or "uncreated" (akrta).

23. Akrliibhyiigama-bh11y11f!Z syat karmiikrtakaf!Z yadi,

abrahmacarya-11asai ~a do!as tatra prasajyate.

lfan action werc not pecformed [by the individual], then there woułd be

fcar ofbeing confronted by something not perfocmed [by him] . Anignoblc life as wcll as error would follow from this.

MKV(P) p.325; MKV(V) p. 140.

If actions were to be something noc performed, then a person would be

.baunted by the fear (bhay11) or anxiety that he bas no hand in the organization

of his own lifc-process. Fears and anxieties, according to Na~rjuna's view, arc

one's own creations. Deny one's owo rcsponsibility, one does not have to justify

a life of maral purifY (brahmacarya-vasa). This is a elear and uncquivocal assercion of personal res}»onsibility for onc's owo pufity and defilement.

24. Vyavahara virudhyante saroa eva na sa1?1fayal/,

puf}ya-papa-krlor naiva pravibh~gai ~ yujyate.

Uadbubtedly, all conventions would tben be contradictcd. The distinction benveen the_performance of merit and evil will aJso not be proper.

MKV(P) p.325 ; MKV(V) p.140.Ext.MINATION OF 'THE FR\JIT OF A cnoN 257

With the cejection of a life of morał purity resulting from the deoial ofhuman

responsibility for act~ons, all motał conventions like merit and demedt (pu„yapapa) would be reodered 1Peaningkss. lt is interescing to note thac Nagarjuna

is not referring to the good-bad (dharmt1-adhamz.a or kusala-akusala) distinc·

tion , for this łatter distincc~n is differctnt from the former in regard co ics value

as a convencion (11ya11ahar~). This is compacible with the Buddba's own explanation of 'karma. On 'pragmatic grounds, the Buddha recognized the

merit/ deme.cit distinction. ltwas helpful in leading theordinary people coward

accepting a morał life. However, the notions of merit and demerit coułd be

harmful in che long run. especiałly because it involves the idea of accumułation

of merit for the sake offuture enjoyment and pleasure. Funhermore 1 it is easily

assoc.iated with che notions of reward and punishment, a notion that the Buddha was not willing to relate to the doctrine of karma (see M 1.373; Chung 32. l

[Tairho l.628b]). As such, the Buddha insisted that a morally perfected person.

would ełiminatc: the desire to accumuJate merit or demerit (punna-papapaht11a, Dhp 39; samiliitiipaliiiya punnapiipaf!I, Sn 540). Yet, it does not mean

that suc~ a person also abandons the good/ bad (kusala-ak_usala) distinction

which is the very basis of merit and demerit. lod~ed , a morally perfect person is

expected to promote good, while eliminating evil or uomed.torious actioits (see

above XVU.l , 17). lt may be for this reason that even a łater Mahayana

philosophir like Dogen deemed it approprate to compile a whole treatise on

this subject.

25. · Tad vipakva-vipiikaf!I capunar~va 11ipak1yatt;

karma 11yavasthita1!J yasmiit tasmat s11abha11ika1'!J yadi.

If actio.n wc:re to be detcrminc:d, because it possesses self-oature, thcn a

matuńry that has maturcd will again maturc.

MKV(P) p.326; MKV(V) p.140.

If an action wc:re to take płace without being performed by someone

(akrtakaf!I), theo it will occur on its owo. It will possess ·its own oature

(s11abhii11a). Such a substantiaJ action will have its own consequences (111jiiik11)

inhereot in it. In that case_, what is being described as the fruitióning of kanna.,

namdy, a mar_iifestation ofits consequences, wouJd merely be a re-fruitiooing.258 THE PHILOSOPHY Ol'nfE MrooL.E WAY

This is the same sort of criticism that Nigarjuna made ofself-causation (st1atautpa1Jt) in Chapter I.

26. Karma klefiitmaka11J cedafl.J te ca kleśii na tall11ataf),

na cet te tat111atal/ klefiil/ karma sjiit 1att11atal; kathaf{'.

lf thls action is associatcd with defilements, these dc6.1emcnts, in tum,

arc not found in themśelves. lf deftlements arc not in themselvcs, .how

coułd there be an action in itself?

MKV(P) p.236; MKV(V) p.140.

The substantialist explanation of karma presented at XVII. 25 would lead to the

distinccion bctwcen karma and its quality or attribute. Qualities refcrred to as

dcfilements (kleśa), etc.. would be merdy incidental. A karma can then make

ddilement "ies owo" (kleiat11111ka) or it can be freed.from defilements (nil/-

kleśiluif. Such a subscantialisc perspective, as mentioned so often by ·Nagarjuna, would rendcr the defilements unreal (na tatt11atal/). cspecially because

thcy come and go, arise and pass away, and hence without self-oacure. Karma,

in sucha case would be substantial, and the acuibutes non-substancial. Nigarjuna, the empiricist, sees no way in which sucb a substancial karma, divorced

from the acuibutes, can be identified.

27. KaTYTlll klefas ca dehiinaf{' pratyayif? samudiihrtal?,

kamtti klem ca te Junya ya_di dehetu ka katha.

Action and dc61cmcnts arc specificd as the conditions of the [different)

bodies. Howcver, if these actions and defilemcnts arc empty, what could

be said about the bodies?

MKV.(P) p.327; MKV(V) p.141.

Herc Nigarjuna moves on to a rugher generality. Botb karma and defilements

_arc geoerally considered to be the conditions that decermine the iodividual. AsExAMINATION OF 1HE FRurr OF ACTION 2~9

such, karma and defilments become attributes ofthe personaJity (de/.a). In the

ptevious verse, Nigarjuna questioned the substantial reality of both karma and

defilmcots. lfthey arc cmpty ofsuch reality, what could be said about the per·

sooaJity itself?

28. A11idya-ni11r10 jantus tr111a-saf!J:fojanaf ca sal?,

sa bhoklii sa ca na kartur anyo na ca sa eva saf?.

A sentient being, beclouded by ignorance, ualso fettcred by craving. As

an experienccr, he is neither idcnticał With nor differentfrom the agent.

MKV(P) p .328; MKV(V) p.141.

The Buddha's discourse to Acela-Kassapa, the discoursc which served as the

fouodation for Nigarjuna1s treatment of "suffering" (Chapter Xll. Dukkhapanlqii), rejected the thcories ofself-causacion and exteroaJ causation of sufft.cing. Rejecting self-causation, the Buddha maintained: "Kassapa, co say that 'a

person acts and he himself expedences the consequences,' wbcre self-caused

suffering belongs to one.who has existed from the bcginning, implies etcrnalism" (so karali JO pafisaf(Jvediyaff ti kho KaJsapa adito salo sayaf(JRalafP

dukkhanti iii vadaf!J sassalaf!J elaf(I pareli, S 2.20; Tsa 12.20 [Taisho 2.86a]).

On the contrary, "To say thac 'one acts and another expcriences the conscqucoccs,' where the suffering causcd by another belongs to one who has been

afflicted with pain, implies annihilationism" (afllło karoli afllło

pafisaf!l.vediyaff ti .. . vedanabhitu'!'!fZSsa salo paraf(1kataf(1 dukkhanti iii

vada~ ucchedaf!# elQf(J pareti, ibid.). lt is interesting to note that in the former

case, the Buddha refers to the bclief in a bcing who existed from the bcginning

(adilo salo), an idea that is generally considercd both by the Buddha and by

Nigarjuna as contributing to a beliefin a permancnt entity (sec ChapterIX on

Piirv11-pank1ii).

In the present verse, Nigarjuna is faithfully following the Buddha'~ owo

argument to reject the identity as well as differeoce bctween a doer and an cxpcriencer. A person who believes either in ideotity or in difference is looked

upon a someone who is beclou'ded by ignorance (avidyii) and craving (trf'!ii).

29. NQ pratyaya-samutpannaf(J niipratyaya-samullhitaf!J,

aJti ymf!iiitl idaf!J k.armll tasm41 kartipi niisty aJał.260 T HE PHILOSOPHY Of THE MIDDLE W AY

Since this action does not exist as ańsen from a condition nor as issuing

forth from a non-condition, evco an agent does not exist.

MKV(P) p.328; MKV(V) p.141.

The causa! cxplanations of karma offcred by the metaphysidans, oamcly, selfcausation, cxternal causation, etc., or the ooo-causal cxplanations arc not accep~blc . If karma itscłf cannot be expłained in thls way. it would ·be futile to

attcmpt any such explanations of an agent of karma. Note the use of the term

i"'1fl.J (this) to ccfer to wma, similar to the use of the term efii at XVII.6, thus

spccifying the typc of explanation that is rcjected by hirn. Por this rcasoo, we

prefer to confine his cdticism only to the mctaphysical views mcntioned in the

verses immediateły preceding (XVII.21-28), lcaving the moce appropriate view

he mentioocd untouched. Tbis secms to be the only way in which one can

rccognize consistency in Nagarjuna's statements throughout this chapter.

30. Kllf1'/'la cen niisti karfii Cli llukll/ syi1 hlrmaja'f!' phalat?J,

maty 111ha phale bhokti kuta eva 'bh1111i1y11ti.

lfboth action and agent are non-existent, whett could therc be the fruit

boro of action? When there is no fruit, where can therc be an ex·

pericncu?

MKV(P) p.329; MKV(v,) p.141.

In the absence of either an aciton or an agent metaphysically coaccived, there

could be oo fruit or consequcoce boro ofsuch action (hlrmafat?J phala?!Z)· Herc

again, itis not a denial offruit or consequcnce born ofaction, but only of those

that arc bora ofsuch action as explained previously. If the (ruit or consequence

is not obtaiocd, its cxperiencer (bhoRfii) would also not be appropriate.

31. Y111ha nirmilt1ka'f!' 1'iistli nirmimlta rddhi-111mpadii

nirmito nirmifliitlinya?!Z sa ca nirmitakal/ punal/,EXAMINATION OF THI! FRUIT OF A cnoN

Just as a teacher, through psycho-kinetic power, were to create a figurc,

and tbis created figure were to create anothe.r, tbat in turn woułd be a

created.

32. Tathi nirmitakaral; karla yat karma taf kr:tam.,

Mlyalha nirmiteniinyo nirmito nirmitas tatha.

In the same way, an agent is like a crcated form and his action is łike'his

creation. lt is like the created form created by another who is cr~ted.

MKV(P) p.330; MKV(Vj p.142.

261

One metaphysical view lcads.to anothcr, that to a further mctaphysical view.

Such is the W1CAcling citdc. A metaphysical view is, indced fabricated by som~­

one. Yet the fact that sucha mctaphysical view turns 9ut to be empty does

not mean that the cxpcricncc dcpcnding upon which the metaphysical view

was formulated 0or the proccss of conception arc thcmselvcs non-existent. Expcriencc as well as concept arc availablc. ·Only that the conception is carricd

bcyond itS limits to assumc the existence of independent entities, .whcther they

be atman or svabhiiva. To understand the significancc of Nagarjuna's statement h~re it would be nc:cesary to cake a look at one of the rarc statemcnts of

the .Buddha recorded in the Siimańfiaphala-.ruttanta (D 1.76-77). In this

passage, which explains the fruit of redusesbip, the Buddha refcrs to two forms

ofknowledge a contemplacive could develop before he directs his a~tention to

the so-called higher forms of knowledge (abhififiii}. The first is dcscribed as

fu~M: · · .

With hiS mind thus sercne, made pute, translucent, cultured,

devoid of evłl, supple, ready to act, firm and imperturbable..he ap.

plies ·and bends down his mind to that knowledgc .and insight

whereby he gtasps the fact: "This body of mine has form, it.is built

up of the four clements, it springs from mother and father, is continually rencwed by so much ~oiled rice and .juicy foods, itS very

nature.is impcrmanence, it is subject·to erosioo, ab~asion, clissołution, and clisintegration; and therein lics this consciousoess of

mine, too, boun1d up„ on that it ąoes depeod.262 THE PHILOSOPHY OFTiłE MIDDLE WAY

This represenu the Buddha's expeńence and cooceptioo ofhis owo personality.

Having stated this, he i.mmediately proceeds to examine whether there is

aoytliing beyood this experience and cooceptioo. What he describes is no mote

than the funciton ofman(IS, the faculcy which is responsible for the formulacion

of the metaphysical ideas of self(atman) and substance (s11abha1111). The statement reads:

With his mind thuś serene, . .. firm and impercurbable, he applies and beods down his mind to the calling up ofa mental image.

He calls up from this body aoother body, having form, made of

mind (mano-maya), having all (his own body's) limbs and pans,

not deprived of any organ.

This is how manas becomes a sensus communis surveying the sensory fields of

other faculties (M 1.295) and maiotaining a feeling ofidentity, which then gets

· converte<ł to a permanent and eternal iitman. Could it not be póssible that

Nigarjuna was aware of the above statement of the Buddba? What could be

the 'differe.oce between the cteation ofa non-existeilt form thtough the power

of psychok.inesis and thć generation ofa belief in a permanent and eternal self

tbough the activities of manas? It seems that human beings, with fa:culties

through which they arc able to perceive and conceive, a.re not the objects of

Nigatjuna's critidsm. lt is only the manner in which perceptions and.conceptions arc formulated that is under criticism.

·33. Kiesa/; kaT'11'Ji11i deha.f ca karliiraf caphaliini ca,

gandhaf"lla-111Jgarakara mtJiici-.wapna--sa??Jnibhal;.

Defilements, actioos and bodies, agents as well as fruits, all these aie similar to

the cities of the gandharvas, arc comparable to mirages and dreams.

MKV(P) p.334; MKV(V) p.143.

The metaphors usecł at the end of Chapter VIl to illustrate the natutc of

m~tapłiysical theories pe~taining to arising, stasis, and ceasing, arc employed

here to elucidate the character of similarly conceived theories relating to

defilements, actions, personalities, agents, and conscquences. .CHAPTER

EIGHIEEN

Examination of Self

(Atma-par"ik.fa)

1. Alma skandhii yadi bhaved udaya-vyaya-bhiig bha11et,

skandhebhyo 'nyo yadi bhaved bhavedaskandha-lakfa'laf?.

Ifthe selfwcrc to be idcntical with theaggreptcs, itwill.pattakc ofupr:ising and ccasing. Ifit wcrc to be diffcrent from the aggrcptcs, it would

havc the charactcristics of the·non-aggreptcs.

MKV(P) p.341 ; MKV(fl? p. 145.

'

The conception of an individual self (atman) was previously cxamincd in a

varicty ofcontc:xts. The prcscnt anałysis was occasioned by a occd to cxplain the

lifc-process as cooditioned by human actions (karma), the subjcct mattcr ofthe

preccding cfuptcr. ·

The Buddha's analysis ofthe human personałity into five aggrcgates (paflcllkkhandha) was intended to show that underlyiog the empirie.al factors constituting the human pcrsooality there is oo pcrrnaneot and eteroal self. The

Buddha's view was that chcsc five factors servcd .as the basis for any conceptuałization of a self or soul. Hence thcy arc ałways referrcd to as aggregatcs of

grasping (upiidiinakkhandha).

Nagarjuna bcgios his investigatioo into the conception ofself by raising two

questions pertaining to the nature of the self, espccially in .its rcłatiooship to

the fivc aggrcgates. If the self and·thc aggrcgatcs werc identical, thcn the self

would havc to paru.kc of the characteristics of the aggregatcs. Thcsc latter bcing subjecc to arising and ccasing, the self cannot remain pcrmanent and etcrnal. On the contrary, if the self and the aggregates wece to be diffcrent, theo

the former could not have the $arrIC characteristics as the latter. Leaving the

argument at that, Nagarjuna is allowing the rcadcrs to come to thcir OWll conclusions.

So far Nagarjuna has not givcn any indication that he tecognizcs a spcciał intuicivc faculty througb which one can sec beyond the world of change and impcrmancnce. Indecd, all that be has admiucd points to his i:ccognition ofsense

263264 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE M IDDLE WAY

c:xpcrienccs as the foundation of human knowledge. The impcrmanent·aggregates constitute not only the human personality, but also its experiences. If

the self is considered to be different from the aggregates, Nagarjuna is herc implying that it is unknowable, not merely inconceivable, for it will not have any

of the characceristics of the aggregates chat are all that we know through sense

cxpcnencc.

2. Atmany 41ah·ciitniiyaf!l kuta e11a bha11i.fyati,

nirmamo nirahaf!lkaraf? samiidiitmiitmani·nayof?.

·Jn the abscnce ofa self, how can there be something tbat beJongs to the

self? From the appeasement of the modes ofself and self-hood, one abstains from acating the notions of "minc'' and "I."

MKV(P) p .34~-347; MJ(V(V) pp.147·148.

If a permancnt entity does not exist, one cannot assumc the existence of

anything that bdongs to ie. The deniaJ of a permancnt entity does not mean

that Nigarjuna is committed to a rejcction of self-awareocss or selfconsćiousncss . The rejcction of the lattec would undcrmine the very foundation

of his cpistemology. As mcntioned carlier (sec lll.17), Nagarjuna, following

the Buddha, recognized consciousness (and this includes sclf-awareness), not as

a pre·existent cogiJo, buc as part of the human personałity condicioncd by facrors such as the sense organs and the objects of perception. Sclf-awarcncss or

self.instinct can be pursued to its extremc limit. The result is che "construction

of a self' (ahaf!l + kara) , which eventualły leads to the belicf in permanence.

The other cxueme is the complete rejetton ofany form ofself·awareness, which

is tantarnount-to annihilation.

Without falling into these two exttemcs, Nigarjuna is herc prcsenting the

Buddha's owo "middle way" philosophy when he speaks of the appeasement

(f11ma), not the complere cradication, of the "self' (at.man) and ''whatever that

pertains to a self" (itmant)..This is pecfectly in accord with the "appeasement

of dispositions" (1ą~kiiropaiama), the "appea5ement of the object"

(drf11(t111yopaśama), ~nd the "appeasement of obsessions" (prapaficopafama),

discussed eatliec·(see commentary on V.8).

Through the appeasement of the self-instinct one eliminates the

met2physical nod ons of a self (atman), and through the appeasement of the

object (drtlłf'WJopaśam11) one is ablc to realize the non-substantiality ofE:JW.ł lNATlON OF SELF 26~

phenomcna and would not eling to them~ "ooe's own" ('iitmani). These

culminate in the absence of self1Shness (ni"'1'1ma) and the absence of egoism

(niraha'f(lkara). ·

The dual meaning of the term 11h11'f(l/dira isworth noting. Ah11f?Jkir11 (literaJly. "1-making") mcans both ego-centcredness and pride. )Vhile the term

aha'l.'kira has come to be so popula,r in ordinary languagc, it is interesting·to

note that oo such term is construcied with the pluraJ ofahaf!I, namely, maya'f(I,

as ""'Jllf!IUra ("we-making1') would have expressed an idea which is eq'ually

unacceptable to the Buddha and Nigarjuna, for they were not willing to

e~te th~ notion of oneself (aha'f!I) altągether in favor of an equ~lly

mc~physical notion of a "social self" , ·

3. Nirmamo nirahaf!luro yaś ca .ro 'Pi na 11idya1e1

·nirmama?'(J niraha'f(lk'iiraf!Z yal/ paśyati na paśyati.

Whosoever is free from selfisbness and egoism, he too is not evident.

Whoever perceivcs someone as lree from selfisbness and egoism, he too

does not eerceive.

MKV(P) p. 348; MKV(V) p. 148.

Nigarjuoa approvingly spoke of the appeasement of the ootioo of selfand th~

conscquent elimination of sełf1Shness and egoism. However, koowiog his contemporaries who were so prone to metaphysical speculacions, he was not willing

to rest satisfied with such a statement.

As a remind~r to those who have not achieved the "appeasement of the nocion of self," Nigjlrjuna pointS out' that someone who is assumed to havc got·

ten rid of egoism 'and pride is alsó not available. The constant attempt by the

metaphysicians to reify things, entities, persons, etc. was kept in mind by

Nigarjuna whenever he roakes any positive assertion.

.

4. Me.mety aham iti '-!Tt!e·bahirdhidhjiitmam e~a ca1

nirudhyata upadiinattz lat k!afiijjanmanal; R!ayal;.

Wben views pertuning to "mine" and "I" , whether they arc assodated266 THE PHllOSOPHY Of rnE MIDDLE WAY

with the interna!._or the exterml, have wancd, 'chen grasping comes to

cease. With the waning of that [grasping], there is wani.ag of birth.

MKV(P) p.349; MKV(V) p.149.

The usc of the iii formula as mama-iii and 11ham-ili in the prcscoc scatcment

makcs it sigoific:antly differcnt &om the founcr statcrncnt at XVlll.2. In the

former statement, Nigarjuna spoke of 111m11n (self) and 'iilm"iy11 (that which

bclongs to the self) and cmphasizcd the nccd ro appcasc such awar~ncss or f~eling. Iń the prescnt verse, he refers-to t1h11m ("I") and mt1ma ("mine") using the

iii-formula and insists upon thcir complete elimination. (.ł,r11jt1) . Thus, it is not

che fact of self~awarencss that causes problems for the human beings but the

theorizing bascd upon such sclf-awarencss. The cogito may thus ruro out to be

harmless, so long as it is considered to be a product of the sensory process (sec

m. 7), but ergo sum is what is dangerous, episcemoJogically as wcU as ethically.

When such thcorizing has waned (kf.i11e), t}?cn there is cessarion of gtasping

· (upadin11-nirodh11), which is frecdom whilc living. The cessation of grasping

cvcntually lcads to the waning of rebirth (j1111man11f? k,rayaf?).

5. Ka1"f1Ul-kle111--k1ayan mok,ra karma-kiera vikalpataf?,

te prapańcat prapałlcas tu filnyat'iiy'iif{i nirudhyate.

On the waning of dc6Jemen~ ofaction, therc is relcasc. Defilemcnts of

action bclong to one who discriminatcs, and thesc in turo result from

obsession. Obsession, in ics tuto, ccases within the context of emptiness.

MKV(P) pp.349-350; MKV(V) p.149.

The face that this statement of Nigatjuna immediately foUows his criticism of

theorizing relating to "mine" and "I," that is, speculation relatlng to subject

and object, becomes very valuable in deterroioing the meaning of the cerm

flWŃp11, a term that has caused much confusion and misunderst:anding.

Vikalpa can mean two differenc types of discriminatioo. One is the type of

discrimination made at the pheoomenaJ.levcl. lt is the discrimioation referred

to at XVIII.2, a discrimination that'is empiricaJły grounded, but which should

bekcpt under control (fama). The second ~ the type ofdiscrimi02tion made at

a mecaphysical Jevcl. lt is the discrimination referrcd to at XVIII.4, which hasExAMJNATION OF Sm.F 267

gone far beyond the cmpiricał levcl and thus become theorecicał or speculative.

For Nigarjuna, che defilements óf action foJłow from the łatter, not from the

former. It scems that this is the primary reasoo for his rcfcrence ro and criticism

of11ikalpa at XVIIl.5 rathcr than at XVIIl.3.

Wrong actions (mithya-karman111). i.e„ actions chat are defilcd, emanate

from wrong beliefs (milhy1i-dr1/I), which arc the results of wrong thoughts or

discriminations (mithya-sa~kalpa, mithjii 11ikalp11). Obsessions arc- the inevitable tesults of such wrong discr.iminations. When- such obsesśioos arc appcased, then a person does not get involved either in a ootioo ofa permanent

self or in a theory ofcomplete annihilacioo. The reałizacion that self-awareness

is dcpeodently arisen (IlL7) is a realization that it is empcy of a permanenc

subsrance (svabhava-iunya). This latter is the middle path that avoids eter·

nałism and annihilationism.

6. Atmety qpiprajflapitam an'iitmety (lpi deiita~,

buddhair niitrnii na caniitmii kaicid ity api deii.ta~.

The Buddha's havc malce known the conception of self and taught the

doctrine of no-self. At the same time, they have not spoken ofsomethiiig

as the self or as the non-self.

AfKV(P) p.355; MKV(V/ p.152

Ifthe distinctions made in XVIII.2 and 4 are not recognized, it is nacuraJ for the

interprecers of Nigarjuna to run into diffićułcies in explaining the contents of

tl:iis verse. Hece agin we have che use of the iti-formula, this time used with the

terms alman and anatman, as atma-iti and anatma-iti. However, the differeocc bctween the Buddha's specu łations and those of the metapbysicians in

this regard is thac the Buddha does not speculate on any enaty (kaicid) as

alman OC as anatman. In other words, he does not reify either atman or

anatman. Reifying atman one eods up in eternaJism; reifying anatman one is

led to annihiJationism. Withouc resorcing to such reificacion, the Buddha has

indicaced the meaning of atman.(atmetz'prajnapitaf!I) and has spoken of·the

implications ofanatman (aniitmeti deiita~) . Both atman and an1ilman are explained by the Buddha in terms of dependent arising (.prafityasamutpada).

This doctrine of dependent arising eliminates the need for posrulating either

permaoence or annihilation.268 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY

As such, the distinccion that Inada attempcs to make bctweenprajflapilaf!J as

"provisionally empłoyed" and defitarrz. as "instructed '' becomes untenabłe. 1f

" provisiona ł explanation" is to be achieved by the use of words, it r.ould not be

different from "instruction." Both need the use of language. Just as much as

the Buddha could instruct on the "true idea of anatfnlln," he could have instructed on the rrue idea of atman, without falling into mctaphysics in either

case. If che·use of the cmpirical terms can be ucilized in one case, thece is no

reasoo to assume any difficułcy in using them in the ocher. The problem then is

not with regard to language as such. but only in regard to the way in which it is

used.

7. Nivrttam abhidh'iita11yatp ni11(t1e ctlta-gocare,

anutpann'iiniruddh'ii hi nir11'iil!am iva dharmatii.

When the sphere of though łw ceased, that which is to be dcsignated aJso łw

ceased. Lilce freedom, the oature of things is non-arisen and non-ceased.

MKV(P) p.364; MKV(V) p.154.

"Whereof thought has ceased, thereof speech also has come to

cease."

Abhidhiilllllya meaos "that which is to be dcsignatcd." It rcfecs to the' Jb~Jd

ofobjects. lt ~ the same as abhidheya which, ifwe follow Nigarjuoa's roethod

of exposition, is mutuałły relatcd to abhidhana, "designation." Bot&

abhidheya and abhidhana would thus cease to be ałong w1th the ccssacioo of

the sphece of thought (citta-gocara).

"Wbeceof one canoot spea.k, thereof one must be silent."

lt is possible for the incerpreters of Nigatjuna to assume that herc is the idcotification of the "unspca.kabłe" with "cmptiness" (śUnyafii), generalły cefecred

to iq negative terms as "non-arisen, non-ceascd" (anutp(lnnaniruddha), which

is then identificd with both "true oature" (riharmat"ii) and frcedom ~nin.iii11a).

This is the easy route to the bełief in the so-całlcd "non-conccptuał" (nir·

vikalpa) ultiroate reality (paramiirtha, tallva).

Howcver, the fust lice ofNagarjuna's scatcment should prcvent anyone EromEXAM1NATION OP Sm..F 269

reaching such a conclusion. Nowhere has Nigarjuna asserted any form of

knowłedge that transcenps the six senscs. For him, what is perceivable is ałso

conceivable. He may, reflecting upon the conceptualization of the metaphysicians, admit that what is not perceivable is also conceivable. Yet, it woułd be

improper to assume that he will recognize the non-conceptual (11ir-11ikalpa) as

being perccivable. Conceptualiziog and concciving arc not two different activicies. Hence his statement: "When the realm of thought has ceased, that

which is to be dcsignated also has ceascd.„

As pointed out in the inuoduction, a similar statemcnt was made by the

Buddha in relation co a tathagata who has passed away, and the present context, in which the mctaphysical nocion of s~lf(atman) is discussed , is no more

differcnt from that in which the Buddha made that statement. ·

Sofar as Nigarjuna's analysis is concerned; it has become elear that his ncgations pcrtained primarily to metaphysics, whether it be the nocion of a pcrmanent and eternaJ self (atman) or a substance (wabhava). Along with the negation of a permanent anq eternaJ self, Nigarjuna also rcjected absolute

"otherness" (para-bhava). Existence and noo-existence, in ·this metaphysicaJ

sense , wece rcjccted by him. As pointed out in the analysis of the Dcdicatory

Verscs, the "non-arising" (anutpada) and "non-ceasing'' (anirodha) wcre intendcd as criticisms of ruch metaphysics. Ifone rccognizcs a substance, Nigarjuna would say it is non-ceasing: if one rocognizcs annihilation, Nagarjuna

would characterizc is as non-arising. In other words, ifabsolute arising and absolute ceasing wece to be acceptcd, thcsc would ncgate empirical arising and

ceasing whicb is the basis of "dependent arising" (pralityasamutpada). W hcn

both "the way of phcnomeoa" (dhtl1'mtzli1) and frccdom (nirva11a), which arc

expiaincd k terms of "dependent arising'' (pralityasamutjiida), arc referred to

as "non-arisen and non-ceasing", it is mor~ appropriatc to assume that herc

they arc to be distinguishcd from absolute arising and absołute ceasing. Arisiog

and ceasing in an absolutc sense represcot inappropriatc conceptualizations.

Neither che nature of phenomcna nor frccdom should be the subject of such

inappropliate conceptualizations.

8. Saf'l!atrz tathya1'(J na va tathyaf?'l tathya1'(J c/jtathyam eva ca,

nai11atathya1'(J naiva tathyam etad buddhanufiisanaf!J.

Evcrythi.ng is such, not such, both such and not such, and oeither such

.and not such: this is the Buddha's admonition.

MKV(P) p.369: MKV(~ p.157.270 THE PHllOSOl'HY OF 'Il-IE MIDDLE W.AY

On the basis of this statement, Inada, following his predecessors in the interpretation of Nigarjuna, rcachcd the conclusion that "truth is non-relationaJ,

non-descripti:ve, non-diffcrential. ... it is thatness or thusness," (p.113).

Refercing specifically to XVIlI.8, he says 'that herc "Nigarjunaintroduces the

famed Four-corncred Logic, , , . i.e„ the póssible conditions ofis, is not, both

is and is not, and ncither is nor is not, in order to exhibit the fact that fina!

truth uanscends all these possibilities; it is fUnyllt'ii per se" (ibid.)

Śo far, 0our analysis ofNagarjuna's statcmcntS has failed to reveaJ any form of

four-cornered logic that he uscd to establish an ultimate truth. Whenever he

ucilized it, he did só i.o order to rejcct metaphysicaJ assumpcions, rather than to

establish something or some theory.

Mter srating the fact that metaphysical views, especially those relating to a

tr1thagata after death, take us beyond the sphere. of thought

(citta-gocara)(XVUI. 7), Nagarjuna is here expanding the discussion to include

one of the most persistent problems ofmetaphysics, namcly, "everything" (sarVa'f!Z). lt is the problem that led the Sarvastivadins to uphold the view that